



Labour Market Insecurities of Young People and Family Formation – France and Germany Compared

Lisa Ahles, Ute Klammer & Michael Wiedemeyer

University of Duisburg-Essen

Final Report
September 2012

Work Package 3
Individual Pathways to Flexibility and Sustainability in Europe

Project participant number 9, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

Contact: Michael Wiedemeyer, phone +49 201 183 4459; michael.wiedemeyer@uni-due.de

Content

Introduction.....	5
1. Setting the Scene: European Labour Market Dynamics.....	7
2. Conceptual Considerations.....	13
2.1. On Uncertainty and Insecurity.....	13
2.2. Life Course Perspective: Transitions as Critical Stages.....	15
3. Institutional Aspects of Economic Uncertainty.....	18
3.1. Political Economy and Institutional Complementarities.....	20
3.1.1. Industrial Relations.....	22
3.1.2. Vocational Education and Training.....	23
3.2. Employment Protection.....	25
3.3. The Employment–Welfare State Nexus.....	27
4. Labour Market Uncertainties of Young People in Focus.....	33
4.1. Labour Market Participation.....	33
4.1.1. Activity Rates and Unemployment.....	33
4.1.2. Fixed-Term Employment.....	37
4.1.3. Temporary Agency Work.....	39
4.1.4. Part-time Employment.....	42
4.1.5. Low Income Work.....	47
4.2. Gender Aspects of Employment Insecurity.....	51
4.3. The Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis.....	54
4.4. The Role of Perceived Employment Uncertainty.....	57
5. Uncertainty and Family Formation.....	60
5.1 What is Puzzling about Family Patterns in France and Germany?.....	60
5.2 Employment Insecurity in Demographic Research.....	64
5.3 Fertility and Economic Recession.....	69
6. Conclusion.....	72
Bibliography.....	84

Figures

Fig. 1: Employment Rate, Men and Women, Aged 15-64, in %.....	8
Fig. 2: Unemployment in Europe, in %.....	9
Fig. 3: Unemployment of Young People, Aged 15-25, in %.....	10
Fig. 4: Aggregate Non-Standard Employment Rates in Europe, 1998 and 2008, in %	11
Fig. 5: The Life Course Perspective as a Frame of Reference	16
Fig. 6: Flexicurity Profiles of FR and DE	28
Fig. 7: Unemployment Rates by Age Group in Different European Countries, 2007, in %	35
Fig. 8: Share of Fixed-term Contracts in European Countries by Age Group, 2007, in %	37
Fig. 9: Temporary Agency Work, FR and DE Compared, FTE in 1000	40
Fig. 10: Part-Time Employment in FR and DE, in %.....	45
Fig. 11: Share of Low Wage Workers in DE by Age 2010, in %	47
Fig. 12: Fertility Trends in FR and DE 1950-2010	60
Fig. 13: Completed Fertility by Cohort: DE and FR Compared.....	61
Fig. 14: Average Age of Mothers at Birth in Different European Countries 2000 and 2008....	62

Tables

Tab. 1: Varieties of Capitalism	21
Tab. 2: Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation.....	26
Tab. 3: Non-standard Employment and Social Insurance Systems.....	31
Tab. 4: Activity Rates of Young Women and Men, Aged 25-29, by Level of Qualification, 2007, in %	34
Tab. 5: Long-Term Unemployment by Age, in %	36
Tab. 6: Main Reason for Part-Time Work Among Women Aged 15-39, 2007, in %	44
Tab. 7: Average Number of Children per Woman (1960 birth cohort), FR and DE, in %.....	63
Tab. 8: Childlessness in DE by Level of Qualification (ISCED 97), in %.....	64
Tab. 9: Theoretical Concepts of Fertility Decisions.....	65
Tab. 10: Demographic Research Related to Employment Insecurity	66
Tab. 11: Differences in Fertility Trends and Family Formation between FR and DE	73

Abbreviations

ALMP	Active labour market policy
AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BGB	Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code)
BIBB	Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (German Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training)
BMFSFJ	Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren Frauen und Jugend (German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth)
CEDEFOP	European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
CEO	Chief executive officer
DE	Germany
DE-E	East Germany
DESTATIS	Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (German Federal Statistical Office)
DE-W	West Germany
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Confederation of Trade Unions)
DK	Denmark
EES	European Employment Strategy
EL	Greece
EPL	Employment protection legislation
ES	Spain
EU	European Union
EU-LFS	European Union Labour Force Survey
EUROSTAT	Statistical Office of the European Union
FI	Finland
FR	France
FTE	Full time equivalents
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGS	Generation and Gender Survey
GSOEP	German Socio-Economic Panel
IE	Ireland
ILO	International Labour Organization
INED	Institut National d'Études Démographiques (French National Institute of Population studies)

INSEE	Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies)
IT	Italy
LLL	Lifelong learning
LU	Luxembourg
NL	Netherlands
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PT	Portugal
RSA	Revenu de Solidarité Active
RTE	Restrictions on temporary employment
SE	Sweden
SMIC	Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance
TAW	Temporary agency work
UB	Unemployment benefits
UK	United Kingdom

Introduction

European labour markets have been characterised by increasing flexibility of workplaces as well as of individual working lives. While employment relations characterised by full-time work on a permanent basis are on the decline, new forms of employment have gained in importance. These dynamics have initiated scientific as well as political discussions under the heading of precarity.¹

Increasing flexibility of labour markets has turned out to be especially challenging for social insurance based systems. As social security is mainly contribution-financed, financial sustainability depends on relatively stable employment biographies, while entitlements are linked to employment status over the life course. In addition to high (long-term) unemployment, the rise in precarious forms of employment poses major challenges to individual social security and overall sustainability. Young people in transition from education to work and those desiring to re-enter the labour market have been hit hardest by the overall dynamic, although gender and skills play a crucial role. While nonstandard employment is not necessarily involuntary and often a stepping-stone into permanent contracts, related insecurities and uncertainties affect status passages and life course decisions.

“Rush-hour” (Klammer 2010, p. 155), “peak of life” (Plantenga 2005) or “sandwich stage” (Schulz-Nieswandt 2006a) are terms used to point out the various developmental tasks of early to prime-age life stages: key decisions about career and family life are taken in a relatively short time span, while the consequences for subsequent life trajectories are long lasting. Life course decisions are expected to be dependent on individual preferences as well as personal and contextual resources. Taking a life course oriented perspective, the research is focused on interaction effects between institutions and life course transitions.

Many European societies are quite clearly confronted with low or declining fertility rates. A common understanding is that young people nowadays are more reluctant to form a family because of the increased economic and labour market uncertainties they face. Empirical clarification of this thesis proves (to be) difficult, however. A comparative look at France and Germany, both major member states of the European Union (EU), promises to reveal further insights into this issue: being historically rooted in the same Bismarckian tradition of social insurance, both countries show clear similarities as far as increasing labour market risks and

¹ See for example Barbier (2011); Castel/Dörre (2009); Frade/Darmon/Laparra (2004).

uncertainties of younger cohorts are concerned, but crucial differences in family formation and fertility patterns. The divergent patterns pose an interesting puzzle: compared to older cohorts, parenthood has increasingly been postponed in both countries, but whereas the French fertility rate is one of the highest in Europe, Germany is at the very low end of the scale. While demographic research into the determinants of birth rates and timing has flourished in the discussion of sustainable social security, comparative policy analysis in this area is biased towards family policy. Yet the socioeconomic situation of families is not only influenced by policies labelled as family related, but by a whole set of interacting institutions, particularly those related to the labour market.

The analysis focuses on two main research questions:

- What are the institutional aspects of the labour market insecurities and uncertainties facing young people in Germany and France? And are there substantial differences in job/employment insecurities between these countries?
- What are the implications of labour market uncertainties among young people on family formation? And do they contribute to explaining the divergent fertility patterns in France and Germany?

The following chapter provides an overview of European labour market dynamics with a special focus on Germany and France. Chapter two refers to theoretical and conceptual considerations concerning insecurity and uncertainty over the life course. Subsequently, dimensions of job and employment insecurity and uncertainty are analysed in the respective institutional context. Chapter five relates labour market issues to fertility decisions. The final chapter brings the different strands together to analyse interactions between employment and family sphere and the role of social policy. The conclusion summarises the main outcomes and reveals policy recommendations and research perspectives.

1. Setting the Scene: European Labour Market Dynamics

For the EU, the years from 2010 up to now (summer 2012) are of particular importance for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the expiration of the Lisbon Strategy in June 2010 marked the beginning of a review process of the results of the European Employment Strategy (EES) (Weishaupt/Lack 2011) and the launch of the new Europe 2020 Strategy. On the other, these were the first post-recession years to follow the banking and financial crisis of 2008/2009. While the majority of the European economies that had been adversely affected by the economic crisis embarked on a more stable economic course, this period is also characterised by the tightening of the euro and debt crisis that is still ongoing today. This succession of crises has thrown many euro states and the EU as a whole into economic and political turmoil, the development and consequences of which cannot be foreseen at this stage.

The following graphs illustrate some central dynamics within the European labour markets. The main focus is on the specific situation of France and Germany as European core countries. The United Kingdom and Denmark are also included. Both states are of relevance because of their role within the context of European employment policy. As an exponent of the liberal welfare state model, the United Kingdom was early in implementing (1998-2000) its activation strategy under the label "New Deal – Welfare to Work" and has therefore served as an example and forerunner in the European context.² For many years, Denmark (together with the Netherlands), by contrast, had been considered an exemplary application of a strategy of flexicurity, which was expected to be sustainable (Dingeldey 2011).


In Lisbon 2000, for the first time ever within the EU, concrete employment figures were established as "hard targets" and exact numerical values for the EES.³ Although steps in that direction could indeed be observed in most states of the EU, in retrospect it must be said that the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy have not been achieved.⁴ Concerning the overall

² See the so called Schröder-Blair declaration Schröder/Blair (1999).

³ An overall European employment rate of 70 % and an employment rate for women of more than 60 % should be reached by 2010; a 50 % employment target for older workers aged 55-64 was introduced in 2001.

⁴ The EES is of particular importance with respect to the ambitiously propagated objective of the Lisbon Strategy to turn the EU into "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion", Council of the European Union (2000).

employment rate, the target of 70% has been missed clearly (not least as a consequence of the EU-wide economic crisis, see Figure 1).⁵




While the economic crisis meant a sudden end to employment expansion within the EU, it is worth bearing in mind the divergent labour market performance of the Member States before the crisis. The heterogeneous picture remains in the post-crisis period. Nevertheless, some interesting aspects have become apparent: “(...)while the labour market experience of countries in the crisis varies strongly, the countries that are managing best are, in many cases, not those that had been the champions in terms of employment and unemployment outcomes over the first eight years of the Lisbon Strategy. This again calls into question simple and unequivocal impacts of labour market institutions such as ALMPs [active labour market policies], unemployment benefits or EPL [employment protection legislation].” (Leschke 2011, p. 163, amended by the author). Whereas Germany – for many years regarded as the problem child – has suddenly advanced to a “best-practice example” and is praised for its adjustments regarding internal flexibility measures, countries like Denmark and the United Kingdom are criticised because of their orientation towards external flexibility. Especially in the case of Denmark, which has seen one of the highest rises in unemployment, this aspect

⁵ The development concerning the quota of older workers as well as female employment has been more favourable (the actual rates have converged to the targets of 2010). This must be seen in the light of the fact that most of the last decade’s employment gains have been achieved in non-standard employment.

raises questions about the long-term sustainability of the national flexicurity model (Leschke 2011). France showed a rising employment rate until 2008, even though it has only been changing slightly since 2003. On the other hand, it is fair to say, however, that the economic crisis has only led to a marginal decline.

The economic recession in 2008/09 has led to a significant EU-wide rise in unemployment figures (see Figure 2).



Whereas unemployment had been on a decline within the EU and most of the Member States since 2005, there was a distinct reversal of this trend in 2008. In 2010/11, the overall EU unemployment rate remained at a stable but substantially higher level than before the crisis. In 2012, unemployment is continuing to grow.

In this regard Germany proves an exception, with remarkable fluctuations in its labour market over the last ten years. At first, there was a notable increase in unemployment to 11%, well above the EU average, in 2005. This had essentially been caused by the reforms of German labour market policies aiming at activation (so called “Hartz legislation”) and administrative changes concerning the registration of unemployment. In the recent past, however, the German labour market situation has been marked by an anti-cyclical trend compared with the development of other EU labour markets, which was only briefly interrupted by the

banking and economic crisis. In 2011, the unemployment rate in Germany was at its lowest since German reunification.⁶

Compared to Germany, French labour market development has been less spectacular. Since the 1990s, it has reflected the general trend of overall EU development. While unemployment in France was lower than in Germany during the first half of the last decade, it has risen since the crisis, although to a lesser extent than in other EU states.

Looking at the labour market situation of younger workers is illuminating. It is not by chance that particular attention is paid to this group within the labour markets of many Member States as well as within the framework of the European employment guidelines. It is well known that the situation of labour market newcomers has been difficult in many countries, even before the crisis. Structural changes in the employment system have caused the careers of younger people to be disproportionately characterised by non-standard and precarious forms of employment (see Chapter 4). The unemployment rate among this age group is well above the national average in most countries.





Figure 3 shows the EU-wide increase as a consequence of the economic crisis. Although the most dramatic cases within the EU are not listed in the chart (namely countries with a se-

⁶ Reasons cannot be analysed in depth here; it is an interaction of a series of factors. Alongside economic and labour market causes, the increasingly precarious labour market as well as demographic trends have been decisive (see Chapter 4.3).

verely strained labour market situation for younger workers, such as Spain or Greece), the development of the countries shown here – with the exception of Germany – points in the same direction (Brenke 2012), with France being one of the countries with a considerably high rate of youth unemployment.

The expansion of employment in the context of the EES has been outlined. A look at the driving forces behind this development shows that the higher labour force participation has primarily been caused by the rise of non-standard employment. Figure 4 shows that this is – with exception of certain Central and Eastern European states – an EU-wide phenomenon. In France and Germany, atypical forms of employment have been on the rise for many years – in Germany, which is now at the forefront within Europe, they are even more pronounced than in France.



The growth of the total employment rate in most EU Member States can be explained by the increase in female labour force participation, which is in turn reflected in the growth of non-

standard employment.⁷ The results of more detailed analysis, showing that the increase in atypical employment and its expansive effect on the overall employment level are mainly based on part-time work, seem to be plausible.⁸ All in all, it becomes apparent that the intention of the EES to raise the employment levels within the Member States has been realised to a large extent by the expansion of non-standard employment.

⁷ However, labour force participation varies according to the level of qualification: women with a low level of formal education are underrepresented; but if they are gainfully employed, they work disproportionately often in precarious segments of the labour market.

⁸ For more details see Schmid (2011a).

2. Conceptual Considerations

2.1. On Uncertainty and Insecurity

The discussion of new uncertainties and precarities in European welfare states has picked up within the last two decades.⁹ Karl Polanyi's (2010 [1944]) classical thesis, that the extension of free markets is attended by a countermovement and fencing commercialisation by regulating social consequences in order to stabilize society, seems – in the light of the global entanglement of financial markets – to be an increasingly challenging prospect (Crouch 2011b). But what is meant by the term uncertainty? As our research refers to the question of how uncertainty influences life course decisions, we are referring to individual uncertainty, leaving organisational and legal uncertainty and uncertainty of law aside.

Uncertainty must be differentiated from insecurity. While insecurity is closely linked to risk, uncertainty refers to the lack of knowledge about future events and the resources required to cope. According to Crouch (2011a, p. 9), uncertainty is defined as the "(...) inability to feel or objectively to be confident that one's situation at time t1 will be at least as satisfactory as it is at time t0." In this perspective, insecurity is constitutive for uncertainty. It is defined as insecurity in combination with a lack of knowledge. Crouch makes it explicit that the definition excludes subjective or objective improvement of one's situation (Crouch 2010, p. 1).¹⁰

As far as risk is concerned, probabilities can be calculated and costs can be pooled according to the following characteristics: risks are involuntary and unpredictable (external) events (Arrow 1963, p. 945), which is the basis of the insurance principle. Uncertainty is a broader concept. Unless situations of uncertainty include one or more risks, the central characteristic is a considerable lack of information.

Uncertainty is a constant of human existence¹¹, and contingency is a central challenge for the subject to cope with. It is not only an objective category, but does have a substantial subjective dimension:¹² individual uncertainty is dependent on personal perceptions, which

⁹ See among others Castel/Dörre (2009).

¹⁰ For a discussion of uncertainty as an information problem in the economic context see Arrow (1963, p. 946) and Knight (1921). The definition is based on the implicit assumption that less uncertainty is linked to greater well-being. Moreover, the subjective or objective improvement of the situation in t+1 is excluded, with Crouch (2011a, p. 9) arguing that such a situation is unproblematic.

¹¹ The precondition of certainty is an immutable world (Kaufmann 2003, p. 80).

¹² Nevertheless, the perception of uncertainty is not necessarily negative.

are based on individual and collective expectations about future developments (1) and the confidence of being able to influence them (2), this makes it an intertemporal (1) and relational (2) category. It is intertemporal in the way that it refers to the future, from the present situation and (personal) viewpoint.¹³ Its relational character refers to the unequal distribution of uncertainty within society: it is expected to be dependent on opportunity structures and access to resources.

Insecurity as threat to life and limb was part of the European societies until the middle of the 20th century. In terms of conceptional history, it was the beginning of the 20th century when the idea of certainty was replaced by the objective of security (Kaufmann 1987, p. 38). As Dewey put it: "Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security" (Dewey 1929, p. 4 as cited by Kaufmann 2003, p. 80). In European welfare states, security works as a substitute for certainty¹⁴, allowing a certain degree of personal freedom under the umbrella of social protection.

A deeper analysis of the meaning of uncertainty and insecurity and their interaction needs to be set aside here. For capitalist western societies, it can be said that while security of existence has become possible for major parts of society, the consciousness of the finitude of life in relation to the uncertainty of a contingent world has become a central challenge of human existence. Moreover, increasing uncertainties are expected as a consequence of three dynamics:

- 1) Decreasing importance of national borders: economic openness and globalisation go hand in hand with transformation processes in the social security systems. In line with an expanding role of activation policies, individual responsibility rises.¹⁵
- 2) Decreasing importance of borders between different domains of life (i.e. blurring boundaries between work and private sphere): assuming social norms as focal points of "good life", individual pressure and uncertainty increase as norms and social roles become less binding. Individual self-optimisation and the increasing risk of (individuals) being overwhelmed by personal developmental tasks are expected consequences.¹⁶

¹³ It is, in fact, often neglected.

¹⁴ See Crouch (2010, p. 2) for internal discussion.

¹⁵ Social rights as part of the solidarity principle have been especially challenged in continental welfare states due to their impact on indirect labour costs (Palier 2010b; Blossfeld/Mills 2010).

¹⁶ Schier/Jurczyk/Szymenderski (2011); Ehrenberg (2008; 2011).

- 3) Increasing consciousness of the finiteness of natural resources. This refers to the threat of losing access to natural resources as public goods (Crouch 2011a, p. 9).

With regard to the present research context, the argument is that the decision to have (another) child is taken under increasingly uncertain circumstances, which are institutionally filtered and culturally framed.

2.2. Life Course Perspective: Transitions as Critical Stages

The study takes up a life course oriented perspective. Playing an important role in political and scientific debate on the links between labour markets and social security issues since the 1960s¹⁷, the approach has regained importance in the context of changing lifetime and gender patterns, as well as demographic change (Klammer 2004, p. 284).

The central idea is that individual development and change are not only characteristics of childhood and youth, but integral parts of the entire life course. Life course transitions are characterised by changing resources, requirements and roles as sets of social expectations.¹⁸ From this viewpoint, status passages, central transitions over the life course, are seen as ambiguous and critical events, leading to an unknown future and linked to uncertainty. Nevertheless, transitions may be the result of individual choice as well as of contextual conditions like cultural norms, social infrastructure, risks or environmental factors. Political institutions influence resource distribution and opportunity structures over the life course and thereby impact the conduct of life among individuals and social groups (Schulz-Nieswandt 2006b, pp. 77-82).¹⁹

The life course perspective does not focus on a certain event in life, but analyses how institutions frame transitions and structure life circumstances of different social groups by integrating different phases and trajectories. In this context we refer to a broad definition of institutions, including not only formal but also informal sets of rules-in-use as well as social norms. Classic examples of transitions as developmental tasks in western societies are the transition to school, the transition to adulthood, entry into the labour market, family formation and


¹⁷ See i.e. Weisser (1978).

¹⁸ This aspect refers to Dahrendorf's "homo sociologicus".

¹⁹ The individual life situation is not merely an empirical factor, but a category for understanding the procedural character of social structures. Starting from the self-concept, it is the key category for understanding the modalities of socialisation and personal individuation (Schulz-Nieswandt 2003, p. 132).

parenthood, career development, the empty-nest phase when children have left home, retirement, dependency and care needs (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: The Life Course Perspective as a Frame of Reference



Source: BMFSFJ (2011, p. 41).

The frequency of transitions over the life course has increased in modern societies. Institutionalisation (Kohli 1994) and standardisation²⁰ of the life course (Konietzka 2010), referring to the phenomenon of a relatively homogeneous chronological order of successive life stages²¹ have been replaced by increasing pluralisation of life course trajectories.²² The dynamics of pluralisation have mainly been discussed in the context of individualisation (Beck 1986), concluding that social norms have become less binding: liberal societies provide wider and more diverse options to realise personal life plans, and transitions will be welcome if improvement of the personal situation is expected. At the same time, transitions are related to social costs and uncertainties. Pervasive changes in personal life are associated with proc-

²⁰ While standardisation describes the empirical phenomenon of age synchronous life course sequences, institutionalisation refers to its regulative and normative foundation (Konietzka 2010).

²¹ Unless this refers to a relatively short period at the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s, which was especially related to the trias of male life courses: education, employment, retirement (Simonson/Romeu Gordo/Kelle 2011, p. 4).

²² Increasing divorce and re-marriage rates or the incidence of so-called patchwork or multilocal families are empirical indicators.

esses of reorganisation and adjustment: dealing with new social roles, different resource requirements and changing self-perceptions may prove challenging.

Individual flexibility and de-standardisation of life-phases may cause coordination problems in the household context (linked lives): alongside the open economies' demand for a flexible labour force, changing and more diverse family patterns require increased adaptability in private life.

In spite of pluralisation and deep-seated changes, role expectations and transitions over the life course are culturally framed. In western societies, becoming an adult is empirically linked to central transitions (Shanahan 2000): finishing school and education, entering full-time employment, leaving the parental home and living with a partner are markers of the status passage into adulthood and seen as central preconditions for starting a family (Settersten 2007; Chanvriil et al. 2009).²³

While the increasing variability of these transitions indicates generally less predictability and rising uncertainty, pathways to adulthood are embedded in national institutional settings.²⁴ Historically rooted, political and cultural institutions²⁵ work as filters, channeling the distribution of uncertainty between social groups and influencing how decisions are taken under (relative) uncertainty.²⁶

Uncertainties and insecurities are assumed to be institutionally filtered and socially structured. Life course decisions like family formation can therefore be expected to depend on the level of uncertainty, while this dependency is expected to have a temporal effect (referring to the timing of life course decisions) as well as a qualitative dimension (referring to preferences).

²³ It is one of the very robust findings of demographic research that there is a strong link between transitions to adulthood and the readiness to become parents.

²⁴ Such institutions are framed by social norms and historical pathways themselves.

²⁵ See Barbier (2010, p. 1) for a detailed discussion.

²⁶ See Blossfeld/Mills (2010, p. 41); Blossfeld/Hofäcker/Bertolini (2011).

3. Institutional Aspects of Economic Uncertainty

Assessing the challenges of economic uncertainty and insecurity in modern societies and individual life courses is the umbrella under which the research of the project GUSTO is taking place. The present analysis focuses on interdependencies between individual and collective aspects of uncertainty in relation to labour market and family decisions. We refer to institutions as filters framing decisions under uncertainty, while individual life course decisions are assumed to be interrelated (linked lives) (Heinz 2003, p. 197). Employment histories, career and family decisions are embedded in family relations and household context in other words interdependent living conditions.

In a first step, dimensions of labour market and economic uncertainty are approached to consider the role of institutions in this context.

Laparra (2004, p. 14) identifies the following dimensions of economic uncertainty²⁷:

- the risk of instability and insecurity of the employment trajectory/career prospects;
- the risk of earning low pay and low income;
- the risk of being exposed to a detrimental work environment and organisation;
- the risk of having bad or second hand social protection.

Crouch (2011a, p. 9) adds the following broader aspects of uncertainty:

- Changes in collective or environmental circumstances that result in a major decline in the predictability of daily life.
- Loss of access to collective goods, whether through policy change, deterioration in general economic conditions or deterioration in environment.
- Changes in rules or procedures that confuse expectations of how institutions affecting one's livelihood will operate.

In capitalist societies, in which gainful employment plays a key role, economic insecurity and uncertainty is linked to the access and quality of work (employment quality).

Newcomers to the labour market are especially exposed to uncertainties, as the process of becoming an adult can be linked to numerous transitions – which by nature tend to be linked to uncertainty – and far-reaching life course decisions. Their employment situation is more

²⁷ According to the discussion and in relation to the definition of uncertainty given in Chapter 2.1, these aspects rather refer to insecurity than to uncertainty, however.

fragile due to their lack of experience and seniority. And, as a consequence, the labour market situation of the young is – positively as well as negatively – more volatile in relation to the business cycle (OECD 2009, p. 60). Higher levels of uncertainty for this age group are therefore expected.

Institutional factors play a key role in channelling young people's labour market trajectories as well as in structuring inequalities. Depending on the structure of vocational education and training, industrial relations, labour market regulation and social security institutions, transitions can be expected to be more or less turbulent, while pathways into the labour market might differ in the level of standardisation, up- and downward mobility and flexibility.

Nonstandard employment periods are in this context usually seen as a short-term experience, a prolonged probation period at the start of working life, in order to gain work experience (Kroos 2008). But increasing economic openness and uncertainty as a result of the global economy demand enhanced flexibility in the labour market. The overall share of non-standard employment is rising, becoming a long-lasting experience for some groups. Resources to cope with the subsequent uncertainties depend on social factors, meaning that social inequality is expected to rise in those settings.

Nonstandard forms of employment play a special role in countries in which employment protection for standard employment is relatively high, in other words, where firing is costly. Divergent labour market regulation for temporary jobs allows employers to bypass security standards and pass on economic uncertainty (about future demand) to the employee.²⁸

With regard to life course decisions and transitional stages, labour market uncertainty as a consequence of employment insecurities is expected to postpone far-reaching life course decisions such as marriage and family formation. In the following, the overall institutional setting is analysed within the German-French context in order to provide an analytical basis for the assessment of labour market uncertainties among young workers in these countries. Particular aspects of the labour market uncertainty of young employees in different segments will be discussed more specifically thereafter.

²⁸ See Wilthagen/Tros (2004, p. 171) for a categorisation of forms of flexibility and security.

3.1. Political Economy and Institutional Complementarities

Economic action in general and labour market dynamics in particular are embedded in the socio-political setting. While institutions are assumed to structure and filter economic uncertainties, they do not do so in an isolated way. Institutional interaction, namely information and coordination mechanisms, play an important role as well. That means that the understanding of institutions (formal and informal) is a relational one. In order to get a deeper insight into the political economy and the relevant coordination mechanisms of German and French capitalism, the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach (Hall/Soskice 2001) provides a useful analytical tool.

The basic question is how institutional arrangements affect economic action. The approach is based on the assumption that particular coordination mechanisms in one sphere of the economy might support complementary practices in others (Hall/Soskice 2001, p. 18).

Taking firms’ access to finance as a starting point, Hall and Soskice (2001) show that coordination and bargaining systems are embedded in the wider context of the political economy. They distinguish two ideal types: while liberal market economies are mainly coordinated by competitive market mechanisms, coordinated market economies rely more heavily on strategic interaction with other institutions. Due to institutional complementarities, good economic performance can be expected for both coordination models (Pontusson 2005, p. 169).²⁹ However, institutional arrangements do not necessarily build a coherent and consistent regime, but are the result of historical developments and framed by class coalitions and power resources. Thus, besides complementarities, mutual deadlock of institutions could also be considered.

Generating ideal types, as the Varieties of Capitalism approach does, bears the risk of blurring important differences and particularities of institutional interaction. While Germany is the prime example of a coordinated market economy, the case is less clear as far as France is concerned. Due to the special role of the state in the French political economy, it cannot be fully assigned to the liberal-coordinated dichotomy. Schmidt (2003) argues for the integration of a third coordination model, namely “state capitalism” to emphasise the special role

²⁹ Coordinated market economies are: Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Austria. Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland are usually identified as liberal market economies. The results for France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey are rather mixed (Hall/Soskice 2001, pp. 19-20).

the state plays within the coordination of the French economy. The analysis refers to this understanding. Table 1 summarises the main features of German and French capitalism, taking Great Britain as a point of reference.

Table 1: Varieties of Capitalism			
	Liberal	State-enhanced	Coordinated
Reference case	Britain	France	Germany
Corporate governance	Accounting and auditing; shareholder value; radical innovation	Vertically integrated system; intermediate position concerning innovation	Network reputational monitoring; incremental innovation
Internal structure	Chief executive officer (CEO) autonomy	CEO autonomy	CEO dependent on the supervisory boards; consensus decision making
Industrial relations	Adversarial; decentralised; wage bargaining on firm level	State controlled contesting; intervening state; fragmented labour organisation; wage bargaining on firm level	Coordinated, centralised labour organisation; sector level bargaining
Vocational education and Training	Focus on general skills; on the job training	Coordinated; low level of specialisation; focus on general skills; basically on the job training	Coordinated; high level of specialisation, focus on specific skills
Inter-firm relations	Competitive; contractual; individualistic	Competitive; autonomous; end of state mediation	Cooperative; network based
Source: Own compilation based on Hall/Soskice (2001, pp. 21-32); Schmidt (2003, pp. 545-550).			

As far as the situation of young workers is concerned, two spheres are of special importance: 1) industrial relations and 2) Vocational education and training. Both of them directly influence key transitions in early working life.

Industrial relations refer to the coordination of organised interests on the employer and employee sides, that is, the relationship between the production factors of capital and labour. Amongst other things, they regulate the competition between individual employees and the degree to which the workforce is exposed to market forces through collective bargaining. The structure of the vocational education and training system coordinates human capital formation and is decisive in regards to the entry of newcomers into the labour market.

3.1.1. Industrial Relations

Labour organisation in France and Germany differs sharply. While the organisation rate has been on the decline in both countries, it has always been higher for Germany (19% in 2010) than for France (8 % in 2010)³⁰ (Dribusch/Birke 2012, p. 2; Pernot 2010, p. 1). With regard to wage bargaining, labour organisations are relatively centralised in Germany, while they are fragmented along ideological lines in France (Palier 2010a, p. 123).

Germany's post-war social market economy has seen the emergence of a united trade union. The principle of autonomy of collective bargaining and dominance of sectoral agreements are central characteristics of the German social partnership. As a consequence, state regulation of industrial relations is traditionally low.³¹ The government is only directly involved in the bargaining process in the public sector and conciliation processes (Dribusch/Birke 2012, p. 2).

Historically, the French working class has been heterogeneous. The union landscape has been fragmented along strong cleavages between secular and Christian democratic forces on the one hand and rural versus industrialised areas on the other (Manow/Palier 2009; Pernot 2010).³² The organisation of collective interests is relatively weak. Social partners traditionally maintain an instrumental relationship, while the power is distributed in disfavour to the trade unions. As a consequence of a weak negotiation culture and the centralist tradition of the country, the state acts as a mediator for inter-firm and industrial relations (Schmidt 2003, pp. 529-531). The main social standards have been set by the state rather than being a result of collective bargaining processes as such (Pernot 2010, pp. 6-7). The general statutory minimum wage (Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance – SMIC) and the 35-hour working week are familiar examples.

Structural transformation processes on the labour market have weakened the overall position of workers. Shifting employment structures have deeply changed the role of collective bargaining, while nonstandard and precarious forms of employment also pose a major challenge to organisational capacity and the power of trade unions. In Germany, these developments have prompted unions to call for state regulation, i.e. the implementation of a statu-

³⁰ The share is 15 % in the public sector compared to 5 % in the private sector (Pernot 2010, p. 1). Young people are underrepresented as union members in both countries. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that young people are overrepresented in those sectors where union membership in general is low.

³¹ Exceptions are the maximum working time of 10 hours a day and the minimum annual leave of 30 days.

³² Unlike in many European countries, French trade unionism did not undergo a merger process.

tory minimum wage. While core institutions of industrial relations remain in force on a formal level, their regulative power and social function have changed fundamentally (Holst 2011). Collective bargaining was a constitutional aspect of the market and has become a dependent feature of market development, whereas negotiations are characterised by competition, increasing fragmentation and decreasing coverage by collective bargaining, particularly in the growing low-skilled service sector.³³ The recent development of industrial relations in France can be summarised by a further weakening and fragmentation of the position of trade unions. Employers' organisations increasingly moved away from firm-level bargaining towards division into occupational categories, which split employees according to the employers' interest (Pernot 2010, p. 10; Palier/Thelen 2010, pp. 126-127). To sum up, it is important to be aware that the ongoing efforts towards greater flexibility – despite resistance from the trade unions – have clearly restricted the unions' scope for action over the last two decades, thus leaving the gate open for increasing precariousness to infiltrate the employment system. Interestingly, it seems that in Germany – despite a more coherent trade union approach – the effect is even stronger for lack of any systematic state regulation.

3.1.2. Vocational Education and Training

According to the assumption of institutional complementarities, industrial relations and the vocational education system interact with each other: dense networks of collective interests (on the part of the employers and employees as well as the coordination channels between them) facilitate collaborative systems of vocational education and training (Hall/Soskice 2001, p. 18). In contrast, countries with fragmented atomised industrial relations show similar structures on the training market. Such systems of vocational education and training are characterised by low levels of standardisation (as a consequence of a low level of coordination of collective interests) and focused on general human capital and school-based vocational education or on the job training.

In Germany, industry-wide employer associations and labour unions play a central role in the coordination of the German “dual system”. They define required skill categories and super-

³³ See Holst (2011) for a case study on call centre employees.

vises the training system, which is partly financed by the state (Hall/Soskice 2001, p. 25). In this respect, the German system of vocational education and training, which is characterised by central standards and institutionalised recognition mechanisms, is a good “sorting machine” (Maurice/Sellier/Silvestre 1986, p. 6). On the employers’ side, knowledge of the skills of the apprentice is relatively high. Moreover, the dual structure³⁴ allows employers to get to know potential future employees. Both aspects reduce the level of uncertainty of the employer. For the apprentice, labour market trajectories become more predictable. As Bellmann and Hartung (2010) state, apprentices of the German dual system under collective bargaining coverage can expect a relatively smooth entry into stable employment.³⁵ But it has to be said that the structural change from industrial to service economy in Germany has crucially changed the landscape. Many workers in the service and retail sector are trapped in precarious employment situations.³⁶ Moreover, school leavers who cannot find a place in the apprenticeship system due to poor achievements in the education system are worse off. Without a vocational education certificate, they only have minimal chances of gaining a foothold in the first labour market (BIBB 2010).³⁷ Due to the expansion of the service sector and the increasing demand for personal services, a shift to full-time school-based vocational education is expected in Germany.

In France, the role of the state and social partners in vocational education corresponds to their general role in the labour market. The French vocational education system remains fragmented with numerous standards and qualifications (CEDEFOP 2008, pp. 16-21). Vocational education is predominantly full-time school based.³⁸ As a consequence of rising youth unemployment, however, combinations of school and work-based vocational education (“formation en alternance”) have become increasingly important since the 80s. As part of the decentralisation process, it is regionally coordinated and characterised by different legal foundations and degrees of formalisation (Zettelmeier 2005).

³⁴ The dual structure and the probation year in school-based vocational education.

³⁵ 46 % (east Germany) and 64 % (west Germany) respectively of the apprentices in Germany are accepted on a permanent basis, (Bellmann/Hartung 2010, p. 160).

³⁶ See for example Voss-Dahm (2011); Holst (2011).

³⁷ Their low chances of finding a place in the apprenticeship system (and perhaps the relative failure of public measures) are partly caused by the signalling effect of their status. The highly institutionalised dual system provides incentives to work hard at school in order to find a “good” place in the system. As – in a rational choice model – employers are aware of this, they prefer “fresh” school-leavers over the ones who are left. The signal is that those who could not find a place in the apprenticeship system are low performers on the job.

³⁸ In general, school-based vocational education is characterised by a strong general component, providing key skills in the respective field.

Differences in standardisation and formalisation remain, as far as integration into the labour market is concerned: in Germany, workers' placement is very much related to their level of education and formal vocational qualification, while it is much more based on general education and seniority in France.³⁹ Young people in France must be prepared for a "period of turbulence" (Jensen 2011, p. 6) until they have proven their skills on the labour market.

Labour market entrance of French youth is linked to transitional precarity almost like a definitory feature of an early employment career (Papinot 2009). One factor is the segmentation of the vocational education system: work experience is what really counts. The German system offers relatively standardised pathways into stable employment in most sectors. On the other hand, it reinforces precariousness for those who do not succeed in gaining a formal qualification. They are disproportionately excluded from stable employment, with little chances of overcoming the disadvantageous effects over their life course (see Chapter 4.1).

3.2. Employment Protection

Continental welfare states are renowned for their relatively static labour market, based on high protection levels for labour market insiders, while outsiders and newcomers find it difficult to enter. As flexicurity literature argues, increasing competition in post-industrial international markets calls for flexible labour market arrangements, while risks of increasing mobility should be compensated by rather generous unemployment benefits and the relative importance of active labour market policies (Wilthagen/Tros 2004) (see Chapter 3.3). In this respect, the Netherlands and Denmark were identified as being comparatively close to the ideal type.

Tracing changes in employment regulation, developments in France and Germany do not show a simple and clear-cut pattern. Whereas protection of the core workforce remains on a relatively high level, flexibility is achieved through growing numbers of "atypical" employment relationships. While changes have been gradual, they nevertheless represent an important break: the coordinated model lost its capacity to cover all citizens under an encompassing system of relatively secure work contracts and employment-based social security. Opposing dynamics characterise recent welfare reforms and draw a line between standard

³⁹ See Maurice/Sellier/Silvestre (1986) for discussion.

employment insurance-based benefits for insiders and social assistance in work benefits for nonstandard employees (Palier/Thelen 2010). To illustrate the changes in the de jure employment regulation, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) strictness of employment protection legislation indicators (EPL) are displayed below.⁴⁰

	Regular employment		Temporary employment		Collective dismissal		Overall EPL ⁴¹	
	1994	2004	1994	2004	1994	2004	1994	2004
France	2.34	2.47	3.63	3.63	-	2.13	2.98	3.05
Germany	2.68	3.0	3.5	1.25	-	3.75	3.09	2.12
Denmark	1.68	1.63	3.13	1.38	-	3.88	2.4	1.5

Source: Own compilation partly adopted from Barbier (2011, p. 6), data: OECD (2012).

Table 2 shows that employment protection for permanent workers, traditionally high in both countries (but significantly lower in France), has been slightly tightened in both countries since the mid 1990s. The development of restrictions on temporary employment (RTE) – including fixed-term employment and temporary agency work (TAW) – paints a quite different picture. Germany has experienced an ongoing period of deregulation.⁴² The gap between the regulation of permanent contracts and forms of temporary employment has broadened.⁴³ The reference indicator for France has remained stable on a high level. As Barbier (2011, p. 6) points out, the high score for collective dismissal in Denmark is quite remarkable, compared to the rather low score in France. The comparatively low barriers for collective dismissal in France result from the absence of a formal definition of collective dismissal in French labour law and the weak role of the social partners in this respect.⁴⁴

While characteristic differences in national systems become more visible looking at the sub-indicators,⁴⁵ the explanatory power of the OECD EPL indicator has its limitations, however. The mechanism between strictness of regulation and employment creation remains some-

⁴⁰ The OECD strictness of EPL indicator is a combination of three sub-indicators consisting of 21 items. The items cover different aspects of procedures and costs involved in the dismissal of individual workers or groups, as well as procedures and restrictions for the use of fixed-term and TAW (OECD 2012).

⁴¹ Unweighted.

⁴² It started, in fact, in the 1980s.

⁴³ Main aspects are: deregulation of reasons for fixed-term employment and the permissible number of successive fixed-term contracts and the overall duration; as far as TAW is concerned: types of work for which TAW is possible (general, with the exception of the construction industry) and maximum cumulated duration of TAW work (no limits).

⁴⁴ See country sheets for a detailed summary: OECD (2012).

⁴⁵ See Barbier (2011, pp. 5-6) for a critique on the use of the cumulative indicator.

what obscure (Barbier 2011, p. 5; Gautié/Galtier 2003). In addition, it is built on legal provisions while application in real life might differ.⁴⁶ The practices in German TAW might serve as an example here: while temporary agency workers formally hold a permanent part-time contract, they work full-time and thereby systematically accumulate long hours. In the case of business-related dismissal, the notice period⁴⁷ is diminished by compensation (Niehaus 2011, p. 12). This illustrates that whereas EPL is thought to reduce uncertainty on both sides (the employer's as well as the employee's), it may potentially even aggravate feelings of uncertainty as a result of exit options which allow employers to bypass specific regulation. In short, it is crucial to keep an eye on the fact that the intention of regulation and the incentives behind its application may differ.

3.3. The Employment–Welfare State Nexus

At first sight, the overall flexicurity profiles of France and Germany show a rather similar structure (Figure 6): a relatively high level of labour market protection legislation, medium range unemployment benefits (UB) and a significant level of active labour market policy (ALMPs), while the share of people taking part in lifelong learning (LLL) activities⁴⁸ is rather moderate (8 % in both countries) compared to Denmark (29 %).

While labour market insecurities are framed by labour market institutions, the compensation of resulting risks is related to the welfare state structure. Welfare states are culturally embedded and historically rooted in the process of industrialisation: “social protection is not simply a collection of odd programs, it is a social relationship” (Barbier 2010, p. 2).

With referenced to the UB, both countries are characterised by a two-tier system⁴⁹: contribution-based unemployment insurance on the one hand, where benefits are dependent on duration of cover, contributions and age, and tax-financed, means-tested social assistance schemes on the other. Both countries are affected by increasing duality between insurance and tax-based systems (Häusermann/Schwander 2009).


⁴⁶ See Zarnowska (2004) for a critical discussion.

⁴⁷ The notice period is two weeks during the probationary period (six months, §622 Abs. 2 BGB) and four weeks for employment relationships of up to two years (§622 Abs. 3 BGB) (ILO 2012).

⁴⁸ LLL is seen as an indicator referring to internal functional flexibility.

⁴⁹ This refers to the financing principle. With regard to entitlement, Barbier/Knuth (2011a) state that both countries had in fact a three-tier system until the beginning of the new century, when Germany merged the second and the third tier in its Hartz legislation.

Figure 6: Flexicurity Profiles of France and Germany



Standardised Values of Flexicurity Indicators				
	EPL 2003	UB 2003	ALMP 2003	LLL 2006
DE	0.42	0.25	0.13	0.08
FR	0.48	0.18	0.11	0.08
DK	0.3	0.34	0.31	0.29

EPL	Employment protection legislation indicator, data: OECD (2012).
UB	Unemployment benefits as share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by the standardised rate of unemployment, data: (Furåker 2009, p. 28).
ALMP	Active labour market policy as share of GDP divided by the rate of unemployment, data: (Furåker 2009, p. 28). ⁵⁰
LLL	Share of persons aged 25-64 taking part in lifelong learning activities; data: EU-LFS (2012).

Source: Own compilation, adopted from Madsen(2010).

Although French and German expenditure for ALMPs are close to each other, rationale and institutional design differ crucially: while Germany mainly focuses on fixed-term, target-group specific qualification measures, the main objective of the “republican activation” (Barbier/Knuth 2011b, p. 2; Barbier/Théret 2001) is focused on occupation as “social insertion” by means of job subsidies and public employment (Bonoli 2010, pp. 19-20): “With undeniable originality in comparison to others, the French system did not focus its reform on compulsory labour, but rather on the goal of integrating everyone in society” (Barbier/Knuth 2011b, p. 2). In contrast, the German route of activation can be described as catching up with the liberal model. Implemented in the early 2000s, the four Hartz laws – as part of the so called Agenda 2010 – aimed at tackling the increasing level of core unemployment through means-tested benefits and workfare. Since the presidency of Sarkozy, and with the

⁵⁰ These data are based on OECD Employment Outlook; there are slightly different results with Eurostat data.

introduction of the “Revenu de Solidarité active” (RSA), labour market policy in France became closer to the German model. In contrast to Germany, however, where the integration of the unemployment and social assistance scheme within the Hartz legislation has been a radical shift towards work orientation and conditionality of social assistance, the French system remains fragmented but in decisive features still more oriented towards integration and security, and the political leverage of the recent reforms is considered to be much lower (Barbier/Knuth 2011a, p. 22).

Box 1: Basic Income Support Schemes for Persons Capable of Work:

Germany:

Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende, i.e. Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II): ALG II was implemented with the *Fourth Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market* (“Hartz IV”) on 1 January 2005, merging the former income-related unemployment assistance with the general social assistance scheme. It guarantees benefits at the minimum subsistence level for registered job seekers, who are not or no longer entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. ALG II benefits are conditional on the fulfilment of active job seeking obligations. Infringements against the personal work integration agreement are subject to legal sanctions, with sanctions being especially strict for young people. Under this scheme, every job is reasonable, regardless of skill level and wage.

France:

Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA): The RSA has been implemented as part of the TEPA-legislation, approved under François Fillon in 2007 to increase employment and economic activity. It merged two minimum income benefits, the *revenu minimum d’insertion* and the basic social security for lone parents, *allocation de parent isolé*. The objective is to increase the incentive to work by way of an income supplementation program. Looking for a job is a condition for receiving RSA benefits, and there are possibilities for imposing sanctions, but de facto enforcement remains low.

Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA jeune): Minimum income benefit for the under 25s: young people under the age of 25 had been excluded from the French social assistance scheme (RMI) and thereby relied on family assistance. Since September 2010, they have been entitled to benefits from the RSA if they have worked for a minimum of two years over the last three years, have children or are expecting a child. However, the conditions concerning labour market participation mean that the eligible group of young workers is small (Barbier/Knuth 2011a; Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Santé 2012).

Activation measures have been introduced over the last 10 to 15 years throughout the EU. Comparative research on the continental Bismarckian welfare states reveals that – despite

national characteristics⁵¹ – labour market activation policies have been applied in similar ways in those countries (Clegg 2007; Palier 2010b).

Predominantly targeted at social assistance recipients who are able to work, these activation measures nevertheless have intensified feelings of uncertainty throughout the workforce⁵² for two main reasons: firstly, an increasing fear among employees of falling below the poverty line as a result of reduced duration and level of unemployment benefits. Secondly, growing demands on the unemployed for self-organisation and individual competitiveness⁵³ in searching for jobs in tight labour markets.

The rationale of insurance based Bismarckian welfare states is built on stable, full-time (male) employment relations to compensate for social risks. As a consequence, employees enjoy relatively high levels of protection and social security, as long as they belong to the insiders of the employment system (i.e. being a member of the core workforce and entitled to unemployment insurance), while social groups who are not entitled to social insurance benefits or out of the labour market for longer spells rely on private or reduced entitlements (in Germany, for instance, through marriage) or means-tested social assistance schemes. The main challenges of continental welfare states are the close relation of social security funding and ancillary wage costs (Barbier 2004, p. 244) in an open economy, demographic dynamics contesting pay-as-you-go financed schemes and the integration of new forms of employment into social security schemes (Klammer 2005). Table 3 summarises social security integration of nonstandard employment relations.

The schematic illustration shows that the main employment forms, usually linked to the “non-standard” notion, are generally integrated into the standard social insurance schemes. As far as the entitlement and the level of benefits are concerned, unemployment and pension-related payments rely on the course of the employment biography: low wages and employment interruptions may leave “scars” on the coverage level of social security.

⁵¹ These national characteristics include the more integrative approach in the French case.

⁵² For the German employment system, this is demonstrated by Knuth (2011); for a French-German comparison see Barbier/Knuth (2011a).

⁵³ These demands are combined under the label of employability.

Table 3: Non-standard Employment and Social Insurance Systems							
		Unemployment insurance		Pension scheme		Health insurance	
		marginal part-time ⁵⁴	other part-time	marginal part-time	other part-time	marginal part-time	other part-time
Part-time	DE	No integration.	Proportional contributions and benefits.	Voluntary contributions. Risk of low-level benefits.	Proportional contributions and benefits. Risk of low-level benefits.	Voluntary contribution, full integration.	Proportional contributions, full integration.
	FR	Proportional contributions and benefits.		Proportional contributions and benefits.		Proportional contributions, full integration.	
Fixed-term	DE	Entitlement after 12 months of employment (within the last 2 years).		Complete integration; discontinuous working biographies can lead to low-level benefits.		Proportional contribution, full integration.	
	FR	Entitlement after 6 months of employment.		Complete integration; discontinuous working biographies can lead to low-level benefits.		Proportional contribution, full integration.	
TAW	DE	Entitlement after 12 months of employment (within the last 2 years).		Complete integration; discontinuous working biographies can lead to low-level benefits.		Proportional contribution, full integration.	
	FR	Entitlement after 6 months of employment.		Complete integration; discontinuous working biographies can lead to low-level benefits.		Proportional contribution, full integration.	

Source: Kroos (2008, pp. 142; 168; 192); European Commission (2011).

The French compulsory unemployment insurance is an independent social scheme under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour, which is managed by the social partners and implemented as part of the collective agreements (Schmid 2010). The German system is centrally administrated by the Federal Employment Agency and compulsory for employment contracts which are subject to social insurance contributions. Benefits are wage-related, while entitlement is generally based on a minimum employment of 12 months in the last two years in Germany. In Germany, the transition rate from employment into the social assistance scheme has increased in the last few years due to the increase in precarious and low-wage jobs. In 2011, one in four of the newly unemployed failed to qualify for the insurance-based unemployment scheme due to short-term tenure and employment interruptions or

⁵⁴ Marginal part-time employment is defined here by the German concept of “geringfügige Beschäftigung”, which is capped at a certain income level (400 euro) instead of maximum working hours.

received additional benefits from the social assistance scheme as a consequence of low wages (DGB 2012).⁵⁵

The institutional context in Germany still creates strong incentives for unequal distribution of paid work and reproduction work (care and housework). Re-traditionalisation of family arrangements over time is often the consequence. De-facto polarisation does not necessarily show individual preferences, however, and may rather be a result of institutionally filtered decisions of interdependent individuals (BMFSFJ 2011, p. 179).

Within the traditional model of the male breadwinner, life courses are closely interrelated and based on stability over the life span. As accepted role models have become more diverse, bargaining processes between household members are becoming increasingly important. Although gender relations are crucial, family arrangements are shaped by institutional conditions, which make some arrangements more practicable than others. Derived social security entitlements for non-working or marginally employed spouses⁵⁶ and the joint taxation of married couples⁵⁷ still provide strong disincentives for egalitarian gender arrangements.

⁵⁵ Temporary agency workers are hit particularly hard.

⁵⁶ It refers to those who are covered by the statutory health insurance.

⁵⁷ The greater the difference between the earned incomes, the higher the tax benefits.

4. Labour Market Uncertainties of Young People in Focus

The following section reveals central aspects of so-called atypical work, which potentially goes hand in hand with precarity, insecurities and uncertainties about future developments. The overview is focused on the situation of young workers in Germany and France. The data mainly refer to the pre-crisis year of 2007, to avoid relying on strong cyclical effects. The effects of the economic crisis on the integration of the young into the labour market will be analysed separately at a later stage. Moreover, self-employed people without employees are excluded here, because of the very low share of self-employed among the young in the reference countries. Initial analysis of the effects of the economic crisis shows that the demand for atypical work reacted very promptly to the economic downturn: fixed-term and part-time work are classical measures of external and internal numerical flexibility used to buffer fluctuations in demand. While fixed-term contracts were not renewed and temporary agency workers were dismissed, the amount of part-time work has increased. Young workers who have not yet established themselves in the labour market have shown to be especially vulnerable to macroeconomic dynamics. While atypical employment is often seen as a stepping stone to working experience and permanent employment, this is not necessarily the case. In countries with highly standardised education systems and centralised vocational education certificates, like Germany, barriers to entering the labour market are very high for those without vocational education. The vast majority of early school leavers have very little chances of finding an apprenticeship (Anbuhi 2012).

4.1. Labour Market Participation

4.1.1. Activity Rates and Unemployment

Participation in education and training means that activity rates in the age group 15-24 are low in comparison to other age groups. Only a minority – about one third on average – of those aged 15-24 is active within the labour market. Educational effects on labour market activity are more clear-cut for the group aged 25-29, which we refer to in the following overview on European activity rates (See Table 4).

Labour market activity of young people is – with few exceptions⁵⁸ – positively correlated with the level of education once the education is accomplished. Gender differences are higher for low educational levels and vary significantly between the countries. While the gender gap for low educational level is close to the European average in France (28.3 %), it is the highest in Europe for Germany (42.1 %) (Eurostat 2009, p. 106). The very low activity rates of low-skilled women, and the wide gender gap, point to the fact that opting out of the labour market is a strategy especially used by women who do not expect much from the German labour market, which is known for its limited permeability. Activity rates are not merely linked to individual preferences, but closely related to what is to be expected within the labour market: the sharp drop in young people’s activity rates all over Europe since the beginning of the economic crisis (see Chapter 4.3) has impressively shown that people exit the labour market in order to reduce uncertainty, although this is linked to insecurity and precariousness.

Table 4: Activity Rates of Young Women and Men, Aged 25-29, by Level of Qualification, 2007, in %									
	Women			Men			Gender Gap		
	Low	Medi-um	High	Low	Medi-um	High	Low	Medi-um	High
DE	46.4	79.9	90	88.5	83.3	95.3	42.1	3.4	5.3
FR	62.4	80.6	88.3	90.6	95.9	93.8	28.2	15.3	5.5
EU15	61.1	79.0	88.6	88.3	89.2	91.1	27.3	10.2	2.5

Source: Own compilation, data: Eurostat (2009, p. 106). Low: ISCED 0-2; medium: ISCED 3-4; high: ISCED 5-6.


In general, young people face a higher risk of becoming unemployed and have worse chances on the labour market than the prime age group (see Figure 7). The analysis of reasons requires a more discerning view: in addition to matching problems and mobility aspects, the situation must be seen against the background of the system of vocational education and training and the regulation of the labour market.

Youth unemployment has been a structural problem of the French labour market for decades. Since the mid 1990s, the situation of young people in the labour market has improved. But while highly skilled workers have relatively good chances of entering the labour market, school-to-work transitions among the low-skilled remain difficult (Joseph/Lopez/Ryk 2008).

⁵⁸ These are Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Portugal.

The structure of the vocational education system might be one reason for the better performance of Germany in this respect. Both countries rely on specific skills,⁵⁹ which are – in contrast to general skills – not easy to transfer. The dual system is seen as a relatively well functioning pathway into the German labour market, while the French apprenticeship system is mostly based on training on the job, which makes it difficult for newcomers to establish themselves in the labour market (Kerckhoff 1995).

Figure 7: Unemployment Rates by Age Group in Different European Countries, 2007, in %



Source: Own compilation, EU-LFS (2012).

But youth unemployment is by no means a discrete event. It is closely interrelated to the labour market situation of other age groups. Furthermore, a breakdown by educational level affirms that there is a negative correlation between the individual level of qualification and the risk of experiencing spells of unemployment at an early age: low qualifications go hand in hand with higher risks of unemployment. This is also true for other age groups. On aggregate, the higher level of unemployment among the young can partly be explained by the higher share of people without formal vocational qualifications within this group. This is particularly the case for Germany⁶⁰, where young unemployed people are much less qualified on average than the unemployed of other age groups. In France, the situation is different: among the young, the share of unemployed people without vocational education is nearly

⁵⁹ France relies on these skills less than Germany (see Chapter 3.1).

⁶⁰ To a lesser extent, this is also true for the Northern European countries as well as for the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland.

the same as it is for the overall workforce (Brenke 2012). It can therefore be concluded that qualifications explain the higher youth unemployment in Germany, but not in France.

Frictional unemployment is a common phenomenon among young workers in transitional stages. Longer spells of unemployment, however, leave deep scars in their individual employment history. A look at the level of long-term unemployment reveals further insights into the structure of youth unemployment (Table 5).

	15-24			25-49			50-64			Total		
	1998	2007	2011	1998	2007	2011	1998	2007	2011	1998	2007	2011
EU-15	35.0	22.7	28.9	49.5	41.3	43.5	61.4	60.2	55.6	48.0	40.1	42.3
DE	29.9	32.7	23.9	50.0	55.2	47.3	65.1	73.6	62.7	52.6	56.6	48.0
FR	22.8	24.3	28.3	43.5	43.5	41.1	62.5	60.7	57.4	41.7	40.2	41.5

Source: Own compilation, EU-LFS (2012), [> 12 months as % of total unemployment by age].

Long-term unemployment of young people increased in Germany and France between 1998 and 2007, which was in line with the development of long-term unemployment of other age groups in Germany, while it went in the opposite direction for prime age and older workers in France. The clear decline in long-term unemployment in Germany for all age groups since 2007 should not only be seen in the light of a more favourable economic situation, but also against the background of institutional change: the development of active labour market measures, namely increasing conditionality and focus on activation measures. In this context, “cosmetic effects” must be taken into account: people who are participating in labour market integration measures do not show up as unemployed in the statistics. Once the measure has finished, participants are counted as new unemployment entrants. While this is pretty obvious in the German case, it also applies to the situation in France.

While overall youth unemployment has declined, long-term unemployment for 15-24 year olds has increased in Germany and France during the pre-crisis period. The risk of becoming unemployed at an early stage is relatively high in Germany and France. In Germany, this is mainly a qualification effect. Once unemployed, the chance of finding a new job is relatively low and has declined since the late 1990s.


4.1.2. Fixed-Term Employment

Fixed-term employment extends the external numerical flexibility of firms, especially in countries with highly regulated labour markets where dismissal is costly. Fixed-term contracts allow employers to bypass dismissal protection and transfer the cost of contract termination to the employee (Kroos 2008, p. 146).

Germany has experienced ongoing deregulation of fixed-term employment since the 1980s, which has widened the gap between permanent and fixed-term employment. In France, the development of fixed-term contracts (*contrats à durée déterminée*) has been characterised by reregulation since the 1990s. Nowadays, employment regulation relating to fixed-term employment is more restrictive in France than in Germany. While it is not necessary in Germany to justify employment on a fixed-term basis, it is obligatory in France.

In general, young workers are much more likely to hold a fixed-term contract. This is true for all European countries. One reason for this is that fixed-term contracts are often used as a prolongation of the probation period. But while this kind of contract is a transitory phase for some groups of people, it is more stable among other groups: it is especially common and attractive for sectors characterised by project-based work.⁶¹

Figure 8: Share of Fixed-term Contracts in European Countries by Age Group, 2007, in %



Source: Own compilation, EU-LFS (2012), [% of all employees by age]. Note: DE, FR and EU-15 are coloured in green to highlight the values.

The high share of young workers holding a fixed-term contract in Germany can partly be explained by the German system of vocational education. Apprentices of the dual system are

⁶¹ The creative industry and the research sector are examples.

employed on a fixed-term basis. Around 60 % of the apprentices get a permanent contract for the same job thereafter (BIBB 2010). The vast majority (83 %) of this age group (15-24) therefore report holding fixed-term contracts for educational reasons. The reference share in France is only about 30 %. The picture becomes even more clear-cut focusing on those who are involuntarily employed on a fixed-term basis: 37 % of young workers in France say that they could not find a permanent job, while only 9 % of the German workers state this as the reason for holding a fixed-term contract; the reference values for the prime age group (25-49) are 66 % and 42 %⁶² respectively. However, the share of fixed-term employment is lower for prime age employees. Moreover, the level of education does play a role in Germany. In general, low-skilled people are more likely to be employed on a fixed-term basis than middle and high-skilled. In France, by contrast, the level of education does not make much difference as far as the share of fixed-term employment is concerned. What does that mean for job insecurity and related uncertainties? Both countries are characterised by a high share of young workers employed on fixed-term basis. The majority of the German fixed-term employees expect to get a permanent job once they have finished their vocational education: around 60 % of the apprentices are taken on by the company where they did their apprenticeship. But on the other side of the coin, 15 % of those aged 20-29 do not have a formal education and chances that they will succeed in gaining permanent employment contracts are small (BIBB 2010; Anbuhl 2012).

The share of fixed-term contracts is relatively high for both countries, but turnover rates into permanent employment are low (Eichhorst/Marx/Thode 2010). Fixed-term contracts are used by the employer as a measure of external flexibility in order to avoid the costs of dismissal. Non-permanent contracts are not precarious by definition, but fixed-term employment transfers the cost of contract determination as well as entrepreneurial risks to the employee, i.e. by increasing the pressure to succeed in the job as a precondition for the prolongation of the contract. Moreover, it makes it possible to combine external flexibility and job security for core workers, which not only increases segmentation but at the same time increases the willingness to make concessions, i.e. in relation to wages, among the core workforce.

⁶² The data refer to EU-LFS data of 2007.

Fixed-term contracts in general and short-term contracts in particular increase mobility requirements and thereby spatial and income uncertainty. They might cause involuntary mobility, as employees are forced to look for a new job in consideration of external factors rather than individual preferences or career planning. Moreover, prolongation is often announced at short notice. Family formation, in contrast, is a long term project, bearing numerous risks and uncertainties.

If fixed-term employment is expected as a prolonged probation period or part of the qualification phase, it will be rational to postpone family formation until the transitional period is mastered at a later stage. The same is true for those who are involuntarily employed on a fixed-term basis, as they might expect to find better employment in the near future. But the rationale differs for those who expect that fixed-term or project based work will pose a long term situation.

Uncertainties of fixed-term employment are gendered: in both countries, women are more likely to hold a fixed-term contract than men. Nevertheless, job and employment uncertainty of holding a fixed-term contract is higher for women in Germany: employers anticipate the possibility of motherhood, which is assumed to be costly in most cases, as rather long time-outs for female workers are expected due to the insufficient care infrastructure.

4.1.3. Temporary Agency Work

TAW is characterised by a triangular relationship between the temporary work agency, worker and company. That means that work and employment relationship diverge. In line with the EU directive on TAW (Directive/2008/104/EC, 5.12.2008)⁶³, indefinite employment contracts are the general form of employment in Germany. But a special arrangement makes it possible to side-step regular dismissal: temporary work agencies fire the workers at the end of their assignment⁶⁴, and reemploy them on demand. In 2010, 56 % of all TAW contracts in Germany ended before completion of a three month period (Niehaus 2011, p. 4). In comparison, TAW is highly regulated in France. Temporary agency workers are usually employed on a "mission" basis that means they hold a special fixed-term contract for the term of assignment. The maximum duration of TAW contracts is 18 months, but can be 9 or 24


⁶³ This has a clear impact on reregulation of TAW (Vanselow/Weinkopf 2009, p. 8).

⁶⁴ They do so by dismissal-compelling operational reasons.

months in exceptional cases, while the waiting period for reemployment is 1/3 of the contract duration (Ministère de Travail 2012). Premature dismissal is regulated more strictly than dismissal under permanent employment contracts and is only possible in cases of serious misconduct by the temporary agency worker (Vanselow/Weinkopf 2009, p. 18). TAW regulations in France commit agencies to contribute to training funds for temporary agency workers and to pay a “precarity bonus” of 10 % of the gross wage to compensate for higher job insecurity (L'administration Française 2012).

Besides Japan, USA and the United Kingdom, Germany and France had by far the biggest growth rates of TAW between 1996 and 2007 (ILO 2011). France already experienced the highest increase during the 1990s, whereas TAW in Germany has increased rapidly since 2004 (see Figure 9) as a consequence of far-reaching deregulation in the scope of the “Hartz” legislation. Among other things, the maximum length of assignments has been thoroughly deregulated and the prohibition of synchronisation and reemployment has been abolished (see Chapter 3.2). The share of temporary agency workers in Germany was 2.5 % in 2007 and reached 3 % in 2011, which is close to the reference value in France. 19 % of young professionals experience at least one spell of TAW in the first three years of their professional life.

Figure 9: Temporary Agency Work, France and Germany Compared, FTE in 1000



Source: Eurociett 2012.

The share of TAW is much higher among the young workers than among the overall working population, and men are more often employed by a temporary work agency than women. The share of temporary agency workers below the age of 30 was 47 %, a share of 7.1 % of the employees. In both countries, around two thirds of temporary agency workers are men (Giesecke/Wotschak 2009).

Box 2: Effects of Flexible Employment and Job Insecurity on Fertility Decisions: The Case of German Temporary Agency Workers.

Contributing to the GUSTO project, Niehaus (2011) examined working conditions and the economic insecurity of German Temporary Agency Workers on the basis of the results of qualitative problem-centred interviews in east Germany⁶⁵, in order to answer the question of how it influences partnership quality and fertility decisions. The sample selection is based on maximum variation as far as skill level and economic sector are concerned. The main results are:

While the personal evaluation of TAW is ambivalent, negative aspects were predominant in all cases. In particular, a high level of job insecurity, economic uncertainty due to very short planning intervals and spatial mobility requirements, as well as discrimination and lack of recognition at the workplace were mentioned.

The effects of TAW reflect social inequality. The opinion of high-skilled workers about their working situation was more optimistic. While they considered TAW to ease the transition from academic education to work ("transitional precariousness", Pelizzari 2009), low-skilled workers fear being fired "from one day to another" (Niehaus 2011, p. 20), which means that they have to deal with a very short planning interval. Low wages (absolute and relative to permanent workers), job insecurity, and the prospect of being "trapped" in TAW have been reported as a burden on relationships.

Among the interviewees, TAW is in general perceived as being incompatible with starting or extending a family. In this context, economic aspects (low wages) and job insecurity (short planning interval and mobility requirements) have been mentioned, but family policy issues were not on the list. Different aspects of perceived job insecurity between women and men are straight forward: women feared dismissal in the event of pregnancy, while the main issue for male interviewees was the risk of losing their job in the event of an economic downturn. Moreover, most contracts with temporary work agencies permit assignment to client companies elsewhere in Germany. The prospect of a long distance relationship has been perceived to be a big strain on partnerships and especially on families. In the sample, family formation had taken place before the first TAW episode, while family extension has been

⁶⁵ The term refers to the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, namely the New Federal States Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen as well as the eastern parts of Berlin. Accordingly, west Germany refers to the territory of the former Federal Republic of Germany, namely the Old Federal States.

observed during employment by a temporary work agency. This is in line with other results on income and fertility, indicating that in Germany, low income has a negative effect on the birth of the first child, but not on subsequent births (Bernhard/Kurz 2007; Eckhard/Klein 2006).

The findings of Niehaus (2011) show the interdependency of working sphere and partnership: while private life is an important area of retreat and helps people to cope with their employment situation, job insecurity and economic uncertainties are a strain on private life. The impact depends on factors related to the labour market situation of the partner (linked-lives).

TAW is a classical tool of external numerical flexibility, used to buffer fluctuations in demand. Correspondingly, both countries responded promptly to the financial crisis in 2008/2009 with a sharp decline in TAW, which began to rise again one year later, when employers had regained some optimism about economic development but not enough to create permanent jobs. 57 % of the rise in German employment in 2010 was due to TAW.

TAW is often seen as a stepping stone into permanent employment for those loosely linked to the labour market. In France, where a standardised transition between school and work is still lacking for large parts of society, TAW has become an alternative pathway into the labour market. In Germany, only one in seven temporary agency workers get directly employed in the client company later on. Among the high-skilled, TAW may ease the transition from education to work by reducing the costs of looking for a job search (Niehaus 2011, p. 11). Lehmer/Ziegler (2010) find a small inclusive effect of TAW: the chance of being employed on a regular basis is slightly higher for long-term unemployed who take up TAW compared to the reference scenario of remaining unemployed. TAW provides employers with maximum flexibility but little de facto security for employees. German regulation of TAW is, moreover, a classic example to show that national legislation and actual implementation may differ crucially⁶⁶.

4.1.4. Part-time Employment

Part-time employment is very much linked to the normative and cultural background of the welfare state. It is deeply rooted in societal ideas about family and division of labour be-

⁶⁶ Analysis on the mere basis of legal regulation therefore needs to be handled with care.

tween men and women and is therefore highly gendered (Morgan 2006).⁶⁷ But part-time work is not only about care work, it also plays a crucial role in stages of education and training. From the company perspective, part-time employment has become a prominent measure of internal numerical flexibility, particularly in the service sector.

In France, part-time employment is not seen as a distinct form of employment but as a variation on the underlying contract (standard or non-standard).⁶⁸ In Germany, the notion of part-time work includes, in fact, very heterogeneous employment contracts: regular part-time contracts and temporary reductions of working time (so-called "Kurzarbeit") on the one hand, marginal part-time jobs, which are not subject to social insurance (so-called "400-euro-Jobs") and "one-euro jobs" (a highly controversial measure of German ALMP) on the other.

In France, part-time work is objectively and subjectively linked to employment uncertainty and income insecurity, whereas in Germany it is seen as an important way of keeping in touch with the labour market during times of care provision. At the same time, however, it is still associated with similar consequences as employment interruptions: loss of income, career breaks and reduced social security claims⁶⁹. As far as high-skilled jobs are concerned, signalling effects of part-time work are especially relevant as employers question the career orientation of part-timers. The German model of marginal part-time and one-euro jobs is even discussed in terms of dead ends (Hohmeyer/Wolff 2012; Wiedemeyer 2009; Wiedemeyer/Diemer 2007). Mobility into standard employment is very low. What is more, people exclusively holding a marginal part-time contract (salaries up to 400 euro) are excluded from social insurance – since 400-euro jobs are not subject to income tax and obligatory social insurance contributions – making these contracts precarious from an individual point of view as well as from an overall socio-political perspective (BMFSFJ 2011).

The comparison of patterns and reasons for part-time work in Germany and France suggests a different meaning dependent on the institutional and cultural context. While the share of part-time work among young workers is quite similar in both countries – in 2007, it was 20 % for Germany and 23 % for France –, reasons for part-time employment at the start of work-

⁶⁷ This is especially the case for countries with a strong historical influence by the Catholic Church.

⁶⁸ In Germany, the notion of standard employment generally refers to full-time employment on a permanent basis only – a historical heritage of the male industrial worker.

⁶⁹ This refers to the income-based social insurance systems, namely the unemployment insurance and the old age insurance. Risk of old age poverty increases with the duration of periods of part-time employment.


ing life differ. In Germany, education is one of the main reasons: 61 % of those aged between 15 and 24 reported being employed part-time for educational reasons, while this reason is only mentioned by 10 % of their French counterparts.

In France, part-time work among young people is to a great extent involuntary. 44 % reported that they worked part-time because they could not find a full-time job. In Germany, this is the case for around one quarter (27.4 %) of the young part-time workers. Moreover, underemployment – as involuntary part-time is referred to – has increased in France since the beginning of the crisis in the second half of 2008 (EU-LFS 2012). Reconciliation of work and care constitutes another important reason for part-time work, predominantly among women. Given that reliable data on the relative importance of care duties are not available for the youngest age group (and presumably far less decisive), we refer to a somewhat broader age group of women between 15-39 (see Table 6). In France, 28.7 % of all women employed within this age group work part-time, whereas in Germany the share is 38.5 %.

Table 6: Main Reason for Part-Time Work Among Women Aged 15-39, 2007, in %							
		Could not find a full-time job	Own illness or disability	Other family or personal responsibilities	Family care	Education and training	Other reasons
	EU 15	21.5	1.1	11.2	37.5	18.0	10.6
	DE	18.3	-	26.8	30.3	16.1	7.8
	FR	33	1	3.6	43.8	2.7	15.9
Source: Own compilation, EU-LFS (2012).							

Mothers reduce their participation in gainful employment; in Germany more than two third worked part-time in 2010. Compared to 1996, the part-time share of mothers has increased in Germany. The reasons for working part-time differ between east and west Germany: gender effects, already visible for the youngest group of workers, become even stronger for prime age employees. Within this age group, the German picture is very clear-cut in this respect. Part-time work is a women's issue. 45 % of prime age women work part-time, while the reference share in France is 30 %. See Figure 10 for the gender gap and the development of part-time work over time.

Figure 10: Part-Time Employment in Germany and France, in %



Source: Own compilation, EU-LFS (2012).

It becomes apparent here that the German increase in female labour market participation has been realised by increasing part-time work. Female labour market integration in Germany over the last years has been a process of redistribution of working time, rather than a substantive increase in employment volume (BMFSFJ 2011). Moreover, deregulation of marginal part-time work as part of the “Hartz” legislation⁷⁰ has set strong incentives: it accounts for most of the increase (Voss/Weinkopf 2012).

In fact, this employment form is often chosen by students, pensioners and female spouses.⁷¹ In the interest of resource maximisation within the household it might be rational for married women to hold a marginal part-time job, especially if they have little hope of finding a well paid job.⁷² The German system of joint taxation of married couples makes this arrangement seemingly even more advantageous, as splitting benefit is positively linked to wage differences between spouses.⁷³ Moreover, they are covered by free co-insurance of dependents through their spouse and as such eligible for health care benefits. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily comply with women’s working time preferences. Recent research shows that

⁷⁰ As part of the Second Act on Modern Labour Market Services, which was implemented in 2003, marginal part-time work has been deregulated. The minor employment threshold of 15 hours per week has been abolished, while the income threshold has been increased from 325 to 400 euro.

⁷¹ This means that the situation of marginally part-time employees is heterogeneous as far as the rationales and consequences over the life course are concerned.

⁷² The use of 400 euro jobs is negatively related to qualifications and positively linked to employment interruptions (BMFSFJ 2011, p. 113).

⁷³ This is a consequence of progressive income taxation in Germany.

the majority of marginal part-time workers wish to work more hours (Wanger 2011). Incentives for marginal part-time employment are even stronger if young children live in the household. Childcare is scarce and costly and may therefore erode the advantages of the additional income. Under the German system of joint taxation, the effect on income is small anyway.

With regard to young workers, marginal part-time work⁷⁴ is mainly used by students and apprentices, who are insured by other means, as summer or student jobs or to improve training salaries. But a substantial share of part-time workers is low-qualified, and for want of alternatives trapped in discontinuous, precarious employment situations.⁷⁵ The means-tested and conditional social assistance scheme in Germany forces them into this situation, even if they do not have a spouse (Dingeldey/Sopp/Wagner 2012).

Marginal part-time work is precarious in multiple respects (BMFSFJ 2011), but there are strong incentives to maintain the special regulation of marginal part-time work: it allows access to affordable domestic help, it is often the only means of access for married women to the labour market, and it is not subject to income tax if it is the only job (Klenner/Schmidt 2012). Moreover, it is used by employers as a strategy for “maximising heads” in order to increase working time flexibility on the side of the employer,⁷⁶ which is especially attractive within the service sector. Within the model of the adult worker, these incentives are clearly misdirected.

In December 2010, 15 % of the employees, or 4.9 million in absolute numbers, were exclusively employed in marginal part-time jobs. Two thirds of them were women. The differences between east and west Germany are quite remarkable, however: 21.9 % of female employees in west Germany and 12.7 % in east Germany belonged to this group. With regard to men, there is no significant difference between east and west (9.8 % and 10 % respectively).

To sum up: while the share of part-time work among young people is quite similar in Germany and France, the meaning in early working life differs crucially. Part-time work is more likely to be an involuntary stage in France, while it is mainly linked to education in Germany.

⁷⁴ It can also be used as short-term employment under certain conditions (less than 52 working days per year).

⁷⁵ This is especially true for east Germany.


⁷⁶ In spite of the fact that employers pay flat rate contributions (10 % statutory pension insurance, 13 % statutory health insurance) and taxes (2 %), which are above the employers' contributions for standard employment.

Gender effects are lower among young workers, but become clear-cut for prime age women especially in Germany. The increase in female labour market participation has to a major extent been a redistribution of work. Looking at the objectives, part-time work is mainly used to combine work and care duties in both countries, but the share of female part-time employment is much lower in France, while the average working hours are higher.

4.1.5. Low Income Work

One of the main risks of employment uncertainty is the inability to earn a living. Low earnings can be regarded as a specific type of precarious employment as well as a consequence of atypical employment. In the following, we refer to both aspects.

The German low wage sector has sharply increased since the mid 1990s (Bosch 2009). According to recent figures from the German "Structure of Earnings Survey", about 20.6 % of employees earn hourly wages below 2/3 of the median wage. According to other data, the share has even reached almost one quarter of the employees (Kalina/Weinkopf 2012). The dynamic is characterised overall by the increase of atypical employment relations (Keller/Seifert 2011). In many cases, young workers, newcomers in the labour market, are especially affected (see Figure 11).



It becomes quite clear that young people are at higher risk than other age groups of earning low wages. But whereas for part-time and fixed-term employment, seniority effects can be expected to some extent for older age groups, the situation is different for TAW and marginal part-time workers: the risk of low wage work remains at a high and relatively stable level for all age groups. Compared with 2006, the data show that the share of low wage workers holding a permanent full-time contract (so-called "Normalarbeiter") remained stable at 11 %. The share is considerably higher (30 %) among employees who are employed in a company which is not bound by collective agreement. Among atypical workers, about one half earn a low wage. The risk of low income is highest for temporary agency workers and those in marginal part-time employment (mini-job). The highest increase has been recorded among marginal part-time workers. About 84 % are paid a wage that is below two thirds of the median.

The problem of the "working poor", well known in liberal countries like the United States, has arrived in Germany. "In-work poverty" is defined by taking the household income (based on needs-adjusted equivalence scales) as a reference. Income risks and related poverty risk will decrease if household income is taken as a reference: the in-work poverty risk of German employees is about 7 % (in 2007), but in contrast to most other European countries, it has significantly increased over the last years. The share for France is only slightly lower: 6 % of the workforce, which is mainly caused by discontinuous employment, as the definition refers to all people working at least six months per year. Especially young workers are often affected by contracts of short duration or spells of TAW, leading to employment interruptions and spells of non-employment. Not surprisingly, the risk of in-work poverty is highest among households with atypically employed sole earners (Keller/Seifert 2011, pp. 28-29). This is true for both countries.

Empirical evidence proves that countries with mandatory minimum wage systems (like France and the United Kingdom) achieve better results with respect to the bridging function into standard employment than Germany with marginal part-time jobs (Herzog-Stein/Sesselmeier 2012). Moreover, while statutory minimum wages do not necessarily reduce income inequality, they restrict the "race to the bottom" of wages.

Box 3: The French Statutory Minimum Wage: Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance (SMIC)

The French minimum wage is a heritage of the post war period. Since 1970, it has been defined as the minimum hourly wage, which is adjusted every year, according to the development of the consumer price index (INSEE 2012). There are certain exceptions for small enterprises and a reduction of 20 % for young people without employment experience. The SMIC is based on the idea of a public win-win scenario: while employees receive a minimum wage, employers profit from reduced social security contributions. In 2011, the SMIC was 9.19 euro gross per hour.

In European comparison, the French statutory minimum wage is the highest. It is about 60 % of the median and hence close to the national low wage threshold (Bosch/Weinkopf 2012). Moreover, it is indexed to inflation rate and average wage developments, which guarantees dynamic adjustment over time. Low wage work in France is mainly a phenomenon of part-time and short-term temporary employment. With reference to the most recent data of 2006, the share of low wage work is twice as high for young workers as it is for those aged 30 to 45. The central factor here is temporary employment of short duration. Within the group of those below 30, 60 % worked less than one year in 2006, while the share is only one third for older age groups. Low wages are more frequent among women (33 %) than among men (23 %), which is in part caused by the higher shares of part-time work among females. The highest share of female low wage work can be found in public administration, in the retail sector as well as in the health and social service sector. Among men, low wage work can be particularly found in administrative work, in the building industry and operational services (INSEE 2009).

The second aspect refers to wage discrimination rather than low wages as such. With regard to atypical employment, European legislation, namely Article 157 TEUV in combination with Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment, Directive 97/81/EC on part-time employment, and Directive 2008/104/EC on TAW, transposed into national legislation de jure guarantees equal treatment for those employed in these forms of employment compared to those employed on a permanent basis. But de facto enterprises use exit options to by-pass employment regulation in order to reduce labour costs.

With regard to part-time work, wage discrimination is more widespread in France than in Germany. One reason is that part-time work is not usually subject to collective negotiations on firm level. Income levels are comparable, but the average working hours are higher for

France, where part-time work is in fact defined as long part-time employment. In 2002/2003, almost half of the part-time employees in both countries received incomes of below 700 euro (Kroos 2008, pp. 123-145). Among German part-time workers, the risk of low pay is especially high for marginal part-time workers (Bosch 2009, p. 341). According to the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the vast majority of 88 % is receiving low pay. Looking at sideline jobs, 58 % of the employees who earn less than five Euros gross per hour are marginal part-time workers.⁷⁷ While employment legislation and collective bargaining agreements do not differ de jure, marginal part-time employment provides an exit-option for employers, de facto undermining the principle of equal treatment: employers can avoid direct wage discrimination and still take a financial advantage from marginal part-time employment: as marginal part-time jobs are not subject to income tax and social security contributions, employers set gross wages on the level of hourly net income of full-time workers. Although employers pay a flat rate social security contribution of 30 %, which is higher than for standard employees, they can thereby reduce their labour costs and increase internal flexibility (Voss/Weinkopf 2012). As a consequence, marginal part-time workers sacrifice personal social security entitlements and do not get any award for the burden of higher insecurity in their present situation due to low wages, secondary social security and long-term disadvantages with regard to pension claims and high poverty risk.

As far as fixed-time work is concerned, various studies confirm wage differences between permanent and fixed-term employees (McGinnity/Mertens/Gundert September 2005). The share of low incomes is higher for France than for Germany. The main explanatory factors are the different sectoral distributions of fixed-term employment, the role of internal markets in France, and the strong link between the length of service and income (Kroos 2008, p. 166).

German wages paid to temporary agency workers are generally lower than in the reference branch. The intermediation of a third party might be one reason. Moreover, temporary agency workers are expected to accept lower wages in order to gain access to the labour market. While legal regulation demands equal pay, this regulation will not apply if there is a collective agreement between the employers' association and the trade union (Niehaus 2011, p. 4).

⁷⁷ Calculations are based on the GSOEP. Differences cannot be explained by sector and qualifications.

From a social security point of view, the time span during which employees are affected by low pay is crucial. Whereas short periods of work in a low pay job in combination with a high probability of upward mobility are not critical, low pay in combination with low upward mobility is more severe. Data on earnings mobility show relatively high wage mobility for intermediate and high-skilled workers in France, whereas in Germany upward mobility is much lower. Low-paid workers run the risk of entering a vicious circle between low-paid jobs and unemployment (Bosch 2009).

As far as wage policy is concerned, France and Germany differ crucially in two respects: on the one hand, the general binding character of the SMIC reduces uncertainty on the part of the employee, as wages have a reliable downward limit, as well as on the part of employers by means of subsidised social security contributions. On the other hand, atypical employment relations in France are subject to stricter regulation as far as payment of premiums for higher insecurity is concerned. Both aspects, together with the dynamic character of the SMIC on a relatively high level, reduce income insecurities and are expected to reduce uncertainty especially among the young, who are in fact often employed in atypical forms of employment. The main employment insecurity for young French workers is employment disruptions due to the short duration of contracts, which increase the risk of in-work poverty.

4.2. Gender Aspects of Employment Insecurity

The policy strategy of flexicurity has, so far, paid little attention to specific measures for gender equality. Focusing on wage security, the implicit assumption is that rising female employment rates will lead to increasing gender equality. Lewis/Plomien (2009) argue that supply-side measures are not enough, however.

Women shoulder a large part of insecurities in Germany, especially through part-time and marginal part-time employment, and in particular through the high gender pay gap and their overrepresentation in low-wage jobs. In France, where the general statutory minimum wage provides a bottom line and a downward limit, the conditions are somewhat better. For Germany, the following trends can be identified: the Lisbon strategy's indicator concerning the female labour market participation rate (60 %) has already been fulfilled in Germany since 1995, but it has mainly been realised by even more women taking up part-time jobs. While

female labour market participation has been constantly rising, full-time equivalents have not increased. As a consequence, average working hours of women decreased due to the strong increase in marginal part-time work (BMFSFJ 2011).

Looking at fixed-term employment, the share of women is higher than that of men, but this applies to France more than to Germany (2009: 9 % versus 8.2 % in Germany, 11 % versus 7.7 % in France, for employees aged 25-64) (DESTATIS 2010, pp. 38-39). Family-related work interruptions and part-time work have long-term negative effects, above all on statutory old age insurance claims. Those negative effects, which women are increasingly becoming aware of at young ages, might influence decisions like family formation, taken in earlier stages of the life course. This can be illustrated taking the German statutory old age insurance as an example:

As far as old age insurance in Germany is concerned, coverage is consistently around 83 % (84 % for men and 83 % for women), not including civil servants' pensions (about 5 %). However, coverage does not say anything about the level of benefits. Periods of unemployment or inactivity as well as low contributions due to part-time or low-wage employment increase the risk of poverty in old age, with women particularly at risk in this context. Difficulties in reconciling work and family life, e.g. due to limited childcare provision and the still widespread half-day schools, mean that children still severely restrict mothers' career opportunities in Germany. At the same time, men's income prospects have decreased, and many have no chance of assuming the role of male breadwinner in a single-earner family. Insufficient income on the part of the male partner is seen as a major obstacle to realising fertility intentions in Germany.

De-facto polarisation does not necessarily reflect individual preferences, however, and may rather be a result of institutionally filtered decisions of interdependent individuals (BMFSFJ 2011, p. 179). Research on desired working hours in Germany shows that preferences of men and women are converging: mothers wish to work more, while fathers would like to work fewer hours (Klenner/Pfahl 2008, p. 273).

Gender effects of employment and wage (in)security are stronger in Germany than in France. To illustrate further insights on the consequences of the inconsistent governance of German labour market and social policies and its effects on gender-specific insecurities, we refer to recent empirical research conducted by our department (see Box "Female Bread-

winner"). On the one hand, the German welfare state still promotes the classic breadwinner model: derived social security entitlements for non-working or marginal employed spouses⁷⁸ and joint taxation of married couples⁷⁹ still provide strong disincentives for egalitarian gender arrangements. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing "revision of the German male breadwinner model from below" (Knuth 2006, p. 164, translation by the authors). In other family phases of life (e. g. separation, divorce and unemployment), policy reforms which have been introduced in recent years are reflecting the norm of the adult worker model. Security claims are increasingly based on individual employment participation, while derived entitlements being eroded. This poses new challenges – in particular for women with a discontinuous employment biography – and often leads to very precarious life situations.

The example of female breadwinner families shows that institutional arrangements might contribute to insecure and precarious economic situations of families and mothers in particular. It could be argued that this might contribute to a decision against parenthood. This argument, however, remains rather speculative and requires further research.

Box 4: Female Breadwinners in Germany⁸⁰

If single mothers are considered, women are the main or even the sole earner in about 18 % of German multiperson households with income. The group of female breadwinners is a heterogeneous one consisting of women who are solely responsible for earning a living for themselves, their children and their partners if applicable. Nevertheless, the female breadwinner is predominately not the counterpart of the male breadwinner "from a different angle". A small group of female breadwinners has evolved who, due to their high skill level and a corresponding labour market position, live in new, hitherto unusual, gender arrangements, by agreement with their partner, who is intentionally less active in employment. However, households with female breadwinners are predominantly difficult and fragile arrangements. Women do not "feed" the family under the same terms as men. They gain this status mostly unintentionally and provide for their families under precarious conditions to some extent. In 2007, 31 % of female (but only 4 % of male) breadwinners earned up to 900 Euros per month (Klammer/Neukirch/Weßler-Poßberg 2012). Women as breadwinners are often affected by an accumulation of strain, because they often bear the double burden of work and care duties (Klenner/Klammer 2009). One may conclude that compared to the (male or female) breadwinner model, egalitarian income constellations of couples offer significant advan-

⁷⁸ In statutory health insurance.

⁷⁹ The greater the difference between the earned incomes, the higher the tax benefits.

⁸⁰ See Klammer/Neukirch/Weßler-Poßberg (2012); BMFSFJ (2011, pp. 117-118).

tages. They provide opportunities for participation and fulfilment for both partners and are associated with a higher income and enhanced satisfaction values, as the data of the GSOEP show.

Within the traditional model of the male breadwinner, life courses are closely interrelated and based on stability over the life span. As accepted role models have become more diverse, however, bargaining processes between household members become increasingly important. Although gender relations are crucial, family arrangements are shaped by institutional conditions which make some arrangements more practicable than others.

To sum up, the institutional framework – in addition to different role models – can be assumed to affect not only the different labour market patterns, but also men's and women's perception of (in)security and (un)certainly and ultimately their private decisions. The last chapter of this section addresses the aspect of perceived employment uncertainty in greater detail (see Chapter 4.4).

4.3. The Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis

Young people are especially vulnerable to economic downturns (Bell/Blanchflower 2010). The less established situation of young workers within the labour market makes their employment situation more volatile in relation to the business cycle – positively as well as negatively. Two effects account for the special sensitivity of youth employment towards the business cycle: 1) the prime entre effect, meaning that the situation of young people on the labour market is constantly influenced by new entrants who are searching for their first job, 2) the precarity effect, standing for the higher risk to young workers of losing their jobs in times of crisis compared to people who have been working in a company for several years, due to seniority (OECD 2009, p. 60). What is more, young people are more often employed on a fixed-term basis, and fixed-term contracts are very likely not to be renewed in economic downturns. This is confirmed by the present situation: in relative terms, the rise of unemployment within the OECD has been twice as high among the young as for the prime age group (OECD 2009, p. 62). The picture looks different if one refers to absolute numbers, which indicate only an average increase compared to other age groups. There are two main explanatory factors. The first and external one refers to the overall demographic dynamic in

Europe. The second and internal factor refers to the development of labour force participation. In order to avoid stigmatising effects of unemployment spells, one way to disappear from the labour market in times of crisis is to prolong periods of education or even to return to the education system. This dynamic becomes apparent from the labour force participation rate of this age group, which has severely decreased since 2009 (Brenke 2012).

As shown in Chapter 1, Germany is performing rather differently compared to other European countries, including France, in the actual downturn. Against the general trend, overall unemployment and youth unemployment have decreased. Even though Germany had a strong recession in 2008/2009, the effect on the labour market was rather moderate. In the post-recession period, Germany quickly returned to a robust growth path, which had positive effects on the labour market.

Several factors had been crucial in this respect: employers tried to retain their core workers by means of internal flexibility measures like working time adjustments and working time accounts; they were remarkably reluctant to apply strategies of external flexibility, so employees were not dismissed as was the case in earlier times of crisis. Knuth (2011) argues that as a *quid pro quo* the willingness of the core workers to make internal concessions in order to secure their jobs has increased, ultimately as a consequence of the German activation strategy. The established corporatist communication channels between the German state, employers and trade unions, and compatible interests (in securing specific skills in companies on the one hand and avoiding rising unemployment rates in society on the other), mean that the scope of external labour market flexibility, which has been created as a consequence of ongoing deregulation and activation, has not been extensively used. This applies but for one exception: TAW. In Germany, such contracts have been a measure of external flexibility to buffer short-term fluctuations in demand. While the number of TAW fell sharply during the crisis, it has been constantly on the increase since that time. In spite of the relatively smooth and stable economic situation in Germany, economic uncertainty of employers has shortened their planning horizon. Internal flexibility was made possible by the use of a classical measure of ALMP: publicly funded short-time working. This measure fulfilled a stabilising function and allowed a quick return to an expanding production path.

The moderate wage development of the last decade and advantages in unit labour costs enhanced the competitive situation of Germany. As an export nation, it has made outstanding profits from the increasing global demand. This, on the other hand, causes current

account imbalances with other EU-member states, however, which is part of the specific problems of the EU crisis. The growing demand for labour first took effect within the rather precarious segment of the labour market but subsequently increased regular employment, which is subject to social insurance contributions.

Another aspect of Germany's specific situation is the demographic dynamic: during the last three decades, the German labour market has been characterised by a constantly growing labour force, but the landscape is now changing. As a consequence of a rapidly aging society, the potential labour force is shrinking and relieving pressure on the demand side of the labour market. The other side of the coin is that Germany will be confronted with an increasing shortage of skilled workers in future.

There is hardly any other country in which the precarious sector of the employment system has been growing as much as in Germany. This is causally linked to the deregulation of marginal employment and the lack of a statutory minimum wage. This also means a redistribution of working time, which becomes visible in the quantitative expansion of part-time and marginal employment. Finally, the use of labour market policy measures has a cosmetic effect at the bottom line of the labour market. Participants in labour market measures are not counted as unemployed and therefore do not turn up in the statistics.

The latter also accounts for larger numbers of young people who participate in different kinds of labour market and school-based programmes. They are not viewed as being unemployed, despite the fact that their prospects of entering regular employment are bleak.

In France, the situation of young workers is much worse: unemployment among the 15-29 year olds reached 17 % in 2010. Moreover, the duration of unemployment increased, while the duration of employment decreased after the beginning of the crisis in the second half of 2008 (Danzin/Simonnet/Trancart 2011). In previous crises, the situation of French young women was more vulnerable than the situation of men in the same age group. This effect has turned reversed in the current downturn. Two main explanatory factors account for this change. First, the educational level of women: in 2008, 37 % of men and 51 % of young women had graduated (*l'enseignement supérieur*) by the beginning of their labour market career, whereas the proportion of those without a school-leaving qualification was 19 % for men and 12 % for women respectively (Mainguené/Martinelli 2010). Secondly, women predominantly work in the third sector, which is less prone to cyclical developments. In 2008, a

share of 87 % of women worked in the third sector, while the share was 64 % for men. It was 1 % against 9 % within the industrial sector and 12 % and 20 % respectively in the construction sector (Danzin/Simonnet/Trancart 2011, pp. 7-8). Moreover, the crisis has led to a significant increase in part-time work in France, mainly among the female workforce. The share of young female part-time workers increased while decreasing among men.

Times of crisis are in general deeply linked to uncertainties: future developments are perceived as threatening and opaque. Crises lead either to protest or to a retreat of citizens into the private sphere. This might not be seen as the right moment to build a family (as we will discuss later on; see Chapter 5.3).

4.4. The Role of Perceived Employment Uncertainty

Unlike insecurity, which is closely linked to risk and evokes political associations of state activity and social security, uncertainty has a more diverse and far-reaching connotation (see Chapter 2.1). As Crouch states, uncertainty encompasses a strong subjective dimension, which is dependent on individual perception. At the same time, it is shaped by external factors, which can be ascertained by some external observer but the individual is not necessarily aware of (Crouch 2010, p. 1). Barbier emphasises, "The perception (individual or collective representation of individuals) about uncertainty, and especially economic uncertainty, is shaped, determined by the political and societal context ('institutions')" (Barbier 2010, p. 1).

The perception of uncertainty is embedded in institutional structures and influenced by social norms as well as personal resources. Comparative data show that even in countries with low de jure employment security - in other words, low levels of individual protection against dismissal - and high employment mobility, people do not necessarily feel insecure. Denmark provides the most striking example, where low levels of EPL are combined with low levels of perceived uncertainty (Schmid 2011b). Perceived employment uncertainty is closely linked to individual welfare and expectations about future developments. It is one of the crucial factors for individual well-being of the employee (Geishecker 2010).

Decisions are not merely shaped by preferences and objective circumstances. They are influenced by subjective appraisal of the current situation and expectations about future developments. This accounts in particular for far-reaching decisions like the challenging endeav-

our of family formation. Whereas in former times childbearing was perceived as a fate imposed upon families, nowadays it is most often the result of a conscious decision for which anxieties and ambivalent feelings have to be overcome. Whereas culture and social norms formerly worked in favour of fertility, this no longer applies to postmodern societies with increasingly flexible employment systems.

Culture used to be seen as a way to reduce complexity and uncertainty, as it sets social norms and defines what is considered "normal" in society (Kaufmann 2003). It is argued that social norms and family bonds provided security and orientation about central stages of individual biography. As a consequence of those social norms losing their binding character – given the growing importance of individual values – structural stability decreases so that, with increasing freedom, certainty about one's own life course decisions diminishes

Furthermore, flexible labour markets demand a new type of "jobholder". Lifelong job security has been replaced by the challenging and uncertain necessity of a continuous self-governing of one's own employment biography.

Burkart (2007) argues that the culture of individualisation is a source of doubt and uncertainty. Subjectivation and concentration on the self by self-monitoring (Selbstbeobachtung), self-disclosure (Selbstoffenbarung) and biographic problematisation require reflectivity as a central competence of the modern self. In such an ambivalent setting, the perception of an individual's employment biography prospects becomes a central issue. One may assume that a culture of uncertainty does not support childlessness per se, but it does have this effect under certain historical circumstances (Burkart 2007, pp. 415-416).

Empirical evidence on self-evaluated employment insecurity reveals interesting differences between Germany and France: in Germany, job insecurity is stated the most important factor for the decision not to have a child (Höhn/Ette/Ruckdeschel 2006), while this aspect does not play a decisive role in France (Letablier/Salles 2011).

The analysis of Letablier/Salles (2011), conducted for our project within GUSTO, examines determinants of different fertility patterns in France and west Germany based on qualitative interviews in both countries. The analysis shows that differences in the perception of insecurity and uncertainty, as well as in social norms and values, frame decisions concerning family formation. The main results of the analysis are:

- More than objective economic security, it is the perception of uncertainty that matters for far-reaching decisions structuring future life.
- The perception of economic insecurity and its reported impact on family decisions is higher for respondents from west Germany than for French interviewees.
- The perception of the direct and indirect costs (opportunity costs as a consequence of reduced degrees of freedom and for expected loss of income) of family formation differs: the anticipated costs are higher in west Germany than in France.
- The perception of labour market uncertainties differs according to gender relations and patterns of division of labour in society. Gender implications are higher in west Germany, where the male breadwinner model is still present. Male labour market insecurities are still perceived as more important as far as the perception of general economic uncertainty of the household is concerned.
- Gender relations are shaped by social norms and institutional context: policies which create a family-friendly environment and reduce tensions between work and care reduce the cost of having children.
- Policies influence perceived uncertainties and may therefore be crucial for life course decisions of young people, but outcomes differ according to the trust young people have in political institutions.


The results of the qualitative interviews indicate that an insecure occupational and financial situation only has a limited impact on fertility intentions and realisations in France, while these reasons are often given by the German respondents to justify a small family size.

It is one of the key findings that not only objective insecurities but also the perception of uncertainty decisively influence life course decisions like family formation. Objectively insecure employment situations are not necessarily perceived as such, while insecurity is not a necessary precondition of uncertainty. There is no simple scale of uncertainty. It must be seen in the nexus of people's life (linked-lives perspective), against the backdrop of social norms, and against the institutional setting as a manifestation of a social relationship within society. This can be explained by institutional factors in their broader sense, with "rules in use" referring to social norms as well as formalised institutions.

5. Uncertainty and Family Formation

5.1 What is Puzzling about Family Patterns in France and Germany?

While fertility rates in most European countries are below replacement, cross-country differences are considerable.⁸¹ The following section gives an overview of trends in family formation and fertility in Germany and France.⁸² The French fertility rate is relatively high with two children per woman on average in 2009, while Germany with 1.4 children on average is at the bottom end of the low fertility group in Europe (EU-LFS 2012).




But while the total fertility rate is biased by postponement effects,⁸³ cohort or total fertility gives a more reliable picture of overall fertility trends (see Figure 13).

⁸¹ See Schoenmaeckers/Lodewijckx (1999) for an overview and the publications of the GGS for more recent data.

⁸² Section 5.1 is in parts based on the GUSTO WP 3 working paper by Marie-Therese Letablier and Anne Salles, see Letablier/Salles (2011).

⁸³ Due to economic trends, changes in the education system etc.

Figure 13: Completed Fertility by Cohort: Germany and France Compared



Notes: *Since 2001 without west Berlin,** Since 2001 without east Berlin, no reliable data available for the 1930-1936 cohorts.

Source: Own compilation, data: FR: INSEE (2011); DE: Statistisches Bundesamt (2011), Mikrozensus.

For the 1960 cohort, the completed fertility was 1.8 in east Germany, while it reached 1.6 in west Germany. A further decrease for the younger cohorts is expected, as the mean number of children until the age of 34 decreased by 13 % in West and 28 % in east Germany respectively, taking the mean of the 1960-1975 cohort as a reference. A catch-up effect until the age of 49 (assumed age of completed fertility) is very unlikely. The French total fertility rate decreased too, but it has risen since the mid 1990s and is, at this stage, one of the highest in Europe (Pla/Beaumel 2011).


Looking to education, the increase has been strongest among the lowest educated group, while fertility has slightly decreased for the intermediate group (Davis/Mazuy 2010, p. 425). The gap between Germany and France has become wider over the past fifteen years (Letablier/Salles 2011, p. 15).

Most so-called “lowest-low countries” empirically share three trends (OECD 2011, pp. 90-91): (1) significant postponement of motherhood, (2) decrease in the number of large families and (3) increasing childlessness.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ While childlessness remains low in Japan and Korea (BMFSFJ 2011; OECD 2011, p. 90).

With regard to the first aspect, this is true for both countries: there has been a common continuous trend of postponing family formation, in other words, an increase in the age of the mother at the first birth, since the mid 1970s (Dorbritz 2008). It has now reached 30 on average in France and 29.3 years in Germany (Letablier/Salles 2011, p. 16). Letablier/Salles (2011) show that the postponement effect differs according to the level of education: in France, highly educated women have their first child almost five years later than the reference group without a school-leaving qualification. In addition, the introduction of modern contraceptive practices and the expansion of education especially among women have been crucial factors for this development. With regard to the overall average age, Figure 14 shows that the postponement of childbirth is a general trend in European countries, while the strength of the effect differs.

Figure 14: Average Age of Mothers at Birth in Different European Countries 2000 and 2008



Source: Own compilation, data: EU-LFS (2012).

In contrast to Germany, however, French mothers catch up in subsequent births. Especially the group of highly educated women concentrate their reproductive life on a short interval, compared to low-educated women who have more children over a longer period of time (Letablier/Salles 2011; Davis/Mazuy 2010). While in east Germany the share of mothers with only one child is increasing, the share of mothers having three and more children has decreased in east and west Germany. Moreover, the gap between the birth of the first and the

second child has broadened in Germany: it is about four years on average in west Germany and five years in east Germany (DESTATIS 2011).

The second dynamic is true for Germany, where many families have only one child, but to a lesser extent for France, where families with three and more children are much more common (See Table 7).

Table 7: Average Number of Children per Woman (1960 birth cohort), France and Germany, in %

Number of children (average)	FR	DE-W	DE-E
0	10	19	7
1	18	20	28
2	40	36	43
3	22	12	11
4	10	5	4
Total	100	92	93

Note: the gap to 100% refers to people who did not answer the question.

Sources: Letablier/Salles (2011, p. 20); data: Toulemon/Pailhé/Rossier (2008) for FR; DESTATIS (2009) for DE.

The third aspect shows the most disturbing pattern in the German-French comparison: Germany – more precisely: west Germany – has the highest share of childlessness in Europe (Eurostat 2011). France, in contrast, is among the countries with the lowest rate of women remaining childless. The overall rate of women remaining childless in France is about 12 % for the 1950-1954 cohort and 11 % for the 1945-1949 cohort, while the reference values for Germany are 18 % respectively 14 % for west and 8 % respectively 7 % for east Germany (González/Jurado-Guerrero 2006; Köppen/Mazuy/Toulemon 2007). In both countries, childlessness among women varies according to the educational level: highly-qualified women are more likely to remain childless (Köppen/Mazuy/Toulemon 2007). But while the effect is rather moderate in France, the level of education is a strong predictor of childlessness in west Germany, though the patterns differ for east Germany (see Table 8).⁸⁵

East Germany is characterised by low levels of childlessness among the high-skilled and rather high levels among those with a low educational level. These contrasting patterns of

⁸⁵ However, childlessness and notably the effect of the qualification level has been overestimated in the past due to the quality of the “Mikrozensus” data, which only allowed assessment of the number of children living in the same household. See Scharein (2011) for further discussion.

childlessness in east and west Germany are one of the most remarkable characteristics of German fertility behaviour. Both structural and cultural aspects are expected to play a role in this context: the better availability of childcare services goes hand in hand with a higher share of young families who do not expect public childcare to have a negative effect on their children (Dorbritz 2011).

Table 8: Childlessness in Germany by Level of Qualification (ISCED 97), in %

cohort	DE-W			DE-E		
	low	middle	high	low	middle	high
1964-1968	14.5	21.7	30.9	26.1	9.3	11.2
1959-1963	15.1	17.6	27.2	21.4	5.6	7.8
1954-1958	12.5	16.7	24.8	-	6.8	6.7
1949-1953	10.8	15.3	22.0	-	6.4	7.2

Source: DESTATIS (2009, p. 29).

Dorbritz (2011) shows interaction effects between the level of education, income and level of childlessness: in west Germany, childlessness among highly-qualified women is low, if they are not in employment, while it is high for those with a low net equivalent income who are working on a full-time basis.

5.2 Employment Insecurity in Demographic Research

Three main strands of theories on fertility decisions can be distinguished: approaches based on ideational aspects like preferences (Hakim 2000) and values (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe/Moors 2000) and rational-choice based economic theories of fertility (Becker 1960) (see Table 9). They share a general focus on mothers, as they assume that they will take on the caring role (Schröder/Pforr 2009, p. 220), which is an oversimplification given that men's preferences as well as the overall household situation might play a critical role (linked-lives).

The decision to start a family is one of the most far reaching over the life course and requires a certain degree of stability or certainty in order to acquire enough resources to keep the family and to rear the children. Traditionally, strong social values and family bonds have provided security and orientation. Entering the bond of matrimony has been the classic way of reaching that stage. Given the growing importance of individual values, the "societal kit" provided by common social norms is expected to be weaker nowadays. This is affirmed by

changing role models and growing variety and acceptance of life concepts, including family life. Family patterns have become more diverse and dynamic.

Economic theory of fertility focuses on the costs and benefits of childbearing. Based on human capital theory, opportunity costs of children increase with the level of education. Increasing levels of education, employment and career prospects of women have therefore been identified as playing a crucial role in the postponement of family formation and the decline of fertility in industrialised countries. From this point of view, fertility is a decision problem: couples optimize their time use between domestic work and employment according to their preferences. Concepts based on preference theory assume preference heterogeneity among women as a work-family dichotomy.

	Independent variable	Proponents
Economic theory of fertility	direct and indirect costs and benefits of children	(Becker 1991; Becker/Barro 1986; Björklund 2007)
Preference theory	female preferences for work and/or family	(Hakim 2000; Vitali et al. 2009)
Value orientations	second demographic transition: reorientation of values, individual, post-materialist values	(Lesthaeghe/Moors 2000; van de Kaa 1987; 2001; Surkyn/Lesthaeghe 2004)
Source: Own compilation.		

Research on the impact of employment uncertainties on family formation and fertility rates is implicitly or explicitly based on rational choice. With regard to employment and job insecurity, unstable employment relations and experience of unemployment are seen as factors taking effect on opportunity costs of children. Moreover, young people might reject long-term decisions like marriage and family formation as a consequence of economic and temporal uncertainty (Mills/Blossfeld 2005). As a consequence, precarious employment might lead to postponement or even rejection of family formation. The argument that family formation might be an exit option for those who do not expect stable inclusion into the labour market has received little theoretical and empirical attention so far. Retreating into the private sphere provides an alternative option for reducing uncertainty and receiving personal recognition.

The following table (see Table 10) summarizes key findings of recent empirical research.

Table 10: Demographic Research Related to Employment Insecurity

Author	Variables	Results	Data & Sample
Adsera (2011)	iv: economic uncertainty of women; dv: second birth	Unemployment leads to postponement of first and second births.	ECHP; analysis based on 13 countries
Bernardi/Klärner/von der Lippe (2008)	iv: stable employment; dv: intention to have a child H: cultural factors moderates individual reaction to job insecurity.	Different patterns of family formation related to different attitudes towards job security: in west Germany, positive effect of permanent employment but only weak effect in east Germany.	semi-structured interviews, east and west Germany
Brose (2008)	Influence of income and economic uncertainty on family formation and extension.	Level of income and income security of the partner is positively correlated with readiness to become a mother.	GSOEP, west Germany
Dribe/Stanfors (2010)	H1: no negative effect of dual careers on fertility after the 1st child due to good family-work compatibility, positive effect due to more gender equality, positive effect on union stability. H2: power couples in which at least one partner is employed in the public sector can be expected to be more likely to have either a second or higher order birth. H3: authors expect to find a positive effect of educational homogamy on having second and higher order births. iv: dual-career couples, union stability, gender equality; dv: continued childbearing	Power couples are more likely to continue childbearing and are less likely to separate than other couples. Despite higher opportunity costs of childbearing and the small gains to specialisation, power couples in Sweden are able to combine career and continued childbearing. H1: linear positive relationship between educational power and fertility in all intervals. H2: supported for third and fourth births, no strong gender effect. H3: higher degree of union stability among power couples. Power couples are more likely to continue childbearing.	longitudinal data on couples from population registers in Sweden, 1991-2005, multivariate longitudinal analysis

Author	Variables	Results	Data & Sample
Gebel/Giesecke (2009)	iv: unemployment, fixed-term contract dv: fertility	The effect of women's unemployment on timing of the first birth differs: while it is positive in west Germany, the author finds a weak significant negative effect in east Germany. No interaction effect of education and job specific characteristics. Fixed-term contracts do not change fertility behaviour in a substantial way, but transitions from unemployment to permanent employment lead to catch-up effects, while transitions to fixed-term employment do not. The differences between east and west Germany suggest an important role for social norms in family formation.	east and west Germany, GSOEP
Kreyenfeld (2010)	Stable female employment is a prerequisite for having children. Periods of employment uncertainty are expected to postpone motherhood especially for high-skilled women. Uncertainties are expected to be more important in east Germany, where mothers are expected to work after childbirth. iv: unemployment (objective measure), perceived job and income insecurity (subjective measure); dv: first birth.	West Germany: no evidence on postponement of motherhood due to employment insecurity. East Germany: weak evidence for the idea that employment instability has a negative effect on the first birth. No effect of unemployment on the first birth. For east and west Germany, significantly higher rates of women entering motherhood among those classifying themselves as economically inactive (housewives or others). But this group is very small in east Germany. Interaction effects of education and measures of economic uncertainty: first-birth rates are lower during unemployment of highly educated women. Women without a formal vocational qualification are likely to become mothers when they experience economic uncertainty.	GSOEP, longitudinal dataset, event history analysis, east and west Germany
Luijkx/Wolbers (2009)	iv: employment precarity; dv: entry into marriage and parenthood; stage at the age of 35 H1: negative effect of employment precarity in early work-life on family formation. H2: only moderate effects expected for the Netherlands due to the rather generous net of social security. H3: in conservative welfare regimes, women in precarious employment reduce uncertainty by opting for marriage and motherhood.	Negative effect of employment precarity on men on entering marriage; negative effect of employment insecurity on men being fathers at the age of 35, while employment precarity, part-time work and duration of unemployment have a positive effect on women entering marriage and becoming mothers.	life-history surveys: households in the Netherlands 1995; Family Survey Dutch Population 2000

Author	Variables	Results	Data & Sample
<p>Pailhé/Solaz (2012); Pailhé/Solaz (2011)</p>	<p>iv: unemployment; dv: arrival of first child. H1: employment instability may have opposite effects on fertility, due to different strength of income and price effect. H2: this impact is expected to be larger when men are unemployed than when women are. H3: this impact is expected to be higher for first births. H4: the long-term implications of such employment instability depend on the duration of job insecurity. H5: the worse the macroeconomic situation, the longer people wait before having a child.</p>	<p>Employment uncertainty matters in different ways for men and women. Unanticipated changes in the economic situation influence timing of the first birth. Men experiencing unemployment delay the transition to the first child, indicating that the income effect prevails (relative to opportunity costs). In contrast, childbirth is not affected if partners are prepared for an unstable employment situation. The authors find no effect of women's unemployment, either on timing or on completed fertility. Moreover, no subsequent effect is found after the first child is born. Employment uncertainty affects timing rather than quantity, though effects differ between men and women.</p>	<p>1st wave Generation and Gender Survey (GGS), France</p>
<p>Sobotka (2010)</p>	<p>Estimated childlessness: high for highly educated women in west Germany but low for those in east Germany.</p>	<p>Postponing parenthood is not the major reason for rising childlessness and educational differences. Rising birth rates at advanced reproductive age.</p>	<p>Birth registry data Denmark, census data, GSOEP 1965 cohort</p>
<p>Özcan/Mayer/Luedicke (2010)</p>	<p>iv: unemployment; dv: timing of fertility of men and women H1: men's unemployment delays first birth, but women's unemployment does not affect timing. H2: negative effect of the duration of unemployment on fertility. H3: positive effect of the duration of unemployment on the timing for low and highly educated women. H4: partner's skill level may deepen or offset the negative effect of unemployment.</p>	<p>"Unemployment per se may not be a clear cause of delayed transitions to motherhood." (Özcan/Mayer/Luedicke 2010, p. 839). H1: only women in west Germany – in east Germany, substitution effect larger than income effect. H2: no effect of cumulative number of months in unemployment. H3: confirmed for east Germany but negative effect for west Germany, low education explains higher costs of childbearing and childrearing, time gain less important than loss of income. H4: men whose partners are highly educated delay fatherhood when unemployed. Effects for unemployed women in east and west Germany are not significant.</p>	<p>German Life History Study (GLHS), 1971 cohort, monthly information, event history analysis, two representative and retrospective surveys, east and west Germany in 1996-1998 and 2005</p>
<p>Source: Own compilation; iv=independent variable, dv=dependent variable, H=hypothesis.</p>			

Research on the effects of employment and income insecurity often refers to the German case. The principal reasons lie in the availability of good longitudinal data⁸⁶, the strong interest in the determinants of the very low fertility rates in Germany and the differences between east and west Germany.

Empirical research on the effects of employment and income insecurity is mostly – implicitly or explicitly – based on economic theory of fertility, but it nevertheless lacks theoretical clarity. Employment insecurity is modeled as both increase (Kreyenfeld 2010, p. 352) and decrease (Adsera 2011) in opportunity costs. More complex analysis differentiates between income, substitution and price effect (with reference to opportunity costs) in order to make contrary effects visible.⁸⁷ While the income effect is identified as being clearly negative, the aggregate effect remains unclear, as different forms of job and employment insecurity might have different effects. One of the most robust and cross-national results of the empirical fertility research is the negative effect of education periods on fertility decisions.

Altogether, empirical – for the most part quantitative – findings on the relationship between employment insecurity and fertility decisions are inconsistent. However, there are indications of different effects for east and west Germany, as well as for men and women. Gender effects have been identified in France as well. There are only few qualitative studies on the role of employment insecurity in family formation. The study of Bernardi/Klärner/von der Lippe (2008) on east and west Germany concludes that attitudes towards employment security are decisive. While there is some evidence that objective aspects of labour market insecurity like the experience of unemployment influence individual timing of family formation, but do not explain different aggregate fertility patterns, namely family size and childlessness.

5.3 Fertility and Economic Recession

Times of economic and financial crisis are associated with increasing uncertainty, not only of markets but also of individuals: the economic uncertainty of households rises. People may fear losing their job or part of their income. Besides increasing job insecurity, financial investments held as economic securities are put at risk.

⁸⁶ The GSOEP.

⁸⁷ See for example Pailhé/Solaz (2012); Özcan/Mayer/Luedicke (2010).

As far as fertility decisions are concerned, expected effects differ according to the theoretical viewpoint. With regard to the economic theory of fertility, the opportunity costs of having children are lower in times of recession, as unemployment and lower wages are more likely at these times and therefore the cost of exiting the labour market are lower. For low earners, however, this might not be an option, as the direct costs of children might be too high. Moreover, job and income insecurity can be expected to lead to the postponement of births, as contextual circumstances and resources do not appear attractive to future parents.

Taking up a sociological point of view, research on the political transitions in Eastern Europe shows that far-reaching political reforms or regime changes lead to decreasing fertility, as a consequence of uncertainties regarding political development and the consequences for personal life (Sobotka 2011). By the same token, if people expect crisis situations to persist, withdrawal from the public sphere and greater focus on private issues might be the consequence. Family formation might have a stabilising function in this setting (Friedman/Hechter/Kanazawa 1994). To put it in a nutshell: parents want to provide a safe environment for their child. Times of war, political transition or substantial economic downturn do not fulfil this precondition. As a consequence, substantial postponements of birth can be expected, but birth rates are likely to catch up at a later stage.⁸⁸

It is still too early to empirically assess the impact of the crisis on family formation and fertility patterns in Germany and France. Moreover, it is difficult to compare the two countries, as France is much worse off, and people experience higher overall levels of insecurity and uncertainty than in Germany. But some expectations and tendencies can be reported here: while French fertility remains stable and even rises slightly unless high unemployment and economic uncertainty prevail (Pison 2011)⁸⁹, the overall fertility rate in Germany still continues to fall, despite good economic indicators and the prospect of legal entitlement to childcare for children of 1+ years of age from 2013 onwards⁹⁰ (DESTATIS 2012a). Sobotka/Skirbekk/Philipov (2011) argue that the impact depends on the pattern of reces-

⁸⁸ One example is the baby boomer effect after the Second World War.

⁸⁹ While Pison (2011) argues that the rise would probably have been stronger without recession, others see a window of opportunity for unemployed women to realise their fertility intentions while avoiding spells of unemployment.

⁹⁰ The Childcare Funding Act "Kinderförderungsgesetz (KiföG)" of 2008 promotes the expansion of childcare facilities for children below three years of age. Legal entitlement to childcare for those above one year of age is planned from August 2013 onwards. Childcare infrastructure in Germany makes up part of the concurrent legislation, meaning that competences are shared between national level and the federal states ("Länder"). Issues of financing and responsibility often remain vague and fragmented.

sion: recession as a consequence of the overall economic system is expected to have an impact on the timing of birth, but not on overall fertility. The results show that the relation is complex and nonlinear. These first impressions of the effect of the economic crisis on fertility decisions support our argument that the “choice under restrictions”, as Regnier-Loilier/Solaz (2010) call the decision to have a child, involves more than economic restrictions and is dependent on the interplay between political institutions, which shapes the perception of future uncertainty.

6. Conclusion

Many European countries are confronted with the challenge of aging societies. Germany is a striking example. Several urgent problems derive from that demographic situation, among which the long-term stabilisation of social security systems as well as the labour force are the most obvious. Not surprisingly, research on fertility has gained in importance in recent years. While most EU member states are characterised by low fertility rates, with Germany at the end of the chart, it does not apply to countries like Sweden or France.

This raises the questions addressed in this paper. We were particularly interested in discussing the possible correlation between fertility trends and labour market developments. There is some evidence that the level of (perceived) uncertainty has increased in European states. Reasons for this include the activation agenda which was introduced to reform social security systems, particularly labour market policies, and the increasing flexibility of employment structures accompanied by unprecedented growth in precarious forms of jobs.

Our analysis in this paper was focused on two main sets of research questions:

- What are the institutional aspects of the labour market insecurities and uncertainties facing young people in Germany and France? And are there substantial differences in job/employment insecurities between these countries?
- What are the implications of labour market uncertainties among young people on family formation? And do they contribute to explaining the divergent fertility patterns in France and Germany?

In addition, we consider the policy implications of our results in the following section:

- What is the role of family policy with respect to family formation and fertility and the obvious differences between France and Germany?

Before we return to these issues, however, we briefly reflect on our initial observation that differences clearly exist between France and Germany concerning attitudes towards family formation and fertility trends.

What are the most striking differences in fertility and family formation between Germany and France?

The starting point for our study is the observation of crucially different fertility rates in both countries. The empirical finding that the desired number of children in Germany is close to that in France differs sharply from the actual number of births in both countries: French women realise their desire to have children more often than German women.

First of all, it is worth emphasising that the differences are not only a question of fertility level, but also of family patterns. In short, the following differences in fertility patterns between Germany and France are striking:

		FR	DE
Timing	First birth	Postponement dependent on level of education: high-skilled have children later, but postponement effect stronger among low-skilled.	Postponement dependent on level of education: high-skilled have children later.
	Subsequent births	Catch up effect (timing) after the first birth, at least among the high-skilled. Spacing depends on skill-level – low-qualified mothers take their time for subsequent births, whereas highly-qualified parents try to keep the period of reproduction brief.	Postponement of subsequent births.
Sequencing	Childlessness	Low, dependent on level of education (higher among low-skilled mothers).	Very high, dependent on level of education (pattern in east Germany close to France, in west Germany, especially highly educated remain childless).
	Family size	Relatively high share of families with three and more children, while the share of one-child families is significantly lower than in Germany.	Overall decline in large families: the share of families with more than two children has decreased.

Source: Own compilation (see Chapter 5.1).

Two different effects can be distinguished: a postponement effect and a replacement effect of fertility. The first refers to timing, while the second refers to the choice of alternative life

preferences as a consequence of life circumstances and expected consequences. Decreasing fertility follows from two dynamics: 1) postponement, 2) sequencing of births (determining family size). While France and Germany share the first dynamic, they crucially differ in relation to the second aspect.

Conclusion: differences in fertility and family formation are not only a question of fertility level, but a question of family patterns. France and Germany show comparable effects of postponement. But sequencing differs crucially, with Germany showing much higher rates of childlessness and one-child families.

What are the institutional aspects of the labour market insecurities and uncertainties faced by young people in Germany and France? And are there substantial differences in job/employment insecurities between Germany and France?

The number of so-called precarious forms of employment has increased in many EU states. This applies especially to the German labour market. In Germany as well as in France, young workers and newcomers are affected to a disproportionately large extent by this development. In France, however, the increase in so-called atypical non-standard forms of employment occurred earlier than in Germany; the strongest growth rates could be observed in the 1990s. Germany has caught up since the turn of the millennium as a consequence of manifold labour market deregulation activities.

The analysis of precarious employment and its effects is made extremely complex by the fact that atypical employment is neither homogeneous nor does it have the same effect on all social groups. Atypical forms of employment are not coherent in function and consequences. The use of the term "atypical" as an analytical umbrella is therefore often called into question. Moreover, as our discussion on TAW regulation has shown, it is often not sufficient to look on the formal contract, meaning de jure employment regulation, since de facto application may differ.

It is no exaggeration to argue that precarious employment has become representative of the status of young employees in France. In Germany, by contrast, there are relatively standardised pathways for young newcomers to the labour market within many sectors. The transi-

tion from vocational education to work within the dual apprenticeship system is highly regulated and institutionalised. However, the status of those without a formal qualification is more precarious in this regard; their chances of accomplishing some form of stable integration into the employment system are very low.

Altogether, the development of atypical employment in France has been characterised by re-regulation efforts since the 1990s. This re-regulation on the one hand has reduced the regulation gap to standard work and on the other hand limited the precarity potential of atypical forms of employment. In contrast to Germany, French levels of regulation concerning permanent and temporary employment show only slight differences. Statutory minimum wages plays an important role. Part-time work is a form of employment mainly taken up involuntarily by young workers. In prime age, part-time employment is less prevalent than in Germany and not a desired or accepted way of combining work and family, especially among the highly-qualified.

In Germany, the deregulation concerning atypical forms of employment has caused a widening regulation gap towards regular employment. More atypical and precarious jobs have been created in return. Easy access and the lack of a statutory minimum wage lead to a sharp increase in precarious forms of atypical employment (especially TAW, "marginal" part-time jobs and low-wage jobs).

Generally speaking, the French welfare state up until now can be said to be more effectively oriented towards social integration arrangements than its German counterpart. The momentum of activation policies has been less far-reaching in France so far. Nevertheless, the extent of the lock-in effects of the main labour market policy instruments in France cannot yet be assessed.

"Precarity is everywhere" - already in 1998, Bourdieu expressed in his well-known dictum that the time and planning horizon of those concerned dramatically shortens as a consequence of increasing precarity experiences (Bourdieu 1998). But sections of society that are not directly affected in the first instance are also influenced – and will be drawn into the maelstrom of uncertainty. This effect is confirmed by empirical findings from the recent past concerning workers with high job security in core segments of the German employment system. Young newcomers, for whom atypical employment has almost become the norm for entry to the labour market, may even appreciate several aspects of atypical employment and

not experience such jobs primarily as a burden. In the end, however, effects on individual planning reliability and restrictions concerning longer term commitments seem inevitable.

Conclusion: labour market insecurities have increased in both countries during the last two decades. This particularly applies to young employees. Not only people in precarious working situations but also the “rest of society” is affected. Most remarkable is the high disciplinary effect which emanates from the new means-tested social assistance scheme in Germany (Arbeitslosengeld II). The gap in regulation between “atypical” and “regular” employment is smaller in France. The dynamic of activation policies has been less radical in France up until now.

What are the implications of labour market insecurities and uncertainties of young people for family formation? And do they contribute to explaining the divergent fertility patterns in France and Germany?

There is no simple scale of uncertainty. Uncertainty must be seen in the nexus of people’s lives (linked-lives perspective). Objectively insecure employment situations are not necessarily perceived as such. To start with an example from Germany: while marginal part-time jobs can be found mostly in the low-wage sector and are precarious in relation to social security, especially in the long run, they are perceived as a stable arrangement for married couples.

In both countries, employment uncertainties and extended periods of education lead to postponement of family formation, namely the birth of the first child. Uncertain and prolonged transitions from school to working life, characterised by high job and income insecurity, delay subsequent passages relating to personal autonomy and the transition to adulthood and influence couples’ readiness for parenting.⁹¹ School-to-work transition has been identified empirically as a normative precondition. Difficult school-to-work transitions and high youth unemployment among the low-skilled in France can be identified as one reason for postponement of first birth, especially among low and middle educational levels. Ger-

⁹¹ Education and income-related differences in family formation do fit in this explanation. The time lag of the first birth is greater on lower educational levels in France, while there are interaction effects between education, income and first birth in Germany.

many shows a contrasting pattern in this respect; here mean age at first birth and/or childlessness increased most among the high-skilled.⁹²

Empirical findings on the effects of employment insecurity on fertility are theoretically and empirically inconsistent. More complex analysis differentiates between different effects which do not necessarily point in the same direction: besides opportunity costs, income or price effects also play an important role.

Following economic theory on fertility, the educational effect is explained by the higher opportunity costs of children (due to higher loss of income). Moreover, higher education is expected to postpone family formation due to longer spells of education and training. Education is not only identified as relevant for timing, however. Career preferences are also expected to have a strong influence on future expectations and potential opportunity costs. The evidence shows that skill level is more important for family decisions in Germany than in France. Moreover, the effects in Germany and France are opposing in relation to timing (see Table 1).

As women are expected to give up career ambitions when they have children, opportunity costs of children are very high in Germany: due to difficulties reconciling work and family life, children restrict mothers' career opportunities. Insufficient income on the part of the male partner is also a major obstacle to realising fertility intentions in Germany. While different role models in France and Germany may still exist, institutional factors are clear: limited childcare provision and part-time schooling particularly in west Germany do not allow women with high career preferences to combine motherhood and substantial labour market participation.

The role of part-time work differs if pre- and post-parental trajectories are compared: for young Germans, part-time work plays a crucial role in stages of education and training and is for the majority not linked to job uncertainty. Later on, it is mostly linked to female care duties in Germany, where, in fact, it has been the standard form of employment for prime-age women (BMFSFJ 2011).⁹³ Nevertheless, many would like to work more hours. Marginal part-time work is often the only possible and rational link to the labour market. By contrast, part-time work is not a preferred option for mothers in France.

⁹² See Letablier/Salles (2011) for further discussion.

⁹³ With far-reaching effects for old-age security: low contributions to old age insurance due to long periods of part-time employment is one of the main reasons for low pension claims of German women (Heien 2011).

Fixed-term contracts and TAW partly transfer the employment risk of parenthood to the employee. This is expected to play a crucial role in family planning and reduces career chances among women, as future planning becomes limited and uncertainty is high. As far as TAW is concerned, a strong postponement effect is expected for both countries. Not surprisingly, in his qualitative analysis for Germany Niehaus (2011) finds negative effects of TAW on fertility intentions and decisions due to perceived employment insecurity, low income and extreme spatial mobility requirements.

The influence of economic insecurities differs according to the institutional background. The qualitative research by Letablier/Salles (2011) indicates that an insecure occupational and financial situation only has a limited impact on fertility intentions and realisations in France, while these reasons are often given by the German respondents to justify a small family size. This can be explained by institutional factors in its broader understanding. From the perspective of social norms, the role of the gendered division of labour is still stronger in Germany. In France, the strong norm of having children prevails.

While job and employment insecurities help to explain timing, and postponement of the first birth, they do not go far in explaining specific differences in family formation and fertility patterns. In this context, we argue that the sharp differences between France and Germany are not predominantly caused by economic insecurities but rather by the general perception of uncertainty. This perception is embedded in institutional structures and influenced by social norms as well as personal resources. Not merely objective circumstances shape the decisions and behaviour of individuals, they are also influenced by personal assessments of present and future developments. Whereas culture and social norms formerly worked in favour of fertility, this no longer necessarily applies to post-modern societies with increasingly flexible employment. As the German example demonstrates, high rates of childlessness among couples has become a normative pattern over the years, which is difficult to counter by social and family policy: whereas in Germany childlessness nowadays is seen as a socially accepted choice, strong norms still work in favour of child-bearing in France (Letablier/Salles 2011).

Conclusion: job and employment insecurities contribute to explain timing and/or postponement of the first birth. However, they do not help much to explain specific differences of family formation and fertility patterns (between France and Germany). Objectively insecure

employment situations are not necessarily experienced as such, depending on institutional framework and norm structures. A broader analytical concept is therefore needed: “perceived uncertainty” which takes into account the nexus of people’s lives (linked-lives perspective) allows a better understanding, but still needs more theoretical and empirical clarification.

What is the role of family policy with respect to family formation and fertility, and what are the obvious differences between France and Germany?

Within French family policies, regulations can be found that facilitate transitions between different life situations or zones and help to reduce future insecurity. In this respect, Germany is lagging behind. On the other hand, there has been a catch-up development within German family policies. By means of parental benefit and extension of the public childcare structure, necessary steps have been made or at least initiated. Nevertheless, other fields like “tax splitting for married couples” must be reconsidered and reformed.

Analyses of the fertility dynamic often predominantly focus on the influence of family policies. Such a single-track view of family formation remains limited, however. On the one hand, the subject of family formation also addresses key dimensions of the so-called “rush-hour” of life, which are influenced by diverse factors. On the other hand, family policy cannot be seen as an isolated measure; its effects can only be analysed adequately in its interdependency on other fields of political regulation. Comparing France and Germany, the following seems relevant:

French family policy has traditionally been pronatalist and employment-related. The French combination of pronatalistic measures, mainly focusing on timing and parity of birth, as well as the employment-oriented leave and care policy, mirror the compromise between the laical French government and industrial relations.

In Germany, labour market and family have been perceived as separate spheres for a long time: the strong social norm of the housewife guaranteed stability in the family life of industrial Germany. Family policy measures were designed in strict isolation from the labour market; they were oriented on out-dated role concepts and based on obsolete general principles. The consequences for fertility were negative, particularly when individual role concepts

were inconsistent with one another; e.g. high-skilled women with career aspirations increasingly remain childless. Nowadays, however, boundaries are blurred. Employment and family are increasingly seen as two overlapping spheres of life. The recent readjustment of German family policies has taken place under two main objectives: to increase labour market participation of women, and to increase fertility.

Family policy and employment and/or social policy are complementary. Therefore, a cross-cutting policy perspective is needed in order to focus on relevant disruptions and contradictions. On the basis of our analysis, we conclude that family policies alone cannot compensate regulatory deficits on the labour market nor the dismantling of security standards (Klammer/Letablier 2007).

In Germany, recent family policy reforms have been described as a paradigmatic shift in accordance with the French model. But timing of political reforms matters: since seminal decisions about family policy structure in France were taken in a climate of mature welfare state development at the beginning of the 1990s, they are associated with a notion that expansive social policies are feasible. That implies more reliable planning for individuals and leads to the confidence that social welfare activities contribute to secure livelihoods and have alleviating effects.

By contrast, German family policy reforms over the last decade have been implemented in a climate of welfare state retrenchment, where the focus is on labour force maximisation through increasing female employment. The readjustment of family policies is taking place during a period of political change, in which significant aspects of mutual solidarity have been transferred to individual responsibility by means of activation measures. Confronted with increasingly flexible employment structures, growing numbers of precarious jobs, more restrictive labour market policies and the new expectations regarding individual self-governing derived from these things, the family policy adjustments cannot be seen to send out a message that reduces uncertainty and convincingly guarantees stability for family planning. Assessing the German reforms of family policies might not be adequate at this early stage of implementation; for the reasons outlined above, however, it is questionable whether the readjustment of German family policy will have profound long-term effects on fertility.

Conclusion: the effect of family policies must be analysed within the broader context of social and employment policy regulation. Clearly, family policy by itself cannot buffer new uncertainties which have arisen from far-reaching labour market transformations within the last two decades. The French example illustrates, however, that increased labour market uncertainties can to some extent be compensated for with respect to fertility and family formation, provided that family policy measures meet reconciliation needs and are in line with other regulation. In Germany, by contrast, current readjustments of family policy cannot keep pace with changing structures on the labour market because of the high deregulation dynamic, but also because of programmatic inconsistencies.

Outlook

Fertility trends in society are influenced by socio-economic events such as economic crisis or long-term shifts in societal structures. Looking at these relationships, one is confronted with an extremely complex structure which is shaped by many factors, while effects are in part contradictory. Research often remains focussed on specific aspects of the overall phenomenon. The issue of family formation and fertility can only be analysed adequately when considering the interdependent interaction of cultural settings, norms and values and political-institutional regulation.

Looking at France, it becomes obvious that, in contrast to Germany, prompt reform of family policies has contributed to stabilising the fertility rate over the last three to four decades at a level which is well above that of the EU. French family policy is not solely based on social norms which favour family formation and child-bearing, but its specific construction has helped to foster those norms. The comparatively “smooth” incorporation of family policy measures into the overall system of national social and employment policies reduces uncertainties, and it enables individuals to anticipate uncertainties as less threatening, as less of a burden on family life. This may explain why fertility in France has – in contrary to the general trend – increased since the 1990s, a period of advancing atypical forms of employment and increasing precarity. The French system of family policies together with predominantly family-friendly norms and values in society facilitates a more robust attitude among people towards the challenge of family formation.

Germany, by contrast, is an illustrative example of how difficult a politically induced change of trend is. Recent family policy reforms were introduced under the heading of a new family model in order to have an effect on low fertility rates.

Apart from inconsistencies within German family policy, it becomes clear how established but outmoded norms and new patterns of behaviour (childlessness within high-skilled couples) preclude new models. In addition, family policy cannot compensate for deregulation within the labour market, its effects on individuals and their ability to reconcile work and private life.

Germany's current model of reconciliation policy is dominated by the idea of providing incentives and increasing pressure to re-enter the labour market (following the overall European Lisbon Strategy and subsequent European policy approaches). Concerning the reconciliation of job and family, business needs and operational requirements so far prevail over the claims to sovereignty of families and individuals. In this deregulated world of work, the leeway for families and children decreases: empirical research proves that blurring boundaries culminate in an excessive strain on family systems. Not surprisingly, fertility rates in Germany, despite all recent reforms in the area of family policies, remain on a low level.

Social policy plays a crucial role in the general framework within which fertility is determined. Since norms and values cannot be influenced "mechanically", the only access is by means of political and institutional regulation. As our discussion has shown, the deregulation activities throughout the last two decades, which have affected young people more than other age groups, have spread labour market uncertainties and are expected to solidify existing patterns of family formation and fertility. Although the underlying structures have not been revealed fully yet, there is some evidence that "perceived uncertainty" has an effect on what couples expect to be the consequences of parenthood. The French-German comparison illustrates that the redirection of the former "pre-modern" model of German family policies does not automatically increase fertility, as was hoped for. This is contrary to the French policy mix, where family policy has had a higher priority under the heading of social inclusion: systematically embedded in a broader socio-political infrastructure and assured by strong family norms, French family policies have proved to stabilise fertility on a higher level. Without some serious effort to re-establish a social standard that conveys more social security to people, German fertility figures presumably will not change much. Reliable arrangements of social policies which help to reduce the level of perceived uncertainty within soci-

ety are required as a precondition for family policy measures unfolding their potential. Reduction of uncertainty means making life courses within the family context more predictable, facilitating reconciliation of work and family life, and reducing the risk of income poverty in a consistent way.

Bibliography

- Adsera, Alicia (2011): Where are the Babies? Labor Market Conditions and Fertility in Europe. In: *European Journal of Population* 21(1), pp. 1-32.
- Anbuhl, Matthias (2012): „Generation abgehängt“ – Was verbirgt sich hinter den mehr als 2,2 Millionen jungen Menschen ohne Berufsabschluss? DGB-Expertise zur Bildungsbiographie und den prekären Perspektiven der Ausbildungslosen. Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB): Berlin.
- Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963): Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. In: *The American Economic Review* 53(5), pp. 941-973.
- Barbier, Jean-Claude (2004): Systems of Social Protection in Europe. Two Contrasted Paths of Activation, and Maybe a Third. In: Lind, Jens / Knudson, Herman / Jorgensen, Henning (eds.): *Labour and Employment Regulation in Europe*. Peter Lang: Brussels, pp. 233-253.
- Barbier, Jean-Claude (2010): Uncertainty, insecurity, quality, precariousness... Contribution to the debate about the notion of «uncertainty», GUSTO-Discussion Paper, URL: www.gusto-project.eu, retrieved: 2011-12-15.
- Barbier, Jean-Claude (2011): "Employment precariousness" in a European cross-national perspective. A sociological review of thirty years of research, Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CNRS): Paris, URL: <ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11078.pdf>, retrieved: 2011-12-15.
- Barbier, Jean-Claude / Knuth, Matthias (2011a): Activating social protection against unemployment. France and Germany compared. In: *Sozialer Fortschritt* 60(2), pp. 15-24.
- Barbier, Jean-Claude / Knuth, Matthias (2011b): Comparing Social Protection in France and Germany. *Books & Ideas working Paper*, URL: http://www.booksandideas.net/IMG/pdf/20110221_BarbierKnuth.pdf, retrieved: 2011-12-15
- Barbier, Jean-Claude / Théret, Bruno (2001): Welfare to Work or Work to Welfare, the French Case. In: Gilbert, Neil (ed.): *Activating the Unemployed. A Comparative Appraisal of Work Oriented Policies*. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick et al., pp. 135-183.
- Beck, Ulrich (1986): *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M.
- Becker, Gary S. (1960): An Economic Analysis of Fertility. In: Easterlin, Richard A. (ed.): *Demographic and economic change in developed countries*. Princeton UP: Princeton, pp. 225-256.
- Becker, Gary S. (1991): *A treatise of the family*, Enl. ed. Harvard UP: Cambridge.
- Becker, Gary S. / Barro, Robert J. (1986): Altruism and the Economic Theory of Fertility. In: *Population and Development Review* 12 (Supplement), pp. 69-76.
- Bell, David N. F. / Blanchflower, David G. (2010): Youth Unemployment: Déjà Vu?, IZA-Discussion Paper No. 4705. Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA): Bonn.
- Bellmann, Lutz / Hartung, Silke (2010): Übernahmemöglichkeiten im Ausbildungsbetrieb. Eine Analyse mit dem IAB-Betriebspanel. In: *Sozialer Fortschritt* 59(6-7), pp. 160-167.

- Bernardi, Laura / Klärner, Andreas / von der Lippe, Holger (2008): Job Insecurity and the Timing of Parenthood: A Comparison between Eastern and Western Germany. In: *European Journal of Population* 24(3), pp. 287-313.
- Bernhard, Sarah / Kurz, Karin (2007): Familie und Arbeitsmarkt. Eine Längsschnittstudie zum Einfluss beruflicher Unsicherheiten auf die Familienerweiterung, IAB-Discussion Paper 10/2007. Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB): Nuremberg.
- Björklund, Anders (2007): Does a Family-Friendly Policy Raise Fertility Levels? SIEPS-Discussion Paper 2007/3. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS): Stockholm.
- Blossfeld, Hans-Peter / Hofäcker, Dirk / Bertolini, Sonia (eds.) (2011): Youth on globalised labour markets. Rising uncertainty and its effects on early employment and family lives in Europe. Budrich: Leverkusen.
- Blossfeld, Hans-Peter / Mills, Melinda (2010): How Does Globalization Affect the Life Courses of Young Men and Women in Modern Societies? In: Tremmel, Jörg (ed.): *A Young Generation Under Pressure? The Financial Situation and the "Rush Hour" of the Cohorts 1970 – 1985 in a Generational Comparison*. Springer: Berlin; Heidelberg, pp. 37-56.
- Bonoli, Giuliano (2010): The political economy of active labour market policy. Working Paper on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe (RECWOWE) 01/2010. Edinburgh. URL: http://www.socialpolicy.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/39268/REC-WP_0110_Bonoli.pdf, retrieved: 2010-08-24.
- Bosch, Gerhard (2009): Low-wage work in five European countries and the United States. In: *International Labour Review* 148(4), pp. 337-356.
- Bosch, Gerhard / Weinkopf, Claudia (2012): Mindestlöhne, Tariflöhne und Lohnungleichheit. In: Bispinck, Reinhard, et al. (eds.): *Sozialpolitik und Sozialstaat. Festschrift für Gerhard Bäcker*. VS-Verlag: Wiesbaden, pp. 221-238.
- Brenke, Karl (2012): Arbeitslosigkeit in Europa. Jugendliche sind viel stärker betroffen als Erwachsene. In: *DIW Wochenbericht* 30/2012, pp. 3-12.
- Brose, Nicole (2008): Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit – Familiengründung und -erweiterung im Erwerbsverlauf. In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 60(1), pp. 30-52.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1998): *Gegenfeuer 1. Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstandes gegen die neoliberale Invasion*. Konstanz: UVK-Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) (2010): *Datenreport zum Berufsbildungsbericht 2010. Informationen und Analysen zur Entwicklung der beruflichen Bildung*. Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB): Bonn.
- Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ) (2011): *Neue Wege - Gleiche Chancen. Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern im Lebensverlauf, Erster Gleichstellungsbericht*. Drucksache 17/6240: Berlin.
- Burkart, Günter (2007): Eine Kultur des Zweifels: Kinderlosigkeit und die Zukunft der Familie. In: Konietzka, Dirk / Kreyenfeld, Michaela (eds.): *Ein Leben ohne Kinder. Kinderlosigkeit in Deutschland*, 1. Aufl. Wiesbaden: VS, pp. 401-423.

- Castel, Robert / Dörre, Klaus (eds.) (2009): Prekarität, Abstieg, Ausgrenzung. Die soziale Frage am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. Campus: Frankfurt a. M.
- Chanvril, Flora / Cousteaux, Anne-Sophie / Le Hay, Viviane / Lesnard, Laurent / Méchinaud, Chloé / Sauger, Nicolas (2009): La parentalité en Europe. Analyse séquentielle des trajectoires d'entrée dans l'âge adulte à partir de l'Enquête sociale européenne, Dossier d'étude N° 122. Sciences Po: Paris.
- Clegg, Daniel (2007): Continental Drift: On Unemployment Policy Change in Bismarckian Welfare States. In: *Social Policy & Administration* 41(6), pp. 597-617.
- Council of the European Union (2000): Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000. Lisbon.
- Crouch, Colin (2010): Towards a working definition of uncertainty for GUSTO, unpublished GUSTO-Discussion Paper. URL: <http://www.gusto-project.eu>, retrieved: 2011-11-08.
- Crouch, Colin (2011a): GUSTO Final Report. URL: <http://www.gusto-project.eu>, retrieved: 2012-03-12.
- Crouch, Colin (2011b): The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Danzin, Elisabeth / Simonnet, Véronique / Trancart, Danièle (2011): L'impact de la crise sur les trajectoires professionnelles des jeunes, Document de travail, Centre d'Etudes de l'Emploi. Noisy-Le-Grand. URL: <http://www.cee-recherche.fr/fr/doctrav/146-impact-crise-trajectoires-professionnelles-jeunes.pdf>, retrieved: 2012-05-22.
- Davis, Emma / Mazuy, Magali (2010): Women's Fertility and Educational Level in France: Evidence from the Annual Census Survey. In: *Population* 65(3), pp. 415-450.
- Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) (2012): Positionspapier: Die Schutzfunktion der Arbeitslosenversicherung ausbauen. URL: <http://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++97b66392-8861-11e1-5564-00188b4dc422>, retrieved: 2012-06-12.
- Dingeldey, Irene (2011): Der aktivierende Wohlfahrtsstaat. Governance der Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Dänemark, Großbritannien und Deutschland. Campus: Frankfurt et al.
- Dingeldey, Irene / Sopp, Peter / Wagner, Alexandra (2012): Governance des Einkommensmix: Geringfügige Beschäftigung im ALG-II-Bezug. In: *WSI-Mitteilungen* 1/2012, pp. 32-40.
- Dorbritz, Jürgen (2008): Germany: Family diversity with low actual and desired fertility. In: *Demographic Research* Vol. 19, pp. 557-598.
- Dorbritz, Jürgen (2011): Dimensionen der Kinderlosigkeit in Deutschland. In: *Bevölkerungsforschung Aktuell* 32(3), pp. 2-6.
- Dribe, Martin / Stanfors, Maria (2010): Family life in power couples: Continued childbearing and union stability among the educational elite in Sweden, 1991-2005. In: *Demographic Research* Vol. 23, pp. 847-877.
- Dribusch, Heiner / Birke, Peter (2012): Die Gewerkschaften in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Organisation, Rahmenbedingungen, Herausforderungen. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES): Berlin.

- Eckhard, Jan / Klein, Thomas (2006): Männer, Kinderwunsch und generatives Verhalten. Eine Auswertung des Familiensurvey zu Geschlechterunterschieden in der Motivation zur Elternschaft. VS-Verlag: Wiesbaden.
- Ehrenberg, Alain (2008): Das erschöpfte Selbst. Depression und Gesellschaft in der Gegenwart. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a. M.
- Ehrenberg, Alain (2011): Das Unbehagen in der Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp: Berlin.
- Eichhorst, Werner / Marx, Paul / Thode, Eric (2010): Atypische Beschäftigung und Niedriglohnarbeit. Benchmarking Deutschland. Befristete und geringfügige Tätigkeiten, Zeitarbeit und Niedriglohnbeschäftigung. URL: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-D816D6AB-06F9D8AF/bst/xcms_bst_dms_31235_31236_2.pdf, retrieved: 2010-06-28.
- European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) (2008): Initial vocational education and training (IVET) in Europe. Review. URL: http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/EN/Files/IVET_Review_08.pdf, retrieved: 2012-05-20.
- European Commission (2011): MISSOC. Mutual Information System on Social Protection, Situation on 01/07/2011. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en, retrieved: 2011-12-15.
- European Parliament; Council of the European Union (2008): Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work. In: Official Journal of the European Union L 327, pp. 9-14.
- Eurostat (2009): Youth in Europe. A statistical portrait. Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg.
- Eurostat (2011): Demography Report 2010. Older, more numerous and diverse Europeans. Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg.
- Frade, Carlos / Darmon, Isabelle / Laparra, Miguel (2004): Precarious Employment in Europe: A Comparative Study of Labour Market Related Risk in Flexible Economies. Final report ESOPE Project. Brussels.
- Friedman, Debra / Hechter, Michael / Kanazawa, Satoshi (1994): A Theory of the Value of Children. In: Demography 31(3), pp. 375-401.
- Furåker, Bengt (2009): Unemployment and Social Protection. In: Giugni, Marco (ed.): The Politics of Unemployment in Europe. Policy Responses and Collective Action. Ashgate Publ.: Farnham; Burlington, pp. 17-34.
- Gautié, Jérôme / Galtier, Bénédicte (2003): Flexibility, stability and the interaction between employment protection and labour market policies in France. In: Auer, Peter / Cazes, Sandrine (eds.): Employment Stability in an Age of Flexibility. Evidence from Industrialised Countries. International Labour Office (ILO): Geneva, pp. 106-158.
- Gebel, Michael / Giesecke, Johannes (2009): Ökonomische Unsicherheit und Fertilität. Die Wirkung von Beschäftigungsunsicherheit und Arbeitslosigkeit auf die Familiengründung in Ost- und Westdeutschland. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 38(5), pp. 399-418.
- Geishecker, Ingo (2010): Perceived Job Insecurity and Well-Being Revisited. Towards Conceptual Clarity, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie. URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37210>, retrieved: 2012-05-18.

- Giesecke, Johannes / Wotschak, Philip (2009): Flexibilisierung in Zeiten der Krise: Verlierer sind junge und gering qualifizierte Beschäftigte, WZB Brief Arbeit 1/2009. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). URL: http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/wzbriefarbeit/WZBriefArbeit012009_giesecke_wotschack.pdf, retrieved: 2010-09-25.
- González, María-José / Jurado-Guerrero, Teresa (2006): Remaining childless in affluent economies: a comparison of France, West Germany, Italy and Spain, 1994–2001. In: *European Journal of Population* 22(4), pp. 317-352.
- Hakim, Catherine (2000): *Work-lifestyle choices in the 21st century. Preference theory*. Oxford UP: New York.
- Hall, Peter A. / Soskice, David (2001): An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism. In: Hall, Peter A. / Soskice, David (eds.): *Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford UP: Oxford, pp. 1-71.
- Häusermann, Silja / Schwander, Hanna (2009): Identifying outsiders across countries: similarities and differences in the patterns of dualisation. University of Zurich, Working Paper on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe (RECWOWE) 09/2009. Zurich, URL: http://lac-repo-live7.is.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/1842/3150/1/REC-WP_0909_Hausermann_Schwander.pdf, retrieved: 2010-08-24.
- Heien, Thorsten (2011): Women's biographical patterns and pension income prospects. Executive Summary - Key results and equality policy conclusions. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ): Berlin.
- Heinz, Walter (2003): From work trajectories to negotiated careers. The contingent work life course. In: Mortimer, Jeylan / Shanahan, Michael J. (eds.): *Handbook of the life course*. Kluwer Academic Publ.: New York, pp. 185-204.
- Herzog-Stein, Alexander / Sesselmeier, Werner (2012): Alternativen zu Mini- und Midijobs? Die Beispiele Frankreich und Vereinigtes Königreich. In: *WSI-Mitteilungen* 01/2012, pp. 41-49.
- Hohmeyer, Katrin / Wolff, Joachim (2012): Arbeitsgelegenheiten im SGB II. Zwei Varianten mit unterschiedlicher Wirkung. IAB-Kurzbericht 09/2012. Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nuremberg.
- Höhn, Charlotte / Ette, Andreas / Ruckdeschel, Kerstin (2006): *Kinderwünsche in Deutschland. Konsequenzen für eine nachhaltige Familienpolitik*. Robert Bosch Stiftung. Stuttgart.
- Holst, Hajo (2011): Von der Branche zum Markt. Zur Regulierung überbetrieblicher Arbeitsbeziehungen nach dem organisierten Kapitalismus. In: *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 21(3), pp. 383-405.
- International Labour Organization (ILO) (2011): *Private employment agencies - Employment. Briefing Paper*. URL: http://www.ilo.org/sector/activities/topics/temporary-agency-work/WCMS_162355/lang--en/index.htm, retrieved: 2011-12-06.
- International Labour Organization (ILO) (2012): *Employment protection legislation database – EPLex*. URL: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplcx/termmain.showCountry?p_lang=en&p_country_id=188, retrieved: 2012-01-10.

- Institute Nationale de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) (2009): Les bas salaires: du travail précaire et du temps partiel. In: *Économie de La Réunion* No. 134, pp. 24-28.
- Institute Nationale de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) (2012): Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance (SMIC). URL: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?ref_id=NATnon04145, retrieved: 2012-01-05.
- Jensen, Carsten (2011): Determinants of Welfare Service Provision after the Golden Age. In: *International Journal of Social Welfare* 20(2), pp. 125-134.
- Joseph, Olivier / Lopez, Alberto / Ryk, Florence (2008): Génération 2004, des jeunes pénalisés par la conjoncture. Bref No. 248. Centre D'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Qualifications: Marseilles.
- Kalina, Thorsten / Weinkopf, Claudia (2012): Niedriglohnbeschäftigung 2010: Fast jede/r Vierte arbeitet für Niedriglohn, IAQ-Report 01/2012. Institut für Arbeit und Qualifikation (IAQ): Duisburg.
- Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver (1987): Normen und Institutionen als Mittel zur Bewältigung von Unsicherheit. die Sicht der Soziologie. In: Holzheu, Franz (ed.): *Gesellschaft und Unsicherheit*. Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft: Karlsruhe, pp. 37-48.
- Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver (2003): Sicherheit: Das Leitbild beherrschbarer Komplexität. In: Lessenich, Stephan (ed.): *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe. Historische und aktuelle Diskurse*. Campus: Frankfurt a.M., pp. 73-104.
- Keller, Berndt / Seifert, Hartmut (2011): Atypische Beschäftigung und soziale Risiken. Entwicklung, Strukturen, Regulierung, WISO-Diskurs. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES): Bonn. URL: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/08527.pdf>, retrieved: 2011-10-20.
- Kerckhoff, Alan C. (1995): Institutional Arrangements and Stratification Processes in Industrial Societies. In: *Annual Review of Sociology* 21(1), pp. 323-347.
- Klammer, Ute (2004): Flexicurity in a life-course perspective. In: *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research* 10(2), pp. 282-299.
- Klammer, Ute (2005): Adjustment of Social Security to Life Course Needs. In: *European Journal of Social Security* 7(4), pp. 335-361.
- Klammer, Ute (2010): The "Rush Hour" of Life: Insecurities and Strains in Early Life Phases as a Challenge for a Life Course-Oriented, Sustainable Social Policy. In: Tremmel, Jörg (ed.): *A Young Generation Under Pressure? The Financial Situation and the "Rush Hour" of the Cohorts 1970 - 1985 in a Generational Comparison*. Springer: Berlin; Heidelberg, pp. 155-166.
- Klammer, Ute / Letablier, Marie-Thérèse (2007): Family Policies in Germany and France: The Role of Enterprises and Social Partners. In: *Social Policy & Administration* 41(6), pp. 672-692.
- Klammer, Ute / Neukirch, Sabine / Weßler-Poßberg, Dagmar (2012): Wenn Mama das Geld verdient. Familienernährerinnen zwischen Prekarität und neuen Rollenbildern. Edition Sigma: Berlin.
- Klenner, Christina / Klammer, Ute (2009): Weibliche Familienernährerinnen in West- und Ostdeutschland – Wunschmodell oder neue Prekarität? In: Bundesministerium für Fami-

- lie, Senioren Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ) (ed.): Rollenleitbilder und -realitäten in Europa. Rechtliche, ökonomische und kulturelle Dimensionen. Nomos: Baden-Baden, pp. 62-84.
- Klenner, Christina / Pfahl, Svenja (2008): Jenseits von Zeitnot und Karriereverzicht. Wege aus dem Arbeitszeitdilemma, WSI-Discussion Paper No. 158. Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI): Düsseldorf. URL: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_wsi_diskp_158.pdf, retrieved: 2012-06-01.
- Klenner, Christina / Pfahl, Svenja (2009): Jenseits von Zeitnot und Karriereverzicht. Wege aus dem Arbeitszeitdilemma. In: Heitkötter, Martina et al. (eds.): Zeit für Beziehungen? Zeit und Zeitpolitik für Familien. Budrich: Opladen, pp. 259-290.
- Klenner, Christina / Schmidt, Tanja (2012): Minijobs – Eine riskante Beschäftigungsform beim normativen Übergang zum „Adult-Worker-Model“. In: WSI-Mitteilungen 01/2012, pp. 22-31.
- Knight, Frank H. (1921): Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin: Boston.
- Knuth, Matthias (2006): "Hartz IV" – die unbegriffene Reform. Wandel der Erwerbsordnung durch Verallgemeinerung des Fürsorge-Regimes. In: Sozialer Fortschritt 55(7), pp. 160-168.
- Knuth, Matthias (2011): Widersprüchliche Dynamiken im deutschen Arbeitsmarkt. In: WSI Mitteilungen 11/2011, pp. 580-587.
- Kohli, Martin (1994): Institutionalisierung und Individualisierung der Erwerbsbiographie. In: Beck, Ullrich / Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth (eds.): Riskante Freiheiten. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt a.M., pp. 212-244.
- Konietzka, Dirk (2010): Zeiten des Übergangs. Sozialer Wandel des Übergangs in das Erwachsenenalter. VS-Verlag: Wiesbaden.
- Köppen, Katja / Mazuy, Magali / Toulemon, Laurent (2007): Kinderlosigkeit in Frankreich. In: Konietzka, Dirk / Kreyenfeld, Michaela (eds.): Ein Leben ohne Kinder. Kinderlosigkeit in Deutschland, VS-Verlag: Wiesbaden, pp. 83-104.
- Kreyenfeld, Michaela (2010): Uncertainties in Female Employment Careers and the Postponement of Parenthood in Germany. In: European Sociological Review 26(3), pp. 351-366.
- Kroos, Daniela (2008): The Institutional Shaping of Employment Change. Non-Standard Employment in Germany and France Compared. Dissertation: Bremen.
- L'administration Française (2012): Contrats de travail dans le secteur privé. URL: <http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/N19871.xhtml>, retrieved: 2012-06-12.
- Laparra, Miguel (2004): Managing labour market related risks in Europe: Policy implications. Deliverable 9, ESOP Project. Precarious Employment in Europe: A Comparative Study of Labour Market related Risks in Flexible Economies: Pamplona.
- Lehmer, Florian / Ziegler, Kerstin (2010): Brückenfunktion von Leiharbeit. Zumindest ein schmaler Steg, IAB-Kurzbericht. Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB): Nuremberg. URL: <http://doku.iab.de/kurzber/2010/kb1310.pdf>, retrieved: 2012-06-26.

- Leschke, Janine (2011): Transition from Unemployment to Work and the Role of Active Labour Market Policies during the Lisbon Strategy Period and the Economic Crisis. In: *German Policy Studies* 7(1), pp. 135-170.
- Lesthaeghe, Ron J. / Moors, Guy (2000): Recent Trends in Fertility and Household Formation in the Industrialized World. In: *Review of Population and Social Policy* No. 9, pp. 121-170.
- Letablier, Marie-Thérèse / Salles, Anne (2011): Labour market uncertainties for the young workforce in France and Germany: implications on fertility and family formation, GUSTO Working Paper, presented at the GUSTO Workshop IV, University of Amsterdam, April, 28-29th 2011. URL: <http://www.gusto-project.eu>, retrieved: 2011-11-15.
- Lewis, Jane / Plomien, Ania (2009): „Flexicurity“ as a policy strategy: the implications for gender equality. In: *Economy and Society* 38(3), pp. 433-459.
- Luijkx, Ruud / Wolbers, Maarten H. J. (2009): The impact of employment precarity on early labour market careers and family formation in the Netherlands. Working Paper: Tilburg University.
- Madsen, Per K. (2010): Young workers facing uncertainty in the Nordic welfare states. Contribution to Workshop II, UAB- Barcelona, March 2010. Centre for Labour Market Research (CARMA): Aalborg University.
- Mainguené, Alice / Martinelli, Daniel (2010): Femmes et hommes en début de carrière. Les femmes commencent à tirer profit de leur réussite scolaire. In: *Insee Première* Vol. 1284. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE): Paris.
- Manow, Philip / Palier, Bruno (2009): A Conservative Welfare State Regime without Christian Democracy? The French État-providence, 1880-1960. In: van Kersbergen, Kees / Manow, Philip (eds.): *Religion, class coalitions, and welfare states*. Cambridge UP: Cambridge; New York., pp. 146-175.
- Maurice, Marc / Sellier, Francois / Silvestre, Jean-Jacques (1986): *The Social Foundations of Industrial Power: A Comparison of France and Germany*. MIT Press: Cambridge.
- McGinnity, Frances / Mertens, Antje / Gundert, Stefanie (2005): A Bad Start? Fixed-Term Contracts and the Transition from Education to Work in West Germany. In: *European Sociological Review* 21(4), pp. 359-374.
- Mills, Melinda / Blossfeld, Hans-Peter (2005): Globalization, uncertainty and the early life-course a theoretical framework. A theoretical framework. In: Blossfeld, Hans-Peter, et al. (eds.): *Globalization, uncertainty and youth in society*. Routledge : London, pp. 1-19.
- Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Santé (2012): Le revenu solidarité active. URL: <http://www.social-sante.gouv.fr/espaces,770/social,793/dossiers,794/le-rsa-mode-d-emploi,2279/>, retrieved: 2012-06-01.
- Ministère Travail, l'Emploi Formation Professionnelle et Dialogue Social de (2012): Le contrat de travail temporaire. Fiches pratiques. URL: <http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/informations-pratiques,89/fiches-pratiques,91/contrats,109/le-contrat-de-travail-temporaire,982.html>, retrieved: 2012-06-30.

- Morgan, Kimberly J. (2006): *Working Mothers and the Welfare State. Religion and the Politics of Work-family Policies in Western Europe and the United States*. Stanford UP: Stanford.
- Niehaus, Moritz (2011): *Effects of flexible employment and job insecurity on fertility decisions. The case of German temporary agency workers*, GUSTO Working Paper, presented at the GUSTO Workshop V, Universita de Autonomía de Barcelona, September, 4th-6th 2011. URL: <http://www.gusto-project.eu>, retrieved: 2012-01-10.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2009): *Jobs for Youth. France 2009*. OECD Publishing: Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011): *Doing Better for Families*. OECD Publishing: Paris.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012): *OECD Indicators of Employment Protection*. URL: http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_2649_37457_42695243_1_1_1_37457,00.html#data, retrieved: 2012-06-01.
- Özcan, Berkay / Mayer, Karl U. / Luedicke, Joerg (2010): *The impact of unemployment on the transition to parenthood*. In: *Demographic Research Vol. 23*, pp. 807-846.
- Pailhé, Ariane / Solaz, Anne (2011): *Does job insecurity cause missing births in a high fertility European country? Evidence from France*, Documents de Travail 169. Institute National d'etudes démographiques (INED): Paris.
- Pailhé, Ariane / Solaz, Anne (2012): *The influence of employment uncertainty on childbearing in France: A tempo or quantum effect?* In: *Demographic Research Vol. 26*, pp. 1-40.
- Palier, Bruno (2010a): *The Dualization of the French Welfare System*. In: Palier, Bruno (ed.): *A long Goodbye to Bismarck?* Amsterdam UP: Amsterdam, pp. 73-99.
- Palier, Bruno (ed.) (2010b): *A long Goodbye to Bismarck?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP.
- Palier, Bruno / Thelen, Kathleen (2010): *Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and Change in France and Germany*. In: *Politics & Society 38(1)*, pp. 119-148.
- Papinot, Christian (2009): *Jeunes Intérimaires et ouvriers permanents en France: quelle solidarité au travail?* In: *Relationes Industrielles 64(3)*, pp. 489-506.
- Pelizzari, Alessandro (2009): *Dynamiken der Prekarisierung: Atypische Erwerbsverhältnisse und milieuspezifische Unsicherheitsbewältigung*. UVK Verlagsgesellschaft: Konstanz.
- Pernot, Jean-Marie (2010): *Die Gewerkschaften in Frankreich. Geschichte, Organisation, Herausforderungen*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES): Berlin.
- Pison, Gilles (2011): *Deux enfants par femme dans la France de 2010. La fécondité serait-elle insensible à la crise économique?* *Population & Societes Vol. 476*, Institute National d'etudes démographiques (INED): Paris.
- Pla, Anne / Beaumel, Catherine (2011): *Bilan demographique 2010: La polulation française atteint 65 millions d'habitants*, Insee-Première No. 1332. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE): Paris.
- Plantenga, Janneke (2005): *The Life Course and the System of Social Security: Rethinking Incentives, Solidarity and Risks*. In: *European Journal of Social Security 7(4)*, pp. 301-312.

- Polanyi, Karl (2010 [1944]): The great transformation. The political and economic origins of our time, 2nd ed. Beacon Press: Boston.
- Pontusson, Jonas (2005): Varieties and Commonalities of Capitalism. In: Coates, David (ed.): Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Approaches. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, pp. 163-188.
- Regnier-Loilier, Arnaud / Solaz, Anne (2010): La décision d'avoir un enfant : une liberté sous contraintes. In: Politiques sociales et familiale Vol. 100, pp. 61-77.
- Scharein, Manfred G. (2011): Der demographische Schluss. Kinderlose Akademikerinnen 0.3 – Wo war das Problem? In: Bevölkerungsforschung Aktuell 32(3), pp. 25-26.
- Schier, Michaela / Jurczyk, Karin / Szymenderski, Peggy (2011): Entgrenzung von Arbeit und Familie – mehr als Prekarisierung. In: WSI-Mitteilungen 08/2011, pp. 402-408.
- Schmid, Günther (2011a): Non-Standard Employment in Europe. Its Development and Consequences for the European Employment Strategy. In: German Policy Studies 7(1), pp. 171-210.
- Schmid, Günther (2011b): Übergänge am Arbeitsmarkt. Arbeit nicht nur Arbeitslosigkeit versichern. Edition Sigma: Berlin.
- Schmid, Josef (2010): Wohlfahrtsstaaten im Vergleich. Soziale Sicherung in Europa: Organisation, Finanzierung, Leistungen und Probleme, 3rd upd. and exp. ed. VS-Verlag: Wiesbaden.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (2003): French capitalism transformed, yet still a third variety of capitalism. In: Employment and Society 32(4), pp. 526-554.
- Schoenmaeckers, Ronald C. / Lodewijckx, Edith (1999): Demographic Behaviour in Europe: Some Results from FFS Country Reports and Suggestions for Further Research. In: European Journal of Population 15(3), pp. 207-240.
- Schröder, Gerhard / Blair, Tony (1999): The Blair/Schroeder Manifesto. Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte. London; Berlin. URL: <https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/jchays/www/PS455/Readings/Schroeder-Blair-engl.pdf>, retrieved: 2012-03-26.
- Schröder, Jette / Pforr, Klaus (2009): Der aktuelle Forschungsstand zum Zusammenhang zwischen Erwerbsarbeit und Fertilität bei Frauen. In: Journal of Family Research 21(3), pp. 218-244.
- Schulz-Nieswandt, Frank (2003): Die Kategorie der Lebenslage – sozial- und verhaltenswissenschaftlich rekonstruiert. In: Karl, Fred (ed.): Sozial- und verhaltenswissenschaftliche Gerontologie. Alter und Altern als gesellschaftliches Problem und individuelles Thema. Juventa: Weinheim, pp. 129-139.
- Schulz-Nieswandt, Frank (2006a): Sorgearbeit, Geschlechterordnung und Altenpflegeregime in Europa. Lit-Verlag: Berlin.
- Schulz-Nieswandt, Frank (2006b): Sozialpolitik und Alter. Kohlhammer: Stuttgart.
- Settersten, Richard (2007): Passages to Adulthood: Linking Demographic Change and Human Development. In: European Journal of Population 23(3/4), pp. 251-272.

- Shanahan, Michael J. (2000): Pathways to Adulthood in Changing Societies: Variability and Mechanisms in Life Course Perspective. In: Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 26, pp. 667-692.
- Simonson, Julia / Romeu Gordo, Laura / Kelle, Nadiya (2011): The double German transformation. Changing male employment patterns in East and West Germany, SOEP Paper No. 391-2011. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW): Berlin.
- Sobotka, Tomáš (2010): Shifting Parenthood to Advanced Reproductive Ages: Trends, Causes and Consequences. In: Tremmel, Jörg (ed.): A young generation under pressure? The financial situation and the "rush hour" of the cohorts 1970 - 1985 in a generational comparison. Springer: Berlin; Heidelberg, pp. 129-154.
- Sobotka, Tomáš (2011): Fertility in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Collapse and gradual recovery. In: Historical Social Research 36(2), pp. 246-296.
- Sobotka, Tomáš / Skirbekk, Vegard / Philipov, Dimiter (2011): Economic Recession and Fertility in the Developed World. In: Population and Development Review 37(2), pp. 267-306.
- Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (DESTATIS) (2009): Mikrozensus 2008. Neue Daten zur Kinderlosigkeit in Deutschland. Statistisches Bundesamt: Wiesbaden.
- Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (DESTATIS) (2010): Qualität der Arbeit. Geld verdienen und was sonst noch zählt. Statistisches Bundesamt: Wiesbaden.
- Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (DESTATIS) (2011): Mikrozensus 2010. Statistisches Bundesamt: Wiesbaden.
- Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (DESTATIS) (2012a): Geburten in Deutschland – Ausgabe 2012. Statistisches Bundesamt: Wiesbaden.
- Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (DESTATIS) (2012b): Niedriglohn und Beschäftigung 2010. Begleitmaterial zur Pressekonferenz. Statistisches Bundesamt: Wiesbaden.
- Surkyn, Johan / Lesthaeghe, Ron J. (2004): Wertorientierungen und 'second demographic transition' in Nord-, West- und Südeuropa. Eine aktuelle Bestandsaufnahme. In: Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft 29(1), pp. 63-98.
- Toulemon, Laurent / Pailhé, Ariane / Rossier, Clémentine (2008): France: High and Stable Fertility. In: Demographic Research Vol. 19, pp. 503-556.
- van de Kaa, Dirk J. (1987): Europe's second demographic transition. In: Population Bulletin 42(1), pp. 1-59.
- van de Kaa, Dirk J. (2001): Postmodern Fertility Preferences: From Changing Value Orientation to New Behavior. In: Population and Development Review Vol. 27 (Supplement), pp. 290-331.
- Vanselow, Achim / Weinkopf, Claudia (2009): Zeitarbeit in europäischen Ländern – Lehren für Deutschland? Discussion Paper No. 182. Hans-Böckler-Stiftung: Düsseldorf.
- Vitali, Agnese / Billari, Francesco C. / Prskawetz, Alexia / Testa, Maria R. (2009): Preference theory and low fertility in comparative perspective. In: European Journal of Population 25(4), pp. 413-438.
- Voss, Dorothea / Weinkopf, Claudia (2012): Niedriglohnfalle Minijob. In: WSI-Mitteilungen 01/2012, pp. 5-12.

- Voss-Dahm, Dorothea (2011): Erwerbsverläufe von Frauen im Einzelhandel. Gründe für die Entstehung geschlechtsspezifischer Ungleichheit im Betrieb. In: Klammer, Ute / Motz, Markus (eds.): Neue Wege - gleiche Chancen. Expertisen zum Ersten Gleichstellungsbericht der Bundesregierung, VS-Verlag: Wiesbaden, pp. 313-329.
- Wanger, Susanne (2011): Ungenutzte Potentiale in der Teilzeit. Viele Frauen würden gerne länger arbeiten. In: IAB-Kurzbericht Vol. 09/2011, pp. 1-8.
- Weishaupt, Timo / Lack, Katja (2011): The European Employment Strategy. Assessing the Status Quo. In: German Policy Studies 7(1), pp. 9-44.
- Weisser, Gerhard (1978): Beiträge zur Gesellschaftspolitik. Philosophische Vorfragen, beratende Sozialwissenschaft, soziale Sicherung, Mitbestimmung, Verteilungs- und Vermögenspolitik, Ordnungspolitik, besonders Einzelwirtschaftspolitik. Schwartz: Göttingen.
- Wiedemeyer, Michael (2009): Ein-Euro-Jobs und prekäre Arbeitsmarktperspektiven. Zum Verbleib von Ein-Euro-Kräften nach Abschluss ihrer Arbeitsgelegenheit, Forschungsbericht für das Diakonische Werk Rheinland-Westfalen-Lippe: Köln.
- Wiedemeyer, Michael / Diemer, Sabine (2007): Ein-Euro-Jobs – umstritten und reformbedürftig. Forschungsstudie zur Umsetzung von Arbeitsgelegenheiten für Langzeitarbeitslose (§ 16 SGB II) in Trägereinrichtungen des Diakonischen Werks Rheinland: Köln.
- Wilthagen, Ton / Tros, Frank (2004): The concept of 'flexicurity': a new approach to regulating employment and labour markets. In: Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 10(2), pp. 166-186.
- Zarnowska, Anna (2004): Religion and Politics. Workers, women, and social change in Poland, 1870-1939. Ashgate: London.
- Zettelmeier, Werner (2005): Berufliche Bildung in Frankreich. In: Wissenschaftliche Dokumentationspapiere des Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) Vol. 74, pp. 16-39.