The Dr. James E. Muller Diaries

On April 21, 1982, Dr. James E. Muller, one of the founders of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, wrote in his journal of "the incredible success" which the anti-nuclear movement was having: "The cover of Newsweek this week is on nuclear war and there's a who's who in the movement which does not even list us. ... There are so many movements now that we are even lost in the shuffle."

Newsweek was reporting about the ground swell of popular support for Ground Zero Week, a high point of the nuclear freeze movement which was part of the intensification of peace activities in the early 1980s. Muller was not concerned that IPPNW had been overlooked; he was glad that a major public movement had been launched. But he did feel that IPPNW had been the pioneer: "There is a part of me that believes deeply that the medical movement stimulated the public movement and that it would not be here if it had not been for our efforts."

Far from being lost in the shuffle, IPPNW went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. In that same year two sociologists stressed the significance of its unique approach. They declared that while many explanations have been given for the increased level of activity by the nuclear disarmament movement in the 1980s, "one of the most overlooked and yet potentially most important explanations involves the medicalization of the disarmament issue. ... the framing of the disarmament issue in concerns for health, disease, societal survival, and the ultimate universal value of life."

The story of IPPNW has been well recorded. Its origins lie in the idea that came to two physicians in Boston that Soviet and United States doctors should launch a public simultaneous effort for reduction of nuclear weapons in their two countries. One was Dr. Bernard Lown, a cardiologist of world reputation, whose friendship with a fellow specialist in the Soviet Union was to provide the key love Soviet connection that made such cooperation possible. The other was the younger physician James E. Muller, also a cardiologist, still early in his career, who was the only one of the American founders fluent in Russian. He had been the first U.S. exchange student in a Moscow medical school and later the director of an American-Soviet cooperative research project in Moscow hospitals. Lown and his Soviet colleague, Dr. Yevgeny Chasov, were named founding co-presidents of IPPNW, and Lown continued in this capacity as a leader of the organization until 1993, serving as its most articulate and publicly visible spokesman. His significant role in the origins of the organization has been well described in print.

This is not the case with Muller, who left his leadership role in IPPNW after the early years to turn his major attention to medicine, and he is now Director of the Cardiovascular Division of the Deaconess Hospital in Boston and an associate professor at the Harvard Medical School. Fortunately, he kept a record of his international activities from the time when he was preparing to study in Moscow, 1967-68, and continuing through his leadership years in IPPNW. For this paper we shall give special attention to Muller's accounts of the decisive meeting of the American and Soviet founders of IPPNW in Geneva, December 1980, and of the dramatic events at the press conference in Oslo before the 1985 peace prize award to IPPNW.

The Muller diaries fill two large red binders and include other documents and press clippings. They were first written by hand and then typed up; the later ones were dictated. They represent important documentation on the early years of IPPNW, throwing an interesting light on a fascinating aspect of the American-Soviet peace movements toward the end of the Cold War. These pages also show how intercultural person to person programs can have important tangible outcomes. Of perhaps even greater significance, the diaries tell the story of how a dedicated young person of talent who sets his sights high can make a difference in the world.
The First Four Journeys to the Soviet Union

James E. Muller was born in Lubbock, Texas, on 6 February 1943, to a Catholic family, the eldest of seven children of Dr. and Mrs. Paul F. Muller. He grew up in Indianapolis, where Dr. Muller was a practicing gynecologist, and entered Notre Dame, his father's alma mater. After graduation in 1965, James was admitted to the Johns Hopkins University Medical School. The first pages of the diary, written in 1970, tell of the events leading to Muller's first journey to the Soviet Union in 1967. It was through a course in Russian at Notre Dame and its teacher that he first became especially interested in the Russian people and began to think of some day going to the Soviet Union.

This idea took shape during his first year at Hopkins, when he heard Dr. Russell A. Nelson, president of the medical school, give a speech about his recent tour of Soviet hospitals. Muller decided then to try to arrange to study at a Soviet medical school during the five months when he could take elective courses, and Nelson warmly supported his search for a travel grant. Muller discovered the Inter-University Committee for Travel Grants, which had been established to promote graduate student exchanges after the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural agreement of 1958. The Committee was surprised to receive an application from a medical student, but his personal and academic qualifications were high, and after he demonstrated his knowledge of Russian, he was accepted.

Until the spring of 1966 Muller had only a vague feeling about the need to improve Soviet-American relations and no thought at all about nuclear war. He was influenced by Dr. Jerome Frank, Hopkins professor of psychiatry, who was himself working for international understanding and peace, but what he remembered as most influential was Senator Fulbright's book, The Arrogance of Power, in which, speaking of relations with the Soviet Union, Fulbright declared that the only way in which nations would eventually get along would be after they developed habits of cooperation through work in non-controversial areas of common interest.

As he read this, in a flash Muller realized that the very area in which he was going to work in the Soviet Union was the non-controversial one of medicine: "I practically went through the ceiling with enthusiasm and concern for the prospects of medical exchange with the USSR. I suppose it was at this moment, alone, uncommitted and faced with a brilliantly clear exposition by Senator Fulbright that my purpose and drive originated." At the same time, "The thought of nuclear war so completely captivated my mind that I had to force myself to think about anything else. ... Only the problem of destruction of the human race seemed to matter." Muller's guiding objective for the following years was now set.

Muller hoped to arrange a continuing medical exchange between the two countries, and Nelson and others at Hopkins had encouraged him. Dr. Mikhail Kuzin, Dean of the First Moscow Medical School where he studied supported the idea, but it was not to be.

Muller's pages on his five months in Moscow are filled with interesting vignettes of student life in the main Moscow University dormitory and with tales of frustrating encounters with Soviet bureaucrats. He left quite satisfied. His Russian became good enough to pass the microbiology course, he learned a great deal about Russia and the Russians, and in this first foreign sojourn, as usually happens, he learned much about himself.

On September 23, 1968, about six months after he is back at Hopkins, he writes, "The return to the US has undoubtedly been the most traumatic part of my life." But "I have changed and grown a great deal." Along with the customary reverse cultural shock, he had to face the change from being something of "a celebrity and an expert to being a nobody." He speaks of the growing pessimism after the assassination of Robert Kennedy and the summer race riots. But the future looks brighter. He has fallen in love with Kathleen, whom he will marry, his studies are going better, and, with the sponsorship of Dr. Paul Dudley White, he looks forward to doing his military service as a commissioned officer of the United States Public Health Service, assigned to the Washington office.

The work at the agency was not exciting, but in 1970, he heard that Dr. Roger O. Egeberg, Assistant Secretary of Health in HEW, was to head a delegation to the Soviet Union to study its health system and needed an interpreter. As a physician with fluent Russian, Muller impressed Egeberg favorably, and he was appointed sub-member of the delegation and seconded to the National Center for Health Service as a medical officer.
Even from the brief diary account, it is evident that Muller was far more than just an interpreter. He helped Dr. Egeberg form a close relationship with Dr. Boris Petrovsky, Soviet Minister of Health, and he won over Egeberg to his idea that a major health agreement between the two countries could promote peace. In the diary is a memorandum "presented to Dr. Egeberg late at night in Minsk," in which Muller makes the case for large-scale cooperation and exchanges in the health field, quoting Senator Fulbright's on cooperation in a field distant from national security as a way of building habits of cooperation.

The existing climate of detente was favorable for the development of this idea. After the delegation returned home, Muller was enabled to finish his military obligation on the staff of the Soviet American Health Exchange and to participate in ongoing secret negotiations for an agreement with the Soviets.

Meanwhile, also in 1970, not recorded in the diary, Muller was assigned to assist a delegation of Soviet physicians, headed by Dr. Yevgeny Chazov, in their tour of the United States.

The negotiations with the Soviets took Muller to Moscow with another delegation. Petrovsky now agreed, encouraged by higher levels as preparations were made for the 1972 summit meeting of President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. On February 2, 1972, Muller's diary entry was "written in HEW north office with doors locked," recording the delicate negotiations just before the signing of the agreement between HEW Secretary Eliot Richardson and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. At one point Muller drafted the press notice. At the summit the U.S.-USSR Health Cooperation Agreement was signed again, this time by Nixon and Brezhnev, providing for cooperative research on cancer, heart disease and environmental health.

Looking back in 1978, Muller wrote, "After this agreement US-USSR health cooperation increased enormously. I had a significant role in its development since I had carried the original US proposal in 1970, and helped with the negotiations in 1972. This was an enormously satisfying accomplishment after the failure of my attempts 3 years earlier to set up a Johns Hopkins exchange."

Under this agreement both Lown and Muller developed important contacts with Soviet physicians, Lown at the highest level with Chazov, a fellow cardiologist, while Muller carried on important research on heart disease in Moscow. Muller finished his residency at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore in 1973 and became Cardiology Fellow at the Harvard Medical School and the Peter Brent Brigham Hospital in Boston. The very next year Dr. Eugene Braunwald, the hospital's physician-in-chief, worked out an agreement with Chazov for Muller to spend three months in Moscow in 1975, attached to the Myasnikov Institute of Cardiology, using the experimental drug hyaluronidase with patients who had just had heart attacks. This time he was able to take along his wife Kathleen and their two small children.

Muller's pages give vivid accounts of his family's joys and sorrows living in a Moscow apartment and his encounters once more with Soviet bureaucrats. He tells engaging tales of his efforts, sometimes heroic, to deal effectively with patients and medical staffs in five Moscow hospitals. The Soviet centralized government controlled medical system made the experiment possible. Not only could the work in all the hospitals be coordinated, but the well known speed and skill of the Soviet emergency rescue service could bring the patients to the hospital fast enough for the drug to be administered soon after the attack.

Cardiologists in Boston, working independently, were able to treat only a dozen patients a year under adequately controlled conditions, while in Moscow Muller's U.S.-Soviet team administered the drug to thirty-five patients during his three months there. Muller had to be ready to drive his rented car through the Moscow streets at any moment of the day or night when a hospital telephoned him to report the arrival of a patient with a severe heart attack (acute myocardial infarction).

It was an excellent example of Soviet American cooperation: the U. S. developed the drug, the Soviet Union provided the facilities to administer it, and the final work was done back in Muller's Boston hospital, where the samples of blood in the 1,500 vials he brought home from his Moscow patients could be adequately analyzed and compared with their electro-cardiagram data. Not only
did the cooperative research advance medical science, but for Muller personally it presented a unique opportunity to help implement the health agreement he had helped bring into being. Moreover, the experience furthered his relationship with Dr. Chazov, now deputy minister of health overseeing Muller’s project. After his return, Muller was appointed Instructor in Medicine at Brigham and Harvard Medical School.

Toward Soviet American Cooperation Against Nuclear War

In a letter to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in March 1986, Helen Caldicott, an Australian pediatrician at Harvard who was President of the Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), declared that her organization "was the instigator of the present doctors' movement which won the Nobel Peace Prize." PSR did indeed play a part, as we shall see, but Muller and Lown took the first initiatives.

Since the last entry in 1975, Muller's diary has nothing about Soviet-American relations until 1978, when he mentioned to his senior colleague, Dr. Bernard Lown, whom he much admired and respected, his idea to have an annual conference of U.S. and U.S.S.R. physicians to discuss the dangers of the arms race. Lown liked the idea, "but nothing more happened." The next year, encouraged by a friend, Muller began to work on the idea in earnest, adding Japanese physicians to the projected conference and calling Dr. Jerome Frank and others.

"Then Dr. Lown told me he had written a letter to Chazov suggesting the conference." Lown had written first to the Soviet Deputy Minister of Health, Dmitri Venedictov in the fall of 1978, proposing such a conference. Receiving no reply, he wrote Chazov in February and again in June 1979, but it was not until October that he received an answer approving the idea of a conference of Soviet, Japanese and U.S. physicians.

Lown had first been active about nuclear war in 1960, when he had organized the original Physicians for Social Responsibility. The association had published a series of articles on the medical results of nuclear war in the New England Journal of Medicine. The articles were widely noted and contributed to the campaign waged by Linus Pauling and other scientists which helped bring about the Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963. PSR's activity peaked in 1969, after which public attention was more occupied with the Vietnam War, and the organization declined.

In 1978, when Lown and Muller were dreaming of cooperation with Soviet physicians, Caldicott and Dr. Eric Chivian, staff psychiatrist at the Massachusetts Institute of Psychology, organized an association of doctors to educate the public about the dangers of nuclear power. For convenience they took the name of the old PSR, then dormant but still registered in Massachusetts as a tax exempt organization. The dynamic Caldicott became president. The main concern turned to nuclear warfare as tension with the Soviet Union increased over its invasion of Afghanistan in January 1980. Caldicott gave rousing speeches against the bomb, and Chivian raised money and organized in Boston the first of a series of well attended symposia on the medical effects of nuclear warfare, sponsored by medical schools across the country. The Boston symposium, held on February 9-10, produced an open letter to President Jimmy Carter and Chairman Brezhnev, declaring that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and that steps should be taken to ban the use of nuclear weapons and to begin dismantling nuclear arsenals. PSR then placed a full page ad in the New York Times on Sunday, March 2nd, including the open letter and an explanation of what a single bomb would do to a metropolitan area. This was signed by over 700 prominent doctors and other citizens. The letter was presented to officials of both countries in Washington on March 6 by Caldicott, Chivian, Jerome Frank and four other prominent physicians.

Brezhnev’s answer came via Ambassador Dobrynin, who had first called Lown, but he was lecturing in London. Caldicott then received the message, notified Chivian, and on March 21,1980, phoned Muller, asking him to join them to fly to Washington to see Ambassador Dobrynin, who would give them a personal reply from Brezhnev at the Soviet Embassy.

Since there had been no reply from Carter, Caldicott wanted to attack the White House for its silence. Both Muller and Chivian told her that this would give PSR the appearance of being a pawn of the Soviet Union. At the airport Muller refused to board the plane until Caldicott promised to withhold her criticism. Then things went smoothly: "On plane practiced answers. In cab wrote press
release. Obtained room at Hilton for phone calls and typing release. It was great to be with Helen and Eric we all work the same way."

The three found a warm welcome at the Soviet Embassy, where Dobrynin, whom Muller had met in 1972, spent 90 minutes with them in a wide-ranging amiable discussion. Caldicott told him that he "was a charming wonderful man who was nothing like the Russian bear who much Americans thought of," and that he should go on American television and "let people see what you're really like." Dobrynin said he had tried that with Tom Brokaw, "but they had edited it down to just a few seconds and he felt it was a high-risk venture because of the editing that could be done.

Dobrynin handed them the letter from Brezhnev, which agreed with their position, and then to their surprise added that there would be Soviet support for the proposed conference of Soviet, Japanese and U.S. physicians. The Soviet Union would not extend an invitation, "to prevent it from being called a propaganda move," but if one of their representatives would be in Moscow, he would be received at a high level. Apparently when the PSR's open letter had been discussed in Moscow, Chazov had brought up Lown's proposal. The Kremlin had now put the two initiatives together, answering PSR with what was actually an invitation to Lown to come to Moscow to discuss the proposed conference.

When Muller gave the story to the Washington Post, with which he had good connections, he said that Lown, then in London, would be their representative to go to Moscow. The dispatch from the Post appeared in the International Herald Tribune before Lown heard from Muller, so he first learned that he was going to Moscow from someone who came up at the end of a lecture. In Moscow in April Lown was able to persuade Chazov to take the lead for the Soviet physicians, and a meeting was arranged for December in Geneva, when the American and Soviet organizers of the conference to be held in the following March could come together to make plans.

In Boston Lown, Muller, Chivian and Dr. Herbert Abrams, Professor of Radiology at the Harvard Medical School and the elder statesman of the group, now formally organized International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War, and letters were sent out to prominent physicians elsewhere in the country asking for their support.

Muller was to be secretary, and he reflected that he "must now devote a great amount of time to seeing that the details are properly cared for. ... Considered in the long run I think that this represents an event in my life similar to 1967 as an exchange student and 1972 as a participant in the Summit meeting, 1975 as an exchange scientist and now 1980 as organizing a major conference of Soviet and American and Japanese doctors to discuss the topic of nuclear war." In Japan in May, working on Japanese participation in the 1981 conference, he wrote, "I feel tremendous excitement that something I've worked on for so long seems to be reaching a new level of significance."

The Geneva Meeting of U.S. and Soviet Physicians The three-day meeting at Geneva in December 1980 of the U.S. and Soviet physicians was crucial for the emerging organization, which almost died aborning right there in the Hotel Richemond. For this decisive occasion, Muller's diary is the best written source we have, several of the entries being written immediately after the events recorded. Gale Warner's essay on Lown presents his own recollections and she also talked to Muller I talked with the three American participants, Lown, Muller and Chivian about the encounter.

On December 4, after arriving in Geneva, Muller wrote of the successes of the past few months, but "our biggest problem ... has been the letter we received from the Soviets which introduced political concerns into the issue." The main reason for the Geneva meeting was "to establish that this is primarily a medical effort because little will be gained by exchanging political insults." Muller already knew Dr. Chazov, and he was delighted to learn that the second member of the Soviet delegation was Dr.Mikhail Kuzin, former Dean of the First Moscow Medical School when Muller had been a student there. Muller brought along the book Kuzin had given him in 1967 and had him sign it again. Kuzin was now director of the Vishnevsky Institute of Surgery and was an
expert on war injuries. The third Soviet physician was Dr. Leonid Ilyin, a biophysicist who was chairman of the National Commission for Radiological Protection.

Muller felt that Chazov had brought along just the right people. Professionally, this was so. Ilyin and Kuzin were actually better qualified than the Americans to discuss medical care and nuclear war. On the other hand, all three enjoyed the highest esteem in their country as members of the prestigious Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, which meant close relationships with the Soviet leadership, and Chazov was a top governmental official and part of the medical team taking care of Brezhnev. They would naturally feel identified with their government's anti-American policies. The American doctors, while personally critical of some United States policies and apprehensive of what the newly elected Reagan administration was likely to do, could not take a public stand against their government, which would lose them all credibility at home.

However, the first session started out well. Then "we began before lunch a session on the most difficult topic of all. The manner in which American perceptions could be presented to the Soviets." Muller gave a statement on "American and Soviet Perceptions of Each Other," speaking as one who had lived in both countries. He could testify to "the deep yearning for peace" of the Soviet people as well as the strong desire of the United States for peace. Unfortunately, neither side recognizes this in the other, and "these misperceptions are so great that they represent a formidable barrier to the success of our mutual search for peace."

To illustrate American misperceptions with which he and his colleagues had to deal, Muller read from two letters from physicians replying in the negative to letters asking for support. One declared, "If the Soviets will not listen to a distinguished nuclear physicist like Sakharov, what hope is there that they would listen to their own physicians, whom they hold in low esteem at best." The other physician wondered "whether the Russians might not use such a project for their own propaganda purposes so as to suggest that they are peace-loving and intent on limiting thermonuclear arms whereas the U.S. has such a war-mongering policy that even prominent physicians must come together to reject it." Both referred to the recent Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

Muller then showed the Soviet delegation the letters, with the signatures whitened out. "This led to a terrific explosion." Kuzin got up and started yelling at Muller. He drew a map (which Muller has kept with the diary), showing the American bases around the Soviet Union, and he asked Muller to draw the corresponding Soviet bases around the U.S. Lown recalled Kuzin's words, "I didn't come all the way from Moscow to listen to anti-Soviet propaganda," and he walked out. Lown remembered trying to calm things down, saying, "Look, let's forget about it. Our intent was not to red-bait you, but to indicate the climate in the United States."

That evening at dinner Muller sat next to Kuzin. After some small talk, he said, "I am sorry if that upset you today showing you those letters. We wanted you to understand the difficulties that we work under. Again he flared [up] a little but not as much and finally he said to me, 'We have the same kind of problems. That's why we have to stick to the medical path.'"

"We were sitting at the crack between two tables and I showed him that if we stay on this path along this crack everything is okay but if we go off to one side or the other with political issues we'll lose everything and our effort will be worthless. He seemed to agree."

The three Soviet physicians finally did agree to keep to the field in which they were expert and to stay away from politics, and the rest of the meeting went very well. It was agreed that any criticisms of the superpowers would be bilateral. The agenda for March was settled, and it was decided to include doctors from Japan, Britain and Germany. Muller, who had developed great skill at public relations, gave the primary story to the Boston Globe, Lown and Chazov appeared on Soviet television, and CBS television filmed the final banquet given by Lown's patient, the wealthy industrialist who had also paid for the Americans' trip and Geneva expenses.

The altercation over the letters was the critical moment. Had the three Soviets walked out, all would have been lost. As it was, there could not have been a better demonstration of the absolute necessity of avoiding the divisive political issues at all costs.
While staying with the single issue kept the doctors' cooperation alive, the American physicians later had to face the charge that they cared nothing about human rights in the Soviet Union. Moreover, as one of the objecting doctors predicted in his letter, the IPPNW founders were to be regarded by critics as making propaganda for the Soviets. All the same, the American delegation returned home jubilant over their success in bringing off what Muller called "a historic event." The publicity, in which Muller played an important role, was favorable and extensive, and they were now ready for a busy January and February preparing for the March conference. Not without some apprehensions, however. Muller and Chivian even had some fears that they might be targets for assassination by parties opposed to disarmament or to such fraternization with the Soviet enemy. Moreover, Muller, with important service in surgery and in the Coronary Care Unit coming up, hoped that he could "keep my profession, family, and prevention of nuclear war somehow all going at the same time."

**IPPNW Successes** In the following years Muller did not find this balancing act very easy. This was a time of expansion for IPPNW, crowned with the winning of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. At the first conference in March 1981, held near Washington, D.C., eleven countries were represented by over seventy delegates. In the fifth annual meeting in Budapest in 1985, over 840 delegates and observers came from 54 countries. By the end of that year there were 145,000 members of the 41 national affiliates. PSR, now the national affiliate of the United States, had over 30,000. The Soviet national organization was the largest, with over 60,000 members.

Since 1982 IPPNW had been organized as a federation of national groups, each of which sent representatives to the International Council, which in 1985 had an executive committee composed of co-presidents Lown and Chazov; five vice presidents from different countries, and the secretary and treasurer, both from the United States. The central office, with Executive Secretary Conn Nugent, was appropriately located in Boston, where the movement had begun. By 1985 IPPNW had secured international recognition. At the annual conference in Budapest, supporting messages were received from President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, from the Pope, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and other heads of state and political figures.

Muller continued to play a leading role as secretary, representing IPPNW in visits to officials in Washington and constantly in demand for interviews with the media. At the annual congresses his fluent Russian helped smooth over differences with the Soviet delegates, who were still inclined to bring in political issues.

At home after the second congress in Cambridge, England, Muller had to reconsider his work for IPPNW: "Over the past 2 years I have devoted approximately 40 hours a week in addition to my regular work to this cause. I've done this at great personal cost both in terms of my work as a cardiologist and my role as a father and husband." The burden of raising the three children, then 12, 10 and 4, "has fallen almost exclusively on Kathleen." The breaking point came after a party at Lown's home when Lown was asked "how he can manage to be a cardiologist and devote so much time to preventing nuclear war." He said, "With those two I don't sleep much." After the party, Kathleen said, "Why didn't Lown talk about what [it] would be to work against nuclear war, be a cardiologist and have a family? She pointed out that those three are impossible."

Muller had to agree. He decided to reduce his IPPNW by half. Lown agreed, "but keep leadership position." This he did, and by cutting down the time he also kept his family and his Harvard job. With the development of the broad anti-nuclear movement he could also tell himself that he was now less needed. In Ground Zero Week he wrote, "It's as if there were a large boulder that Lown, Eric and I and very few others are pushing on for several years. Now it's begun to roll."

Space does not permit reference to many other significant parts of the diary: Muller's drafting of IPPNW's constitution; the rift between Caldicott and Lown which led her to end her cooperation with IPPNW; Muller's television speech on 22 June 1982, to the Russian people in Russian "I think it was
maybe the best thing I've ever done”; Muller’s trip to Norway; and the second, third and fourth annual congresses.

The Nobel Peace Prize After an entry on October 5-6, 1983, dealing with the planning meeting in Athens for the fourth IPPNW congress, the next, dated December 1985, gives a detailed account of the incident at the press conference held in Oslo before the ceremony of award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1985. This and a short entry on February 12, 1986, conclude the diary.

The announcement in October that the prize was to go to IPPNW, with Lown and Chazov personally invited to the ceremony to receive it, met with a mixed reception. In the American press, for example, while most editorials were favorable, others criticized the joint award as fraudulent, since Chazov and his colleagues were spokesmen for the Kremlin, while the American doctors were more likely to be hostile to their own government.

When it was discovered that Chazov in 1973 had signed a letter of Soviet scientists denouncing Andrei Sakharov, leaders of ten European Christian Democratic parties, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, signed a letter to the Norwegian Nobel Committee asking the committee to reconsider their award. In Oslo the former committee chair denounced the decision and in an unprecedented action demonstrated outside the hall in which the award ceremony was held.

The IPPNW director of public affairs felt it necessary to send a memo to IPPNW leaders in western Europe analyzing the press criticism and telling them how to respond. Hardest to answer was the charge that IPPNW ignored human rights problems in the U.S.S.R. and specifically, had refused pleas from the family of Sakharov, then in internal exile in Gorki, to help his cause. The basic answer was that IPPNW had only one focus, the prevention of nuclear war and the organization was leaving divisive political issues aside in order to maintain an international medical consensus on the medical consequences of nuclear war.

As to Sakharov's family, the memo declares that Muller and three other IPPNW physicians had met with family members during the fourth annual congress in Helsinki in 1984. They had brought along the cardiograms of Elena Bonner, Sakharov's wife, who suffered from heart disease, and Muller had examined them. He had also transmitted to Chazov two other requests of the family. Subsequently, Chazov said to the press that he would be glad to treat Sakharov, Bonner or others who sought his help as a physician.

Chairman Egil Aarvik of the Norwegian Nobel Committee and Lown both responded to the criticism in speeches at the award ceremony, saying that the most fundamental human right of all was the right to survive.

The most important response, however, was made at the press conference. The reporters were asking Chazov hostile questions about Sakharov, when suddenly a Soviet radio and television correspondent slumped to the floor, victim of a sudden cardiac arrest. IPPNW American and Soviet physicians worked together to save him, but after Lev Novikov was taken to the hospital, his fate unknown but the worst feared, the meeting resumed, Lown, visibly shaken but quick-witted, found the words to explain that what had just been witnessed was a "strange parable" of IPPNW itself: in the face of the threat of sudden death, Soviet and American physicians cooperate to save a man’s life, not asking his nationality, politics or beliefs; in the same way the physicians of IPPNW put all other considerations aside to work together to save the human race from extinction.

The dramatic incident was seen widely on television, and immediate press reports were favorable. Muller told Chazov later that "it was like a gift from God, and he grabbed me by the shoulders and he said, 'It was like God, Jim, and that is exactly what it was.'" The Sakharov issue did not go away, however, and within IPPNW there were also troubled waters. Chazov and Lown had been taken to the hospital by Norwegian physicians, and the next day the Norwegian newspapers had a large photograph of Lown and Chazov at the patient's bedside, with the caption, "Nobel laureates save patient's life."
Newspapers like to personalize events, and so did the Norwegian Nobel Committee. While previously institutional winners had always decided who should represent them, this time the committee wanted to send a message to the upcoming Soviet-American summit meeting, and they invited the American and Soviet co-presidents personally to come to accept the IPPNW award. To some of the IPPNW members, this emphasis upon Lown and Chazov was resented as a "Hollywoodization," of the prize, as a staff member told me.

For Muller, the Oslo time was "bitter sweet." Some of the family baggage had been lost, there was illness, the weather had been extremely cold, there were the attacks by the Sakharov defenders, and then there was Novikov’s cardiac arrest.

"Muller had been more personally involved in this than the newspaper reports had indicated. As Lown remembers it, he and Chazov, who were sitting at the front table facing Novikov when he fell, reached him first and started to help. Muller, who was at the back of the long room, rushed forward, making his way through the wall of journalists, shouting that he was a cardiologist, and when he reached him immediately applying mouth-to-mouth ventilation.

He describes the scene vividly in the New England Journal of Medicine, referring by name to all the doctors who helped with CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) and the other efforts to help, including Chivian; Dr. John Pastore, who had succeeded Muller as IPPNW secretary; Dr. Jennifer Leaning of the PSR board, a specialist in emergency medicine; Dr. Sidney Alexander, PSR president; Dr. Dagmar Srb-e; Chazov and Lown.

In the diary Muller is more explicit about his own role, telling how he was asked by the others to take charge of the rescue effort. He ran the code for the chest compression. At one point, when Pastore was so engaged, Muller noticed Chazov behind him and motioned that Pastore should let Chazov take over for the symbolism. After twenty minutes, far longer than in Moscow, the ambulance arrived with a defibrillator, the instrument Lown had invented to resuscitate the heart in such situations.

The Norwegian doctor, who conferred with Muller as the head of the international team working on Novikov, thought it was hopeless and told Muller, "We don't take these kinds of cases to the hospital." Muller explained that they had begun the CPR immediately and there was a chance. The Norwegian said that there was already a patient in the ambulance. "Get him out," insisted Muller and then climbed in at the back, the only foreign doctor aboard.

At the hospital Muller could explain to the doctors what had already been done, and he did not leave until Novikov was stabilized. He could tell Novikov's wife, who said he was a heavy smoker and had a history of heart attacks, that he would live. Muller himself was concerned that Novikov's brain might have been deprived of oxygen for too long. Two days later when he saw Novikov in the hospital, he asked if he remembered him. Novikov nodded in the affirmative. "Did we meet in Budapest or Helsinki?" Novikov wrote on a pad in good Russian, "Helsinki." Muller then knew "he was completely saved." Novikov was a very lucky man to have had his cardiac arrest in a room of physicians, among them the most famous cardiologists in the world.

He was also fortunate that the resourceful Muller took charge of his case at the very beginning. The newspaper report that Lown and Chazov had saved Novikov symbolized Muller's experience with IPPNW.

When the Boston office was putting together a "Description and Brief History" of IPPNW in November 1985, Muller told them about his previous Soviet work and that he had written the constitution. This was omitted from the final version, which begins with a meeting between Lown and Chazov in 1960 and brings in Muller only in 1979, saying nothing about how he arrived at the idea of the organization independently or how his fluent Russian had been of basic importance in the earliest relationships with the Soviets. Nor was there any specific reference during the ceremonies and other occasions in Oslo of Muller's special contributions in the development of IPPNW or of his part in the establishment of the Soviet-American health agreement, out of which the cooperation between physicians of the two countries may be said to have arisen. With the benefit of the Muller diaries, the future historian of IPPNW will be able to set the record straight. The young medical student who went to Moscow with the hope of promoting international understanding stayed the course and went on to make a difference in the world.