

## **Discretionary Moral Duties**

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The topic of this paper is the idea that there are discretionary moral duties, i.e. duties that cede to the agent who stands under them wide latitude in determining the actions that count as satisfying them. I offer a general framework for thinking about moral obligations, which construes such obligations in essentially relational terms. I then draw on this conception of moral obligation to understand two classes of obligations that are intuitively understood to exhibit wide agential discretion: duties of gratitude and of mutual aid. I argue that the wide agential discretion apparent in these cases makes sense against the background of an understanding of morality as a set of directed obligations that we owe to each other, as individuals. A further important theme is the standing of morality as a source of requirements that make it possible for agents to relate to each other on a basis of autonomy and equality.