NORTHEAST ASIA IN FOCUS: LIFE, WORK AND INDUSTRY BETWEEN THE STEPPE AND THE METROPOLES, 1900–2020

Essays in Commemoration of Flemming Christiansen’s Retirement

Festschrift

Edited by Christine Moll-Murata

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WORKING PAPERS ON EAST ASIAN STUDIES

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Northeast Asia in Focus: Life, Work and Industry between the Steppe and the Metropoles, 1900–2020

Essays in Commemoration of Flemming Christiansen’s Retirement

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https://www.uni-due.de/in-east/people/christiansen_flemming.php
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Flemming Christiansen retired in March 2020 from the position of Professor of Social Sciences of East Asia and Political Sociology of China at the University of Duisburg-Essen in Germany. To mark the occasion, his friends and colleagues from the study group on Northeast Asia present him with a volume of collected essays on the topics they have worked on together in recent years.

Flemming Christiansen was born on 28 June 1954 in Copenhagen, Denmark. As he rarely speaks about his private life, the author collective was not able to find details of about his childhood and youth before he entered third-level education. He began his undergraduate studies at Aarhus University in 1973 in the subjects German and Chinese Studies. He graduated with a BA in German Studies in 1975 and an MA in Chinese Studies in 1980 and experienced the first years of China’s reform and opening up policy in 1978–1979 when he studied Chinese and Modern Chinese History in Beijing and Nanjing. Back in Aarhus, Flemming Christiansen’s position as an Academic Fellow at the China Information Service between 1981 and 1984 was a formative experience. One of his tasks there was to provide information on China for Danish enterprises and potential investors, among them dairy companies. This was when he first came into contact with Northeast Asia and Inner Mongolia. From Denmark he moved to the Netherlands, where he worked as Research Assistant at the Sinological Institute of Leiden University between 1985 and 1986. From 1986 to 1990, he received a scholarship from the Danish Research Council for Development Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct his Ph.D. research in Leiden. He obtained his doctorate (Doctor in de Letteren) in 1990 with a dissertation entitled The De-Rustication of the Chinese Peasant? Peasant Household Reactions to the Rural Reforms in China since 1978. The next stage in his career was the position of Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the University of Manchester between 1989 and 1995. Following this, he started teaching and doing research at the University of Leeds, first as Lecturer and then as Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies, 1995–2005. In Leeds he was promoted to Chair Professor in Chinese Studies, Director of the National Institute of Chinese Studies and Deputy Director of the White Rose East Asia Centre up until 2011. Thereafter, Flemming Christiansen accepted an offer by the University of Duisburg-Essen to join the team of East Asian scholars at the Institute for East Asian Studies IN-EAST as Chair Professor in the Social Sciences of East Asia with a focus on the Political Sociology of China. Between 2012 and 2014 he held the role of Director of IN-EAST, and between 2014 and 2020 he was Speaker of the Postgraduate Research Training Group Risk and East Asia. In 2016, he was one of the founding members of the Alliance for Research on East Asia (AREA) Ruhr, the cooperative research council set up jointly by IN-EAST and the Faculty of East Asian Studies of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum. His service to the field of sociology and politics of China was, and is, manifold, with editorial board memberships on several peer-reviewed academic journals such as Journal of Current Chinese Affairs (Hamburg); China Information (Leiden); Journal of Agrarian Change (London); Asian Politics and Policy (Washington and Beijing); Economic and Political Studies (Beijing), Zhongguo Yanjiu / China Studies (Nanjing), and the book series Chinese Worlds (Routledge, London).

In addition, he holds visiting and honorary appointments and supervises research students at his own and external universities. His contributions to the scholarly community include the organization of conferences, refereeing on numerous occasions, and more than one hundred book reviews in a large number of scholarly journals. Throughout his career Flemming Christiansen has been a tireless and productive leading figure
in the field of the sociology and political economy of China. He has supervised more than thirty doctoral theses, providing guidance to young researchers who were eager to learn from his erudition and extensive knowledge of social studies, sociology, and political economy. The large number of his students who attended his farewell ceremony on 29 January 2020 was ample proof of his dedication to teaching, fostering and interacting with future generations of scholars. After his retirement, he will continue to work on research projects and to supervise MA and PhD theses at IN-EAST as an Associated Member.

Among Flemming Christiansen’s abundant publications, the books and articles on Chinese politics and society, with special focus on the Chinese rural society, the household registration (hukou) system, and the democracy movement of the 1980s stand out, in addition to his groundbreaking work on Chinese diasporas worldwide, especially in Europe, and on the situation of agriculture in China after the period of the reform and opening up. For his research interest in Inner Mongolia, an important impetus came from one of the founders of modern Mongolian studies in Europe, Owen Lattimore. Flemming Christiansen had met Lattimore as a student in Aarhus in the mid-1970s and remained impressed by Lattimore’s perception and conceptualization of the Inner Asian frontiers. Since the present study group on Northeast Asia was informally created in 2016, Flemming Christiansen developed his own ideas on the conceptual fields of frontier, empire, and industrialization on multiple occasions. These include a workshop in the Framework of the Postgraduate Research Group Risk and East Asia on 14 November 2016, a joint talk with Christine Moll-Murata for the AREA Ruhr lecture series in winter semester 2017/18 on 17 January 2018, and speeches at a workshop on 25 and 26 February 2019 entitled The Changing Nature of Industry as Concept and Practice. Straws in the Wind from North-East Asia and Perspectives on Urbanization and Industrial Change in Inner Mongolia since 2000, as well as presentations at the Biannual Conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Asienkunde on 11 March 2021 and at a roundtable of the European Social Science History Conference on 27 March 2021. One part of his explorations of Inner Mongolian lifestyles is contained in a recent article. In this article, and in the talks he gave in Duisburg after his return from field trips in 2016 and 2017, Flemming Christiansen outlined Hohhot’s urbanization which is attracting people from the Inner Mongolian hinterland with the offer of new, but often precarious, occupations and sources of income. These all hinge on the industrialization of production and agriculture in the region and, as seen and experienced by Flemming Christiansen, are typical of developments elsewhere in China.

In this volume, people in all stages of their academic careers salute their esteemed teacher and colleague with essays on life, work and industry in the Northeast Asian frontier regions. In chronological order, the contributions treat the earliest attempts at modernization, as in Nasan Bayar’s article on prince Gungsangnorbu of Harachin in the Josutu League (present-day Chifeng, Inner Mongolia), and the transformation of Mongolian nomadism and the establishment of new institutions in the early twentieth century, with a reflection on the valuation of nomadism in the present day. Attempts and projects to establish industrialization under the conditions of nominal autonomy, but de facto reliance on the Japanese colonial empire are in the focus of Christine Moll-Murata’s essay on the industrialization of Inner Mongolia during the Mengjiang years (1937–1945). It highlights diverse Japanese accounts on the period and shows the contrasting character of the urban centres of Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) and Suiyuan (Hohhot) as the respective cores of Japanese and Chinese dominance in the observed period. Limin Teh showcases a further critical phase of transition in the immediate post-war years (1945–48) of what had

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been Manchukuo before the Japanese surrender and was thereafter a zone in which the interests of Republican China, the Communist Party, Soviet Russia and the United States clashed. The article focuses on the coal mining sector in Fushun in this transitional period, on the legacy of Japanese industrial construction and on the consequences of the Russian dismantling of mining equipment in Manchuria, both from the viewpoints of those who contended to rule and of the ruled.

Longer time perspectives are discussed in two essays on the Republic of Mongolia and the Chinese-Korean border region respectively. Katarzyna Golik outlines the Soviet pattern of industrialization in the Mongolian state between the 1920s and the 1990s. This is set against the post-transition Western and Chinese impact on the Mongolian economy. She emphasises the reliance on foreign investment before and after the transition and assesses the development potential in the twentieth century and at present. More specifically, the article analyses the options for self-organisation and growth based on exogenous and endogenous input factors, especially in the financial sector. Bas van Leeuwen, Li Jieli and Leo Lucassen explore Yanbian prefecture on the Chinese-Korean border between the 1890s and the present day. In their study, the region is shown to have experienced a stable level of Korean immigration since the end of the Qing dynasty. Yet recently, change has occurred both in the form of return migration to Korea or migration from Korea to other parts of China. The political situation in the region in the twentieth century obliged Koreans to define themselves as Japanese subjects during the Manchukuo period, as Chinese citizens after 1949, or as Koreans if they migrated back to Korea. Their research highlights the importance and the tribulations of transnational labour and the livelihoods of people under the economic policies of border zones.

A further three contributions take the recent situation into account. From the theoretical perspective of transition studies, Julia Aristova’s contribution concentrates on ecological sustainability aims in China’s socioeconomic policies. She thus considers the effects of industrialization based on ideas of inexhaustible resources, especially fossil energy sources and mineral ores. With the awareness that such conceptions can hardly be continued, the method of socio-technical experimentation for realizing sustainability is being conducted globally, though not based on equal premises. The author found that (at least until most recently) concepts such as ecological civilization or green development were more prominent on Chinese development agendas than sustainability. Anastasia Herber’s essay examines a paradigmatic change in industrialization by comparing Chinese and Russian Special Economic zones, the latter being those in the Russian Far East. Together with a sketch of industrialization during and after the Soviet period, the author proposes a conceptual frame that looks beyond the pattern of import substitution industrialization (ISI). The article proposes that in the transition to the present “fourth” or digital industrial revolution, China is most likely to take the lead and Russia will follow and emulate. Ines Stolpe and Tümen-Ochiryn Erdene-Ochir draw attention to Mongolia and the institutionalized connections between the cities and rural, or herding, localities. The self-governed nutag councils provide important points of reference and identification for the many people who migrated to the cities, while the inhabitants of the cities support their native place or place of identification with the necessities of modern life, as is shown in the authors’ case study: access to education in the form of scholarships, campaigning for ecological preservation, but also for development of the infrastructure, or funds to overcome the devastation caused by snow storms and forest fires. This fascinating glimpse of reality, acquired in a long-term project with extensive fieldwork, closes the volume. At the same time, it opens the agenda for setting up a joint research programme that will embrace the whole of continental East Asia in the modern period.

This book was presented to Flemming Christiansen at his farewell party in Duisburg, with a cover, table of contents, and handwritten tabula
gratulatoria, beautifully laid out by Harald Krähe, the IN-EAST consultant for design and print. The content was still missing, because many of the contributors, including the present editor, were taken by surprise and very much regretted the idea of Flemming Christiansen’s retirement. Immediately thereafter the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. Instead of getting together and devising new research projects, we had to maintain social distance and learn to use techniques of digital communication to keep conversations going. When asked whether he would consider contributing one of his own essays on Northeast Asian frontiers for the volume, Flemming Christiansen declined, yet consented to share with us his thoughts in the talks at the conferences in spring 2021. We count on him to develop and expand his endeavours on Northeast Asian industrialization together with us and the extended group of scholars he brought together within this field of research. Now the volume is filled with content, and the essays are being presented in what is hopefully the final phase of the pandemic. The assistance of Dr. Susanne Stein for valuable suggestions in the first stage of the compilation and of Karen Finney-Kellerhoff for English copyediting is gratefully acknowledged.

At his farewell party, Flemming Christiansen began his words of thanks to the audience with the statement “I am a happy man.” So be it, now and in the future. Colleagues and students raise a virtual toast to Flemming Christiansen for good health, inspiration, and long-lasting happiness.

Author collective, consisting of the authors of this volume, supported by Vinita Samarasinghe, Helmut Demes, Markus Taube, Karen Shire, and Harald Krähe

FLEMING CHRISTIANSEN: WRITINGS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
based on the publication list at his website https://www.uni-due.de/imperia/md/content/in-east/people/christiansen_flemming_mp.pdf [accessed 5 Dec. 2021]

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F. Christiansen: Creative Borrowing. How the Chinese Appropriated Dualism and Transmuted It. In: Søren Clausen, Roy Starrs and Anne


**1994**


**1993**


**1992**


**1991**


**1990**


**1989**


1988


1987


1981


F. Christiansen: Kinas forenende samfundskritiker, Xu Wenli, offer for ny stramning [China’s leading social critic Xu Wenli targeted by new tightening-up]. In: Dagbladet Information, 209780 bnm, June 1981.

1980

1979

Book Reviews
TABULA GRATULATORIA

Julia Aristova, M.A., Duisburg
Prof. Dr. Nasan Bayar, Hohhot
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Nicole Böttcher, Duisburg
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Dr. Limin Teh, Leiden
Tran An Huy, M.A., Duisburg
Yang Zhiyong (Latzzi Ayur), M.A., Duisburg
Zeng Shixu, M.A, Duisburg
NOMADISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AN INNER MONGOLIAN NATIONALIST: A CASE STUDY OF PRINCE GUNGSANGNORBU

Nasan Bayar

FOREWORD

The Mongolian nomadic society, a traditional form of society that had existed on the Mongolian plateau for thousands of years, began to face unprecedented survival challenges in the early twentieth century. These challenges came both from external factors such as the “new policies” of the late Qing dynasty and the infiltration of Russian and Japanese forces, and from internal social forces such as the pioneers of modernization who advocated social transformation projects. After the implementation of national policies (including those of the Qing dynasty, the Republic of China, the puppet regime Manchukuo, the People’s Republic of China, etc.) and the active pandering and participation of the Mongolian elites, the inner structure of Mongolian society gradually entered a process of transformation. In the course of almost a century, this transformation occurred both on the level of the mode of production and on the level of the construction of an Inner Mongolian cultural and ethnic identity. Today, the nomadic society in Inner Mongolia is almost completely changed, and the remaining settled livestock industry faces severe survival challenges.

In recent years, the academic circle of Inner Mongolia has sparked moderate research interest in grassland culture (nomadic civilization or culture). Many scholars have expounded the characteristics and functions of nomadic culture from different perspectives, for example, affirming the positive significance of this culture for ecological environmental protection and multicultural preservation. Why, then, has a culture that is so “precious” and “excellent” been neglected, even deliberately abandoned, for a century so that it is now almost extinct? In addition to the various external factors mentioned above, the forces from within Mongolian society, including the understanding, attitude and actions of Mongolian social elites towards traditional nomadic culture, have triggered the transformation of traditional society and culture in Inner Mongolia. Their ideas and efforts to negate and reform nomadic culture are tantamount to a rebellion against and abandonment of the Mongolian nomadic tradition. All these are the result of the otherization or alienation of the subjectivity of nomadic culture.

Gungsangnorbu (贡桑诺尔布, 1872–1931), prince and head of the Right Wing Banner of Harachin in the Josutu League (卓索图盟喀喇沁右旗), Inner Mongolia, advocated the purpose-oriented and planned transformation of traditional Mongolian society, and he was also the earliest promoter of modernization in Inner Mongolia. The analysis and understanding of traditional social culture in the minds of Mongolian elites such as Gungsangnorbu will undoubtedly help us to see the deeper reasons for the social changes in Inner Mongolia over the past century and reveal the development context of Inner Mongolia’s modern and contemporary social thought.

This paper will make a preliminary analysis of the definition of nomadic society according to Gungsangnorbu of Harachin Right Wing Banner, in order to provide a reference for an in-depth discussion of the role of the Mongolian elites in the transformation of nomadic society in Inner Mongolia, so as to pave the way for more com-

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1 This research is a part of major project (16JJDB500007) in Humanities and Social Sciences of the Chinese Ministry of Education. I would like to thank Prof. Christine Moll-Murata for her editing and suggestions for this paper.
prehensive research on the social and ideological history of modern Inner Mongolia and north-east Asia as a whole.

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which we are discussing, were extremely complex and crucial historical periods for the Harachin Banner and for the whole of Inner Mongolia. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty had adjusted its policies on frontier areas due to the domestic crisis and foreign aggression, by relaxing the “prohibition policy” in the Mongolian areas and encouraging inland farmers to “open up” the land outside the Great Wall. After the “New Policies” (xinzheng 新政) in 1901, the Qing court accelerated the reclamation of the Mongolian areas by setting up provinces and counties in the region.

The Mongolians, who had joined the Qing dynasty as allies in the seventeenth century, had been treated favorably, enjoying autonomy and in some cases marrying into the Manchu imperial family, but by the late Qing dynasty they started to lose many of their original rights and positions. Inland farmers coming into Mongolian areas not only cultivated vast tracts of land (grasslands), but also had a strong impact on Mongolian nomadic society.

Located in the southeast of Inner Mongolia, the Right Banner of Harachin was different from the majority of Mongolian banners in that it accepted migrants. As early as the 1720s, due to the famine in Shandong and other areas, the Qing government had implemented the policy of “borrowing land to support the people” in eastern Inner Mongolia, including the Josutu League. The Mongol princes and nobles, greedy for profit from leasing land, actively recruited refugees to cultivate the land. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Mongolians in the banner had already “begun the transformation from herdsmen to agriculturalists, and agricultural areas as well as semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral areas were basically formed in this region.”

In 1904, the population of Harachin Right Banner totalled about 450,000, and the ratio of ethnic Mongolians to Han Chinese was 11:89. Part of the banner land was incorporated into Jianping (建平) county, a newly established county at the time, so the banner’s area was greatly reduced. According to Misako Kawahara (河原操子, 1875–1945), a Japanese educator who came to teach at the invitation of Gungsangnorbu in the Harachin Right Banner in 1906, Mongol male costumes in the banner at that time were no different from those of the local Han Chinese, while female costumes were more like those of the Manchu people. When she asked her Mongolian students what to them was the most valuable thing, they replied that it was millet. This shows that by the beginning of the twentieth century the Harachin Right Banner had adopted Chinese styles in terms of food, clothing, housing and transportation.

**MAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE PRINCE**

Gungsangnorbu was the only son of the 13th Jasag (banner head) Wangdutenamjil (or Prince Wang 旺都特那木济勒, 1844–1898) of the Harachin Right Banner. Prince Wang was “proficient in four languages: Mongolian, Chinese, Manchu and Tibetan, with a profound knowledge of Chinese, being good at poetry, Chinese musical instruments, Chinese chess, calligraphy and painting, almost being omnipotent.” He was a devout Buddhist and loved Beijing Opera. Under the strict control of his father, Gungsangnorbu began to learn Chinese at the age of five from Mr. Ding, who had been specially recruited from Shandong province, and Mongolian and Manchu from a Mongolian teacher. When he was 14 or 15 years

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2 Leagues were administrative units during the Qing dynasty.


4 Kawahara (1993), 137.

5 Hasbagan et al. (2006), 6.
old, he was able to "read the Four Books, the Five Classics and some classical poems, write the eight-part essay, and write some Chinese type of poems (格律诗)." His stern father later forced him to learn Tibetan and Buddhist scriptures, as well as boxing, horse-riding, archery and other sports and military skills. Gungsangnorbu wrote poems in Chinese, mostly in metrical verse. He was also a collector of Chinese antiques.

When Gungsangnorbu was 15 years old, under the arrangement of the Qing court, he married Shankun (善坤, 1871–1934), the third daughter of prince Su (Su Qinwang 肃良親王) from an eminent noble lineage very close to the imperial family.

It is worth emphasizing that the Jindandao (金丹道, the Golden Elixir Taoism) incident and the Boxer Movement that the young Gungsangnorbu experienced during his growing years must have had a significant impact on him. These two incidents, the former in particular, had a serious effect on the Josutu and Ju-uda areas, including the Harachin Right Banner. In addition, it is said that Gungsangnorbu met Kang Youwei (康有为, 1872–1927), Liang Qichao (梁启超, 1873–1929) and Tan Sitong (谭嗣同, 1865–1898), the key forerunners of the reform movement of 1898, and had contacts with them several times.

When his father died in 1898, Gungsangnorbu arrived in Beijing at the age of 27 and succeeded to the rank of Harachin prince. In 1900, the eight-power allied forces invaded the capital. "He knew that the Manchu dynasty was not strong enough, and he wanted to open up another road, so he had the determination to study, train and work hard."

Since ancient times, no matter what kind of people, with the tide of evolution, are gradually carried from backwardness to civilization. For example, the (Han) Chinese, although living in the central plains where the climate was suitable and there were rich natural resources in the ancient Xuanyuan (轩辕) emperor’s time, they still lived a life of eating raw animal meat and drinking their blood. In the course of the next several thousand years, many wise emperors and ancient sages created writing and culture and educated the whole people, which resulted in the formation of today’s civilized people. The western European powers, no matter which country, experienced barbarism without exception, but grew stronger and stronger as a result of the ability of the kings to educate their people. Japan is an island country in the East China sea. During the Meiji era of their wise emperor, they traveled around the countries, reformed laws, and revitalized industries. In a few decades, they became rich and strong. We the Mongolian people, hundreds of years ago, when Chinggis Khan rose in the land to the north of the great Gobi, swept across Europe and Asia, and defeated forty countries; Kublai Khan entered the central plains (China proper) for several generations. Emperor Shundi of the Yuan dynasty lost control of the central plains and retreated to the homeland. Since then Mongolians have declined gradually and have arrived in the condition of the poor and weak today. Hasn’t this been caused by lack of culture? My family has enjoyed the title and salaries of princes from the court of the Qing dynasty. These are troubled times for this country. If I did not assist the country and make people practice martial arts today, it would really be against my conscience. In particular, if we do not improve the cultural level of the Mongolian people who live with the Han Chinese in this banner, the Mongolians are bound to be despised and bullied by them (Han people). Therefore, we must establish public and private schools. The assistant nobles, the officials and all the Mongolian people of the banner should completely understand my intention and work accordingly. This is hereby solemnly proclaimed.
Thus, in 1902, the first modern school in Inner Mongolia was established – Chongzheng school (崇正学堂).\textsuperscript{10} Gungsangnorbu said in the school opening ceremony: “I as a prince, having enjoyed privilege and wellbeing, can say that no unpleasant things happened to me, but I have never felt so happy as today, because I see children of the people of my banner going to school. After acquiring education, they will take responsibility to restore the great undertakings of Chinggis Khan in the future.”\textsuperscript{11} According to Jagchid, the school “was the first modern school in all of Mongolia with the possible exception of the Burjaid area”.\textsuperscript{12} Obviously, in the mind of Prince Gung, the founding of the first modern school in his banner was a step towards “upholding knowledge and martial arts,” and was designed as a means of “correcting customs” in social life. Naturally, the prince was excited about the school he was founding, as seen from the poem he wrote for this new educational institution:

\begin{quote}
The royal court has completed the Hundred Days Reform,\textsuperscript{13} vassals should be educated and be enlightened as well.

Chongzheng [school] is established for reforming the customs of the masses, promoting the education of the talented is worthy of intellectuals.

It is delightful seeing this brilliant generation, expecting them to be cornerstones in the future.

May they possess boundless ambition and great expectations, for being excellent talented and for [Mongolians] to be haughty in front of neighboring powers.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

In 1903, Gungsangnorbu traveled to Japan and attended an exposition of industrial development in Osaka. Although he had planned to visit the United States of America “to gain ideas useful for his modernization policies”\textsuperscript{15} he was prevented from doing so by the Qing court. On his trip to Japan, he was impressed by the power of this modern Asian society, in matters of education, military capabilities and industry. Having returned to his banner, Prince Gung was inspired to make even more ambitious plans for the development of his own banner and the Mongolians as a whole. He issued an official instruction to the local people, after he had discussed the matter with his assistants. The Prince’s decrees read as follows:

\begin{quote}
For the attention of all senior and junior nobles, officials and commoners (arad),

I visited Japan and had an inspection of their society, from emperor to ordinary people. They are united as one and work with one heart. Although they are classified into upper and lower groups, they have strict and clear laws to follow, and treat one another in a close and harmonious way. People see their emperor as parent, while the monarch treats his subjects as children. They do their own jobs, with one heart. There is no single loafer there. Women
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} The name of the school was based on the combination of the first word of each line in a couplet written by the prince in Chinese that was posted on the school gate, “崇武尚文无非赖尔多士，正风易俗所望于群公” (roughly meaning “Upholding knowledge and martial arts would be completed by many talents, correcting customs of the educated”).

\textsuperscript{11} Wu / Xing (1986), 18.

\textsuperscript{12} Jagchid (1988), 213.

\textsuperscript{13} The original version of the poem is as follows: 朝廷白度尽维新，藩属亦应教化均。崇正先从端士习，兴才良不愧儒珍。欣看此日峥嵘辈，期作他年柱石臣。无限雄心深期望，养成大器傲强邻。

\textsuperscript{14} CFSWSZL (1986), 53–54.

\textsuperscript{15} Jagchid (1988), 213.
assist their husbands, by diligently performing household chores and educating children. There are many schools in Japan, and all of its people, regardless of their sex and age, study at schools to get training in various fields for the capacity to do a job. The population of poor people is very small in that country.

As for the small group of us Mongolians, although incomparable to Japanese, the most dreadful thing is the lack of a strong will. With a strong will, the weak can become strong and the poor become rich. In recollecting our past, we can see that Chinggis Khan rose from a small tribe and obtained great fame on earth. Although our banner is small, we have some thousands of households in the banner. Who would dare say that we are unable to become stronger? To be strong and rich, we must establish schools first. I founded a school in the year before the last, and it has had achievements. Since it takes several years for students to complete all courses and study further, its results will come later.

Considering the emergent situation at present, we have no reason to delay various undertakings. I have discussed with officials of the banner and decided to establish a military school at a courtyard in Daxigou (大西沟) that is the heritage of the Third Prince (sangongye 三公爷), near by the banner center (yamen), and a girls’ school at the Yanyitang (燕贻堂) in my palace. Considering the fact that all of our tribe (aimag) and country (ulus), from ancient times to today, have defended their own tribe and country with military force, we had the intention to set up the two schools. For example, in the seventeenth year of the Guangxu Emperor (1891), Chinese inhabitants in Mongolian banners rebelled as “Red Caps” and harmed Mongolians very severely. If we had had a strong army of some hundred men at that time, there would not have been a serious disaster. Therefore, my aim to create a military school is to protect the northern frontier of the country, and to protect the safety of the banner.

We know that children grow up with education by their mother. Children will easily imitate the mother’s character and way of speech and behavior. If mothers are educated, they will be able to instruct children in preschool education, such as teaching them how to read [simple readings], how to be hygienic, and how to be an honest, straight and modest person. Then children can be educated in schools to cultivate excellent talents with knowledge and morality. It can be seen from this that development of a race (aimag ugsaga) is dependent on the promotion of public culture, and the promotion of public culture relies on the teaching competence of mothers. This is the reason why I want to set up the girls’ school, and I hope that all of the people in this banner correctly understand the intention, and should send young girls of school age and youngsters who are suited to study to the office (yamen) of the banner before the deadline, to study at the girls’ school and the military school. Please do not disappoint my zeal. Respect this order!

The military school was named töb-i sahigsan tanghim, meaning “School for Protecting Integrity,” and the girls’ school named töb-yi homüjügl-hü tanghim, meaning “Girls’ School for the Development of Integrity.”

The prince invited two Japanese officers, Captain Itō Ryūtarō (伊藤柳太郎) and Lieutenant Yoshiwara Shiro (吉原四郎) to teach at the military school. The Japanese instructed students in Japanese, using Japanese textbooks, with assistance from Yao Zishen (姚子慎), an interpreter from Zhejiang province. The first class of the school admitted some thirty students from the banner; these were to be trained as officers, and the school later enrolled some hundred young men to train as soldiers. The courses were classified into two groups: learning courses and

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16 Xing (1986), 5–6.
17 The interpreter’s name is spelled Yao Yu 姚煜 in Wang Guojun (2006), 85.
training courses. The former included army skills, field expertise, shooting, physical education, arithmetic, Japanese language, geography and history, and the latter unarmed exercises (tushou ticao 徒手体操), armed exercises (jixie ticao 机械体操), field exercises, and shooting exercises.\(^{18}\) To fund the military school, Prince Gung released a piece of land to Chinese farmers for agricultural development. The school was maintained until 1910 when it was changed into the banner armed forces centre due to financial shortages.

The prince also invited another teacher from Japan to join the girls’ school. The Japanese instructor Misako Kawahara provides us with a description of the school at that time. At the opening ceremony more than three hundred local celebrities attended, and Princess Shankun and Kawahara gave speeches on the importance of education for women. The princess stressed that men and women should be equal and women should be educated so that they would be capable of undertaking household chores and educating children. All of these duties were part of the development of the nation. She firmly believed that “this school would be the fountainhead of the stream of civilization in Mongolia, and the foundation of Mongolian development and prosperity”.\(^{19}\) Kawahara’s speech was first translated from Japanese into Mandarin by Yao Zishen, then from Mandarin into Mongolian by the prince. The princess was schoolprincipal, while Kawahara was in charge of the management of teaching. The school also had other teachers for its courses on Mongolian and Chinese.

Gungsangnorbu also successively set up the “Mongolia Industrial Company” (蒙古实业公司) (to produce cloth, soap, candles, chalk, dye and other daily necessities) and department stores, and introduced mulberry seedlings to promote silk production in his banner. He set up telegraph lines connecting the banner with the outside world, opening telegraph services, and established a post and telecommunications link between the banner and Beijing. Prince Gung founded a Mongolian and Chinese bilingual newspaper Yingbao 婴报, which was published on every second day, and a library for the public in the banner.

Prince Gung sent a group of students to study various subjects in Japan and Chinese cities such as Beijing in order to develop talents for future grand plans. At the same time, he established a small but regular army for his banner, which played an important role in protecting the security of Harachin.

In 1906, Gungsangnorbu accompanied the Qing imperial prince Su Shangqi (肃亲王善耆, 1866–1922), his brother-in-law, on a three-month tour of the four leagues of Josotu, Ju-uda, Jirim and Shilingol.

In 1908, when he went to Beijing for his yearly court service (nianban 年班), the prince submitted an eight-point petition to the Qing authorities. These were:

1. To establish a bank as soon as possible;
2. To hasten the construction of railroads;
3. To develop the exploitation of local mineral resources;
4. To develop agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises;
5. To give special attention to diplomatic matters;
6. To popularize and elevate education;
7. To modernize military forces; and
8. To establish a police administration.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\) Kawahara (1909), 285.

Nasan Bayar: A Case Study of Prince Gungsangnorbu

He also suggested a "reform of animal husbandry policy in Ujumuchin Banners" and "improvement of bureaucratic rule in the Mongolian banners." Clearly, Prince Gung was thinking not just about his own banner, but about the future of the entire Mongolian region. The central government was said to have taken note of the proposal and issued a written reply. However, it was never put into practice as required by the prince.

After the 1911 revolution, the provinces declared their independence one after another, and the Qing court faced its greatest challenge to date. This was a historical turning point both for the dynasty and the Mongolians. The princes and nobles from the Inner Mongolian banners, who were in Beijing at that time, were shocked by the situation, while some of them considered the matter from the perspective of Mongolian nationalism. Prince Gung was the leader of the latter group. A group of princes, in which Prince Gung was key member, put the following proposal to the court:

• The east Mongolian leagues (Josutu, Jirim, and Ju-uda) should not be under the administration of the three eastern provinces and the Jehol authorities;
• Mongolians should have the right to train their own troops;
• Mongols should have taxation rights for products from Mongolia;
• A Mongolian should be appointed as minister of the Court of Dependencies 理藩院;
• Mongolians should be granted equal rights with the Chinese in the constitution.

On December 1, 1911, Outer Mongolia declared its independence from China, with the support of Russia. Afterwards, the Qing court negotiated with the revolutionaries in the south of China. Prince Gung, together with other senior princes, founded an association of Mongolian peers, "to facilitate communication (kaitong fengqi 开通风气) among Mongolians, reform (gailiang 改良) politics, maintain rights, unite all banners and treat one another harmoniously." Another source indicates that they decided that "all Mongolians will follow the independence of Huree (Outer Mongolia) as an example, and separate from the Qing dynasty." The negotiation between the Qing court and the southern revolutionaries ended in failure, the Mongolian princes, including Prince Gung in Beijing, adopted a pro-Manchu stance against the republicans at first and when the republicans gained more ground and the Manchu court failed in the struggle, the Mongolians indicated a willingness to discuss their status in the newly emerging regime with the revolutionaries.

In February 1912 the Manchu regime collapsed, leaving the Inner Mongolians to consider their own future. The Mongolian leaders were aware that the Mongolians were not strong enough to achieve their aims on their own and sought support from two foreign powers: Russia and Japan, both of which had a strong interest in Mongolian issues at that time. Prince Gung, together with Gonchugsurung, a prince from Horchin, asked for help from a Russian diplomat in Beijing who indicated that, although he was sympathetic to the Inner Mongolian independence movement, there was no possibility of such assistance for the Inner Mongolians because of the geographical distance. On the other hand, upon the establishment of the Chinese republic, Japan supported the separation of the Manchu and Mongolians from China, with a view to establishing a domain of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia, respectively. The Japanese bound the two nationalities into one, eventually to make use of these peoples

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21 Bailadugeqi (2002), 85.
22 Bailadugeqi (2002), 85.
23 Nakami (1983), 418.
24 Bailadugeqi (2002), 86.
26 Bailadugeqi (2002), 87.
for their own agenda. Prince Su, brother-in-law of Prince Gung, was a key figure in connecting the Manchu and Japanese, and his Manchu loyalist party (Zongshedang 宗社党) was the main agent in restoring the resigned court.

In March 1912, Prince Gung borrowed 20,000 taels of silver from a Beijing-based Japanese bank and made a contract with a Japanese firm based in Beijing, ordering guns and ammunition from Japan. Then he immediately returned to his homeland and had meetings with officials and nobles in his banner to discuss a possible solution for the Mongolians in the growing Chinese crisis. His stance was to choose independence for the Mongolians, but conservative locals kept silent. In April, Prince Gung sent his banner’s official Chogbadarhu and lama Serjijamsu to the capital Huree with a letter pledging his allegiance to the Bogda Khan Jibtsundamba, (c. 1869–1924), head of the newly founded independent Mongolia, on behalf of all monks and laymen in the Harachin banner. In mid-June, Prince Gung convened a conference of princes and leaders of Josutu and Ju-uda and Jirim leagues in Ulaanhad (Chifeng 赤峰) to discuss the issues facing the Mongolians at that time. As spokesman of the conference, he made it very clear that he favored establishing an independent Mongolia. However, princess Shankun, his Manchu wife, disagreed with the prince on this particular idea and tried to convince participants to support the restoration of the Manchu Dynasty. At the conference she responded negatively to the prince’s proposal, realizing that it was risky to undertake any move for independence from Beijing.

After the Ulaanhad conference, the Prince sent Lobsangchoijur (1866–1945), a high-ranking lama from his banner, to Huree once again, to be better informed on the latest developments in independent Mongolia. Subsequently, the Bogda Khan Jibtsundamba appointed Prince Gung through the envoy as leader of Inner Mongolia. Lobsangchoijur, however, saw that the newly established Mongolian regime itself was vulnerable and doubted that the Inner Mongolians could be supported substantially by the Mongolian polity. Perhaps due to the fact that the princes only reluctantly supported his plan for independence, Prince Gung initiated plans for the local autonomy of both Mongolians and Chinese. In mid-April, he organized a conference of officials and representatives from his banner and neighboring counties, and founded an association of five nationalities (wuzu 五族) in the Harachin area. The prince himself was elected as chairman of the association, along with some other deputy chairmen, including a Chinese. The slogan of the association was: “to abolish barriers between nationalities” (huachu zujie 化除族界) and to “share the republic” (gongxiang gonghe 共享共和). Yet the security of the nascent movement depended on the acquisition of modern weapons. The endeavour met with failure as in mid-June the Japanese weapons that had been ordered by Prince Gung were intercepted and confiscated by the Chinese north-eastern army, while Japanese soldiers were killed by the local Chinese army in the area.

Thus, the prince’s ambitious plan for independence ended in failure and he went to Beijing at the “invitation” of Yuan Shikai (袁世凯, 1859–1916), President of the newly established government of China, where he accepted an appointment as head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau in September 1912. In the same year, he was involved with the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), when it was transformed from the Tongmenghui (United League) by Sun Zhongshan (孙中山 Sun Yat-sen, 1866–1925). However, the prince’s role in the party was insubstantial while his official post gave him no actual

27 Wu/Xing (1986), 25.
29 Jagchid (1988), 220.
power in the Yuan Shikai administration. Indeed, the sole achievement of his tenure was the establishment of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy (蒙藏院) that later developed into a key higher educational institution for national minorities in the country.

THE PRINCE’S PERSPECTIVE ON NOMADIC SOCIETY

Gungsangnorbu left no writings that theoretically discussed nomadic traditional societies. But from his speeches and social activities we can infer his thoughts and ideas on nomadic society and its transformation. Let us take a look at his views on nomadic societies from some of his statements and social behavior.

In his 1902 edict, Prince Gung pointed out that “since Shundi Khan (顺帝, 1320–1370) lost power in the Middle Kingdom and withdrew to his [homeland] to the north of the Gobi, our race has declined and become worse and worse to such an extent that we are now in an extremely weak position.”

His proposal of 1908 to “reform animal husbandry policy in the Ujumuchin Banners” and “improve bureaucratic rule in the Mongolian banners”, reflected his thoughts on reforming the nomadic economy. This means that to change the traditional nomadic mode of production it was a necessary step to transform traditional society. He specifically stated that in order to “breed strong horses and cattle” some talented students should be sent to study abroad, or teachers should be invited to train them, establishing schools with specialties such as veterinary medicine and teaching the science of animal husbandry. Once this was achieved, each Ujumuchin Banner should set up a large organization to handle this matter exclusively, namely the management of big farms. Based on this, Mongolian livelihoods would also be improved.33 He believed that the Ujumuchin Banners were the best place to develop modern animal husbandry.

In 1906, when Prince Gung accompanied his brother-in-law, Prince Su Shanqi, on a tour of four eastern leagues, Lobsangchoijur, a member of Prince Su’s entourage, was always Prince Gung’s right-hand man. In 1911, Lobsangchoijur, considered by Prince Gung to be “experienced in the Mongolian region” (Jagchid’s word), went to Huree as the personal representative of Prince Gung to congratulate Jibtsundamba on the newly announced Mongolian independence. In fact, he was sent to observe current political and social conditions for Mongolian independence and its consequences for the Inner Mongolian banners. Lobsangchoijur, based on his observations, politely declined the appointment and issue of the corresponding seal of the new Mongolian government to Prince Gung, saying that Prince Gung could only accept in person such an important appointment from the Khan Jibtsundamba. In addition to finding the new regime on shaky foundations, the special envoy probably also had a negative impression of Mongolian society, which was still largely nomadic at that time and “sparsely populated, covered with deserts and the Gobi desert, impoverished and ignorant.”34 Purely nomadic societies such as Outer Mongolia may have been a strange, backward and ignorant sight to Lobsangchoijur and Prince Gung, since they both lived in the largely agricultural Harachin banner.

In this context it is interesting to recall how Hai-shan (海山), a noble from Prince Gung’s banner, who had engaged in the movement for independence in Outer Mongolia, became involved in a legal dispute there. Haishan went to Outer Mongolia to actively participate in the independence movement and became an important figure in Huree. After his arrival in Outer Mongolia, he arranged for his relatives and followers to farm

33 Bailadugeqi (1997), 22.
34 Ruihe (1986), 40.
some land there that had been allocated to him by Khan Jibtsundamba in recognition of his excellent performance in the political movement in Outer Mongolia. Haishan’s engagement in agriculture caused conflicts with a local noble, because Haishan had hired Russians and Chinese to cultivate land in northern Outer Mongolia. This incongruous approach to nomadic society of Outer Mongolia by a nationalist dedicated to the Mongolian independence movement reflects the views of the Harachin elites towards the nomadic society.\textsuperscript{35}

Founded in 1910 by Amurlingui, prince of Horchin (Jirim League), with the support of the Qing court, the Mongolian Industrial Company was supported by a group of prominent Mongolian princes, of which Prince Gung was chief member. With the slogan of “developing Mongolia” as its mission, the enterprise planned not only to open automobile transport from Zhangjiakou (张家口 Chugulgatu Hagalga) to Huree, but also and more importantly to reclaim land in the Gorlos Rear Banner of Jirim League. The head of the Gorlos Rear Banner, Zagreb, was seriously indebted and had to sell a large piece of land to pay off his debts. The Mongolia Industrial Company was responsible for hiring people to cultivate the land.\textsuperscript{36}

The company, which suspended its business due to the influence of the revolution of 1911, resumed its activities in 1913, and the following year came into conflict with the northeast warlord forces over the land reclamation issues mentioned above.\textsuperscript{37} The focus of the conflict was the right to reclaim land rather than the question of whether to reclaim land for agriculture or to preserve pastoral land.

In 1918, the same group of princes advocated the establishment of the “Mongolian Development Bank Co., Ltd.” Although Prince Gung was no longer their leader, his social ideals were shared by these princes and nobles. They explained in their application to the Mukden authority to found the bank that there were vast lands and rich resources in Mongolian areas, but that industry was totally underdeveloped, due to poor transportation and the lack of a unified currency system. The bank they sought to establish would support forestry, agriculture, mining and industry.\textsuperscript{38}

Clearly, in the eyes of these people, including Prince Gung, who were seeking a modern (Inner) Mongolia, nomadic societies perpetuated backward modes of production that needed to be reformed or abandoned.

**CONCLUSION: NOMADISM NOT ONLY AS A MODE OF PRODUCTION**

It is accepted among academics that nomadism is not only a mode of production, but also a way of life, that is, a culture or civilization. It is the way in which a group obtains natural resources (production) in the specific natural environment in which they live. More importantly, it is the moral code for the relationship between humans and nature and the relationship between human and human (social relationship). In other words, the world outlook, outlook on life, ecological outlook and values of the nomadic people are all based on their nomadic lifestyle.

The Mongolian social elite of the early twentieth century clearly saw nomadism merely as a mode of production that needed to be improved or transformed.

At that time the dominant social thought in the world, especially in the West, was social evolutionism. After the spread of social evolutionism to China, it became the main line of thought of the country’s literati. According to social evolu-

\textsuperscript{35} Boldbaatar (2002), 38–42.
\textsuperscript{36} Wang (1984), 82.
\textsuperscript{37} ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{38} You (2001), 18, 20, 21.
nomadism is in an evolutionary stage preceding agriculture. After his visit to Japan, Prince Gung expanded his horizon and found a model of social development, describing Japan as the “blueprint” of “prosperity” for Mongolian society and “restoration of the great cause of Chinggis Khan.” Nomadic societies were urgently in need of alternative modes of production, with settled farming and commerce, or at least with modern animal husbandry.

Mongolian “history” in Prince Gung’s eyes was both glorious and dark, glorious because of the period of Chinggis Khan, and dark mainly because of nomadism and Buddhism. This definition of nomadic society was widely recognized by the Mongol elites during and after Prince Gung’s time, who endeavoured to carry out projects to transform nomadic society in practice. In doing so, they were bound to become embroiled in a self-contradictory dilemma, both to deny the nomadic society, but also to affirm the historical period of the nomadic society.

Each culture has its own subjectivity, that is, its unique cosmology, values, ethical standards and national self-identity. Nomads are no exception. They cultivate, develop and pass on their own subjectivity in a specific cultural and natural environment. Cultural subjectivity is often transformed under certain historical conditions. Like the great change in social identity brought about by the conversion of the Mongolians to Buddhism in the sixteenth century, the acceptance and promotion of various social trends, including evolution, by the Mongolians in the twentieth century brought about the unprecedented decline of the nomadic society.

What should be noted here is that Prince Gung’s overall social development plan was for the political purpose of “striving for the international status of the whole Mongolian nation.” In other words, this nationalist political framework is the ultimate factor in determining the social significance of specific projects, including the transformation of nomadic societies. After 1912 when he accepted a ministerial position in the government of the Republic of China, Prince Gung, having abandoned his efforts for (Inner) Mongolian independence, turned to improving Inner Mongolian social and political interests in China.

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*Prince Gung as head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau*

Source: Powell (1925), 432.
In the process of modernization and industrialization in the region that is presently the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia in the People’s Republic of China, a relatively short period stands out. This was the phase when, among the powers that strove for predominance in North-east Asia, the Japanese had the strongest impact. In political terms, this became most evident after the Japanese military interference in the north-eastern Chinese provinces in 1931 and the foundation of the dependent state of Manzhouguo 滿洲國 in 1932. Yet in military terms, the wars with China in 1894/95 and with Russia in 1905 antedated this manifestation of political power and led to economic repercussions that contributed to the industrialization in the region north of the Great Wall.

This paper focuses on the industrialization efforts during the regime of Mengjiang 蒙疆 (Mongolian borderland) ¹ between 1937 and 1945, which formed a satrap state under Japanese control. It looks at the preconditions of industrialization – that is, infrastructure, electricity, communications, and finance – as they were presented in the Japanese literature of the period, mainly for the cities of Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), Datong, Hohhot and Baotou. Moreover, it demonstrates the extraction of resources in agriculture, herding and mining and outlines the presence of the Japanese state and private enterprises in the cities. The literature of the period² is biased by its Japanese provenance. It conveys the remarkable speed with which the Japanese enterprises and colonial institutions made their appearance in the region. As in the case of Manchoukuo, pre-existing infrastructure built during the time of Chinese Republican and Warlord rule was largely ignored, just as the Japanese endeavours and possible achievements are passed over in silence in the period after 1945. The paper thus aims at adding and critically evaluating a facet of growth and impact that tends to be forgotten in the present Chinese discourse.

POLITICAL HISTORY OF MENGJIANG

After the end of the Qing monarchy in 1911, several declarations of independence from the newly founded Republic of China were made in the region of present Inner Mongolia. Yet the 1915 Kjachta treaty between Russia, China and Mongolia established that Outer Mongolia accepted the suzerainty of China, but was considered “autonomous”, while Inner Mongolia was mentioned only once, as the southern border of Outer Mongolia. The autonomy of this part of Mongolia was not mentioned.³

In what is today the central part of the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, the Northern

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² For instance, Wakatake/Hayashida (1938), Tō-A kenkyū-jo daiichi chōsa iinkai (1939), the Mengjiang Yearbooks Mōkyō nenkan, Nakamura (1941), Yamada/Sekitani (1942).

³ Treaties (1921), 1241, Article XI.
Warlord regimes dominated during the first half of the Republic of China (1911 to 1937). The Shanxi province warlord Yan Xishan 閻錫山 (1883–1960) and, after 1931, his subordinate Fu Zuoyi 傅作義 (1895–1974), governed the region and tried to colonize it, especially by land reclamation under government control, and by settling Han Chinese population. All the while, independence movements led by various Mongol leaders, sometimes competing and sometimes in alliance, existed and were visible. After the Japanese assumed indirect control over Manzhouguo in 1931, these independence movements became more pronounced. One Mongol prince, Demchugdongrub or Dewang 德王 (1902–1966) from Chahar province in Eastern Inner Mongolia, tried to gain the upper hand over other competitors, including the warlords. Sechin Jagchid (1914–2009), Demchugdorub’s biographer, participant in and historian of the Inner Mongolian independence movement under Dewang, outlined the phases and subsequent governing institutions in the region as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Polity (English)</th>
<th>Polity (Chinese)</th>
<th>Power base / capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1934 –</td>
<td>Mongolian Political Council / Mongolian Local</td>
<td>蒙古大會 Mongolian地方自治政務委員會</td>
<td>Bailingmiao 百靈廟 (Bat Chaalga / Bat Khaalag)(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1936</td>
<td>Self-Rule Political Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1936 –</td>
<td>Mongolian Military Government</td>
<td>蒙古軍政府</td>
<td>Dehua 德化 (Jabsar)(^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1937</td>
<td>Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government</td>
<td>蒙古聯盟自治政府 / 蒙古地方自治政府 /</td>
<td>Hohhot 呼和浩特 / Zhangjiakou 張家口 (Kalgan) / Datong 太同</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1939</td>
<td>included Southern Chahar Autonomous Government and Northern Shanxi Autonomous Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1939</td>
<td>Mengjiang Allied Autonomous Government</td>
<td>蒙疆联合自治政府</td>
<td>Zhangbei 張北(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1941</td>
<td>Mongolian Autonomous State Government</td>
<td>蒙古自治邦政府(^9)</td>
<td>Zhangbei 張北</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1941</td>
<td>August 1945</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Mengjiang was thus quasi-independent from the Republic of China, it was dependent on Japan in military and economic terms. Moreover, in 1940, Demchugdorub nominally paid allegiance to the National Government of the Republic of China, a further satrap state of Japan established by Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883–1944) during the invasion and occupation of the Nationalist capital Nanjing by the Japanese army in December 1937.

After the Japanese invasion in China proper in July 1937, Demchugdorub’s military adversaries, the warlord armies, were held back, so that in October 1937 the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government could be established in Hohhot. The region, including the previously Chinese-governed Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi, was renamed Mengjiang

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\(^4\) Jagchid (1999).
\(^5\) Monastery, ca. 110 km northeast of Baotou.
\(^6\) The present name is Huade 化德 in the present-day Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR).
\(^7\) Presently the capital of IMAR. The present transcription is 呼和浩特. The previous name was Guisui 歸綏, see below.
\(^8\) A district about 40 km north of Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) in present-day Hebei province.
\(^9\) Jagchid (1999), 204 note 8, 208, 212 f. stresses that Demchugdorub and other Mongolian leaders strongly rejected the name “Mengjiang” (Mongolian borderland). They considered it an insult, and insisted on referring to the polity as “Menggu” in their striving for independence from China and hope of unification with the Mongolian People’s Republic.
in November 1937. Under the subsequent names mentioned above, the Mengjiang regime lasted for seven years, until the Japanese surrender in 1945. During that period, Demchudongrub travelled several times to Manzhouguo, and twice to Japan, where he was received by the emperor and visited the Osaka and Kyoto Chambers of Commerce, as well as the printing press of the Asahi Newspaper in Osaka. Like Gungsangnorbu, Demchudongrub attached high value to education. But overall, the prince had little room for military and economic manoeuvring, and little hope of achieving unification with the Mongolian People’s Republic, in spite of several efforts to forge alliances with the Mongolian government. Until 1941, the Japanese consultant Kanai Shōji (1886–1967) was in charge of all matters of industrial construction in Mengjiang, serving the Japanese state rather than the local communities.

Ganbagana (b. 1970), a historian from Inner Mongolia who completed his Ph. D. in Japan, published an account of Demchudongrub’s activities as a head of state and military of Mengjiang. This study focuses on warfare and diplomacy, but also mentions the establishment of institutions of learning, such as elementary schools for boys and girls, military schools, and an academy. Moreover, Ganbagana discusses the opening of the first public hospital; the first newspaper publishing company (Zhangjiakou, 20 July 1938); the first radio station (Hohhot, 11 Dec. 1941); the state-operated Mongolian Leather and Wool Stock Company Ltd. (1 Oct. 1943); and the Mengjiang Bank, established in late 1937. In this author’s interpretation of events, the Japanese Kantō Army was for some time interested in supporting the Mongolian drive for independence, but after its defeat in the Nomonhan / Khalkhin Gol battle with the Soviet Union in 1939, the Japanese government decided to turn south to conquer the resource-rich regions of Southeast Asia. Thereafter, Inner Mongolia was of less importance to the Japanese government. However, the sources that contain information on the economy show that the Japanese impact increased rather than declined, at least until about 1943. To gain insights into the inception of industrialization in Mengjiang, this paper will turn to sources from the period and one written after the war and published in 1955.

**ECONOMY AND GROWTH IN A DEPENDENT STATE: EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION IN MENGJIANG**

In 1938, the Japanese government established the East Asia Development Board (Kōain), an institution that was intended to develop the economies of the occupied zones of China and its border regions. It had branches in north, central and south China and Mengjiang. In July 1940, one of the directors of the Mengjiang branch of the Kōain, Major-General Takeshita Yoshiharu (竹下義晴, 1887–1946), submitted a plan for emergency measures for strengthening the regions bordering on Outer Mongolia that included the development of the productive sector (sangyō 産業). In December 1941, the necessity to develop the industry was reiterated by the military advisor to the Mongol army (of Mengjiang), Matsuzaki Yō (松崎陽, 1899–1981) in “Guidelines for the promotion of the Development of Mongolia” 興蒙推進要綱. However, these “Guidelines” contain rather general plans, which is why...
NORTHEAST ASIA IN FOCUS

Further publications from the Mengjiang era in Japanese concerning economic topics need to be analysed to shed light on projects planned and realized. The research question is how far the Japanese publications took the Chinese industrialization efforts into account, and which future they envisaged for the region. The present article questions Ganbagana’s assertion that after the Nomonhan battle, the interest and main thrust was directed at the Pacific rather than to China’s northern frontier regions.

In recent years, the Mengjiang Yearbooks (Mōkyō nenkan) have become available from the National Diet Library in Tokyo as well as other digital platforms, such as Duxiu or Early Twentieth Century Books in China, 1911–1949. The 1941 edition is most widely available. Furthermore, a parallel edition under the title HokuShi Mōkyō nenkan (North China and Mengjiang Yearbook) exists from the year 1941. As that title implies, the “alliance” with Southern Chahar and Northern Shanxi, which had existed since 1937, was intended to facilitate political and economic integration of North China and the regions north of the Great Wall. Yet other parts of China under Japanese occupation and Manzhouguo were also expected to function as areas for import and export of commodities and manpower.

The intended audience of the Yearbooks were first and foremost readers of Japanese. Other Yearbooks published during the period of Japan’s colonial rule were translated to other languages, such as English, but not those from the Mengjiang phase. This handbook type of publication contains information about the political situation and government institutions. Topics concerning economic administration include public finances, currency, resources and prices, labour, commerce, manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, animal breeding, mining, infrastructural topics such as traffic and communications, culture and education and information about the most important cities, Zhangjiakou, Datong, Hohhot, Baotou and Xuanhua. The same sequence of topics is repeated for the northern Chinese Beijing-Tianjin region, as well as for Hebei, Henan, Shanxi and Shandong. Thus, the Yearbooks constitute concise overviews of activities concerning industrialization. They convey the message that Mengjiang was meant to be integrated in the resource-rich parts of northern China under Japanese control. The intended integration not only pertained to mineral resources, but also to manpower. The population of this specific region, as quoted in the 1941 Yearbook, totalled 3,637,360 people. More than 60 % of them were residents in the south – that is, in southern Chahar and northern Shanxi. A further 26 % lived in the core region of Hohhot and Baotou, previously called Suiyuan province 綏遠省, but referred to as Bayantala (or Bayandala) league (巴彥達[塔]拉盟) in the Mengjiang era. In an area of roughly 500,000 square kilometres, the average population density was 7.2 per square kilometre.

PRODUCTIVE AND EXTRACTIVE SECTORS

The overview of the entire productive sector (sangyō 産業) in the 1941 Yearbook ranks the agricultural, animal breeding, and mineral resources of the extractive sector first. The manufacturing and industrial subsector (kōgyō 工業) is said to be still in a stage of “infancy” (yōchi 幼稚), but the emergence of a light industry is becoming visible. The production of flour, alcohol, matches, tiles/bricks, cement, tobacco, ironware, ammunition and foodstuffs is cited as rising, and the
Christine Moll-Murata: The Industrialization of Inner Mongolia in the Mengjiang Phase

Figure 1: Area of Mengjiang 1937–1945

Source: Nakamura (1941)

number of production companies established since late 1939 is noted as 40.23 The Yearbook treats the separate branches according to the importance of their output and sales volume. Thus, the wool processing branch tops the list. Mechanized equipment was available in some of the firms that produced wool cloth, such as the Suiyuan wool weaving company in Hohhot. It was founded by the provincial local administrator, Fu Zuoyi, in 1934, but after the Japanese occupation, the military controlled this factory and operated it together with a wool weavery in the occupied ManMō 滿蒙 territory, on the border between Manzhouguo and Mengjiang. The Japanese manufacturing firm Kanebō 鐘紡 had opened a wool weavery in Zhangjiakou, and in Baotou, a wool washing facility had started in 1939, with a 300,000-yuan investment. A similar factory was planned in Suiyuan too. The Yearbook gives a detailed account of the internal organization of the industrial committee for this production branch (蒙疆羊毛同業會). The members of that committee were eight trading and production firms with

23 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 202.
headquarters in Japan or Manzhouguo. In addition to the goods manufactured in mechanized production, the Yearbook also explains that carpets, felt, and wool cloth were made in handicraft production. The carpets, mainly exported to the Peking-Tianjin region, were entirely produced by Han people; the Mongols had no hand in making them. Further branches of manufacture were leather processing, glue production, hat making, dairy production, alcohol production, flour mills, the production of bricks, cement, carbide, tobacco, and medicine. Electricity was also subsumed under "manufacture and industry" (kōgyō). For this important element of industrialization and mechanized manufacturing, the Yearbook states that before the Japanese occupation of Suiyuan province, four separate, uncoordinated companies provided electricity in Zhangjiakou, Hohhot, Datong and Baotou. In 1939, the Mengjiang Alliance was established, and one month later, all electrical companies in the region were unified and operated by the Mengjiang electricity company Mengjiang dianye zhushi huishe / Mōkyō dengyō kabushiki kaisha, which also planned investments in a thermal and a hydro power station.

In sum, the Yearbooks portray the manufacturing sector as developing, if starting from a low level. An explanation is given in the section for glue production. The late development of manufacturing, as compared with the extractive and distributive sectors, was due to the restrictions on all economic processes in the region, which functioned as a colony of China. The entry on dairy similarly states that the Mongols of Shilingol league and Chahar league did make butter (黃油), clotted cream (urum, 奶皮子), and alcohol mainly for their own use. Only one company, Huangyou gongsi ("butter company") of the Chahar league, established in 1919, traded butter and cheese, mainly to (Western) foreigners. The Yearbook points out that "the equipment of the workshop is simple and it belongs to a mere handicraft stage. However, it deserves special attention because it is an industry in the animal herding region, and furthermore because the Mongols display a tendency to avoid commercialization and industrialization." Concerning the resources and locations of the extractive sector, the Yearbook states which coal and ore mines were already known, and which options existed for further exploitation. Thus, stone coal in Datong in northern Shanxi and in Xiahua yuan 下花園 in southern Chahar is mentioned – though surprisingly not Baotou, which was an important coal-mining region as well – along with mica, lead, asbestos and graphite. As in the case of manufacturing, strong emphasis is set on the legal provisions, especially mining concessions, both for Mengjiang citizens and for foreigners and foreign companies. The Mengjiang Allied Government's "new mining law" of 1 October 1939 on the mineral deposits in Mengjiang is appended in full, as is a law on the extraction of mineral salt. In the section on the coal mines of Datong, the South Manchuria Railway Company (Mantetsu), de facto the biggest continental development institution of the Japanese government, is explicitly mentioned as a main contractor. According to the Yearbook, after the occupation of the Datong coal mines by the Japanese Army, the government of Mengjiang concluded a contract with Mantetsu that made

24 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 202 mentions eight member companies: Kanebō 鐘紡, ManMō keori 滿蒙毛織, Nikke 日毛 (Nippon keori kabushiki gaisha, based in the Manzhouguo capital Xinjing [Changchun]), Mitsui 三井, Mitsubishi 三菱, Kanematsu 兼松, Manshū chikusan 満洲畜産, DaiMō kōshi 大蒙公司.
25 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 202–211.
26 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 203.
27 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 206 f. Considering the size and output of the two biggest dairy companies in China, Mengniu and Yili, both based in Hohhot and founded in 1999 and 1993, respectively, the modest beginnings of the dairy sector 80 years earlier seem amazing.
28 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 180–193.
29 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 183–185, New Mining Law 新礦業法 in 73 clauses; 198–201 Mengjiang combined salt law 蒙疆鹽業組合法 in 65 clauses.
the government an authorized administrator of the Datong mines. With an investment of 20 million yuan by the government, and 10 million each by Mantetsu and by the North China Development Company 北支開発会社, the Mengjiang Special Corporation Datong Coal Mining Stock Company 蒙疆特殊法人大同炭礦株式會社 was established for the extraction of high-quality coal that could be used in steel production. The fact that the Mengjiang government was to be installed as an administrator of the mines by consent of the Mantetsu, but eventually invested twice as much in the enterprise, reveals a distinct dependence and ambiguity in the relation of the two entities.30

**MENGJIANG ENTERPRISES – TYPES AND RANGE OF BUSINESS SECTORS**

Apart from (proto)industrial production and natural resources, institutionalization in the form of companies and company laws and finance was a further prerequisite for industrialization. It was stressed and accelerated during the Mengjiang years. The Yearbook introduces in detail the “special companies” (特殊会社) and “semi-special companies” (準特殊会社) established with the strong support and partly on behalf of the Mengjiang government. The system of government-financed or partly financed enterprises in branches of strategic importance with the aim of forming monopolies was adapted from Manzhouguo, as historian Shibata Yoshimasa has pointed out.31

The dates and circumstances of the foundation of the enterprises after the Japanese occupation, the sums of capital paid, the actual or expected outputs, addresses, telephone numbers and the names of the directors and most important managers and consultants are given. Ethnicities or nationalities listed in the table below can be surmised, in almost all cases, from the names. Japanese names outnumber Chinese and Mongolian names. The investment sums stated as “paid in capital” are probably not to be taken literally, as the variance for the Datong mining company shows.

**Special companies in Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 279–284**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capital (yuan)</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Date of establishment32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Bank 蒙疆銀行</td>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>12 million (one fourth paid in by the Mengjiang government)</td>
<td>Mongolian / Japanese / Chinese</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrification Company 蒙疆電設會社 (long name: 蒙疆電気通信設備株式會社)</td>
<td>Electrocommunication (telephone, telegraph, radio)</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>12 million</td>
<td>Mongolian / Japanese / Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Power Company 蒙疆電業會社</td>
<td>Electrical power</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>18 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Newspaper Company 蒙疆新聞社</td>
<td>Newspapers (in Japanese, Chinese, Mongolian)</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Japanese, Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Automobile Company 蒙疆汽車公司</td>
<td>Transport, logistics</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 181. Note the higher investment sums quoted here, in comparison to the company profile cited on p. 283.
The ten semi-special companies included three banks as well as enterprises dealing with mineral oil, cement, general trade, tobacco, transport, silica and general mining products.

Semi-special companies in Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 284–286

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capital (yuan)</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chanan Business Bank</td>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinbei Business Bank</td>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia Business Bank</td>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>Hohhot</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Mineral Oil Company</td>
<td>Mineral oil import</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Cement Company</td>
<td>Building materials</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mengjiang Business Promotion Company| Machine manufacturing, ceramics, ore smelting | Zhangjiakou | 5 million | Japanese | 1939 |}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capital (yuan)</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Tobacco Company</td>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Transport Company</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Mica Company</td>
<td>Ores (Mica)</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Trade Company</td>
<td>Mining products – export to Japan, Manzhouguo and China</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Apart from these, there were 21 “regular” firms, all of which were established after 1937, and most under Japanese direction.\textsuperscript{35}

**Regular companies in Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 286–288**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capital (Yuan)</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hohhot Grain Mill Company, Ltd.</td>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>Hohhot</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Cattle Breeding Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Cattle trade</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>3 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Mongolia Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>General trade</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperous Shanxi Brick and Tile Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Bricks and tiles</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Leather Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>Baotou</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ltd. Stock Mengjiang Company</td>
<td>General trade</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Mongolia Brick and Tile Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Bricks and tiles</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Matches Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Matches</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi Cooperative Business Promotion Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>General trade</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Shanxi Chemical Industry Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daqingshan Mining Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baotou Grain Mill Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>Baotou</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Development Production Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Development Manufacturing Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datong Trade Alliance Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>General trade</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>3 million</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Medicine Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Timber Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Brewery Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Brewery</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengjiang Ceramics Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>Ceramics</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhangjiakou Boundless Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>General trade</td>
<td>Zhangjiakou</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datong Boundless Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>General trade</td>
<td>Datong</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{35} Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 286–288.
If all the data in the Mengjiang Yearbook of 1941 are credible, mining companies had the highest capital cover, followed by the electrical power company, the banks, and firms for building materials. The most capital was invested in the enterprises in Zhangjiakou, followed by Datong, Xuanhua, Baotou and Hohhot. Most companies were in Zhangjiakou, followed by Datong, Baotou, Hohhot and Xuanhua. The most capital was invested in enterprises under (nominal) Chinese leadership, followed by Mongolian leadership, and (nominally) the least capital was invested in companies under Japanese leadership. However, if not only the top positions, but all other management positions, are considered, it is clear that Japanese people outnumbered functionaries of other nationalities and ethnicities by far. The majority of companies (25) were under Japanese leadership, followed by Chinese (11) and Mongolian (3). Considerable investments were made by the colonizing power in swift succession, mostly in the resource extraction and the building sectors. Finances were allocated to the Mengjiang Bank and smaller subsidiaries. Even before the founding of the Mengjiang Bank, its predecessor, the Chanan Bank, had started to produce new banknotes in 1937, and after the alliance between the Suiyuan region, Chanan and Jinbei was formed, the Mengjiang region was included in the yen block, with its currency linked to the Japanese yen and the Manzhouguo yuan.

A contemporary assessment on the economic situation of Mengjiang was authored by Nakamura Shin 中村信, who worked in Mengjiang as a financial specialist at the rank of First Lieutenant in the Japanese Field Army. To him we owe the information that Mengjiang was struggling with inflation. He presents, on one hand, the achievement of the Mengjiang Bank, which was to unify the currency into the Mengjiang yuan, that was produced in sufficient volume for the liquidity of the economy. This implies that it drove out the nine other legal tenders that had been in circulation previously. The author does not conceal the problem of inflation, however, but analyses the reasons (i.e., the abrupt cut-off and prohibition of trade with north-western China and Xinjiang) and offers solutions. The book blames Chinese usurers for claiming far too much interest on loans for Mongols, and for overprizing the many goods from central China that were in high demand in the Inner Mongolian cities and the countryside, claiming that “eventually, it will be necessary to expel Chinese merchants in order to ensure the livelihood of the Mongols.”

As can be seen from the investments in the firms established after the occupation, traffic and communications were given great importance, not only for the economy, but also for “public order”, the main rationale – or pretext – for the Japanese presence in the region. The Yearbook especially stresses the road-building project between Hohhot and Baotou. The railway connection of the Beijing-Baotou line and its administration had been taken over from the previous Suiyuan provincial government. Aviation had also been organized in the Mengjiang branch of the China Aviation Company (Chūka kōkū kabushiki kaisha 中華航空株式會社) in Zhangjiakou.

36 Jagchid (1999), 190, cites the Mengjiang Bank as an example of nominal Mongolian direction (General Director Sainbayar), but actual leadership by the Japanese counselor Yamada Moichi. According to Jagchid, few Mongols had the skills to manage a modern financial institution, and Sainbayar was more of a “figurehead”.

37 For an account of the rupture between the banking system of Suiyuan before and after the Japanese occupation, the Mengjiang Bank and its predecessor, the Chanan Bank, from the Japanese perspective, see Tokunaga (1940), 35–44.

38 Tokunaga (1941), 37.

39 According to a newspaper report in Yomiuri shimbun (June 27, 1939, p. 7), he was affiliated with the Buddhist University Ōtani in Kyōto, and was sent to Zhangjiakou in 1939 as one of six group leaders of a Japanese student battalion. Apart from his 1941 book on the economy of Mengjiang, several short articles authored by him about China are available, but his career is not traceable after 1944.

40 Nakamura (1941), 151.

41 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 225.
Since 1939, it had operated the regular Beijing–Datong–Zhangjiakou line; however, the frequency and number of airplanes is not mentioned. Therefore, it presumably did not play a large role in the transport of civilian passengers and freight.

**LABOUR LEGISLATION AND ALLOCATION**

One critical component in the modernizing and industrialization projects of the Mengjiang regime was the labour force. Under Japanese occupation, labour was a scarce resource. In 1939, the Mengjiang government sought to regulate labour allocation, first by way of a Mengjiang Labour Control Committee 蒙疆勞働統制委員會 in the Welfare Section of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 民生部厚生科. Moreover, the legal framework was given in a Labour Control Law 勞働統制法 modelled on the Manzhouguo Labour Control Law. It was promulgated, with very detailed implementation procedures 勞働統制法施行細則, and revised, all in 1940. According to the Yearbook, the revision became necessary to make the jurisdiction more explicit and to emphasize control, "possession" (保有) in the sense of retention or maintenance (keeping workers from leaving) and the welfare (福祉) of the workers who had immigrated in Mengjiang. Since observation of these regulations critically depended on the active participation of the enterprises, the labour control committee was dissolved in 1940, and the Mengjiang Labour Association 蒙疆勞工協會, formed of company representatives and officials, was installed. It set wages and labour regulations concerning recruitment, payment, accommodation, discipline, and working hours. This was considered necessary for maintaining unified, officially set and negotiated wage levels. Accordingly, the officially fixed daily wages of 70 sen (0.7 yuan) were not enough “due to the price trends” (inflation is not expressly stated here), so “there are changes in the food provision problem” of the workers. Attempts to attract a workforce of 150,000 people that was considered necessary for Mengjiang’s economic development, and to prevent those who were already present from fleeing abroad, as well as the different treatment of daily labourers and those hired for longer periods had led to “illegal” payment of higher wages of 1 yuan up to 1.2 yuan. Therefore, the Mengjiang Labour Association was formed to strive for unified policies and practices. Its functions and membership regulations were also laid out in a special law with bylaws. Although the law did not restrict membership by nationality or ethnicity, the names of its board members given in the Yearbook were exclusively Japanese, and so were those of the board members of the subbranch of the Construction Companies. Regulations for such subgroups and individual branches could be more concrete than the overall laws and bylaws. For instance, the organization of the mobilization of mining workers was planned in a systematic and scientific way. Several individuals and institutions were engaged, among them the Kōain liaison bureaux for Mengjiang (in Zhangjiakou) and north China, the Japan Labour Research Institute, and the functionaries responsible for labour in all north China and Mengjiang mining companies.

Dr. Kirihara Shigemi 桐原葆見 (1892–1968), a psychologist with the Japan Labour Research Institute, came to Mengjiang in 1940 and set up a branch of the Institute at the iron mines of Longyan. Shigemi oversaw a team of five co-operators whose task was to analyse the organization, mobilization, classification, protection and human development of the mine workers, who were referred to as “coolies”. The entry on the

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42 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 125–127 cites the text of the law, the implementation procedures, and the revision.

43 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 131.

44 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 132.

45 Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 142 gives a detailed outline of the duties and functions of the Zhangjiakou office of the Kōain, together with a plan for educating engineers and technicians in technical schools at the secondary and tertiary levels to recruit skilled manpower for the industrialization of Mengjiang.
wages at Baotou yields the most detailed information about the classification of workers. There were four wage levels for unskilled workers (“coolies”) between 0.7 and 0.45 yuan; level five, children, earned 0.4 yuan per day. Skilled (technical) workers earned between 1.4 and 1 yuan. On average, workers laboured for ten hours a day. Registration of workers with the authorities was to be diligently performed. The unskilled workers had to obey the regulations and would be severely punished according to military law if they violated them. This representation of work for industrial development does not mention the issue of forced labour and deportations. Clearly, the labour force was to be attracted to the region and made to settle there. Leaving was to be made as difficult as possible, even though cases when workers could not stand the hardships and had to be allowed to resign were provided for. It was at best a paternalistic type of work organization that did not provide any legal form of worker representation. The safety and development of the region, formally for its own advancement, de facto at least as much in the service of Japan, were the primary targets.

Recent studies show the sombre side of work in the occupied regions, especially after Japan began the Pacific War in 1941. Historian Ju Zhifen, in her study on forced labour recruitment between 1941 and 1945, stresses that 1941 marked a watershed. She cites data compiled from the Labour Office of the North China Development Company which suggests the number of northern Chinese forced labourers in Mongolia was as high as 170,800 between 1942 and 1945, and narrates instances of inhumane treatment of the workers.46

To sum up: one-sided, overly optimistic, paternalistically and nationally biased as the 1941 Yearbook and other Japanese publications from the Mengjiang period may be, they show partly planned and partly realized efforts at constructing and extraction of resources. Institution-building was of particular importance, especially for the newly created monopolistic firms under state supervision, as well as for development agencies on different levels between the local and central governments, and for different sectors of the economy. That said, crucial elements of industrialization were already begun in the Republican period, especially the railway connection, electrification, and company laws for the “regular” companies. The Yearbook sets the Japanese-launched initiatives at centre stage and judges Chinese modernizing efforts as inefficient. Yet despite vociferous claims about the achievement of unification, for instance in the electrical power sector, Mengjiang was an extremely heterogenous polity. To highlight just one of the internal tensions and differences, Zhangjiakou and Hohhot constitute a strong contrast. This becomes clear from the study on Hohhot by a Japanese author that was published after the war years.

**HOOHOT IN 1944**

As presented in the Yearbook, Zhangjiakou was the centre of Japanese influence in Mengjiang. The city had been occupied by the Japanese army since August 1937, and had been declared the capital of the Chahar Independent Government before it became the capital of Mengjiang in September 1939. Yet the city of Guihu 歸化 (a merger of the sixteenth-century Mongolian settlement Guihua 歸化 and the adjacent seventeenth-century Qing dynasty garrison Suiyuan 綏遠) had been the provincial capital of Suiyuan province under the Republic of China since 1911. It was renamed Hohhot (Khoke-khota), written Houhe 厚和 in Chinese, after the Japanese occupation and the establishment of the Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government, and served as the seat of that government from December 1937 to August 1939.47 Its population was largely Chinese, since Chinese merchants had settled there since the sixteenth century. Zhangjiakou was likewise a city of trade, but with

46 Ju (2007), 218.

47 Jagchid (1999), 184.
a smaller population. Zhangjiakou had about 127,000 inhabitants in 1937; Hohhot, at 257,000, had twice as many.\textsuperscript{48} However, Zhangjiakou was, politically and economically, more important than Hohhot during the Mengjiang years.\textsuperscript{49}

Without direct discussion of the complicated political and military issues, the work of the Japanese guild historian Imahori Seiji 今堀誠二 (1914–1992) offers extremely detailed insight into the social groups of Hohhot in the Mengjiang era, in strong contrast to the Yearbook.\textsuperscript{50} The author conducted field research in the large cities, Guisui, Baotou, Zhangjiakou, and in towns and villages in the region, but the book contains his studies on Hohhot only.\textsuperscript{51} Modernity and technology had made its entrance in Mengjiang in 1944, with a railway connection, electrification, broadcasting, and mechanized production in weaving and flour mills. Yet this author’s concern was not with these things, but with the internal organization of the “feudal Chinese” society, as observed in a multi-ethnic region and when feudal system had already faded away in some parts of China. Therefore, the colonization around Suiyuan by Chinese farmers from adjacent provinces, the transition in trade patterns, mutual help and provincial club organizations for migrants from the same places, and their links to the outside world and capitalism were of interest to Imahori Seiji.\textsuperscript{52} In the transition from the traditional designation for guilds 行 or “rows” (from the clusters of shops of the same business lines in particular streets) to “trade associations” 商會 in the early twentieth century, which presupposed the legalization of the business relationships with each other, with customers and suppliers, and with the state, Imahori saw the compromise made with the rise of capitalism and the world market, especially since the opening of the Beijing-Hohhot railway in 1922.\textsuperscript{53} The author declares once, in the preface, a very pessimistic view of capitalism and the concomitant mechanization and modernization. In these remarks, which are informed by Marxism and quite typical for the early post-war standpoints of Japanese historians, he states that international capitalism had an interest in maintaining feudal structures within Suiyuan’s groups and organizations. Mechanization and modernization would create compradoreship and dependence on international demand. Feudal internal structures would have to be maintained, while the flexible organizations and producers would “feign to put on the clothes of modernity.”\textsuperscript{54} His pessimism echoes the depressed tones heard in the interviews with the guild representatives of Beijing conducted by the eminent legal historian Niida Noboru’s 仁井田陞 (1904–1966) team, of which Imahori Seiji was an important member. That said, Imahori presents a most finely detailed account of the social groups in Suiyuan based on 150 interviews, stone inscriptions and published records in Chinese regional gazet-

\textsuperscript{48} Mōkyō nenkan (1941), 93. In comparison, the gazetteer Suiyuan tongzhi gao of 1936, 5/4 (Chapter 35) quotes population figures of 79,511 for the city of Suiyuan. It is not specified which year this pertains to, but the context shows that it must be after 1928. The large discrepancy may be due to the inclusion of the subordinate districts in the case of the Japanese figures.

\textsuperscript{49} Jagchid (1999), 190.

\textsuperscript{50} Imahori Seiji was born in Osaka, and studied history at Hiroshima Bunrika University and, from 1939 to 1943, in Peking. He took up work as a lecturer in Hiroshima Bunrika University, but was able to obtain a scholarship for a field trip to Mengjiang. He spent five months there in 1944, then returned to Hiroshima, was drafted as soldier and survived the atomic bombing. He worked as assistant professor at Hiroshima University beginning in 1945 and defended his dissertation, on the structure of Chinese feudal society, in 1950. He stayed at Hiroshima University as Professor of History until his retirement in 1977. He belonged to the group of guild and social historians around Niida Noboru, and apart from his historical studies, was active in the antinuclear movement.

\textsuperscript{51} The English translation of the title on the frontispiece is given as Chinese Feudal Society: An Intensive Investigation of Social Groups in Kuei-Sui since 1644.

\textsuperscript{52} Imahori (1955), 20.

\textsuperscript{53} Imahori (1955), 23.

\textsuperscript{54} Imahori (1955), 24.
teers, as well as many unpublished materials by Japanese researchers in the region who provided them to him.56

CONCLUSION

The perspectives on the Mengjiang era presented above diverge widely. The Yearbook shows optimism, appealing to Japanese readers to spark their interest for investing in and committing themselves to the colonial project in the larger framework of Pan-Asianism. This was seen as important to warding off communism and maintaining Japan’s geopolitical security. In this framework, industrialization was possible and necessary in the service of the new polity and of Japan, and decisive steps were already actively taken, realized or planned. In the publication of fieldwork from the end of the Mengjiang era, published ten years after the end of the war, Imahori expresses a more critical view of the rise of an industrialized capitalism and the disappearance of feudalism, a transition considered inevitable in the framework of historical materialism to which most Japanese historians subscribed in the post-war years. For an in-depth understanding of the meaning of this interlude between the phases of Chinese dominance and attempts at Mongolian self-determination, Chinese and Mongolian positions need to be included to complement the view of what was planned and aspired to, what was realized and what could be considered as a basis for the later development of the region. The widening of such perspectives will show that previous efforts at realizing industrialization and the legalized institutionalization of the economic and technical actions of states, polities and individual enterprises existed, as well as how and if the achievements of the Mengjiang era were taken up in the development agendas of subsequent periods of the People’s Republic of China.

Both the Yearbook and Imahori’s study are full of technical, organizational and socioeconomic detail. Their respective foci are on different cities in the region. In an area as sparsely populated as Mengjiang, the impact of cities and their hinterland will be stronger and more unique than in a region with urban clusters. The Yearbook centres on Zhangjiakou, where the headquarters of Japanese-installed companies and institutions were based, and presents achievements in logistics, communication, electrification, institution building, legislation, finances, labour legislation and recruitment, light industrialisation and mineral extraction. Since Mengjiang included northern Chinese regions south of the previous Suiyuan Province, economic integration within Mengjiang implied a larger workforce, more mineral resources and more accessible infrastructures. Beyond the immediate borders of Mengjiang, the neighbouring larger and more developed Manzhouguo, as well as Japanese-occupied north China, formed part of the same currency bloc. The Manzhouguo institutions, in particular, made their presence felt in Mengjiang.

Imahori’s study on the vestiges of the “feudal society” shows Chinese Mongolia, where Chinese guild members and commercial association elders offered a rather subdued view on their options and scopes of action, but also showed resilience (in varying degrees) to change and market demands. Here, prosopography, informal and formal institutions are set up front, appealing to an academic audience in search of patterns of traditional socioeconomic organization or traditional practices in transition to modernity.

Neither the Yearbook nor Imahori discuss the Mongolian factor intensively and explicitly in their presentations. Nor is Japanese military action and oppression foregrounded, most probably due to reasons of censorship and sensitivity even after the war.

55 Such as the almost contemporaneous Suiyuan tongzhi gao 綏遠通志稿, compiled by Fu Zengxiang傅增湘 et al. in 1936, or Guisui zhi lüe 歸綏志略 by Zhang Zeng 張曾 from the year 1861.

56 Imahori (1955), 7 f.
Contemporary Mongolian historians like Ganbagana outline distinct elements of action of the Dewang regime from the Mongolian side. They point to the importance accorded to the military and to education, but also to reasons for hardships, such as the scarcity of labour power and the necessity to recruit workers in the extractive sector (mining and agriculture) from China. They point to modernity in the context of pastoralism, which implied amelioration of livestock through experiments in breeding, inoculation and feeding.

As can be seen from the outlines of the two diverging stances on industrialization in the Mengjiang polity described here, as in Manzhouguo, ethnic issues were not placed in the limelight. All actors were aware of the sensitivity of topics such as warfare and geopolitics, and largely avoided these thorny themes in their statements on the socioeconomic conditions of Mengjiang.

The joint Mongolian-Japanese efforts at promoting industrialization did not start from scratch. Agricultural land reclamation, mineral extraction, electrification and railroad connections were pre-existing foundations created during the early years of the Republic of China, along with legislative and institutional settings in company and corporate law. The specifics of the Japanese interlude in the early industrialization of the multi-ethnic polity consisted in a swift Japanese intervention with considerable initial funding, with expectations of extracting mineral resources by way of recruitment of a workforce from the interior Chinese provinces, first of their quasi-free volition, and later under more coerced conditions as warfare and economic blockages intensified. Many of the prerequisites of modernity and industrialization were intensified and unified under state control. Warfare and over-extension of material and human resources, as well as the complexities of ethnic interplay, led to the rapid collapse of the polity, but the wheel of industrialization in the region kept turning, independent of ethnicity and nationality.

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INTRODUCTION: SOVIET REMOVALS

As Japanese defeat appeared imminent in 1944, high-ranking members of the Chinese Nationalist government in Chongqing began preparations to take over Japanese-controlled territories. Their attention quickly trained on Northeast China with its vast natural resources and heavy industries that Japan had controlled, directly and indirectly, for over four decades. Re-establishing Nationalist control in this region required careful planning, which Song Ziwen 宋子文 (1894–1971), Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1942 and 1945, spelled out in his proposal Dongbei jingji yijianshu 東北經濟意見書 [Suggestions for the Economy in the Northeast].¹ Song’s proposals for governing the region’s economy included peaceful cooperation with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. Yet Song’s plan came to naught when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945 and the Soviet Red Army began its military offensive to take Northeast China on 9 August 1945. After the Japanese surrendered on 15 August 1945, Soviet troops occupied the region for the next seven months, denying entry to Nationalists troops. Talks between the Soviet and Nationalist government over the terms and timeline of Soviet troop withdrawal dragged on for months as both sides failed to agree on the Soviets’ demand for joint management of several key industrial enterprises in Northeast China, including Fushun Coalmine.²

When the Soviet Red Army finally announced on short notice its intention to completely withdraw from Manchuria on 15 March 1946, it took with them considerable amounts of industrial equipment, raw materials, and finished stock that it regarded as war reparations. The Soviets declared that the reparations were worth US$ 95 million while the Americans disagreed, estimating the value of removed industrial goods and equipment at US$ 895 millions and the losses in production and replacement costs at US$ 2 billion.³ Soviet withdrawal, according to historian Odd Arne Westad, was timed to “destroy the possibility of a U.S.-led comprehensive peace settlement and to leave the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) in control of as much of Manchuria as they could grab by their own force.”⁴ As the Soviets desired, U.S.-led peace talks between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists broke down, and shortly thereafter armed conflict broke out in Siping, a railway town in Jilin province. For the next three years, Northeast China became one of the major theaters of the Chinese Civil War.

Given the region’s centrality in the Chinese Civil War, it is not surprising to find a wealth of scholarship on this period of the history of Northeast China, focusing on the explicit question of Communist victory and the implicit question of Nationalist defeat. Steven I. Levine’s Anvil of Victory examines how the Chinese Communists mobilized rural areas in the fight against the Nationalists. Harold Tanner’s books on the major military campaigns – the Battle of Siping (1946) and the Liao-Shen Campaign (1948) – illustrated the

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¹ Song Ziwen 宋子文, “Dongbei jingji jihua yijianshu 东北经济计划意见书,” Folder 45.12, Box 45, T.V. Soong Collection, Hoover Institution Archives.

² Chang / Gillin / Myers / Zen (1989), 199.

³ Pauley (1947), 77; Levine (1987), 69.

⁴ Westad (2003), 35.
brilliance of Chinese Communists’ military strategists and the miscalculations of the Nationalists’ military leaders. Diplomatic historians Odd Arne Westad, Niu Jun, Shen Zhihua, and Yang Kuisong utilized increased archival access in mainland China and the former Soviet Union in recent decades to revisit the complex alliances and rivalries between the Chinese Communists, the Nationalists, the United States, and the Soviet Union driving events in Northeast China in these years.5

A curious gap in this rich literature is the topic of Soviet removals. Despite the considerable value of the removals, there has been scant attention given to the question of how Soviet removals affected work and life in the industrial mining towns of Northeast China. This essay addresses this question by investigating how the removals impaired mining work and daily life in the coalmine and city of Fushun in Liaoning Province. Using documents from Nationalist archives and a mineworker’s publication, I chart the consequences of Soviet removals on mining operations, labor processes, workers’ welfare, and Nationalist governance. Soviet removals, I argue, imposed greater constraints on the Nationalist state’s capacity for governance than historians have acknowledged, and thus the standing view of the Nationalist party-state as ineffectual deserves reconsideration. This study of Fushun under Nationalist control (1946–1948) adds to the growing body of scholarship re-examining the wartime Nationalist party-state.6

COLD WAR POLITICS OF MINING OPERATIONS

In Fushun Coalmine alone, the Soviet Red Army took the most advanced electric power shovels, which resulted in shutting down production in the Eastern Open Pit. They also removed railroad rolling stock and electric motors from the west oil shale plant.7 Most damaging to both mining production and urban life were the removals from Fushun Power Plant. There, twenty-one Soviet engineers, ignoring pleas from the former Japanese manager and a local citizens’ committee, directed a hundred Soviet soldiers and several hundred more Chinese workers and Japanese technicians to dismantle six turbo-generators, three feed pumps, the overhead crane in the generator room, five boilers, five transformers and six switchboards.8 The removals halved the electricity capacity, causing coal production to plummet, and streets and homes in Fushun to go dark and cold. Without adequate electric supply, machinery to extract and haul coal ground to halt, mine water flooded underground tunnels, electric lamps went out, and heating boilers went cold.

The Soviet Union defended these removals on the basis of its right to Japanese assets in Manchuria as war compensation. These removals so outraged the U.S. government, whose plans for rebuilding a Nationalist-led China centered on Manchuria’s heavy industries, that U.S. President Harry Truman commissioned a special ambassador, Edward A. Pauley, to conduct an inventory of Japanese assets removed and to survey damages to the Manchurian economy arising from the removals. Pauley and his team of twenty-one experts spent June 1946 touring factories, power stations, mines, and other industrial plants throughout Manchuria. Pauley’s team discovered that in addition to the Soviet troops’ systematic removals, they also “permitted and even encouraged Chinese mobs to pillage, taking official movies of the process in some instances.”9 Pauley concluded that the “conservative estimate of the damage to Manchuria resulting

5 Westad (1997); Niu (1987); Niu (1989); Shen (1994); Shen (2008); Yang (2001); Yang (2004).
7 Pauley (1946), 77–78, Appendices 4 & 9.
8 Pauley (1946), Appendices 1 & 8.
9 Pauley (1946), 10.
from the Soviet occupation” approximated two billion U.S. dollars.¹⁰

Perhaps the most damaging consequence of Soviet removals was the reduction in power generation capacity. Mechanization of mining operations in underground and open pits under Japanese management had replaced muscular power with electric- or steam-powered machines to perform all aspects of mining operations, from coal extraction to haulage to dressage. In other words, mechanization made mining operations completely dependent on electricity and any disruption to power generation would halt mining operations. Pauley foresaw the consequences of Soviet removals on mining operations in Fushun. The most urgent task, Pauley recommended, was restoring power supply. He elaborates, “If sufficient power generating equipment can be quickly transferred from Japan, there is a good chance of salvaging one or two important coal mines that are not flooded or in grave danger of flooding.”¹¹

Pauley’s predictions came true in the winter of 1946, which was Fushun’s coldest in ten years. Mine Director Xie Shuying 謝屬鶯 reported to the Natural Resource Committee (NRC) Director Weng Wenhao 翁文灝 that more than one foot of snow had accumulated over the period of 30 November and 5 December.¹² Temperatures did not rise above −30 degrees Celsius, freezing pipes in power plants, damaging boilers, and eventually shutting down power generation. Mining operations came to a near standstill without adequate power supply. In the underground pits, water pumps stopped pumping out water from the flooded tunnels, electric-powered conveyor belts and hoists stopped conveying coal, and ventilation fans stopped circulating fresh air into and mine gas out of the pits. In the open pit, skips, electric shovels and locomotives stopped transporting stripped coal and overburden.

Power shortages causing work stoppages occurred frequently. Soviet removals reduced power supply in Fushun Coalmine from 100,000 kilowatts to 28,000 kilowatts.¹³ In April 1947, mine management reached an agreement with the Northeast Power Board for the Board to supply the mine and its residential areas with supplemental electric power.¹⁴ In addition to this measure, mine management also restricted non-mining power usage in the evening hours, alternating production shifts and limiting night shifts, and using manual labor where possible.¹⁵ Workers carried water in buckets from flooded tunnels, dug out collapsed roofs with hand shovels, and drove trucks.¹⁶ Power shortages returned mining operations to the days of manual tools, which were not used in the mine for two decades.

Soviet removals also created an acute shortage in machine equipment and parts. Although mining operations especially in the open pit were given priority in the delivery of power supply, stripping operations could not be fully restored due to missing key parts. Mercury rectifiers, which were necessary for providing direct-current electricity to high power consumption machines, were damaged in the open pit, but the mine had no more replacement left in its stock. As a result, existing electric shovels and locomotives stood idle even when the open pit received its share of power supply. The central office of NRC sent supplies of mercury rectifiers.¹⁷ But replacement equipment and parts were not always in easy reach.

¹⁰ Pauley (1946), 37.
¹¹ Pauley (1946), 14.
¹² Institute of Modern History Archive, Folder 24-12-05-004, 1–2.
¹³ Academia Historica, Folder 003-01301-0235.
¹⁴ Academia Historica, Folder 003-010303-0419.
¹⁶ Academia Historica, Folder 003-010303-0419.
¹⁷ Academia Historica, Folder 003-01301-0235.
Because the majority of the mine’s machinery were of Japanese make, replacement parts had to be purchased from Japan. The flexible shafts that the oil shale distillation plant needed had to be obtained from Daian Heavy Industries Company in Tokyo and most of the parts for the electric locomotives had to be ordered from Mitsubishi Denki Company, Toyo Denki Company, the Department of Railway in Japan, Hitachi Works, Shibaura Company, and Koito Company. But the absence of formal trading relations between occupied Japan and the Nationalist government posed both bureaucratic and diplomatic problems. Nationalist officials did not know which appropriate department in the Nationalist government should conduct the business, who their counterparts in occupied Japan were, and which party should handle the customs paperwork. It was eventually decided that a Nationalist government representative would be appointed to handle all requests to import goods from Japan, and this official would be responsible for obtaining permission from the U.S. occupation forces in Japan or SCAP (Supreme Command for the Allied Powers) and for preparing import documents from the Chinese Nationalist government.\(^{18}\)

The ingenious solutions that Nationalists officials, mining engineers, and mineworkers put in place did not bring mining output back to its pre-1946 levels. Coal output in Fushun Coalmine under Japanese management declined steadily from its peak in 1937: annual output fell from its peak of 9,529,693 tons in 1937 to 6,368,800 tons in 1942.\(^{19}\) But coal output under Nationalist management was even lower than in the final years of the Second World War. In the three years of National management, output in 1946 stood at 1,266,862 tons, before climbing to 1,401,517 tons in 1947 and then tumbling to 1,074,290 tons in 1948.\(^{20}\) Accompanying declining output was falling productivity, which was largely due to the return to manual labor in mining operations. According to the calculations of Nationalist mining engineers, mining productivity in 1946 was one-third lower than that in 1942, though it rose in 1947 when mining productivity reached half of that in 1942.\(^{21}\) Productivity figures for 1948 are not available, but it is safe to assume that productivity in 1948 could not have risen higher than the figures for 1946 and 1947. An unexpected outcome of reduced coal output was food scarcity.

**FOOD SCARCITY IN THE COAL CAPITAL**

Two years after the Chinese Nationalist Government assumed control over Fushun Coalmine, mineworkers and other residents faced one of the worst food shortages in the recent past. A mineworker, Li Chengrong 李承榮, recounted his experience over the course of three days, 9–11 June 1948, in an essay published in the 11 July 1948 issue of the Fushun Coalmine workers’ periodical, *Fukuang xunkan*. Food was a recurring topic—he dreamt of food that he hadn’t had in a while, he fought with his wife over lack of food, and his supervisors often used the promise of food deliveries to spur on production. The most poignant part of his account was his description of his sons’ hunger when they learnt of a rare availability of pork at the butcher’s. Li would love to buy the meat but he would have to go into debt and he preferred not to do so. As he deliberated, his sons ran over to him and begged him to buy some meat. His oldest son said “Papa, let’s buy some meat! Liu Xiaozhu’s family are frying up meat. Papa, it smells so good …” Before the oldest boy could finish, the younger one chipped in, “Papa, Old Yang’s family is enjoying a meal of rice, stewed meats and even noodles. How wonderful the smell! My good father, let’s get some of that!” After Li gently turned

\(^{18}\) Institute of Modern History Archive, Folder, 24-12-05-001-01.

\(^{19}\) Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha Bujun tankō 南満洲鐵道株式會社撫順炭礦 (1942), 142.

\(^{20}\) *Fushun meikuang gaikuang*, 10–12.

\(^{21}\) *Fukuang xunkan*, May 1, 1948.
down his sons’ request, his younger son burst into tears and wailed, “Why do we have to eat those horrible-tasting bean cakes!” The poor boy had eaten nothing but bean cakes – blocks of steamed or fried dough made from soybean flour – for months.

In fact, many mineworkers in Fushun Coalmine had been relying on bean cakes since December 1947. In his telegram to NRC Director Weng, dated 26 December 1947, mine director Xie pleaded for assistance from the central government in Nanjing. Food supplies in the mine had dwindled so low in December 1947 that workers resorted to eating bean cakes, instead of their usual diet of sorghum grains, to stave off hunger. Instead of overseeing mining operations, he was consumed with the urgent task of feeding mine workers. He bartered coal with grain merchants in exchange for sorghum grains and used emergency funds from the NRC to purchase wheat flour. Mine management was under tremendous pressure to provide food for mineworkers because their salaries did not keep pace with rapidly rising food prices. According to Xie, the price of sorghum at the time of sending the telegram had risen threefold in a single day. The effect of runaway inflation on mineworkers is explained in a worker’s article in the 21 January 1948 issue of Fukuang xunkan. In his article, Wei Sheng lamented that the food situation in Fushun coalmine had worsened despite winning the war. When the Japanese surrendered, the price of sorghum grains was no more than 0.80 to 0.90 yuan per 600 grams, and now it was over 4000 yuan. This rise came within a span of two years. Workers had to spent at least 90 % of their wages on food. Coalmine staff with monthly salaries below 200 yuan, who made up 84 % of the staff, could not afford to purchase 30 kilograms of sorghum. Because of the inflation, mineworkers depended on the mine for providing basic sustenance.

Food scarcity in turn caused malnutrition, which became a public health concern. Fushun Coalmine Hospital doctors reported in March 1948 of a sharp rise in the number of patients suffering from a severe eye infection that led to the softening of corneas and even blindness. The identified cause of this infection was malnutrition, namely vitamin A deficiency. Young children between the ages of 1–5, the most susceptible group, accounted for most of the admitted patients, but the doctors believed that there were many more unreported cases among mine workers. By August 1948, the situation of food scarcity in Fushun Coalmine deteriorated to a low point. A delegation from General Trade Unions, sent by the NRC to look into the food situation in Fushun, reported that “workers have no food and must stop work ... 80 per cent of workers subsist on beancakes and soy pulp. While investigating the situation, we do not dare to ask [the workers directly] but we have heard about instances of those who starved to death and those who killed themselves. [...] Now, we’re facing the worst situation.”

**CONCLUSION: MORE THAN INEFFECTUAL GOVERNANCE**

Almost four decades of Japanese control (1907–1945) transformed the coalmine in Fushun into the largest and technologically most advanced coal producer in all of China, earning its moniker “Coal Capital.” Moreover, Japanese control also transformed Fushun into an industrial city that manufactured steel and chemicals, distilled petroleum and lubricants from oil shale, and generated electric power for much of southern Liaoning. Enabling this transformation was a workforce that grew to more than 80,000 workers by the mid-1940s. This sizeable workforce with a majority of Chinese workers was subjected to the racism of Japanese imperialism,
but was reliably provided with food, even after the Japanese empire mobilized for total war in the years 1941–1945. Fushun under Japanese colonial rule was neither fair nor equal, but as mineworker Wei Sheng wryly noted, at least food scarcity was not a problem under colonial rule. Rather, it was the mine’s return to Chinese sovereign control in April 1946 that marked the arrival of food insecurity for mineworkers and other residents of Fushun.

As a non-agricultural producing area, Fushun Coalmine relied on revenues from extracted coal to procure necessary food supplies. Most of agricultural lands in Fushun had been converted into land used for mining or urban development. Food was supplied by other parts of Northeast China. Sorghum, millet, rice, maize, and soybeans came from farms in eastern and southern Liaoning province while wheat came only from farms in northern Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces. Merchants acted as intermediaries in purchasing and transporting food from distant suppliers to Fushun, and then selling the acquired stocks of food directly to residents via local markets, stores, and restaurants. They also sold to the mine for resale in its company stores or use in its dining halls. Sustaining this system of food procurement was the consistent flow of revenue generated from coal sales. Without this revenue, the mine could not purchase any food for its stores or dining halls, or pay its workers the wages they needed to buy food from company stores, markets, or restaurants. This reality of food security was true under both Japanese and Nationalist managements, but the latter confronted constraints that curtailed coal production and revenue that the former did not.

This is not to say that the Nationalists’ missteps, especially at the central level, did not exacerbate the situation in Fushun. The central government’s inability to curb hyperinflation and its rigid coal pricing policy made food procurement more difficult for Fushun mine management. Hyperinflation, as mentioned above, rendered the wages of individual workers useless as wages seldom caught up with skyrocketing food prices. Mine management succeeded in blunting the effects of hyperinflation when it started issuing workers food rations in place of money wages. Because the mine bought in larger quantities than individual workers, it wielded more leverage with food merchants in setting purchase prices. In addition to hyperinflation, the national government’s rigid coal pricing policy also limited the mine’s ability to provide for its workers. In its attempt to rehabilitate industrial production, the NRC set the selling price of coal but, unfortunately for these nationalized coalmines including Fushun, it often fixed the price of coal much lower than actual production costs. For instance, the price of a ton of Fushun coal was fixed at 88,000 yuan but the cost of producing a ton of Fushun coal was well over 170,000 yuan. To make up the shortfall in revenue, mine management took out loans from the NRC and banks. These loans provided immediate relief but did not remedy the situation. Future interest payments added to the mine’s expenses in the long term, making it more difficult for mine management in subsequent months to afford wage payments or food purchase.

Food shortages during the Chinese Civil War were common occurrences, though more so in the countryside than the city. Food scarcity, hyperinflation, ineffective and even counterproductive economic policies, and tensions between central and local levels of government plagued various parts of Nationalist-controlled China in the years 1945–1948. Historians such as Lloyd Eastman and Suzanne Pepper have viewed these socioeconomic problems as indicative of

26 Institute of Modern History Archive, Folder 24-12-05-004, 81-83.
27 Fukuang xunkan, Jan 21, 1948.
28 Lary (2015), 38 & 114.
the Nationalist party-state’s ineffectual governance. The Nationalists in these earlier narratives, from its leader Chiang Kai-Shek to local officials, are frequently portrayed as nepotistic, corrupt, and incompetent. But the experience of Fushun in 1946–1948 challenges this portrayal of Nationalist governance. Its ineffectiveness in preventing food scarcity stemmed more from dislocations in coal production that Soviet removal engendered than from faults commonly attributed to Nationalist governance. Mitter and Moore argued in their re-interpretation of the wartime Nationalist party-state that they sought to see the Nationalist party-state as “a state attempting a project of state-building in which its intentions ultimately outran its capacity.” The same could be said for Fushun, where Soviet removals critically damaged the Nationalists’ capacity for state-building.

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Katarzyna Golik: Dependent Development of a Frontier State

DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT OF A FRONTIER STATE – THE CASE OF MONGOLIA

Katarzyna Golik

INTRODUCTION

In the twentieth century, the Mongolian state underwent a staged economic transition along two extremely different modernisation lines. The first wave, from the 1920s to the 1990s, was a Soviet pattern of industrialisation. After the transition to a market economy in the 1990s, the impact of the financial markets became more evident. The common element of these two stages is that decisions relating to economic structure, including the type of activities and modes of operation of (some) business enterprises, were made abroad. Also, foreign investment has been hugely important in the modernisation of the state.

The situation will be analysed through the lens of structural power, used to explain international economic relations. Economic structural power is the systematic way in which economic conditions influence weak states. The theory was introduced for international economics by Jeffrey Reeves in relation to China and its neighbours, but the idea could be a framework for further analysis of the relations between other states, also over a wider time horizon. This paper focuses on the verification of Reeves’s theory with respect to Mongolia’s development path. It will also include an analysis of the economic role not only of China, but also of other players. Although the main economic power holder in the region is the PRC, Western states, Japan and Korea, and multinational institutions also affect economic conditions. So far there has been a lack of in-depth knowledge about the impact of their activities in Mongolia.

Mongolia can be considered an example of dependent development, where there is persistent inequality between the metropoles and the countries that depend on them, exacerbated by the elites in the peripheral countries who benefit from that inequality. Economic relations can cause inefficiencies and imbalances which become harmful to the economy. The Marxist concept of social relations was introduced into the discourse on international economic relations when China became ‘capitalist’. The external power holders exerted structural violence, which means that weak states were harmed by economic conditions. Violence is subtle, invisible, and no specific person can be held responsible.

The issue of Mongolia’s economic transition has already been analysed in publications focused on East Asia or on the political and economic situation in the former Eastern Bloc (the USSR and its satellites). The issue of Mongolia’s independence from Chinese politics after World War II has also been a topic of historical and political research.

Another gap in research on Mongolia that needs to be filled is the role of capital needed for industrialisation. The adoption of foreign patterns resulted in an often overlooked type of dependence – reliance on external sources of financing. Inner Asia’s vast territories were peripheries for imperial powers like Russia, China or Japan. Even some contemporary scholars regarded them as

1 Reeves (2016), 1–37.
2 Cholaj (2008), 140.
3 Atwood (2009), 386–387.
“no-man’s land”. Mongolian areas in different periods of time were too weak to resist foreign (or “external”) dominance, but at the same time the empires were not able to maintain strong surveillance over them. When the Republic of Mongolia was founded in 1921, its government institutions were weak, and there was little cohesion between state and society. As a result, the Mongolian state again and again became dependent on foreign financial assistance.

This article asks questions about the impact dependence relations vary according to the type of economic power. The issue of Mongolia’s dependent development can also be linked to the inadequacy of top-down programs that are not tailored to local needs. By questioning the mainstream development paradigms this project might help to re-define thinking about them and improve the quality of assistance. Mongolia is a state with abundant natural resources and a small population. Its potential per capita wealth is comparable to that of the Arabian Peninsula states. However, according to the World Bank almost 30% of Mongolia’s population are still living in poverty.

THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Outer Mongolia, which later became an independent state, entered the twentieth century as a peripheral part of the declining Qing state. Its development potential was more modest than that of Inner Mongolia, which had a larger population, a more diversified economy, and even local modernisation projects.

Outer Mongolia’s economic system was not based on a unified monetary exchange rate, but on the value of livestock. In practice, a variety of means of payment was in circulation, including Chinese coins, checks, and Russian rubles, Mexican and US dollars. Money was used mainly by Chinese merchants (and some other foreigners). For formal payment transactions a variety of securities and various units of measure for precious metals were also in use. However, the most widespread medium of exchange was livestock, particularly sheep and cattle.

For most Mongols, the money and even more so the loans which the Chinese provided remained something abstract. On the family level, the Mongols did not know and did not understand the economic mechanisms to such an extent that the herders could even face insolvency. The activities of the Mongolian political elites were dictated by its indebtedness to the Russian empire. Mongolia’s Northern neighbour continued to extend its sphere of influence with financial tools through different times and under different political regimes.

During the 1915 tripartite talks in Kiachta, China, Russia and Mongolia signed an agreement which granted Outer Mongolia “autonomy” under the suzerainty of the Republic of China. There was no agreement on the foundation of a Central Bank. The Russian representatives proposed that the Bank of Mongolia (founded in 1914) should have the official right to issue banknotes and coins of the Republic of China. In response, in 1915 four representatives of the central government of the Republic of China established a banking institution. Thus, the paradoxical situation occurred where two banks acted as the Central Bank. The Russian-funded bank worked with the Ministry of Finance in terms of taxes, duties, 

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5 To describe this phenomenon, Caroline Humphrey introduced the concept of James C. Scott’s Zomia as, in her view, relevant in the region’s context. Lecture during the workshop Facing The Challenge Of Identification: New Approaches To Buryat Identities And Their Cross-Border Dynamics, Warsaw, June 22–24, 2016. See also Humphrey (2019), 59–80 and Humphrey (2015), 92–105.


9 According to Lonjid, it was called Ba Zhai Yang Han. It is not clear which Chinese characters this refers to.
and loans and also held the function of treasury management, while the Chinese bank emitted money.\textsuperscript{10}

From this perspective, we can see Outer Mongolia as a playground for foreign powers not only in a political, but also in an economic sense. The region always lacked stable sources of financing, and its modernisation was dependent on foreign capital. This structural element remained a factor throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, despite changes in the balance of foreign power and domestic political regimes.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{THE SOCIALIST PERIOD, 1920S TO 1990S}

The Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) was founded in 1921 as a satellite state of the Soviet Union. It was obliged to follow the development path of the “Older Brother”, though it was limited by local conditions and in some respects, country-specific adjustments were made. According to Socialist sources, industrialisation proceeded in two stages.

In the first phase of reforms between 1921 and 1940, one crucial change in social and economic policy was the removal of indebtedness and the abolition of serfdom. This was intended to provide the subaltern classes with certain civil rights, although it occurred in the context of Stalinist-style terror of Choibalsan’s\textsuperscript{12} apparatus under Choibalsan’s Soviet-style reign of terror, with mass purges\textsuperscript{13} among the Buddhist clergy, the aristocracy and some minorities.\textsuperscript{14} But it also provided debt loop relief for the population. However, the demands of industrialisation put pressure on the Mongolian state to obtain the necessary funds. As a result, it became dependence on the state level.

Another aspect of Socialist reform was the collectivisation into cooperatives following the Soviet pattern.\textsuperscript{15} As it was part of the narrative of a political success story, the declarations and statistics lack coherence, which makes analysis difficult. Moreover, there are no alternative sources of information as most witnesses of the transition are no longer available.

Between 1926 and 1927 the cooperatives\textsuperscript{16} were responsible for the production of almost 25\% of GDP.\textsuperscript{17} Despite concerns about the precision of the statistics, these data convey the message that collective herding units were created in just five years, while in other Soviet-style regimes implementation of this policy encountered the resistance of the people, causing violence and turmoil. However, it seems that in Mongolia the process went relatively smoothly. There are several explanations for this. Of the different hypotheses the first is that collectivisation was a fiction for administrative use. It can be assumed that the process may have incorporated traditional herder structures like \textit{neg aavyn khüükhe} (‘one father’s children’ – the common lineage-based structure) or other kin and quasi-kin groups\textsuperscript{18} in the concept of ‘collective’. It may have been a

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Lonj} Lonjid (2006), 65, 70.
\bibitem{Kim} For a comparison with the situation in Xinjiang, see Kwangmin Kim (2016), 1–312.
\bibitem{Choibalsan} Khorloogiin Choibalsan (Хорлоогийн Чойбалсан, 1895–1952), the leader and chief marshal of the Mongolian People’s Republic. He took part in founding the Mongolian People’s Party, defeating Baron Ungern-Sternberg (1886–1921) and proclaiming the MPR. He was responsible for the 1930s mass purges, which earned him the name “Stalin of the Steppes”. Together with Georgy Zhukov (Георгий Жуков), he conducted the victorious battle of Khalkhin Gol against the Japanese Kwantung Army.
\bibitem{Baabar} Baabar (2006), 436–459.
\bibitem{Buriads} Like Buriads or Chakhars.
\bibitem{Kolhoz} Kolhoz (Колхоз), Kollektivnoe hozjajstvo (коллективное хозяйство); Sovhoz (Совхоз), Soveskoе hoziajstvo (Советское хозяйство); more in: Repozytorium FINA, http://www.repozytorium.fn.org.pl/?q=pl/search/site/ko%C5%82chozy [March 2, 2020].
\bibitem{Kojlo} Kojło (1973), 195.
\bibitem{Szynkiewicz} Szynkiewicz (1973), 1–268; Atwood (2012), 4.6.
\end{thebibliography}
The bureaucratic procedure to simply rename them. This hypothesis still has to be verified. Yet this will be difficult, as the official documents do not provide the necessary information, and those who were responsible for the implementation inside the state apparatus may not have passed on this information. In fact, herding collectives emerged in Mongolia, but their formation was a slow process. The 1920s were not a time of mass repressions. The state had limited possibilities to enforce the implementation of the collectivisation project. In fact, according to later Socialist sources, it was supposed that collectivisation not accomplished until the 1960s. On this question the pre-Stalinist and post-Stalinist sources seem to contradict each other, as they both claim successful collectivisation, although many of the declared ‘workers’ were in fact herders organized in partly traditional social structures.

In the second stage of socialist reform, from the 1940s to the 1970s, the Mongolian government created the foundation for industrialisation and the basic infrastructure. After a hiatus in the most repressive decade of terror in the 1930s, between the years 1940 to 1960 the main emphasis was on national industry, transport, and trade. 1961 to 1972 was the core time for developing heavy industry, particularly the Darhat-Selenge economic zone. At the time, the People’s Republic declared the creation of a working class making up 56.5% of the whole population. Many of the workers were herders, which accounted for the largely rural character of the Mongolia’s socialist economy. This workforce was needed to work in over 130 combines which were formed at the time. Despite the prioritisation of heavy industry, the economic policy also focused on the creation of country-specific industries, especially on the light industry related to food production, such as the processing of animal products, and on domestic-grown crops and vegetables. Apart from that, there were attempts to develop transport and foreign trade as state monopolies.

These grand projects required the mobilisation of significant resources, which was a huge burden for the under-developed state. The first act of Soviet aid was the cancellation of liabilities worth five million Tsarist rubles. This was not the only instance of debt relief. It was estimated that in the 50-year period until the 1970s, the cancellation of debt totalled four billion MNT (Mongolian Tögrög). This figure is difficult to verify and the real value of the Mongolian currency is hard to estimate. However, the number becomes impressive on a relative scale, for example, if we compare it with the state budget, which in 1940 amounted to 124 million MNT, while in 1965 it had risen to 1.5 billion MNT.

In Mongolia, the excessive import of goods such as machines or products for everyday use resulted in a balance of payments deficit, which created the need for foreign borrowing. There were different channels and mechanisms for financing this external debt. The first was debt relief. The other mechanism included the Soviet budget allocation paid to the Mongolian state, which in 1991 was estimated at 30% of MPR’s public revenue. Another way of supporting Mongolia were foreign investments. Their inflow was obviously not market-driven, but largely governed by the USSR. A good example were the funds remitted between 1966 and 1970. 52% of these were loans from the Council for Mutual

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19 According to historian Bazaryn Shirendev, see Kojił (1973), 180–181.
20 Al Jazeera: From the Steppe to the Slum, https://www.youtube.com/watch?fbclid=IwAR3ay-PX4yulPDvXP2pR1JSYSVY13TIXP3o4Zv4cct-fI8bGhxzYD03cR8U&v=8x7wgiTmCSc&feature=youtu.be [January 13, 2021].
22 Kojił (1973), 193–196.
Economic Assistance (Comecon). In addition, when the Russian-funded Central Bank (Bank of Mongolia) was established in 1924, 43% of its funds were from Mongolian domestic sources, while 57% were an allocation from the Soviet Union. The scale of dependence on the USSR is also shown by the fact that between 1981 and 1985 MPR absorbed about $3 billion in Soviet aid with a population of 2 million people, according to the Asian Survey. Moreover, 80% of trade was with the USSR.

Apart from direct funds, there was also a significant transfer of knowledge. The support from the Soviet Union included the involvement of foreign specialists from the whole Eastern bloc as well as the training of the local workforce.

THE POST-TRANSITION PERIOD SINCE THE 1990S

The transition towards the market economy was, as in other socialist countries, a shock for state institutions and society. Mongolia was among the states in which the changes were particularly devastating. At the end of the twentieth century, the citizens were without access to previously provided state services, such as electricity and basic healthcare. The economic system and hard infrastructure were crumbling. Local communities were abandoned by the state and had to find their own ways to survive.

The rapid withdrawal of Soviet Union financial assistance and a call for debt repayment (11.5 billion USD) in the context of the disintegrating economy called for immediate support on a macro scale. Mongolia had no room for manoeuvre.

Although the political transition was carried out by agreement between the ruling party, MAHN, and the democratic movements, that was not the case with economic reform. Economic transition cannot be perceived as a Mongolian national project but was implemented in all socialist (former Eastern bloc) countries. On the state level, institutions like the IMF and the World Bank came into play with restructuring programs. These were not fully tailor-made projects but variations on a single restructuring scheme. According to the author’s interviews with members of the above-mentioned transnational institutions and with practitioners on economic transformation, the same requirements of radical liberalisation of the economy were made to both Poland and Mongolia, without taking into account differences in economic structure or geographic conditions, not to mention the institutional or socio-cultural context.

The reforms that transformed Mongolia into a market economy and which led to membership of the WTO in 1997 were similar to those in other post-communist countries: The liberalisation of the economy, especially of energy prices, together with the disintegration of public services transferred the costs of the changes to the local communities, pushing many of them into poverty. This transition trauma is shared by towns and rural groups in other post-socialist countries, Mongolia is not an exception. Decades later these left-behind communities are still struggling to cope with the uncertainty and structural unemployment, and are “in mourning for the...
state”, that is, regretting the state’s withdrawal from risk-sharing with its citizens. The transition seen in the terms of linear progress provided many positive impulses and opportunities for the state and its citizens, but at the cost of economic and even civilisational decline.

The multi-national organisations proposed a catchy narrative of development and progress, suppressing the voices of rational criticism with good PR. When the World Bank prescribed the same economic reform plan for Poland and Mongolia, it failed to recognize the differences in local conditions. This was common practice among the development institutions at that time. These lenders were often mistrustful of grassroots and social organisations which were not run by the upper-middle class elites that were alienated from their own society. The foreign financing entities’ representatives tended to perceive the grassroots organisations as corrupt and non-transparent. At the same time, they failed to recognize that these groupings were able to diagnose local needs and provide the necessary services to the people. As a result, some of the top-down initiatives were often not fit for purpose and were quickly abandoned, such as, e.g., a cultural centre, which was constructed without consultation with the local community. The imposed projects can be inefficient in other ways. For example, a concept of empowerment for disadvantaged populations contradicts itself when it refers to their traditional dwelling districts per se as ‘slums’. This concept not only lacks understanding and tact in terms of Mongolia’s situation, but is also mistaken, as not all ger districts can be regarded as ‘slums’ or ‘ghettos’ high in poverty.

After the recession during the global economic crisis, Mongolia’s dependent development continued under the new powers. In the market economy, a wave of foreign investments flowed into the resource-rich country putting pressure on the small open economy, and causing the classical ‘twin deficit’, i.e., fiscal deficit combined with current account deficit. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) put strain on the Tögrög, so with high inflation, the economy has remained dollarized. The donor states together with powerful international institutions and corporations gained structural power over the Mongolian economy. This resulted in development being imposed from the outside: bottom-up and local ideas were pushed aside in favour of the multinational powers. Even if the projects conducted to help Mongolia were implemented, they often did not fit local needs. Another factor was the instability of the financial sector, which was vulnerable due to both the general economic imbalances and the social situation, particularly on the labour market. A survey of the macroeconomic situation reveals various imbalances in the economy, which demonstrates the vicious circle of the vulnerabilities of the macroeconomic structure. As the situation in the banking sector is a result of trust and macroeconomic perspectives, the uncertainty is high, with 90% of bank deposits fixed at one year or less.

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36 Majmurek / Jacyno (2020).
37 Based on discussions with experts from the World Bank and IMF.
39 Their financial status and their cultural background, often shaped by foreign education, makes them unable to understand their own society. See also: Iwanek / Burakowski (2013), 50, 70; Acemoglu / Robinson (2012), 74, 88–90.
41 According to GCMC.
43 Golik (forthcoming b), 21–23.
44 Golik (2013), 65, 101; Romatowski (2005), 17.
45 Reeves (2016), 188.
Figure 1: Leading macro-indicators

Source: Data of IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2019.46

Nevertheless, it would be unfair to highlight only problematic issues, when in many fields there were significant improvements. While the new rail network was hampered by corruption scandals and geopolitical concerns, the road system was expanded linking the provincial capitals (aimag centres) with Ulaanbaatar (UB). This was done according to the grounded centric paradigm, whereby the developed links are exclusively oriented towards the state capital, while the neighbouring aimags have no direct transport infrastructure.46

Another improvement was the opening of borders with China and Russia and an increase in locally developed cross-border connections.47 Given China’s role in Mongolia, it is worth mentioning its general strategy towards its neighbouring states. Since the 1980s it has changed to an economic-centric approach, understood as conditio sine qua non or even an equivalent of good relations and stability of borders.

The idea of economic exchange as basis of security under various borderland policies (including zhoubian zhengce 周边政策, mulin zhengce 睦邻政策, zou chuqu zhanlue 走出去战略) was formulated by Xi Jinping in 2013 as “amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighbourhood” (mulin 睦邻, anlin 安邻, fulin 富邻).48 The 2014 ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (yi dai yi lu 一带一路) also has important, though often neglected, implications for borderland policies.

The dependence on financial markets gave rise to instabilities, such as, e.g., the quick withdrawal of assets by both international and domestic private investors. In the liberal paradigm, market instability was not a widely discussed issue on the international level. The problems of the Mon-
The economic reality of post-transition Mongolia has changed dramatically in almost all aspects. A key factor is the persistent capital shortfall, resulting in recurrent indebtedness. Mongolia was one of very few countries in the World Economic Outlook database with no data for General Government Debt. It significantly limits qualitative analysis, but four debt restructurings by the World Bank since 1992 indirectly indicate the financial constraints faced by the country.

52 Golik (2017), 75–76.
54 Radchenko (2003), 4; Rowiński/Golik (2011), 267, 278; Atwood (2009), 1–8.
56 In the spring 2020 notification, the debt statistics of all the countries have not been published, so for comparison earlier datasets should be referred to.
nancial inefficiency of the state. Since the beginning of the transition the state’s financial needs have been supported by the financial markets, but with high involvement of the international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The financial assistance which they provided supported the modernisation of the state, countering ongoing economic disintegration.

The symbolic turning point was the 2009 economic crisis in Mongolia. Although the recession seemed rather shallow, given its vulnerability the World Bank’s diagnosis was that the state was again near to bankruptcy. While the IMF provided loans amounting to 236 million USD, China offered 3 billion USD, proving to become an alternative source of funding. It gave bargaining power to Mongolia, so that it was able to ignore some of the IMF’s recommendations. Unlike Western institutions, China’s loans had officially “no strings attached” in terms of economic policy conditions. The costs were more on the political side, more or less openly claimed by Beijing on the occasion of the visit of the 14th Dalai Lama in Mongolia.

During the years of crisis, General Government debt to GDP ratio in 2009–2010 dropped from 59.5 % GDP to 45.0 % GDP, due to partial relief from the foreign institutions. In 2012 the world economy rebounded, which lifted the demand for commodities. Mongolia experienced dynamic GDP growth again, becoming the global “investor’s darling”. The financial markets ignored the fragile basis of growth. Also, for the Mongolian government a window of opportunity opened, allowing them to push forward with infrastructure projects. That year it issued Chinggis bonds. That year Mongolia’s debt ratio was 30 % GDP, while the securities’ release would add 15 % of the GDP. Investors responded surprisingly well. However, the Chinggis bonds quickly turned out to be speculative grade, and their value dropped dramatically. The funds raised by the government were used mainly for railway investment under minister Battulga (the current president). The projects have not been completed and the funds have vanished, leaving Mongolia with another heavy debt load.

MINING INDUSTRY

The main source of economic growth in Mongolia is the exploitation of and trade in natural resources, particularly metals and minerals. Whether under communism or capitalism, these large-scale projects were the domain of foreign capital. The changes in the development of mining in Mongolia can be illustrated by the infrastructural projects at the USSR-managed mines as compared to the similar post-transition entities. Under Soviet influence the industrial cities of Darkhan and Erdenet, with full-scale public services, grew up around the mines. The more recent mining projects, including Oyu Tolgoi, are nothing of this kind with only a temporary and minimalistic social infrastructure. Today, the unsustainable mining industry is causing social and environmental tensions, which has given rise to grassroots movements and eventually an act of eco-terrorism. Mining is perceived as the branch of the economy that drives away funds and takes people away from animal husbandry and manufacturing, e.g., the sectors that are more likely to create jobs and more sustainable development.

In this context Oyu Tolgoi, the largest ore mine in the world, is a case that has been widely commented on. The conflict between the Mongolian authorities and the multinational mining corporation Rio Tinto attracted much publicity when the state first accepted the unfavourable deal and then used discretionary and even illegal means to make corrections to alter the conditions. In a nutshell, the authorities reviled here the inefficiencies of the Mongolian state. It is an iconic example of the mechanisms of industrialisation in a weak peripheral state driven by supra-state financial powers and the alienated national elites.

Surprisingly, one aspect of the conflict was ignored: most analysts overlooked the presence of the Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (CHALCO), especially in the context of the Law on Investment. This issue requires further research, due to its complexity and the many interest groups involved. Domestically, tension erupted between the politicians and the financial elites, sometimes even including the social movements. Their activities in many cases are prompted by the impact of international lobbies, operating through the Mongolian politicians. If we trace basic changes, we see periods in which the regulations were very liberal with cheap and readily available licenses. In 2012 the bill became unclear and discretionary, but it is important to note that it blocked investments from State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Given that among the SOEs the main economic players are PRC firms and that the regulations came into force during the conflict on Oyu Tolgoi, another dimension of the rivalry is indicated. One of the companies involved in this mine project, as mentioned earlier, was CHALCO, which had to withdraw its investments. This brings up the question whether the same or different factions were behind both the detention of Sarah Armstrong, who was Rio Tinto’s lawyer, and the anti-CHALCO regulations. Were they domestically led or was there cooperation with foreign lobby groups? Due to the lack of transparency here, we might not find the answer, without information from someone in decision-making circles. Moreover, this was not the end of the conflict, but just one stage. No later than the next year, in 2013, the bill had been changed again, allowing SOEs to invest and helping CHALCO back into the game. The recent outbreak of the conflict in 2020 with Rio Tinto on fiscal issues indicates ongoing tension behind the scenes.

INDUSTRIALISATION PATTERNS

Mongolia being between a hammer and an anvil, is actively searching for alternative partners in terms of security, sources of capital, etc. The contemporary “Third Neighbour” policy has deep roots in the political practice of the Mongolian elites. On the other hand, however, the determinants are undisputable and the dominant foreign actor in its affairs could only be Russia or China. This also reflects the modernisation dilemmas. Learning from Japan and recently from Korea can add strategies to the main pattern of economic relations shaped by global conditions and stronger neighbours. This was accurately formulated by the Polish Ambassador to MPR in the 1960s, Stanisław Tkaczow: “Whatever the Mongols say, Russia and China will make communism for them.”

A comparison of Soviet or Chinese-driven industrialisation patterns depends on time and space. If we compare MPR and Inner Mongolia (IMAR), we see that the former had more stages of adjustment and awareness for local specifics. The outline of contemporary industrialisation impulses from China in the Mongolian state is focused on the acquisition of raw materials to secure supply for domestic industrial production. The mining industry reflects wider tendencies of modernisation patterns in communist and market-oriented times. The infrastructure from Soviet times might be considered inefficient, but it created a basic framework for economic activity, including a Trans-Siberian connection and one quasi-highway as well as the two mining cities mentioned above. It also introduced administrative restrictions allowing free migration to develop local centres. After the transition

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58 Golik (2013), 97–98.
60 “Investors assert that Mongolia’s support for FDI seems more an aspiration than a reality. Specifically, they report that government action affecting both FDI and resource extraction show a declining GOM [Government of Mongolia] commitment to the transparent rule of law and free market principles.” (US Department of State 2013).
61 Rio Tinto escalates Oyu Tolgoi tax dispute (2020).
until the 2010s, even the modest infrastructure was in a state of disintegration, with some minor exceptions in the capital city. The result is that currently more than half the population lives in Ulaanbaatar (UB). The city absorbs all the state resources, pulling more migrants from the under-developed regions, which is in fact the entire country, with increasing pressure for investment in the capital, not the regions. According to the author’s comparative analysis of the data from Mongolia and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the real estate sector’s share of GDP was higher in the state of Mongolia. At that time, it was widely assumed that a real estate bubble could occur in IMAR. In contrast, Ulaanbaatar was regarded by the investors as a ‘place of opportunity’, without any perception of imbalanced growth. The ‘predatory’ exploitation of the Mongolian natural environment, which is one of the factors for GDP growth, indicates the murky prospects for foreseeable long-term development.

Mongolia’s long-term strategies might be undermined by the political instability, with changes of government impacting on the public institutions. Mongolia has implemented good-quality regulations, including the anti-corruption law, based on Western standards. However, traditional social institutions and codes of practices have often proved to be stronger. Mongolia is commonly believed to be an “oasis of democracy” and an “exemplary transition state”. To give an example of the practical social dynamics: when budgetary reforms were implemented, following the New Zealand model, with low detail fiscal classification and relaxed scrutiny of capital flows, large sums of public funds disappeared with no one held accountable. Despite positive social capital, the political mechanisms lack transparency. The political and economic elites bear some resemblance to the Polish leadership of the 1920s, whom sociologists called “the residents of foreign capital”. The close relation between the elitist group of the peripheral state and influential external groups is widely known worldwide. In Mongolia, politicians are often businessmen, so there are many concerns about conflicts of interest. Instead of developing its own high-quality and labour-intensive manufacturing, market-oriented imports from China were seen to be more profitable. Such imports might perpetuate Mongolia’s low position in the value chain. It has also contributed to macroeconomic imbalances with high unemployment, a negative balance of payments, poor revenue base for public finance, and the inability to build and mobilise national capital. When 76 members of parliament own about 7.5 % of GDP it can be an indication of a developing oligarchy. According to Acemoglu and Robinson’s theoretical model, when a relatively small or closed group which exploits the rest of the population creates extractive institutions, this has a negative impact on a country’s development prospects. Other attributes of the ineffective peripheral state will result from this power structure setting and manifest themselves as the “three weaknesses”: weak government, weak institutions, and weak cohesion between state and society. The inefficient governance of the state and its inability to counteract external influences creates the conditions for perpetuating underdevelopment. At this moment, the country is trapped in an economic vicious circle of foreign investment in mining, dependence on imported products, and dependence on foreign loans. Mongolia has benefited from various programs run by multi-national institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. However, these top-down

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62 Own calculations for 2010 based on the data of Mongolian Central Statistical Office and IMAR’s Statistical Bureau. Presented during the IN-EAST workshop Risk and East Asia, Duisburg, November 14, 2016.

63 By the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and many other American commentators (Torbati 2016).

64 Rakowski (2019), 56–73.


projects have done nothing to change structural inefficiencies of the state. Without cooperation with the local communities, these projects will be mostly ineffective. 68

GRASSROOTS

In the local dimension, when the state withdrew its services, self-organisation became the only survival option. This could have been implemented by the grassroots or by close interaction of the authorities with the managed population. Here, however, we enter the informal sphere, with all its ambivalences. The negative potential of extra-procedural relationships notwithstanding, they constitute social capital. 69

Bottom-up mobilisation ran in parallel with macroscale processes. The shock of the transition absorbed by the various social groups has gone from trauma to the new reality. 70 Modernist discourse often refuses to recognize societies’ own mechanisms to develop 71. Given the insufficiency of top-down programs, which are far removed from local needs, some critiques perceive them even in terms of “cultural colonialism”. 72

As in the case of socialist modernisation, cooperatives were based on traditional structures – mainly the ail (family). With the exception of complex social structures that go beyond clan and kin ties, 73 there has always been cooperation in dynamic networks. Institutions could of course change over time in their operating methods, e.g., pre-revolutionary monastery-based governance shabinar, communist negdel, and post-transition lineage groups of neg aavyn khüükhed. Despite the differences, most types of communities developed specific economic practices. Among themselves, they have temporary possession of goods, including common pasturelands. More typical in this context are the community ties that go beyond short-term gain, and which become the basis of reciprocity. 74 These economic practices are also the basis of mutual help, which however cannot always be realized. Mongolian social relations are hierarchical and quasi-familial, which provides a traditional framework for community self-organisation. Thanks to this, strong institutions have been created with a degree of inclusiveness, which is the foundation of an efficient state in the theory of institutional economics. 75 However, this does not happen according to the model of Western developmentalism, which indicates the need for further research on theoretical models to describe Inner Asian socio-economic practices.

The communities and their proxies absorb the inefficiencies of the state approach to local authorities. They maintain relations with the public administration, and sometimes businesspeople enter regional governments. They can take over the state institutions or integrate them into the social structure.

The potential for bottom-up economic co-operation is created especially by the cross-border trade of small and medium businesses. The dynamics of the transition zone between two systems can often contradict central government policies, both for the region inside the state and for international economic relations with neighbours. Such business transactions can partly be done in ‘gray’ and ‘black’ economic areas, but they also provide impulses for development in the peripheries of the states, which would rarely share interests and investments with the region. Cross-border development is based largely on kin groups but can also practice ‘economic Pan-Mongolism’ or multi-ethnic co-operation. This attitude may impact not only the border

69 Rakowski (2019), 56–73.
70 Rakowski (2016), 90.
71 Op. cit.
72 Rakowski (2016), 92.
73 Atwood (2012), 4–76.
75 Acemoğlu/Robinson (2012), 124–150.
areas. Well-researched examples could be the Torguuds from Bulgan, who expanded local border trade and then became an important economic player on Mongolian state level and in relation to their kin in Xinjiang and Kalmukya regions. Chakhars from Bortala (Xinjiang), although they try to rely heavily on the kin group from Inner Mongolia (Xilin Gol, possibly Ulaanchab), have created a network of suppliers with producers from the Republic of Mongolia and from Shenzhen.

The Torguuds from Bulgan in Kobdo have realized bottom-up accumulation of capital and created a specific business model. Economic activities have resulted in the creation of community services and in the appropriation of state functions. This case raises the question whether it can become a wider pattern for organic modernisation or whether its success would be impossible on a broader scale.

CONCLUSION

Research on the economic development models for Mongolia is multidimensional. It is important to emphasize differences in industrialisation between Mongolia under Soviet rule and Inner Mongolia under communist China. It should be noted that the two neighbouring empires (China and Russia) have pursued different policies towards different regions. The two cases of economic policy towards Xinjiang and divided Mongolia mark a rather neglected aspect of the geopolitical game of the two competing states.

In this context Soviet support was ambivalent. On the one hand, it increased Mongolia’s dependency. On the other hand, it left a sound economic base for the further development of the state. The later post-transition aid projects seem far less successful in providing leverage for increasing the long-term economic potential of Mongolia. At the same time, states and transnational players have also used their structural power to make the Mongolian state economically dependent. In parallel, we see self-organisation based on own cultural capital and development potential. The question is whether this can become a more universal trend. Currently, it is difficult to find indications for the realisation of this alternative.

Further research conducted from an economics perspective should also reflect anthropological and philological aspects, looking specifically at the issue of self-reliance. Nevertheless, given the global changes in power relations and economic settlements it is rather hard to imagine Mongolia escaping from its permanent financial dependency on foreign donors.

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THE INTEGRATION OF ETHNIC KOREANS IN YANBAN PREFECTURE (CHINA), CA. 1890–PRESENT

Bas van Leeuwen, Jieli Li, and Leo Lucassen

In this chapter we look at five measures of ethnic Korean integration in Yanbian 延邊 prefecture (China) over the past century. First, we find that the number and socio-economic background of new migrants have varied little over time. Yet, partly due to Chinese policy, return migration was much higher at the end of the twentieth century than at the beginning. Second, even though ethnic mixing, e.g. through intermarriage increased, rates remained low. Third, throughout the twentieth century Koreans had on average higher levels of education than Han Chinese. Fourth, their occupational position converged with that of Han Chinese in the second half of the twentieth century. Fifth, we find that their position was strengthened by geo-politics, closeness to Korea, and the clustering of Koreans in Yanbian. Overall, the conclusion is that the long-term settlement process produced mixed results, with structural (socio-economic) integration being well advanced, whereas identificational integration was limited.

1 INTRODUCTION

Migration in Northeast Asia is widespread, partly caused by the very fluent boundaries over the past millennia. At the end of the nineteenth century this part of the continent even became one of the three global hotspots of intense migration. Comparable with the tens of millions of migrants who left Europe for the Americas and similar numbers of Indians and Chinese who were drawn to the plantation economies in South-East Asia, some fifty million Asian migrants flocked to North-East Asia, comprising Manchuria, Siberia, Central Asia and Japan in the period 1846–1940. The Chinese who moved north profited from the gradual relaxation of migration restrictions to Manchuria from the 1860s onwards. For geopolitical reasons both China and Japan stimulated colonization via migration through homesteading arrangements in the 1880s. The construction of railroads further speeded up Chinese migration into Manchuria, which totaled some 300,000 migrants per year in the period 1860–1907.

A second group of migrants who, due to a combination of geopolitics and natural disasters, left for Manchuria, were Koreans. This chapter focuses on the heart of Manchuria, the Yanbian (延邊) Korean Autonomous Prefecture located in the Chinese Jilin province which borders on present-day North Korea, and is also known as

1 We thank Christine Moll-Murata, Karen Finney-Kellershoff, Kwon Suyoung, Robin Philips, and the participants of the workshop The Frontier of Continental North East Asian Industrialization (February 2019) for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The research leading to these results received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme / ERC-StG 637695 – HinDI, as part of the project The historical dynamics of industrialization in Northwestern Europe and China ca. 1800–2010: a regional interpretation.

2 McKeown (2004). See also Gottschang / Lary (2000), 47, 64 and 171. Due to the lack of sources it is not known how many Chinese and Koreans moved to Manchuria before 1891, but we know that in 1876 alone some 900,000 Chinese migrated to North China. Ge Jianxiong et al. (1993), Jianming Zhongguo Yimin Shi, calculated that between 1860 and 1907 some 14 million Chinese moved to Manchuria. McKeown (2004), 187.


4 McKeown (2004), 158. Many migrants travelled partly by boat from Shandong to Liaodong, crossing the Yellow Sea.
the ‘third Korea’. The history of this prefecture is relatively well known: it experienced large-scale economic migration in the late nineteenth century and another wave during Republican China due to war and poverty. After World War II, when the occupation by Japan (1910–1945) ended and Korea became an independent state again (until separation in a southern and northern part in 1948), more than half of these Koreans stayed in northern China. Until the 1960s the border between Yanbian and North Korea was quite porous and ethnic Koreans (termed Joseonjok 朝鲜族 in Korean) could choose to live on either side of the border. Today, whereas between 1–5 % of ethnic Koreans live in most prefectures in the three northeastern provinces of China (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang), in Yanbian prefecture (some 2 million inhabitants in the late 1980s) this was no less than 36 % (see Figure 1), many of whom (some 100,000) at present work in South Korea, Japan and overseas.

Notwithstanding the long history of settlement of Koreans in Yanbian, their level of integration is lower than might be expected. On the one hand, by far the most Koreans opted for China due to generally more beneficial educational, political and economic conditions. Yet, even though compared to the local Han Chinese, they are well educated, their access to the labor market is limited, which partly explains why they still feel ethnically Korean. In other words, their structural integration, measured by their socio-economic position, is mixed, while their identificational integration, defined as the extent to which they define themselves primarily as Chinese, is very limited.

In the following section we deal with the new migrants who arrived in Yanbian over the past century. In Section 3 we will use three further indicators, mostly driven by data availability, i.e. ethnic persistency, education and employment. The policy regarding Koreans will be dealt with in Section 4. We end in Section 5 with a brief conclusion, finding a mixed picture with geographic closeness to Korea, the large share of Koreans in Yanbian, and geopolitical interplay between Japan, Korea, China and the USSR, leading to a relatively high degree of freedom for the Koreans. Whereas they have managed to exploit this in terms of education, this was less the case on the labor market.

2 KOREAN MIGRATION TO YANBIAN PREFECTURE

Yanbian prefecture became a focal point of Korean migration at the end of the nineteenth century when, after centuries of indeterminacy, the Chinese Qing dynasty and the Korean Chosŏn dynasty set the Chinese-Korean border at the Tumen river. After the defeat in the Opium Wars and China’s perceived weak-

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5 Han (2013), Chapter 4.
6 E.g. Sun (2009).
8 On this distinction see Lucassen (2005), 19. Needless to say, various variables are of limited importance as they might affect each other, e.g., Huddleston (2013), 37.

9 When considering the educational situation of Koreans in present-day Yanbian prefecture in the long run, we first have to identify the territory. In 1952 it consisted of the identically named Yanbian prefecture plus Dunhua 敦化 county, which in 1952 had not yet been included in Yanbian. For the pre-New China period (before 1949), we equate the present-day prefecture with what the Japanese called “Jiandao province” 間島省. Hence, when we speak about Yanbian prefecture, we use present-day boundaries of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture 延边朝鲜族自治州. Even though the boundaries of Yanbian, with the exception of Dunhua county, remained constant, the same cannot be said for its constituent counties. Prior to 1952 Yanbian prefecture consisted of Hunchun 延吉, Wangqing 汪清, Antu 安圖, Yanji 延吉, and Helong 和龍 counties. In 1953 Yanji city 延吉市 was split off from Yanji county 延吉縣 and in 1965 Tumen 图們 was also split off from Yanji county. In 1983 Yanji county was renamed Longjing 龙井 county. Consequently, today counties and county level cities of Yanbian prefecture are Hunchun, Wangqing, Antu, Dunhua, Yanji, Longjing, and Tumen.
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Figure 1: Share of ethnic Koreans in Northeast China by prefecture in 1982


Shen / Xia (2014), 135.
Migration increased after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, as can be seen in Figure 2. Many left in order to flee the harsh policing measures by the Japanese but also because they could obtain cheap land, offered by the Chinese state.\textsuperscript{11} This migration from North Korea to China in fact continued up to the 1950s when the Korean War caused further large-scale migration. After the 1950s, migration from Korea to China declined before it increased again in the 1990s. In the last few decades the presence of irregular migrants in Yanbian has declined again, mainly as a result of increased – forced – return migration following the stepping up of identity checks by the Chinese authorities, after some irregular North Koreans had forced their way into foreign embassies in China.\textsuperscript{12} As a consequence, some 50,000 irregular Korean migrants, who lived in Yanbian around 2002, were targeted, and soon this number dwindled to ca. 10,000–20,000.

During the twentieth century the reasons for migration remained quite constant, as did the socio-economic background of the migrants. Indeed, in Table 1 one may observe that, throughout the twentieth century, migration from North Hamgyong province dominated. The main reason for Koreans from this province to move to China was economic, while political factors seem to have played a very minor role. Not only does the out-migration predate the rise of the Communist regime in North Korea, it is also remarkable that during the 1990s people from other North Korean provinces sharing a border with China, with similar options to migrate, did not do so. This suggests that the political regime did not function as a strong push factor.

In fact, throughout the twentieth century it were the poor agricultural conditions in North Hamgyong that stimulated Koreans to leave. As pointed out by Lee,\textsuperscript{13} this out-migration started with a series of famines in Hamgyong province, leading to ca. 100,000 migrants leaving for Yanbian around 1900, i.e. an annual net migration of ca. 7,000 persons. Given a return migration of probably close to 35 \%,\textsuperscript{14} this implies ca. 10,000 migrants per year around 1900. These numbers increased in the 1920s–1940s when mostly poor farmers moved to Yanbian.

This was not much different in the 1990s since, as pointed out by Smith (2005), per capita grain production in North Hamgyong province was the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Cathcart (2010), 28.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Smith (2005), 171–172.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Lee (1986), 16.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Idem, 23.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
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### Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics of persons who migrated from Korea to Yanbian, 1890–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of origin</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No education</td>
<td>Primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Hamgyong</td>
<td>83 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Hamgyong</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Korean provinces</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>58 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>52 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See below Figure 2; Robinson et al. (1999), 293.

In order to explore the level of integration of ethnic Koreans who settled in Yanbian in earlier periods, we analyzed their identificational (with intermarriage as a proxy) and structural and socio-economic (education and employment) characteristics, for which we have sufficient data. The policy regarding Koreans will be dealt with in Section 4.

As pointed out above, up to ca. 1950 migration was an important driver of the increase in the number of Koreans in Yanbian. However, this declined significantly and, from the 1960s onwards, migration was limited and population dynamics were primarily driven by the fertility rates of those living in Yanbian. As we can see in Table 2, the share of Koreans dropped from 1950 onwards. Yet, this downward trend is less strong than one might expect, which we may attribute to three main reasons. First, while the immigration of Han Chinese, naturalization of Koreans, and repression during the Cultural Revolution, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, led to a declining share of Koreans in the population of Yanbian, the low rate of intermarriage further reinforced the trend. The rate of intermarriage largely depends on the share of each ethnicity in the local population: in many cases, if one ethnicity dominates, the intermarriage rate is like-

### Table 2: Share of people who defined themselves as ethnic Koreans in Yanbian, 1939–2003 (000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
<th>Han Chinese</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio Koreans/total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907*</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>80 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>74 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>57 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>1,828</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Yanji county only.

Source: Lee (1986), 17; Yin / Tian (2009), 271–282; Han (2013), 68.

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15 Ai (2014), 35.
16 Robinson / Lee / Hill / Burnham (1999), 293.
17 E.g. Lee (1986).
ly to be higher in the smaller of the two ethnic groups. In order to correct for this effect, we use the Herfindahl index,

\[ H = \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2 \]

which is the sum of the squared proportion of each ethnicity \( s \). \( 1 - H \) then gives the % chance of intermarriage if marriages were completely random. The actual rate of intermarriage divided by the chance of intermarriage equals the diversity-adjusted intermarriage potential. This implies that, with the exception of the 1930s and the Cultural Revolution period, when there were attempts by the Chinese state to prevent marriages between Korean women and Han Chinese men, intermarriage was at close to 10% of its potential (see Table 3). This is not much different from the intermarriage rate among all ethnicities in the USA in the 1960s–70s and is relatively low.

### Table 3: Rate of intermarriage in Yanbian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Intermarriage rate</th>
<th>Share of Koreans in total population</th>
<th>Diversity-adjusted intermarriage propensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>86.0 %</td>
<td>0.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910s</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>86.0 %</td>
<td>0.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>86.0 %</td>
<td>0.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>74.0 %</td>
<td>0.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>65.4 %</td>
<td>9.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>56.8 %</td>
<td>7.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>48.1 %</td>
<td>4.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>39.5 %</td>
<td>2.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>39.5 %</td>
<td>6.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>36.5 %</td>
<td>13.7 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Before 1940 Helong and Yanji county only.
Sources: See below Figure 2; Minnesota Population Center (2019: National Bureau of Statistics, China, 1982, 1990, and 2000 census).

Indeed, around 1932 there were 137 schools run by Koreans in Yanbian. Assessing the educational attainment of Koreans in Yanbian (see Table 4), we find that, up to today, illiteracy rates are lower and secondary and tertiary education higher than among the Han population. The reason for this remarkable educational development is often attributed to Koreans traditionally placing much value on education. Indeed, private schools, which teach reading and writing, calculus, and basic Confucian texts, had traditionally been very popular in Korea, and had been strongly supported by the Korean government, contrary to China.19 Even when the move towards “modern” education occurred after 1880, '[m]ore schools were founded in Yenpien [i.e. Yanbian] as a result of the “patriotic cultural enlightenment movement.”'20 a movement that reached its peak after 1905 and tried to stimulate Korean nationalism by concentrating on culture and enlightenment.'

The third aspect of integration for which we have data is the occupational structure. As shown in Table 5, for Koreans in Yanbian there was a trend away from agriculture to services in the final decades of the twentieth century. Essentially this is a convergence in occupational structure between Koreans and Han. This trend is partly due to an increasing return to education during the Reform Period since the 1980s,21 which on the one hand particularly benefitted Koreans in urban areas because they have a larger share of urban household registrations (hukou 户口) than Han,22 enabling them to profit more from education. On the other hand, the opening-up of China-Korean trade created jobs for people with Korea-specific skills. This urban-rural differential is, however, also a story of Yanbian’s decline. With Koreans spreading across urban regions

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18 Lee (1986), 30.
19 Dittrich (2014), 268.
20 As argued by Tsurushima Setsure (1932); op cit. Lee (1986), 31.
21 Fu / Ren (2010), 602–604.
in China or migrating to South Korea, those remaining in Yanbian often work in agriculture with relatively low incomes which causes a further out-migration of young people.23

4 POLITICS AND TREATMENT OF KOREANS

As the experience of Koreans in, e.g., Japan and the USSR shows, external factors also have a major effect on integration. Whereas in the USSR Koreans were, around 1937, deported and forced to assimilate with the local (Central Asian) populations, in Japan in ca. 1949, there was a policy of keeping Koreans apart, while discouraging the establishment of Korean schools and limiting it to a small number of private institutions.24 Yet, contrary to the processes of assimilation in the USSR and Japan, the geopolitical interplay created some agency for Koreans in China. Partly due to pull factors, i.e. the opening of Manchuria in 1881 by the Qing, and partly due to push factors, i.e. harvest failures, many farmers from the neighboring northernmost Korean province North Hamgyong moved to Yanbian.25

The position of Koreans in Yanbian was regulated by three Sino-Japanese treaties, the most important one being the Agreement relating to the Chientao Region signed in 1909. This treaty set the border at the Tumen river, but allowed the Japanese consular police jurisdiction in Yanbian.26 Moreover, the treaty stipulated that Koreans were, contrary to Koreans living in other parts of Manchuria, allowed to purchase or lease land, to be treated equally to Chinese in judicial matters,27 were allowed to trade freely across the border, and to move between the two countries. In 1910, with Japan’s annexation of Korea, Japan considered Koreans in China to be Japanese citizens. This created a complicated situation since the Japanese in 1915 argued that, as Koreans had become Japanese citizens, the new

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23 Choi (2016), 251.
24 Min (1992), 11–12.
25 Han (2013), 67.
26 Commission of Enquiry (1932), 58.
Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 applied, in which the Japanese obtained the right for their citizens in Yanbian to trade freely in South Manchuria. Yet the Chinese challenged this view, claiming that the 1909 treaty remained valid. This period saw the settlement of a large number of migrants, of whom 93% did so for economic reasons.

During the 1910s and 1920s China was unable to keep order in Yanbian. In addition, anti-Japanese resistance groups were set up among Koreans, making them popular with the Chinese who viewed it as a common struggle. At the end of the 1920s these groups split into nationalists and communists with changing fortunes in the struggle for power of both groups. In the 1930s the Koreans in North China became the target of anti-Korean sentiment by both the Nationalists and the CCP. In the latter case, the well-known Min-sheng-Tuan (People’s Livelihood Corps) Incident of 1933–1936 resulted in a purge of senior Koreans from the CCP ranks.

In 1945 Japan was defeated and a movement soon swept through the land that led to the persecution of collaborators (including Koreans in the CCP). This was a period of systemic violence, but nonetheless re-migration to Korea was limited (only about 33% of 1.4 million Koreans re-migrated). This can be explained by the fact that the political and economic situation in North Korea was not much better. Later in 1946 the CCP started a campaign of persuasion by distributing land, which worked especially well in rural Yanbian. Also due to its high share of Koreans, anti-Korean sentiment was less widespread in the prefecture. Finally, after the Nationalist defeat, Yanbian became communist from 1947 onwards. However, continued fighting in Northeast China as well as broken links with Korea and Northeast China led to the impoverishment of Yanbian.

But during peacetime, too, the relationship between Koreans and Han Chinese remained fragile, with benefits (such as education) for each ethnic group having to be carefully balanced. However, the Korean War changed this as rising nationalism forced Koreans in Yanbian to clearly state their loyalty to the PRC. Recruitment in Yanbian for the war started in 1950 with thousands of youths signing up to fight against the USA and South Korea. This war caused refugees to flee to Yanbian and led to the presence of Chinese and Sino-Korean troops in North Korea. The net effect was a mix of people moving back and forth across the border. After the armistice, the Chinese government decided that only those who had been present in China before the war were Chinese citizens.

The situation did not change much in the 1950s and, with only minimal documentation needed to cross the border and an urgently required workforce in North Korea, migrants moved from China to Korea. This led to active North Korean campaigns in the late 1950s to encourage Koreans in China, the USSR, and Japan to migrate to North Korea. Supported by the PRC in 1957 eventually 50,000 Koreans went to North Korea, with 40,000 returning quickly because of “undesirable circumstances”. Further measures from China included pressurizing Koreans with dual citizenship to move to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Also, illegal migration from Yanbian to North Korea occurred on a small scale mainly because of higher grain yields in North Korea and its preferential treatment of Chinese-Koreans. This culminated in a mass border crossing, sometimes argued to be orchestrated by North Korea but certainly triggered by the Great Leap For-
ward between 1958 and 1961 and the ensuing famines. Between January 1961 and May 1962 77,000 people attempted to cross the border, with 55,000 succeeding.\textsuperscript{35} The main reason for China not to interfere was that in the early 1960s the Sino-Soviet split occurred and both countries tried to win over North Korea. Consequently, in the case of the Koreans, there was no nationality policy and Chinese measures were mostly ad hoc and intended to charm North Korea.\textsuperscript{36}

Up to the 1980s net migration to North Korea occurred but was soon followed by reverse migration when the Chinese economy expanded at an unprecedented pace. At the same time, borders with North Korea were opened up in the mid-1980s, due to the desire of the Chinese government to strengthen China’s position in Northeast Asia by acting as a bridge between North and South Korea. In addition, the idea was to reduce discontent in Yanbian since it had profited little from the economic progress in China as a whole.\textsuperscript{37}

5 CONCLUSION

The situation of Koreans in the neighboring Chinese prefecture of Yanbian has been the topic of much research. On the one hand, studies have shown Koreans, at times, to be generally accepted in Chinese society and well-educated,\textsuperscript{38} while on the other hand it is found that recently Yanbian has become impoverished, the share of Koreans in the population is declining, and substantial out-migration has been occurring.\textsuperscript{39}

In this chapter we have looked at five aspects (divided into a structural and an identificational dimension) on the basis of which the integration of Koreans in Yanbian 延邊 prefecture can be measured over the past century. First, we find that the numbers of new Korean immigrants to Yanbian and their socio-economic background have varied little over time. Yet, partly due to the Chinese policy, return migration levels were much higher at the end of the twentieth century than at the beginning. Second, even though ethnic mixing by intermarriage increased, intermarriage rates remained comparatively low. Third, throughout the twentieth century Koreans had on average higher levels of education than the Han Chinese. Fourth, their occupational representation in the different sectors of the economy converged with that of the Han Chinese in the second half of the twentieth century. Fifth, their position was strengthened by geo-politics and closeness to Korea, and clustering in Yanbian.

This leads to a mixed message: whereas some factors strengthened the position of Koreans in Yanbian, others weakened it. Combined with an initially adverse economic situation in Yanbian, this led to out-migration to other regions in China and to South Korea, thus reducing the Korean character of this prefecture.

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EXPERIMENTING FOR SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION: CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE

Julia Aristova

INTRODUCTION

The concept of sustainability has emerged as a response to environmental, economic and social challenges caused by unbalanced exploitation and an increasing deficit of natural resources in the pursuit of economic development. At some point, in the process of industrialization and marketization, energy-intensive production came to guarantee economic growth and stability, access to abundant resources and careless consumption lifestyle became a symbol of social and economic wellbeing. Environmental degradation, a growing population, increasing demand for energy, and intensified natural hazards have made the need for a systemic restructuring all too obvious. The UN broadly defines sustainability as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”¹ Thus, it calls for a restructuring of economies and societies in a way that the human livelihoods are fully sustained, while negative impacts on the environment are minimized or avoided. This process is conceptualized in transition studies as sustainability transition.

Sustainability transition claims necessity and certitude of system change.² It also acknowledges that this type of change is a time-consuming, toilsome and, from the perspective of the existing benefit-oriented economies and practices, unnatural process. Sustainability transition is to a large extent socio-technical transition: its driving force is the introduction of new technologies and novel social practices, in other words the restructuring of a socio-technical system.

A socio-technical system, or “regime” as it is referred to in the sustainability transitions literature, is shaped by a network of actors, a set of norms and technical elements.³ On the one hand, these factors provide structural stability, on the other hand, they resist innovation. Effective sustainability transition means overcoming material, institutional and cognitive rigidity of the dominant socio-technical system.

In practice a regime’s obduracy is challenged through experimentation, when technological innovation is introduced into practice in a selected location.⁴ Unlike science experiments that take place in laboratories or under other controlled conditions, socio-technical experiments are set up under uncertainty and complexity of social environment.

Academic enquiry into the process of sustainability transition and experimentation as a main tool constitutes the field of transition studies.⁵ It originates from science and technology studies, evolutionary economics and the history of technology.⁶ This origin explains the rather technical – and in the context of social transformation controversial – term “experiment”.

Scholars of sustainability transitions recognize the importance of location.⁷ Socio-technical ex-

1 World Commission on Environment and Development (2009).
3 Geels (2002).
4 van den Bosch (2010).
5 Zolfagharian et al. (2019).
6 Sengers / Wieczorek / Raven (2016).
Experiments are usually limited to a certain place, which is characterized by a specific set of actors, formal and informal rules, and a material context. Yet analyses and conceptualizations in the field are mainly based on case studies situated in Europe, whereas other regions, and specifically China, is distinctly underrepresented in sustainability transitions research. This by no means reflects the dynamics of sustainability development and the quantity of socio-technical experiments in China. Since the early 2000s China got actively involved in finding solutions for environmental issues, providing legal frameworks, and setting goals for emission reduction. All these activities led to a vast number of what sustainability transition scholars would call “experiments”, but in China, related research is referred to as “pilot projects”. The term “pilot project” is a direct translation of the Chinese term 试点 shidian that is used in Chinese official documents for any type of innovative policy trial in one or several settings before full-scale application.

Sustainability is a goal-oriented process that requires a shared vision and conceptualization. Globalization of economies and interdependency of the global environment make sustainability achievable only when it is supported by mutual understanding. In the contexts of uncertainty and extreme complexity, ever-changing conditions and challenges, a common conceptualization and vocabulary is of paramount importance. While sustainability transition is taking place in China, it seems to be steered by its own vision and vocabulary.

Therefore, it is essential to analyze the existing body of research on sustainable experiments in China in order to find out how China’s experimentation for sustainable transition is conceptualized in academic discourse compared to the perspectives and vocabulary of sustainability transition studies in the West.

In what follows I will give an overview of how socio-technical experiments are conceptualized in the sustainability transitions studies, explain the methodology and analyze case studies of sustainability experiments in China in English language publications with special attention to normative orientation, theoretical orientation, analytical emphasis, and actors. The analysis will show whether a sustainability transition grid is applicable to the existing conceptualization of sustainability experiments in China or there is an alternative pattern of how China’s experiments conceptualized.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This part explains key hypotheses of sustainability transition studies, addresses some criticism of this theoretical approach and elaborates why it is still worthwhile and reasonable to analyze China’s activities in this field in line with sustainability transition principles.

Sustainability transition offers a holistic approach to achieving sustainability through the ongoing management of socio-technical development, which is conceptualized as a coevolution of societal practices and technology. Thus, sustainability transition is clearly goal-oriented. This approach assumes existence of a shared global vision of the future despite complexities and uncertainties. Achieving sustainability is a long-term process requiring fundamental change of the incumbent socio-technical regimes. The analysis of the emergence, transformation, and decay of socio-technical regimes allows to model transformation and to map actors and context factors. Equipped with this knowledge, intervention into the development process and its navigation towards sustainability are deemed possible. It is driven by the ambition to shape a desirable future by means of a proper transition management.

Experimentation is a way to stimulate alternative paths of development and to learn about specific socio-technical regimes. The systematic review of recent publications in transition studies literature by Sengers et al. (2016) reveals a set of con-
cepts developed by researchers to describe socio-technical experimentation. Among them are niche experiments, bounded socio-technical experiments, transition experiments, sustainability experiments, and grassroots experiments. Although all of them point at the similar process of technology testing within delineated boundaries, these concepts have different theoretical roots and analytical foci.

The term *niche experiment* originates from the theory of Strategic Niche Management (SNM). SNM are activities aimed at the creation of market niches, that constitute a protective nurturing environment for an innovative technology to facilitate its embeddedness into the socio-technical structure. Protective spaces provide shielding (protection from pressure), nurturing (support of the development) and empowering (making competitive with dominant technologies). SNM focuses mainly on technology and users. Some argue that niche experiments lack the ability to generate a particular future and only exert indirect influence on a socio-technical regime.

The *bounded socio-technical experiment* originates from social learning literature. It stresses the development of a diverse network of actors and unlike niche experiments shifts away from the strong focus on technology. An experiment includes a small number of users in a geographically delineated community for a time period of about 5 years. At least some of the actors have to recognize the activity as an experiment.

*Transition experiments* are an upgraded version of a technical project that offers learning experience. The concept derives from transition management research, which is based on complex system theory and evolutionary theory. From this perspective the experiment is an exploration of innovative ways to respond to societal problems. Goals in this case are not set, but get adjusted to the current situation and policies. This concept goes beyond technical change and environmental sustainability. The experiment should stimulate a transition towards societal goals through a process of deepening (setting up legal, economic and cognitive contexts), broadening (activating learning experiences) and scaling up. It encourages cooperation between front-runners with complementary backgrounds.

*Grassroots experiments* comprise local bottom-up innovations for sustainable development motivated by social needs and ideology. They draw on the social movement theory and the multi-level perspective approach (MLP). Experimental use of green technologies encourages civil society to unite in informal groups, cooperatives and associations for social innovation. It is an inclusive development beyond formal policies and markets. This type of experiments is valued by itself without the intention of sharing learnt experiences or expanding them.

*The sustainability experiment* is a planned, radical, goal-oriented socio-technical innovation aimed at achieving clear sustainability gains. It is rooted in geography and innovation studies in developing countries and in MLP. This type of experiment contributes to environmental, social, and economic development and includes top-down and bottom-up initiatives, that are locally led and transnationally informed. It relies on transnational flows of knowledge, technology, capital, institutions, and actors. This definition of

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10 Smith / Raven (2012).
11 Hoogma et al. (2002).
14 van den Bosch (2010).
16 Seyfang / Smith (2007).
17 Geels (2005).
18 Berkhout et al. (2010).
experiment stresses the importance of international linkages, but defies theories of catch-up development and claims avoidance of environmental convergence.

The overview shows that although all of these concepts describe a process of introducing new technology into social practices, their theoretical origins and analytical foci differ clearly. In an attempt to combine the above-mentioned descriptions, Sengers et al. (2016) offer the following definition of an experiment for sustainability transitions: “An experiment is an inclusive, practice-based and challenge-led initiative, which is designed to promote system innovation through social learning under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity.” This study aims to explore whether researchers’ conceptualization of sustainable pilot projects located in China fits any of the above types or definitions.

At first, however, criticism of the sustainability transition approach should be mentioned. First, it is criticized for its assumption about the existence of a “postpolitical” common sustainability interest.19 This, in other words, would mean that people all around the globe share a similar vision for their future that transcends national and regional interests and goals. Moreover, as sustainability transitions theory is mainly researched and developed by scholars in Europe and even taken as a guidance for policy formulation in the UK and the Netherlands,20 one needs to recognize its power to legitimize certain discourses and to disseminate a distinct vision of the global future.

Sustainable transitions theory has also been criticized for applying a too narrow approach to a debate on social systemic change.21 That is to say, despite its efforts to map processes and identify context factors, its potential to explain socio-technical developments and assist in achieving sustainability is rather limited.

Despite this critique, it is still important to assess whether China’s experiences with environment-oriented pilot projects are conceptualized as a part of the global UN-initiated development towards sustainability. The analysis will show if China’s dedication to sustainability goals is considerate or ad hoc, whether China shares these goals or whether it is led by its own visions and concepts that only happen to coincide to some extent with the concept of sustainability. This analysis might assist in evaluating the prospects of global cooperation for sustainability.

**METHODOLOGY**

Systematic review as a method in the social sciences allows to synthesize research findings related to a specific research question or subject.22 With the research question in mind, a set of twenty publications were selected for the analysis. All of them meet the following parameters: First, a publication must mention the terms “sustainability/sustainable”, “experiment / pilot project”, and “China/Chinese” in their title, key words, or abstracts. Featuring the concept of sustainability is essential as it means that from the author’s perspective the analyzed innovative activity is part of the larger developmental process of sustainable transitions. Along with the term “experiment”, “pilot project” was taken as an alternative. In the Chinese context the word “experiment” (shiyan 实验) is usually used for technical testing, while innovative policy implementation is commonly referred to as “pilot project” (shidian 试点).

Second, contributions had to be published after 1998, when research in sustainability transitions had already started to develop and grow. Third, led by the assumption that academic publications are embedded in a body of knowledge

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19 Swyngedouw (2011).
20 Sengers et al. (2016).
22 Petticrew / Roberts (2012).
through citation, citation analysis was conducted, bringing the most cited ones to the top. Finally, publications that address only technical aspects of an experiment/pilot project were excluded from this selection, as the sustainability transitions approach suggests discussion of the economic and social contexts.

After the selection process was completed, twenty studies on China’s sustainability experiments were assessed with regard to their theoretical orientation and analytical emphasis, and the pilot projects’ normative orientation and involved actors.

**FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

In this part I present the results of my analysis and discuss the implications of my findings. The identified publications analyze sustainability projects in various domains: energy (7 cases), transport (4), agriculture and food safety (3), urban development (2) and waste management (4). Despite the limited number of selected publications, this distribution represents the core areas of sustainability concerns.23

All pilot projects were city-level initiatives, for example an innovative food waste collection and transportation system in Suzhou,24 an offshore wind-farm project of Shanghai’s Donghai Bridge,25 Yuelai eco-city in Chongqing,26 and carbon capture and sequestration in Beijing.27 This observation leads to the discussion of actors involved in the projects. It is predominately governmental agencies that initiate and carry out pilot projects, including the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, city and provincial governments, research institutes, state-owned enterprises, and government commissioned contractors. The private sector is only rarely included in the process, and limited to private companies developing bike-sharing systems in Shanghai,28 or to international players such as the World Bank financing the “Wuhan Second Urban Transport Project”.29 Therefore, in the analyzed cases the experiment initiative was always top-down with a limited set of actors involved. Government domination in promoting technological innovation decreases chances of technology to scale up when the market is underdeveloped, even if a pilot project appears to be successful. Innovation needs the market to develop further.30

Within the framework of sustainability transitions, analytical emphasis in research might be put either on sustainable indicators, such as the reduction of the ecological footprint, community building, collective action, or on process dynamics, such as broadening, deepening, and scaling-up.31 In the analyzed papers attention centers on performance indicators, namely technical, environmental and social, with special emphasis on economic indicators. This can be explained by the fact that for a couple of decades economic development was a top priority for local governments in China. Currently, when they are also under pressure to improve their environmental performance, governments look for a compromise which allows them to minimize costs of sustainable innovations, so economic efficiency is particularly highlighted.

Experiments in sustainable transitions literature tend to have different normative orientations, that is success factors, for example, creating market niches or stimulating transition towards societal goals.32 Pilot projects in China seem to

23 Geels (2011).
27 Lai et al. (2012).
28 Zhang et al. (2015).
29 Wei et al. (2016).
30 Lai et al. (2012).
31 Sengers et al. (2019).
32 Sengers et al. (2019).
share the same normative orientation, that is learning for scaling up. What might be specific for China is that technological innovation that gets its chance in a pilot project already went through a careful selection process. The key point of a pilot project then is not to test a technology, but to learn how to implement it better and to scale it up to other locations afterwards.

Conceptualization of experiments in sustainability transitions studies relies on similar theories, such as SNM or MLP. The analyzed publications are based on various theories: structural decomposition analysis, ecological engineering model, sustainable urbanization theory, technology integration theory, etc. In other words, although these studies seem to be united by the idea of sustainability, they are actually disconnected. This could be justified by the fact that they are analyzing pilot projects in different domains, such as transport or agriculture. Nonetheless, while sustainability transitions theory accumulates inputs from experiments in various areas, there seem to be no efforts to systemize experience of pilot projects in China. There is a lack of an overall theoretical framework, which might benefit China’s environmental performance by identifying systemic barriers to development. This reflects the specific lack of the Chinese political system regarding communication between governmental agencies that also happen to initiate the pilot projects in question.

If we return to the description of various types of experiment designed by researchers in the field of sustainable transition, it appears that none of these correspond to the conceptualization of China’s pilot projects. The niche experiment aims at creating a market, but in the Chinese pilot projects it is often the market that is missing, even if the project is generally successful. The bounded socio-technical experiment focuses on the formation of a diverse network of actors, but in the Chinese cases observed in this analysis, it is mainly governmental agencies that initiate and implement innovation. The transition experiment’s goals are adjustable, whereas pilot projects in China are always goal-oriented. The grassroots experiment suggests bottom-up innovation, whereas the Chinese projects reviewed in this study are all top-down. Besides pilot projects aim at scaling up, but grassroots experiments do not require expansion. Finally, the sustainability experiment’s definition comes close to China’s scenarios: planned, radical, goal-oriented. However, it is also associated with international cooperation, which doesn’t seem to be the case with the projects analyzed here.

Nonetheless, this does not imply that any environmental pilot project initiated in China is planned, radical, goal-oriented, and government-led. There is a great variety of environmental pilot projects in China at different levels launched by various actors, but they are initiated, developed, researched and conceptualized under the umbrella of China-specific concepts such as Ecological Civilization (shengtai wenming 生态文明), green development (lüse fazhan 绿色发现), and low-carbon development (ditan fazhan 低碳发展), rather than sustainability. A simple Google Scholar search of publications on pilot projects combined with the above-mentioned concepts offers a wide variety of contributions. On the one hand, China is officially devoted to the sustainable development goals of Agenda 2030. Consistent with that, the Development Research Center of the State Council held the Sustainable Development Forum in Beijing in 2019.33 On the other hand, it is remarkable that in the article titled “Promote China’s Sustainable Development with A New Round of Reform and Opening-Up” displayed on the Development Research Center’s website, the word sustainability is mentioned only twice: First in the title and second in the last sentence.34 This might support the assumption that China’s environmental development and pilot projects are driven by the country’s own visions and concepts, which coincide

33 First Sustainable Development Forum held in Beijing (2019).
34 Li (2018).
partially with the concept of sustainability and allow to connect to the global agenda.

As mentioned before, in the Chinese context sustainability experiments are invariably referred to as “pilot projects”. In fact, any policy experiment in China is called “pilot project”. China is by no means new to large-scale transitions. China’s shift from a planned to a market economy is a remarkable example of tremendous and steady system transformation. Its path to the world’s first economy was laid out by an endless series of pilot projects. This explains why the term is prevalent. China’s experience with long-term large-scale transformations through experimentation might serve her well in dealing with environmental issues.

CONCLUSION

Sustainability transitions theory treats experimentation as a key instrument for achieving sustainability. Scholars in the field differentiate between several types of experiments. This analysis shows that academic conceptualization of China’s pilot projects for sustainability hardly coincides with any of those types. It appears that experimentation in China is driven by and conceptualized under the umbrella of China-specific concepts such as Ecological Civilization or green development, rather than sustainability. I discuss China’s environmental vision, policies and bureaucratic decision-making in the forthcoming doctoral dissertation “Institutional drivers for deciding on sustainable technologies in China”.

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RUSSIA AND CHINA: CHANGING PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON THE VERGE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Anastasia Herber

This article aims to give an overview of the development of East Asia from the perspective of industrialization. We explore if the industrialization concept can be used to establish the research framework for area scholars. With a focus on East Asian industrialization, we try to go beyond the import substitution (ISI) model by adding a policy transfer dimension to it. Inspired by institutional theory, we take a comparative look at industrialization processes in Europe, Latin America and Asia and distinguish specific characteristics of Russian and Chinese industrialization in the twentieth century.

Further, we use special economic zones (SEZs) as an illustration of industrialization processes in autocratic states. By applying the policy transfer theory of de Jong (2002), we describe China’s Soviet-led industrialization before the Great Reform in 1978. Having undergone radical socio-economic transformation during the 1980s and 1990s, China, on the opposite, has become a donor of development models for Russia in the twenty-first century.

At the same time, the theories mentioned were not entirely able to construct a ‘real world’ model. They either focused on global tendencies or on nation-state priorities. In real life, by contrast, these two often clashed with each other, posing constraints on human action unpredictable over time and place.

In this paper, we aim to take a closer look at the East Asian industrialization process. Our goal is to consider the challenges that reality poses for many existing theories of industrialization. For the purpose of this study, we narrow the scope of analysis to the economic field, where possible. To clarify the meaning of industrialization, we use one of its most recent definitions. It was formulated by Simandan, who suggests that industrialization is a set of economic and social processes, related to the discovery of more efficient ways for the creation of value.

Our focus of interest is on China’s and Russia’s industrialization patterns, as well as the devel-

1 Schwab (2016).
Development of the Far East. To offer a broader view on this issue, we are combining two approaches – the import substitution industrialization (ISI) and the export-oriented industrialization (EOI). Probably all industrialization processes worldwide at some stage are a combination of these two approaches. For China and Russia, using only the import substitution industrialization model would lead to speculative and unproductive economic activity, which was solved by including elements of export-oriented industrialization.

The Ricardian theory of comparative advantage applied to East Asia, whose main competitive advantage is relatively inexpensive labor, shows that this was the strategy of the Third World countries to succeed in industrialization during the 1960s. One may argue however, that China’s stringent controls over capital flow, subsidies given to specific industries, and a highly interventionist state prevent free market forces to shape economic development. Nevertheless, in China all these measures (intentionally ‘wrong’ prices, import licenses only for the best exporters) were used to achieve export-led growth, while the protected domestic market allowed to preserve this growth.

From a historical perspective, the process of industrialization in East Asia is unique in some respects. To understand it, we may refer to the industrialization processes worldwide.

European industrialization began in eighteenth-century Great Britain, and it was followed by continental European states half a century later. Industrialization was capital- and energy-intensive and had a savings-investment mechanism as the key element of industrial capitalism. Significant technological innovation accompanied the process of industrialization in Europe, supported by importing capital, labor, and machinery.  

Industrialization in Latin America took off at the beginning of the twentieth century in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. This process is often associated with the appearance of such approaches as import substitution industrialization and dependency theory. This is where they originated and have been influential ever since, although after World War II more export-oriented and liberal economic regimes have appeared there.

Industrialization in Asia, by contrast, was primarily labor-intensive. In 1868 it started off in Japan, which became Asia’s first industrial nation. It focused on the transformation of rural industries (and in particular, rice cultivation), which paved the way for reform in other East Asian states. This was later referred to as the “flying geese approach”. Accordingly, Amsden (1989) suggests in his work (e.g. Asia’s Next Giant) that industrialization in Asia is highly dependent on learning. The other distinguishing factor of East Asian industrialization is the significant role of the state, which both controlled and directed the process of industrialization.

Industrialization in Asia owed much to learning from the developed nations. Thus, for example, Amsden mentioned that Asian development is simply “industrializing using borrowed technology”. To further develop this idea, Dolowitz and Marsch (1996) suggested a concept of policy transfer. According to this concept, in the neo-functionalist view the main reason for policy transfer is the convergence of modern societies around similar systems of economic organization, which leads to similar policy responses, as well as administrative, governance and organizational outcomes.

In this paper we suggest looking at the industrialization process through the lens of policy transfer. It is important to keep in mind, however, that policies do not exist in a vacuum. There-

3 Sugihara (2007).


5 ibid.
Therefore, we consider the agents of industrialization and their motives, processes of policy-oriented learning (copying, emulation, hybridization, inspiration), forms of transfer (voluntary, negotiated, coercive), obstacles (cognitive, environmental, domestic, public), and outputs. Following this argument, Guy Peters suggests that there are differences to what extent countries are able to adapt due to structural factors. Evans adds that those states that share common features are more likely to engage in policy transfer with one another.

The industrialization processes started in Europe, and Asia followed suit. Russia was the closest Chinese neighbor with a European culture and yet a remarkably strong state, which made her a perfect supplier of an industrialization model to China. Along with England, Belgium and France, Russia (as well as Germany and Japan) formed undisputedly an echelon of the world’s first industrializers. This process in Russia took off in the 1880s and accelerated in the 1890s with the construction of the Eastern Railway, which improved government revenue, the tax base and helped to reduce the state deficit.

The South Russia Metallurgical Project of 1887–1890 was perhaps one of the biggest examples of Russo-Western European technological interaction. It was at that time when the first joint ventures with European and American companies were established in Russia. They brought with them qualified labor, techniques and mechanisms, as well as basic institutional foundations. By 1900, 50 percent of all foreign capital in Russia was located in the southern parts of the Empire. This produced an unbalanced industrial development until 1914.

After the First World War, Russia possessed a large productive capacity. Besides, the Revolution of 1917–1923 resulted in a change of power: the Tsarist Russia was now taken over by the Bolshevik Party. In 1922, the Soviet Union was established. The organization and management of major industrial enterprises (of which there were few) was easier to control by Bolsheviks. That led to the over-expansion of heavy industry under the control of the Communist party. In the Soviet Russian model, growth depended on the government’s ability to extract forced savings and to invest them into the expanding heavy industrial sector. Other sectors were developed only if their output was needed in the form of wage goods, or if they were inputs to the main sector.

The Far East was always a cornerstone of Stalin’s national policy, and the years of industrialization were accompanied by the resettlement of people to the far-eastern part of the country. Resources for development included using the labor of the prisoners, who were sent to the Far East, and foreign capital derived from grain exports. During the 1930s labor resources were increased by resettled Red Army servants. The next level of resettlement was enforced after the Second World War when two million people were given land for agriculture in the Far East. The industrialization of the far-eastern regions remained in focus of the leadership until the 1970s. Afterwards, in the middle of 1970s rich resources of hydrocarbons were discovered, and the economic development changed its route. The socio-economic policy in the FE has temporarily lost its importance to the state.

The success of industrialization in the Soviet Russian model was a factor of supply elasticity (the supply of factors of production could be easily increased) and a large market for producer goods, both of which stemmed from the strong central state. The communist pattern of industrialization led to a marked increase in the capital intensity of production, but at the same time also resulted in a shortage of consumer goods and raw materials. This ‘closed’ the Soviet economy to the world.
To summarize, the communist pattern of industrialization with a strong state implied:

1. A focus on import substitution (self-sufficiency in raw materials and certain commodities)
2. A basically closed economy
3. A postulate: “For fast growth, high rates of socialist accumulation are essential”
4. As much investment as possible to increase the output of commodities
5. A postulate: “Producer goods should exceed consumer goods.” Stalin decreed that heavy industry was the only way to industrialize, especially the machine building industry, fuel and metallurgical industry (iron, steel, coal).
6. A high degree of centralization which is required in planning and economic administration. With that market forces are meant to be suppressed, and planned targets should be excessively high.
7. A policy of great and sudden spurts.

In the era of Perestroika, industrialization in Russia (as well as many other development processes) stagnated. Experiments with liberalizing reforms failed on account of a top-heavy centralized system. More recently, President Vladimir Putin brought back some of the state-interventionist mechanisms, which may remind of a quasi-ISI policy. It was clearly combined with the export-oriented paradigm. This was possible due to country’s resource endowment, railroads, agriculture and competent human capital.

Industrialization in China took after Russian Soviet industrialization of 1920s. It is noteworthy that China’s ISI was a key part of the central planning system copied from the Soviet Union. It protected all industries and introduced tariffs on all imports. In financing, the Soviet model of the 1930s was used: Agriculture was collectivized in 1950s in order to transfer the surplus to industry. Even before that, in 1949 all industries and banks were nationalized to ensure reinvestment into industrial development.

Rapid industrial growth was carried out by mobilizing China’s domestic resources, receiving Soviet help but otherwise completely avoiding foreign assistance. Combined with the embargo from the US of 1950–1972, China found herself in isolation in 1960s and 1970s.

Following the Soviet model, China faced a number of challenges:

1. Isolation resulted in the lack of modern technology.
2. Suppressing consumption (which was necessary for mobilization) inhibited people’s motivation to work. This worsened during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976.
3. In the 1970s a lack of financing made China turn to oil exports, still unable to balance budget deficits.

From the 1970s to the 1980s China’s leadership realized the crisis of ISI mechanisms and a solution was found in combining ISI with EOI. In 1978 the ten-year plan known as the Great Reform was introduced by Deng Xiaoping. A turn towards foreign means became clear. In the same spirit, the 1980s’ Open Door Policy was aimed at importing modern technology and equipment to balance off the payment disaster and play a supplementary role to industrial development. With that, ISI methods were also not abandoned – during the 1980s import tariffs were still on the

Note that market increase in international trade was observed within a large common market protected against the rest of the world. Such one existed between Soviet Republics and Asia (no taxes), while customs protectionism was clearly noticeable on the European border.

I.e. the high rate of investment in fixed and circulating capital.

The rate of industrial growth should exceed the growth in other sectors.

Sun (2007).
rise, and heavy industry was used to promote industrial growth.

Until China prepared to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), the import tariffs remained high. At the beginning of 2000s, the tariffs were reduced to 20 % and favorable treatment of joint ventures with foreign companies became more common. Besides, local industries gradually shifted under the control of local governments and collectives. Township and village enterprise reform further spurred industrialization, providing market incentives for rural development. Active industrial policy was achieved by supporting state-owned enterprises, with the government forcing the banking sector to give approximately 80 % of all credits to SOEs. This led to non-performing loans and the need for privatization and the policy of ‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’.

At its core, China’s industrialization destroys the common assumption that communism is incompatible with the market. While applying the Soviet model, China’s leadership intended to adjust it to market needs. China’s capitalism was government-controlled, but accompanied by the network arrangements from below. At that, decentralized development led to significant regional variations. With all that, the role of FDI in technological and organizational upgrading in China was higher than in Russia and in other Asian countries.

Speaking about these factors (FDI and technological and organizational upgrading), one of the best illustrations of China’s next stage of industrialization is the special economic zones (SEZs).

In general, SEZ is a term used to describe different types of economic zones at different periods. It refers not only to ‘classic’ top-down SEZs of the 1980–90s (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, Hainan, Pudong, Tianjin), but also to the zones of techno-economic development that started to appear in 1984, known as China’s national industrial parks, the second wave of which took off in 1992 with inland tech-intensive development. Moreover, it includes the zones of high-tech industry development, free-trade zones (FTZs), zones of cross-border cooperation, export-processing zones and other types, as well as regional-level SEZs.

Historically, the first experiments to attract FDI were carried out during the 1980s in Guangdong SEZs (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou) in the Zhujiang delta. The second ‘growth pole’ originated in the Yangzi delta during the 1990s and included SEZs in Pudong and Binhai. These SEZs had a number of special traits:

1. They comprised large geographic areas with the objective to facilitate comprehensive economic development.
2. They enjoyed special financial, investment and trade privileges.
3. They were located far from Beijing, but close to Hong Kong and Macao.

The National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a separate law for each zone (Zeng 2012). Also, over 200 zones of lower level function were regulated by the State Council of the PRC. This point-focus system allows to count for regional characteristics, prompt regulation and (upon necessity) closing of the zone.

From the middle of the 1980s, economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) were created in the suburban regions of major cities, in order to gain access to major local markets located mostly along the coastal areas. The local government selected an administrative committee to oversee the economic and social development of the zone.

13 Sun (2007).
14 ibid.
15 ibid.
After 1990 and before China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001, FTZs were set up to facilitate export processing, foreign trade, logistics, and bonded warehousing. The first national-level free-trade zone Waigaoqiao in Shenzhen was set up to experiment with customs regulations (tax refunds on exports, import duty exemption and concessionary value-added tax). Since 2004 FTZs have been linked to the nearby ports in order to strengthen logistics and warehousing capacities. Export processing zones appeared after 2000 (at Kunshan near Suzhou in Jiangsu) in order to segregate manufacturing for export from other types of manufacturing. Export processing zones are similar to FTZs but have been solely established for the purpose of managing export processing. Since China entered the WTO, she has focused particularly on high-tech innovation and environment zones.

China’s next level of industrialization is characterized by an additional trend – the establishment of industrial clusters. These clusters grow out of SEZs (Shenzhen, Pudong, Dalian, Wuhan). These bottom-up structures are networks between geographically close, interconnected firms within a certain field. These firms communicate with interrelated institutions, i.e. financial providers, public and educational institutions, industrial associations and government agencies. Transactions between them involve multiple parties and would normally lead to prohibitive costs. Therefore, they use informal mechanisms, like, for example, oral agreements, to support business processes. Altogether, these clusters provide well-functioning value chains, efficient division of labor, help to reduce operation costs, enhance productivity and increase efficiency. Besides, they allow to obtain trade credit from upstream enterprises. The infrastructure of these networks helps to reduce the costs and promotes competition. Within a few years, clustering has proven so effective that in the early 2000s the government created a supportive legal base for them, aimed at accelerating innovative growth.

Industrialization in China has the following features:

- gradualism with an experimental approach, i.e. the policy has to be flexible, and go through the stages of experiment–popularization–innovation;
- strong commitment of the government, which controls key industries and financial resources;
- active, pragmatic facilitation of the state;\(^{16}\)
- relative autonomy of the local government in establishing rules and regulations.

China’s SEZs can be characterized by:

1. Preferential policies, including favorable policies to attract skilled labor
2. Inexpensive land
3. Tax breaks, including export tax exemption
4. Rapid customs clearance
5. Strong market pull\(^ {17}\)
6. Having a large staff/body of R&D personnel
7. Intellectual property rights
8. Close links with the domestic market and industrial clusters
9. Spillovers through inter-firm links\(^ {18}\)
10. Having their own specialization, which is especially true for the industrial parks who have a long history of production or business activities in a specific sector
11. Effective local government support\(^ {19}\) through infrastructure building, creating industrial markets to facilitate business activities, set-

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16 Zeng (2012).
17 When China first opened up, there was a shortage of almost everything because of centrally planned economy.
18 Including SOEs and foreign firms with regards to technology and skills.
19 More often at middle or later stages, when the zones have demonstrated their potential.
ting the standards and preferential policies, as well as support via technology innovation centers.

12 Government facilitation, but

13 Market choice.

After having conducted a number of interviews in China, we have become convinced that the zones are the more successful the better they focus on their comparative advantage. 20

As mentioned above, industrialization in China at its early stages saw much emulation from the Russian Soviet neighbor. Later, it followed a more individual development mode. Some traits of the industrialization process can be found both in China and in Russia, while some others are unique to either of them. One thing, however, is clear: In Russia experimentation with SEZs started later.

When the first SEZs appeared in Russia, their primary goals were to solve economic development imbalances, foster technological innovation, and attract FDI. As in China, they occupied large territories and were established where there was abundance of foreign capital. However, the newer SEZs which were established just before the collapse of the USSR, were mainly used for legalizing non-legal businesses. Shortly after, when the Soviet Union dissolved, financial-tax authorities declared the formal legal documents concerning SEZs as expired.

It was not until the years 2005–2007 that a new set of laws on the SEZs was created. According to that, there are five types of special economic zones:

1 Technical implementation zones
2 Industrial processing/manufacturing zones
3 Tourist-recreational zones
4 Port zones
5 Old type zones (which still use the legislation of the 1990s)
6 Game/gambling zones

Since 2018, there are 25 functioning SEZs in Russia. Russian SEZs have some similarities with special economic zones elsewhere, like favorable policies for residents or the policy of ‘one-window’ to minimize bureaucratic costs. With the establishment of the Far East Development Corporation, a managing company has been created that is in charge of the zones’ administration, control and consultancy services.

Very characteristic of Russian SEZs, perhaps even more than of the Chinese ones, is that they operate under strict administrative control and rigid guidelines. Zones are created top-down on municipal land and funded by the means of state budget. On the positive side, this approach facilitates the accumulation of large amounts of resources, but on the other hand, local interests are not sufficiently reflected.

Unlike the Chinese zones, in the Russian SEZs relations between the state and science business do not form an integrated network, which makes business activities within the zones less innovative, if at all. Clustering has also yet to develop, as the critical mass of interested enterprises has not been reached.

It would be fair to say that China’s latest wave of special economic zones is hardly comparable to the Russian ones due to the advancement of the former. One might rather compare the Russian SEZs of 2005, when a comprehensive SEZ development started, and the Chinese ones of the 1970–1980s.

In China, SEZs were set up as special regions with simplified regimes of export trade activity. Whereas in Russia, although the zones have some favorable regime in terms of implementing a customs-free zone, which regulates entre-
preneurial activity, they are still part of the Russian territory and fall under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

With regard to SEZs the two countries pursued different goals. In China, SEZs were primarily established to experiment with the economic and administrative structures, as well as to increase export trade, employment and competition between regions. In Russia, by contrast, the major goal was the development of processing and high-tech industries, and their marketization. Development of tourism and transport infrastructure were the two other main focal points. In terms of benefits, China’s first economic zones were not as rich in benefits as the later Russian ones. Speaking about the Chinese SEZs of later periods, their focus has shifted from providing material, fiscal benefits to creating favorable and competitive atmosphere for investors.

In 1980s and 1990s, the first SEZs in China provided tax incentives for companies with foreign capital. They returned 40% of profit/income tax, in case the investor was going to stay in the zone for more than five years, or income tax was abolished altogether, if the investment exceeded five million USD. Personal income tax was reduced by ¼ to 5%. Land tax for the first five years was abolished, and afterwards was reduced by 50% of the land tax outside the zone. China’s SEZs also provided the investors with rich resources of low-cost labor.

In Russia, however, SEZs also include a free-trade regime, i.e. they abandon customs taxes and value-added tax, or provide a special tax regime by reducing income and property taxes, transport and land taxes for the first five to ten years of operation within the zone.

In China there is no universal legal act concerning the zones. The decision to construct a zone is made by the State Council, and relevant agreements are made by the National People’s Congresses of the regions. In Russia there is a Federal Law from 2005 “On the SEZs in the Russian Federation”, and by-laws, as well as the Agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus on the Customs Union.

There are more responsible parties when it comes to SEZ establishment in China. They are the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Land Resources, the General Customs Administration, the Currency Control Department, and several law enforcement agencies. In Russia the parties involved are limited to the Ministry of Economic Development, the managing company and the regional government authorities.

When it comes to financing, China’s SEZs are large state-financed programs that nevertheless attract much investment from abroad. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan were the largest investing parties at the time, and China’s huaqiao are often in the list of largest investors. Despite all state measures Russian SEZs cannot attract comparable amounts of FDI and therefore remain financed mostly by the state.

Given all the similarities and differences between the SEZs of the two countries, we suggest that China’s economic zones of the late 1980s were an example and a model for Russia to follow. At the same time, we need to consider that the process and meaning of industrialization have been developing over time. One of the latest concepts in the field of new industrialization was coined by Schwab in 2015. He suggests that we are now witnessing the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

To understand what is meant by this concept, we refer to history. The First Industrial Revolution used water and steam to mechanize production. The Second Industrial Revolution used electric

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21 Overseas Chinese, i.e. people of Chinese ethnicity, living outside China, its special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macao SARs), and the Republic of China (Taiwan).

22 Schwab (2016).
power, whereas the Third Industrial Revolution was associated with semiconductor industry, IT, internet, computer and automated production. The 4IR speaks for the latest technological revolution combined with the emergence of artificial intelligence, photo robotics and the creation of new business models (for example, the Internet of things).

The concept became popular after the introduction of the Industry 4.0 strategy at the Hannover Fair in 2011. According to this strategy, the main goal is to create smart products and services connected to the internet-base of new data and the service-focused business model. The new industrialization will create new value chains and networks based on digital convergence and alliances.

Park suggested a list of countries ready for the 4IR. Interestingly, while the EU occupies one of the leading places with its innovative cluster policies and technology innovation that raise its global competitiveness, China is not even close to the top. At the same time, China also prepares herself for the 4IR with the policy "Made in China 2025" proposed in 2014 by the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE). This strategy is supported by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. In May 2015 it was approved by the State Council and became a national action program along "Internet+'. The plan outlines ten priority fields in manufacturing, which should accelerate informatization and industrialization in China. They include chemical manufacturing, transportation and aerospace equipment production, pharma and medicine manufacturing.

The reason why China is not considered one of the leaders of 4IR today is because the ratio of R&D spending to GDP is smaller than in other countries (for example, Japan or the US). When considering R&D intensity as a proxy for how effectively the country has spent her money on (new) industrial development, China is not the most efficient with her 2.1% stable over the past three years.

And how is Russia following this 4IR trend? Presidential order #204 of May 2018 outlined nine priority national goals of development till 2024. Three of them are devoted to accelerating the pace of high-tech development. A 50% increase in tech innovation companies is expected. The presidential order also aims to enforce implementation of digital technologies in economics and social life. The main project of 4IR in Russia is called "Digital Economics in the RF" and focuses on creating information-telecommunication infrastructure for big data. At the same time, even at the later span of industrialization, different forms of protectionism remain important in Russia. 4IR here still can be described by the increased role of government in articulating and implementing industrial policy (activated government).

What is common about industrialization in Russia and China is the strong role of government. Institutional innovation in economics and finance in both countries is led by the state. What is special about China is the rapidly growing number of patents. Such success can be explained by the government’s significant control and involvement in MARKET forces. This can push for over-the-horizon innovation, where market forces by themselves would normally fail. The cooperation between the government and technology companies is fostered. Besides, the state has access to consumer data with little (if any) privacy protection. Coupled with China’s large investment in the artificial intelligence (AI), the country may soon become one of the hubs for AI development. In general, taken the size of population and the diverse industry mix, AI in China has enormous potential.

24 Ibid.
Will China lead world industrialization in the twenty-first century? We shall see. There is little doubt that the continuing Chinese industrial take-off is reshaping the world economy. The composition of China’s industrial output is changing, with increasing skill and capital intensity. In his book *The Dragon in the Room* (2010) Kevin P. Gallagher speaks of a two-fold influence. He points out that on the positive side, the increasing Chinese demand has a beneficial impact on world’s export markets; and on the negative, that the market competition is usually won by China herself. China’s economic policy paradigm, also known as neo-developmentalism, covers not only direct state intervention, but also innovation policy and activist trade policy, which are targeted at strong intellectual property regimes and investment opportunities for domestic firms. In such an environment, rapid industrialization in China is almost unavoidable. In view of that, her influence remains only a question of time.

REFERENCES


**NUTAG COUNCILS AS POST-SOCIALIST LIFELINES BETWEEN THE STEPPE AND THE METROPOLES IN MONGOLIA**

Ines Stolpe and Tümen-Ochiryn Erdene-Ochir

Nutag councils (nutgiin zöвлöл) are dynamic multi-local networks that connect rural and urban spheres within and beyond Mongolia’s borders. Initially established after socialism as an answer to the sudden disintegration of the countryside, they have become the most widespread yet – for outsiders – least visible features of the civil society landscape. Nutag councils (NCs) are self-governed by people who feel committed to support their rural homeland after they had migrated from the countryside to province centers, cities or abroad. They operate independent of foreign aid and their manifold activities provide, like a prism, key insights into distinctive structures of relevance, knowledge cultures and (socio-)logics of practice which are characteristic for modern Mongolia.

Today, more than half of the country’s population resides in cities, and a large number of citizens is living abroad. When Mongolia’s countryside (khöđöö) is considered a reservoir of cultural authenticity, it is often overlooked that prevailing notions of intactness include aspects of modern life that originated in socialism. This applies in particular to centers of rural districts (sum), which are primary foci of nutag council activities. During the socialist era, sum had become congruent with economic units, each with either a herder collective (negdel) or – to a lesser extent – a state agricultural farm (sangin aj akhui). They provided income, created prosperity and facilitated the development of a modern infrastructure. Each sum got its center with social institutions such as a school with dormitory, a hospital, a veterinary post, a cultural center, a library, a post office with communication facilities, a kindergarten, an electricity station, a shop, a bank, a repair station and an administration. Even though herder collectives and state farms mostly disintegrated with privatization, Mongolia’s rural economy is still primarily administered through sum centers. The rural districts remain not only important for governing the country but also as focal points of collective territorial, socio-cultural and – last but not least – deeply felt emotional identification. Sum are, more often than provinces, local reference points for nutag councils and, in a way, act as centripetal forces to keep in contact after out-migration.

**NUTAG COUNCILS AS LIFELINES**

Given that they form a considerable part of Mongolia’s civil society, NCs are strikingly unexplored. The following narrative outlines selected findings of an ongoing research project. Its collection of data is based on interviews with urban members of nutag councils and their rural counterparts (herders, local administrators, teachers, directors of schools, museums, libraries and cultural centers, monks, border guards, nurses, physicians, veterinarians, shop owners, artists, janitors, horse trainers, pensioners), on questionnaire-based surveys among rural and urban Mongolians, participant observation, informal talks, specialized literature and the analysis of documents as well as a large body of written materials published by NCs in books, brochures, journals and a wide range of digital formats. Af-
ter a brief description of nutag councils with regard to their goals and legal forms, structures, members, activities, communication channels and forms of self-representations, we will introduce an exemplary case and a recent initiative.

NCs emerged from the 1990s, and their goal was initially to mitigate negative consequences of the institutional void and the neglect of rural infrastructure by establishing direct lines of redistribution. They represent genuine Mongolian knowledge cultures and are not easy to categorize due to their flexibility. NCs usually don’t have offices, their degree of formalization is low and their existence is mainly visible through initiatives. So, how many exist countrywide? According to Mongolia’s general authority for state registration, there are 275 legal entities listed directly with the designation ‘nutgiin zövlöl’. For fiscal reasons, they are registered as non-governmental organizations. However, there are many more NGOs that are in fact nutag councils but did not exactly use that term when registering. Instead they appear under names such as ‘people (nutgiinkhan) of Bulgankhangai’ or ‘children from Bulgan nutag’, and it needs some background knowledge to determine them as NCs via their structure, shared purpose and/or the person leading the board. Based on the number of provinces and districts, one would expect a minimum of 350 NCs in Mongolia. However, each sum may have up to six councils: one in its province center, one in the capital and perhaps one in the cities of Darkhan and Erdenet and/or in the frontier towns Zamyn Üüd (bordering China) and Altanbulag (bordering Russia). Sometimes those smaller urban reference points might act as branches only. But then one also needs to take into consideration that rural districts located close to the capital have either no nutag council or only one in Ulaanbaatar. Finally, many NCs have target-group oriented sub-branches, such as for young people. For all these reasons, the exact total number of NCs in Mongolia is hard to define. Although registration provides some indication, it came with the introduction of the law on NGOs in 1997 that we find the councils, many of which had existed long before, in that category.

NCs represent a broad spectrum of civil society interests, and their activities are as diverse as the ideas, potentials and capacities of their active members. All have in common that they contrive ways and means to (re-)integrate rural areas into processes of progress and development and to increase their visibility. Membership is generally open to anyone who emotionally identifies with a rural district; it does not have to be the place where the person was born or grew up, even though that would be the classical constellation. Each nutag council has a board (udirdakh zövlöl) with about 10–30 people, most of which are in high-ranking and/or prestigious positions and preferably represent a greater variety of the society. Thus, we find politicians, businesspeople, principals of public or private institutions, scientists, journalists, army officers, sportspeople, monks, artists, and various professionals with a good reputation. In order to gain public attention for realizing bigger projects, it is desired to recruit a number of influential members for the board. Usually, we find a chair, a vice-chair, one or more secretaries, sometimes a treasurer, and always a number of ordinary board members. All use their affiliation with heterogeneous social worlds to establish contact zones and to open up and utilize opportunities. In Mongolian, this is usually described as bolomj, a term that dynamically includes resources in the widest sense. Local knowledge and good networking are essential for successfully using potentials

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3 Ulsyn bürtgeliin yerönkhii gazar.
4 Ibid.
5 Among the great things about doing research in Mongolia are the ample opportunities to find people related to their nutag, which is just another demonstration of the uniqueness and key role of that concept.
6 The following section is partly based on an earlier publication (Stolpe 2014).
that derive from a plurality of starting points and approaches. Having influential people on the board of a nutag council allows to turn some of the dilemmas of asymmetry between rural and urban areas into win-win situations.

NCs do not have a preconceived agenda. Instead, most activities are need-oriented and conducted in coordination with the state-aided local development plans (oron nutgiin khögjiiin tölövlögöö). Calls to action happen by means of mobile phones, the internet (primarily via Facebook) and mass media. Typical activities of NCs include the support of social and cultural events with nutag-relevance, infrastructural and business development, talent promotion, tourism, local historiography, environmental protection (especially in mining areas), emergency aid in cases of disaster or calamity such as zud, and, more continuously, the support of public institutions, such as schools, dormitories and gyms, hospitals, libraries, and cultural centers. Very common are support strategies along the lines of the members' own qualification or professional occupation (mergejliin chigleleeree), so that teachers are often particularly engaged with educational institutions, physicians with hospitals, businesspeople with companies, historians with historico-cultural heritage and/or historiography, biologists with nature protection, monks with monasteries, athletes with sports facilities etc. This also underlines how strongly nutag networks are connected to interpersonal relations and to social ties developed in public institutions.

NCs mobilize resources primarily via their own channels and only exceptionally take external fundraising into consideration. However, the benefits are anything but a one-way transfer of resources. In fact, most rural-to-urban migrants seek and find emotional and/or spiritual support from their nutag, try to visit it regularly and make sure that pictures and photographs of signature places (mostly worshipped mountains or waters) are present in everyday settings of their urban surroundings, often as wall decorations or screensavers. Supporting their nutag is less often motivated by gaining prestige than by the wish to give something back (ach khariulakh), a concept that is central in Mongolian and goes way back into cultural history. People who have become successful are expected to take over some responsibility for their nutag. Even though they could reject a request, the moral pressure makes that very unlikely.

Despite the time flexibility, there are recurring spatio-temporal reference points, constituted by two main factors: the Mongolian festival calendar and anniversaries of and in administrative units (aimag/sum). This includes anniversaries of local institutions, such as schools, dormitories, kindergartens, hospitals, border posts, museums, veterinary stations etc. Namsaraeva’s concept of “multiple temporalities of a Mongolian nutag” can be extended to members of NCs for they keep sight of their homeland’s timings even when living far away. Jubilees are welcome opportunities to launch bigger fundraising campaigns. Apart from those occasions, at least two mutual visits take place every year: in celebration of the national holiday naadam, members of the now-urban elites travel to their places of origin, and after the Mongolian lunar New Year tsagaan sar, representatives of rural administrations travel to Ulaanbaatar. Let’s briefly outline what typically happens around these two traditional holidays and what other temporal reference points exist:

The cooperative arrangement of local naadam festivals belongs to the popular activities of NCs. They often finance the renovation of venues, organize equipment and donate the prizes for winners of sports competitions (classical: wrestling,

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7 We will further elaborate on zud in the next section of this paper.
8 For examples from urban offices, see Manalsuren (2020).
9 Namsaraeva (2020), 107, Italics in original.
horseracing and archery). Naadam may also be used to inaugurate newly built monuments or landmarks which often show the names of the main sponsors. During their stay in the countryside, urban elites celebrate their affiliation to their rural place of origin, while rural communities proudly celebrate the social mobility of elites who have risen from their nutag. Thus, many publications of NCs show photographs of elites typically in their urban work environment (usually in Western-style business attire) as well as in their rural nutag (usually in festive Mongolian dress, together with wrestlers, archers and/or horse-trainers). Entirely different are gatherings at tsagaan sar, where paying respect to the nutag’s elders, who are now living in cities, is central. Thus, NCs organize special mutual greeting ceremonies (tsagaan saryn nutgiin zol-golt). During these meetings, people from one nutag do not only celebrate New Year and exchange greetings, but also information and ideas for future collaboration. In order to keep a nutag-oriented community sense, NCs furthermore organize New Year parties for young people, who celebrate in December and, in reminiscence of the Russian word for the New Year tree, called this yolk. Finally, many NCs organize a matinée (ödörlög) for veterans several times per year as well as special days to promote the culture of their respective rural districts (sumyn sayolyn ödrüüd).

All these occasions promote the exchange and production of locally oriented publications on internet platforms or CDs, as well as radio and TV broadcasts and books. Usually, members of the NCs are also greatly involved in the creation of special anniversary publications called taniltsuulga (introduction) which are in fact self-portraits of rural Mongolian localities and institutions.10 Developed during the socialist era11 and inextricably linked with notions of nutag, Mongolian taniltsuulga are the most informative sources for local identity concepts in connection to modernization and change. Although they accentuate unique regional characteristics, the following categories typically appear and thereby indicate aspects that constitute a modern Mongolian nutag on the rural districts’ level:

- biological and geographic characteristics, including natural monuments, featuring worshipped mountains and waters
- early local history, including cultural monuments and events of transregional importance
- economic foundations, including statistics of livestock numbers
- the local history of progress and prosperity, strongly connected to modern institutions, personalities, professional groups and achievements
- local heroes – historical and contemporary, featuring ‘heroes of labor’ and champions
- prominent representatives of sports, arts, science, media and politics
- representatives of charismatic animals, such as popular racehorses or signature animals and/or those who are on the red list of threatened species
- local or locally oriented literature, featuring poetry, songs, legends, fables and blessings (yerööl) for the nutag
- locally relevant ethnic characteristics and religious activities, including historical events of transregional importance
- facets of locally anchored cultural heritage
- social events celebrating the nutag
- personal memories

Many of these publications are either results of collective authorship or were written by academicians who are usually prominent members of NCs. All of them radiate unshakable patrio-

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10 For a comparative analysis of this specific Mongolian genre see Stolpe (2019).
11 On selected taniltsuulga published in the socialist era see Ressel (2018).
tism and optimism, and they always emphasize their respective nutag’s unique features to establish them as corporate trademarks (nutgiin brend).

Some NCs have been criticized for aggressive lobbying, especially when it comes to taking people from their own nutag into high-ranking positions. However, even though this might be about personalizing channels of allocation, it is – in contrast to aryn khaalga, the most widespread form of clientelism in Mongolia – not motivated by private interests but rather those of the rural nutag’s community. As dynamic, multi-local groups, NCs practice political action beyond, but usually not behind state politics.

In principle, nutag relations are not contestable. Whether living in a city or a foreign country, people remain part of their nutag (nutgiin khün). According to most of our interlocutors, this belonging is much stronger and more powerful than ethnic, religious or party political affiliations. But in a few cases the NC was dominated by one of the two most powerful Mongolian parties, which is why supporters of the other did either refuse to engage and/or founded their own NC. However, such incidents seem to be exceptions so far and were classified as stupid by our interviewees. Some emphasized how much they considered it important that NCs would keep clear of the excessive politicization of administration that has paralyzed important aspects of social and political life in Mongolia since 1996. Another controversial issue is the claim of multiple territorial affiliations during election campaigns, a more recent phenomenon which Munkherdene and Sneath subsumed under “nutagism”.

Before we proceed with our case study, it should not go unmentioned that not all of Mongolia’s NCs are active and successful. Some lack ideas, motivation, initiative, stamina and/or leadership skills to mobilize their nutag’s potentials, while others concentrate on rather easy tasks such as sponsoring festivities, which was by many of our interviewees considered to be not sustainable.

CASE STUDY: SAIKHAN SUM, BULGAN AIMAG

Bulgan province is located in northern Mongolia and mostly covered with forest steppe. It was established in 1938 and is currently divided into 16 districts. The province’s self-representations highlight the fact that it was in several respects a pioneer and produced remarkably many forerunners who were the first of their kind in Mongolia. The most prominent figure is J. Gürragchaa, the first – and so far only – Mongolian who undertook a space flight (in 1981). But also social events of national importance, such as the first trained physicians (1949), the first naadam festival for students (1959), the first gold medal won by a schoolboy at an International Mathematical Olympiad (1964), the first Olympic gold medal in Judo (2008), and the first meeting of young herders (2009) are part of the collective memory and appear in nutag-related self-presentations.

On these grounds, Bulgan is known and proudly marketed as the home and cradle of vanguards (ankhdagchdyn ölgii nutag).

Saikhan sum is nationwide known for its superb airag (fermented horse milk), which has become one of the major economic factors since it reaches high prices on the market. It is one of the most densely populated districts of Bulgan province with an area covering 277,276 hectares and 3501 inhabitants, out of which 700

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13 Literally: ‘back door’, most common metaphor for by-passing (primarily bureaucratic) hurdles with the help of influential contacts (tanil talaaraa).
15 Munkherdene and Sneath (2018), 822, Italics in original.
16 For example: Erdenebat / Ganbold (2018).
17 Ündesnii khögjliin gazar (2016).
reside in the center. This district was established under its current name (which means ‘nice/beautiful’ and was derived from the toponym of the area’s worshipped mountain Saikhan Uul) in 1930.19 Its center was settled in the present location in the early 1930s at a distance of 101 km to the aimag center and 524 km to the capital. Saikhan sum is divided into six sub-districts (bag).20 Most of its residents (ca. 80 %) live from animal husbandry, looking after a total of 373,700 animals of all five Mongolian species.21

Saikhan sum has altogether four nutag councils: in Ulaanbaatar, in the province center of Bulgan aimag, and in the two cities Erdenet (160 km away) and Darkhan (329 km away). People from Saikhan district migrated to these places primarily in search of work and better life conditions, but also for better educational opportunities, most of all in higher education. Our illustration (Figure 1) shows the basic exchange relations and communication structures between the four nutag councils of Saikhan sum and the rural administration:

Figure 1: The four nutag councils of Saikhan sum and the rural administration

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19 Until 1691, the area was known as Tüsheet Khan koshuu, from 1691 to 1911 as Daichin Vangiin koshuu (both Tüsheet Khan aimag), from 1911 to 1922 as Khalkhyn Tüsheet Khan aimigii Erdene Daichin Vangiin koshuu, and from 1923 to 1930 as Bulgan Khan Uulyn koshuu of Bogd Khan Uulyn aimag.

20 These are Manuult, Ugalz, Khulj, Undrakh, Ikh Khüremt and Saikhan-Ovoo.

21 Mongolian: tavan koshuu mal – horses, sheep, cattle, camels and goats. The numbers given are according to the last livestock census, National Statistics Office of Mongolia (2019).

The cities Erdenet, Darkhan and Ulaanbaatar host the nutag council from Bulgan province as well as NCs from all 16 districts. Our illustration shows that there are strong direct connections between the sum-level and each city, whereas the connections between the four NCs in those cities are rather weak. Gold-colored lines for annual visits of rural-to-urban migrants to their homeplaces, blue lines stand for the annual visits of rural administrators to the cities shortly after the Mongolian New Year tsagaan sar. During
these visits, they introduce their rural development plan to NCs, mention problems and ask for possibilities of support and collaboration. Hereby the rural administration does not only keep connection to the NC in each city but also ensures that there is no doubling of activities and that they are integrated well into the rural development plans. The dotted line on our illustration indicates that, due to the relative vicinity to the aimag-center, most individuals living there have strong direct connections to the sum of their origin. Some districts do not have a nutag council in the province center because they are located in close proximity, while in a few other cases the NCs are not very active. This refers a general tendency in Mongolia: the further away a district or a province is from urban centers, the more likely it is that its NCs work very actively and sustainably. On our illustration, the number of vehicles indicates that the amount of donations and other support from the cities depends on the number of migrants living in urban areas, while the icons of livestock show the supply of dairy products and fresh meat to the nutag’s migrants living in cities. Although this is not exactly an NC activity, all rural-to-urban migrants prefer food from their nutag. Thus, each visit is used to transport what is called nutgiin idee (food from the nutag, i.e. meat and milk products) to the cities. In the case of Saikhan sum it would be unthinkable for the now-city dwellers to celebrate any festivity – whether traditional or modern – without their famous airag.

Our icons of people indicate that elected board members of NCs mostly hold high-ranking and prestigious positions. The current board of the council of Saikhan sum in Ulaanbaatar consists of 19 people, 4 of them female. These members were elected during the mutual nutag-greet-

22 In the case of Bulgan aimag, this does not include camels.
23 This is part of a Mongolian tradition, called övliin idesh (winter food): Each year in late autumn, slaughtered frozen animals (usually about one large and five to ten small livestock) are delivered to families in cities for their consumption until the next summer.

ing ceremony at tsagaan sar in February 2019. The chairman is a gold medal winner in Judo (Olympics 2008) and a national wrestling champion with the title ‘elephant’ (zaan), also awarded as ‘hero of labor’ (khödölmöriin baatar). The vice-chairman is the head of a department in the Ministry for Construction and City Planning, both secretaries (male and female) have a PhD, one works at the center for educational evaluation, the other at the National University of Mongolia. Among the board members is a head of the Central Health Insurance, an advisor for the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry, an engineer, a deputy head of the Ulaanbaatar railway, a singer and merited actress, a head of a logistics project, a wrestling researcher (bökh sudlaach), a principal and lecturer for a policy center, and six directors of companies (one of them female).

Over the last decade, the NC of Saikhan sum in Ulaanbaatar has, apart from the regular biannual meetings, organized the following activities:

• fundraising and donation for emergency aid during the zud in 2002–2003 and forest fires in 2005
• engineering consultancy and infrastructure planning for a water tower in the center of Saikhan district in 2019
• a demonstration and campaign under the slogan “Let’s save our holy mountain” in order to stop coal mining in 2008
• donations for scholarships for talented students from low-income families
• certificates enabling talented students to study without tuition fees (with the help of the former NC chairman who established a private university)
• educational advice for rural school teachers and students

24 For further information on zud as endemic disasters see Stolpe (2011).
25 Shüteen uulaa avar’ya.
• co-organization of the annual worship of Saikhan mountain (Saikhan uulyn takhilga) in early June, together with local school alumni and the rural administration

• implementation of a small project to improve the breeds of cows, sheep and racehorses

• donations to the sum administration throughout the anniversary of the district’s establishment

• erection of a gate on the main road to the district center of Saikhan sum

• erection of one statue of a famous local wrestler and one of a general

• production of a documentary about the making of this nutag’s famous fermented horse milk (Saikhany airag) and related ceremonies

• funding of the composition of the song about the local holy mountain in 2013, written by a local poet

• New Year parties for the youth of Saikhan sum living in Ulaanbaatar

• organization of an annual festive day to commemorate the International Day of Older Persons (in early October) for veterans from Saikhan sum living in Ulaanbaatar

• donations for a concert of a Saikhan-born female singer in Ulaanbaatar in 2019

• donations for salaries and publication costs for an anthology book featuring famous people from Saikhan sum prepared for its 90th anniversary.

The most recent activity started off in the wake of the corona crisis and sheds light on the international dimension of NCs. A native from Saikhan sum, now living in South Korea, wanted to support his nutag during the crisis and started a collection of face masks and a fundraising campaign via Facebook. During that time, Saikhan sum was hit by a disaster the Mongolians call white zud, i.e. the pastures were highly covered with snow and prevented the livestock from grazing. In order to support the herders struggling with this hardship, the fundraiser redirected his campaign and called his fellow natives to support an “Encouragement of our herd-ers” (malchdadaa setgeliin dem ögökh).

Very soon, people from Saikhan sum, now living in cities in- and outside Mongolia, donated a total of nearly eight million Mongolian Tögrög (MNT). When it turned out that the finances of the local administration were sufficient to rent vehicles to clear the snow on the roads and to provide the pastoralists with hay bales and other fodder supplies for the starving animals, the fundraisers decided to distribute foodstuff and other items to all herder families of Saikhan sum. This was done by employees of public institutions with the help of the six bag governors who know the localities of mobile herder camps very well.

Far more important and impressive than the actual amount of support was, from the herders’ perspectives, the emotional support offered by so many people living all over Mongolia and in foreign countries. Herders were very happy, because these migrants have proven that they care about the herders in Saikhan during this difficult time and truly act as people who originated from the same homeland (nutgiin khün).

As usual with fundraising campaigns organized by NCs, all information on donations are transparently accessible.

**CONCLUSION**

Our case study briefly introduced some aspects of how Mongolia’s rural-urban civil society networks can provide lifelines after migration which work both ways in a dynamic balance. Nutag councils allow, like a prism, to gain a deep understanding of the social dynamics and concepts.
that underpin various mobilities from the perspective of those who shape and propel them. They shed light on intersections between state and civil society, on Mongolian concepts of societal participation and development as well as on the impact of (modern) heritage and intellectual history on future visions of the present society.

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