

State-Building as a Two-Level Game

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Abstract The international community is currently engaged in a number of state-building exercises around the globe that range in intensity from technical assistance to governments in post-conflict states to *de facto* international trusteeship. All of these enterprises strive to appear ‘locally owned’, that is, international actors need local actors with which (and, occasionally, through which) to work. Usually, this means that countries emerging from conflict must quickly appoint a government to serve as an intermediary between the national constituencies and the international community. This paper argues that the relationship between these actors can usefully be analyzed as a ‘two-level game’ (Putnam). The paper argues that post-conflict governments are largely autonomous from their constituencies, thus putting them into a weak bargaining position in international negotiations. This, however, is a threat to a durable peace and should be remedied by the international community by helping domestic governments in post-conflict countries to develop political capacity and accountability. However, the chances of such a policy being pursued are judged to be slim as there are structural disincentives for outside actors.

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, post-conflict state-building has become a frequent activity in international politics. The United Nations, the OSCE, International Financial Institutions, individual countries (sometimes as part of an ad hoc coalition) and international non-governmental actors participate in these enterprises. The growing importance of post-conflict state-building is reflected in the fact that, at the end of 2006, there were more than 80,000 uniformed personnel in 16 different peacekeeping missions administered by the United Nations.

Another indicator of the increasing relevance that is attached to state-building is that substantial institutional innovation has occurred recently with a view to strengthening organizational capacities towards post-conflict states. For example, in 2006 the United Nations created the Peacebuilding Commission, an organ specifically devoted to assisting countries recovering from conflict. Even earlier, the U.S. State Department had created the post of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (Krasner; Pascual 2005). National governments and international governments have also formulated action plans (or are in the process of doing so) to govern their dealing with fragile and post-conflict countries, as the LICUS Initiative ('Low Income Countries Under Stress') of the World Bank and the Fragile States Group within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD – among others – evidence.

Post-conflict state-building occurs at the end of an armed conflict (here simply understood as a cessation of violence). Its principal aim is the (re-)construction of the core structures and institutions of the western, Weberian state, i.e., a legitimate monopoly of violence (military, police), rule of law (a legislature, courts, a penal system) and a functioning state bureaucracy. Where external actors are involved (which is usually the case), state-building is undertaken alongside other strategic projects (and is occasionally supplanted by them), e.g., stabilization, democratization, increasing regional influence, or securing access to natural resources (Rubin 2006: 179). As such, it is part of what is termed the 'liberal peace', a large-scale modernization of 'developing' societies supported by Western countries²: "The aim of liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities." (Duffield 2001: 11)

In accordance with the increased importance that post-conflict state-building has gained in political circles, it should come as no surprise that a large body of academic literature that deals with this topic has been produced.³ By virtue of the fact that post-conflict state-building has always involved international actors, most of this work comes from the (sub-)discipline of International Relations. This has imbued the study of the topic with a certain bias inherent in

² In post-conflict settings where these countries cooperate, they are often called 'the international community'.

³ Rather than list all these contributions, it suffices to point out that, starting 2007, there is an entire academic journal (the *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*) devoted to this issue.

the field: “The international relations specialist wants to explain foreign policy and international politics. He care about the domestic system insofar as it is useful for that purpose.” (Gourevitch 1978: 881)⁴ Hence, just as international politics is viewed through the lens of Western policymakers, post-conflict states are usually not conceptualized as *actors* in international relations, but rather as the passive *object* of politics. As a result, much of the literature reads like a ‘How To’ manual for would-be state-builders. However, this glosses over the fact that state-building is not the neutral activity it is apparently assumed to be. Rather, it is a conflictual process where actors bring their own interests to the table: “Studies of state-building operations often try to identify ‘best practices’ without asking for whom they are best.” (Rubin 2006: 184)

For example, the special section on “Post-Conflict Peacebuilding” in issue 36:4 of the journal *Security Dialogue* discusses how best to meet the needs of the population with regard to the provision of security, welfare and representation. Actors from the war-affected country are inevitably portrayed as obstacles to peace (‘spoilers’), as potential allies of external powers or as passive victims of violence. Another example is the volume edited by Rotberg (2004), the second half of which deals with the “post-failure resuscitation of nation-states”. The articles therein represent the state of the art about an array of topics (e.g., fostering social capital, economic reconstruction, post-conflict elections), but they inevitably approach their topic from the point of view of Western countries intervening in a post-conflict country.

This paper starts from the assertion that present approaches to post-conflict state-building need to take a closer look at the government of the post-conflict country. It argues that an analysis of said government and its relationship to various domestic constituencies and veto players is vitally important for understanding the political dynamic of state-building. To this end, it adapts Robert Putnam’s concept of two-level games (1988) to the subject area at hand. It then develops the argument that current practices of post-conflict state-building produce overly autonomous governments that are dependent on external resources (legitimacy, funding, personnel) to function, jeopardizing the sustainability of peace. In conclusion, the paper lays out several implications for research and policy.

Current Practices of Post-Conflict State-Building

Post-conflict state-building can take many forms. Often, the term represents a diverse array of programs and projects centered around the aim of (re-)constructing the state. Nowadays, the process of state-building inevitably takes place under the aegis of the international community. However, intervention by international actors can take several forms.

⁴ To be sure, the disciplinary barrier separating the international from the domestic has been waning for some time (and had already been weakened by the time Gourevitch wrote this), but the IR bias in favor of the international is still extant in the post-conflict literature which really should know better than to arbitrarily favor one level of analysis over others.

The ‘Light Footprint’ approach is the least intrusive. Here, international actors serve as mediators between conflict parties and supply humanitarian and financial aid. On the whole, the international presence is kept to a minimum, usually only consisting of a few diplomats and/or UN observers. The international assistance to Guatemala from the early 1990s onwards can subsumed under this type.

Somewhat more intrusive are ‘mainstream’ measures of state-building, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, the reconstruction and reform of state institutions and infrastructure, and providing technical assistance (e.g., registering voters). These projects typically require a larger international presence of aid workers, consultants, and (occasionally) police and military personnel. Such a mainstream approach is often undertaken after a military intervention, as in Afghanistan or Liberia.

At the other extreme of the scale is what is known as ‘international administration’ (or as ‘de facto trusteeship’ or ‘neo-trusteeship’) of territories. Here, international actors under the UN umbrella construct, staff, and run administrative structures in the post-conflict country. It involves full-fledged territorial governance by the international administration. This model was developed first in Cambodia and then later applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor. Ink has been spilled about this phenomenon far beyond its empirical relevance (e.g., Krasner 2004, Fearon; Laitin 2004, Zaum 2005).

Of course, this categorization of interventions uses ideal-types – usually, cases are not as clear-cut as this simply typology would indicate. Instead, cases might encompass elements from two (or even all three) kinds of interventions. For example, while assistance to Guatemala typically followed the Light Footprint approach, it also included a DDR programme which was co-organized by MINUGUA, the UN observer mission.

State-building – as a collection of individual programs – is supposed to be undertaken in cooperation with the country government. For example, in the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005), donor and ‘partner’ countries have pledged to support the principles of ‘ownership’ and ‘alignment’. ‘Ownership’ means that partner countries have to implement national development strategies and coordinate aid flows, while donors are reminded to “(r)espect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it” (para. 15). ‘Alignment’ demands that donor countries “(b)ase their overall support [...] on partners’ national development strategies” (para. 16), or (in other words) make sure that their development plans match up with those of the partner country. Calls for ownership and alignment abound in policy documents and the academic literature on state-building (e.g., Brinkerhoff; Brinkerhoff 2002, Rondinelli; Montgomery 2005, World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006), so, in theory, state-building seems to be an inclusive process that reflects and incorporates domestic interests in post-conflict countries.

However, this commitment is stronger in rhetoric than in practice. While there is near-consensus in the academic literature that state-building cannot succeed in the absence of local partners and against local interests, this tenet is routinely violated by external political actors following their own agendas. The process of state-building is much more interest-driven than is usually acknowledged in the relatively technocratic literature. Local interests often find themselves marginalized if their plans do not conform to international blueprints of the country's future.

Nevertheless, the 'international community' tries to keep up the twin fictions of ownership and alignment. During 'mainstream' interventions, it will quickly install a new national government in order to exude 'local ownership' (Francois; Sud 2006). It is of no consequence whether said government is selected by external forces, voted into office, or picked according to the provisions of a peace agreement, the only thing that matters is whether it can be made to comply with the wishes of the international actors. A 'light footprint' intervention will preclude such heavy-handed measures, but it will still open up new avenues for external actors to exert influence on the government. In cases of international administration, intervening actors drop all pretense of ownership, instead legitimizing their dominance by referring to the transitional nature of such an administration.

The role of newly established government is the implementation of policies, often formulated abroad. Ottaway (2002: 1007-1008) recounts the example of Sierra Leone which signed a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies with the IMF in November 1999, after eight years of near-continuous civil war. She lists thirteen specific demands, from establishing security to the liberalization of the petroleum market, which are detailed on just the first two pages of the six-page Memorandum. Other authors detail how the post-Taliban Afghan legislature was swamped with bills mandated by the international community during the first years of its existence. Francois and Sud put it thusly: "Finally, the opportunity of a 'new start' with a new government is seen as an opportunity to pish through a wide-ranging set of political, economic and social reforms." (2006: 150)


However, these governments cannot be reduced to being mere extensions of external forces. Instead, this paper argues, they have to be appreciated in their role as mediators between external and internal actors. Governments of post-conflict countries are confronted with a huge list of demands from the domestic constituents and from the international community. The governments have to negotiate between these (sometimes) conflicting demands, all the while pursuing their own interests. For the purposes of this paper, the government will be considered a unitary actor with exogenously determined interests. It is quite clear that no government will be without internal frictions – particularly not a post-conflict government – but this is a necessary bit of simplification.

State-building as a Two-Level Game

State-building can usefully be understood as a two-level game. The concept of two-level games was originally developed by Robert Putnam (1988) to describe the dynamics of diplomatic negotiations. He started from the assertion that “(i)t is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes.’” (Putnam 1988: 427) He believed that the outcome of diplomatic negotiations was never a direct result of international or domestic factors, but from a combination of both.

At the national level, interest groups pursue their goals by pressuring the government (the ‘negotiator’) to adopt their policies. In turn, the government is dependent on domestic support to remain in power and therefore will be responsive to these demands. During negotiations, the government will be keen to achieve an agreement that fulfils domestic demands as much as possible. Both of these levels determine the outcome of negotiations, as Putnam describes: “Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.” (1988: 434) A useful metaphor for this set-up, Putnam suggests, is that each government in a bilateral negotiation plays a game on two simultaneous game boards: the international board (with each other) and the domestic board (with domestic groups). Each move they make is done equally on both boards (inconsistency in international and domestic moves is a sure-fire way to lose credibility fast). Fig. 1 shows such a stylized negotiation between countries A and B.

Fig 1. Basic layout of the two-level game



The basic model of the two-level game entails two sides negotiating a single issue. Each party is represented by a chief negotiator who is assumed to have no independent preferences. Negotiation proceeds in two idealized stages: In the first stage, negotiators bargain a potential agreement (Level I). In the second, there are separate discussions within each side of the negotiation about whether to ratify the agreement (Level II). (In this context, ratification means any procedure, formal or informal, whereby the constituency either assents to or rejects

the agreement.) In practice, these stages usually occur at the same time and are iterative, i.e., they are repeated over and over until agreement is reached or negotiations are broken off.

Preferences within each constituency (the collection of domestic groups) are assumed to be homogenous (i.e., no infighting), although they can change over time. Therefore, for any Level II constituency, what Putnam calls 'win-sets' can be determined. Win-sets represent all those agreements that a constituency could be persuaded to ratify in a straightforward up-or-down vote. For example, if a labor union demands a 10% pay increase during negotiations, but would also agree to anything above 5%, then the area between five and ten percent would be the union's win-set. Where win-sets of both negotiating parties overlap, agreement is possible.

From this it follows that larger win-sets make Level I agreements more likely. It also follows that "the relative size of respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be 'pushed around' by the other Level I negotiators." (Putnam 1988: 440) That means a country with a highly fragmented constituency and a weak government unable to bring the disparate interests closer together will be able to get better results: "A Third World leader whose domestic position is relatively weak (Argentina's Alfonsín?) should be able to drive a better bargain with his international creditors, other things being equal, than one whose domestic standing is more solid (Mexico's de la Madrid?)." (Putnam 1988: 440)

The size of win-sets will be affected by several factors:

1. The lower the cost of "no agreement" to constituents (e.g., if the constituency is very self-sufficient), the smaller the win-set.
2. Size and composition of a constituency will greatly influence the win-set. Participation in the constituency will vary from issue to issue, depending on how broad the costs and benefits of agreement will be spread.
3. Multi-issue negotiations open up a broader spectrum of possible agreements and thus strengthen the position of the negotiators.
4. The larger and the more heterogeneous the majority necessary for ratification, the smaller the win-set.
5. Many negotiations deal with heterogeneous conflicts (i.e., conflicts that are not simply distributive in nature). These negotiations cannot be undertaken with a 'the more, the better' approach, but must take into account domestic cleavages on both sides. "In some cases, these lines of cleavage within the Level II constituencies will cut across the Level I division, and the Level I negotiator may find silent allies at his opponent's domestic table. [...] Thus transnational alignments may emerge, tacit or explicit, in which domestic interests pressure their respective governments to adopt mutually

supportive policies.” (Putnam 1988: 444) This may increase win-set size by opening up the possibility of new, dynamic coalitions.

6. “The greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II constituents, the larger the win-set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement.” (Putnam 1988: 449)
7. A shrewd negotiator will try to shrink his side’s win-set to improve his bargaining position, but not so much that agreement is no longer possible. However, given the uncertainty about the other side’s win-set, this strategy is risky and can lead to a breakdown in negotiations which might have otherwise resulted in an agreement.

As the last point highlight, misinformation and misperception are major problems during negotiations, not only with regard to the other side, but even with regard to a negotiator’s own side: “Level I negotiators are often badly misinformed about Level II politics, particularly on the opposing side.” (Putnam 1988: 452) This uncertainty can be employed as a bargaining chip, e.g., when negotiators try to understate their own win-sets by playing up domestic divisions. Another tactic is to try and increase the other party’s win-set through lobbying, public relations campaigns, side payments, and contacts to opposition parties.

The model can also accommodate negotiator self-interest (which is assumed to be exogenously determined). Motives of the chief negotiator usually include: a) enhancing his standing in the Level II game by concluding advantageous agreements or by blocking detrimental ones), b) shifting the Level II balance of power in favor of his own ends, using the Level I negotiations as a lever, c) pursuing their own notion of national interest in the international arena. In most democratic state, even a self-interested chief negotiator will heed his domestic constituency, simply because he is dependent in their approval to stay in office. However, by stipulating that agreement can only be reached where the win-sets of both Level II constituencies *plus* the personal win-sets of the chief negotiators overlap shrinks the scope for potential agreements.

The concept of two-level games has received a huge amount of attention and has been applied to a wide range of economic, financial, diplomatic, defence, agricultural, scientific and ecologic topics.⁵ However, to the best of my knowledge, it has not been applied to situations of post-conflict state-building. Despite this, I believe that we can learn something about state-building by analyzing the matter in terms of a two-level game.

Some caveats are in order, since a post-conflict setting departs from the stylized assumptions of Putnam’s concept in several ways. For the purposes of this article, I am going to assume that the international side is represented by a single negotiator with a single Level II constituency. This is, as Rubin (2006) and others have clearly shown, an oversimplification –

⁵ The *Social Sciences Citation Index* (Thompson ISI) returns 620 citations of the article while Google Scholar (<http://scholar.google.com/>) lists 1,064 citations.

the international community is frequently divided and disunited in its policy towards post-conflict countries. Occasionally, intervening countries advance their own agendas, sometimes competing with each other for influence, despite all the calls for ‘donor harmonisation’.

Such a simplification is no problem here, for this paper focuses on the role of the government of the post-conflict country. This government is faced with a Level II constituency that is not made up of a homogenous electorate, but rather comprises a set of ‘veto players’. ‘Veto players’, to borrow the concept from George Tsebelis (2002), are those individual or collective actors who “have to agree to the proposed change” (2002: 2) a legislation will produce. In post-conflict settings, such veto players can be powerful warlords, regional authorities, states-within-states (Kingston; Spears 2004) and influential interest groups with autonomous bases of power.

In a post-conflict setting, veto players are usually closely identified with former parties to the conflict. This is because conflict parties possess an organizational advantage due its military command structure whereas genuine civil society groups usually were unable to work during the conflict. As a result, many of the animosities that fueled the conflict will still be present among the key actors in the post-conflict situation. Tsebelis characterizes such a situation as follows: “the greater the distance among and the number of veto players, the more difficult it is to change the status quo.” (2002: 19) In other words: in post-conflict situations it is very hard (if not downright impossible) to achieve an agreement among veto players, many of whom will be openly hostile towards each other.⁶

As a result, the win-set of a post-conflict government will be relatively small. According to Putnam, a small win-set decreases chances of an agreement being reached, but improves the bargaining position in Level I negotiations. However, this seems to collide with the empirical record – post-conflict governments usually have little influence during international negotiations. When it comes to negotiating international aid payments, troop deployments, or domestic legislation, they often have to along with the wishes of their Western counterparts. How can this be reconciled with Putnam’s concept?

The answer lies in the fact, that post-conflict governments are largely autonomous from their Level II constituencies, thus increasing their win-sets and worsening their bargaining position (see above, Putnam 1988: 449). These governments are much more dependent on external resources to survive. They get their funding not from taxation but from international aid. Their claim to the monopoly of force is dependent on foreign troops. They gain legitimacy by being invited to international summits, not by being responsive towards the needs of their population or by allowing domestic participation. Their personnel is often recruited from returning exiles with a Western education and technical knowledge; international consultants abound in government ministries; NGOs and international organizations construct elaborate

⁶ Obviously, this approach is quite similar to the “spoiler” concept (Stedman 1997).

parallel structure to administer their projects. This dependence on external support leads to the conclusion that the government will *ceteris paribus* pursue policies that are in the interests of powerful members of the international community rather than that which benefits its own people.

This is a stance that Jean-Francois Bayart has called “extraversion” (1993). In a nutshell, this means that a government is oriented outwards, rather than inwards, for resources, legitimacy and capabilities. Bayart developed the concept in relation to postcolonial African states which exhibit quite a few similarities to post-conflict countries.

Astri Suhrke provides a vivid example of such extraversion of the post-conflict government of Afghanistan. She considers state-building in this country to be an attempt of a forceful modernization of society driven not by indigenous interest, but rather by “a grand, transnational coalition of Afghan and international actors.” (2006a: 7) On the Afghan side, actors are drawn from an educated, urban class, most of whom have studied and worked in their North American or European exile. Initially, these modernizers had to share state power with military and religious leaders who had built up a political following during the war (the *jihadis*), but gradually forced these out of the cabinet. “The sociological distance between the modernizers and much of the rest of the population, on the other hand, is vast.” (Suhrke 2006a: 9)

Accordingly, the Karzai government is a pliant actor in international negotiation, presenting itself as a cooperative partner rather than as a representative of the Afghan people. In part, this was a result of the shared social background of negotiators from both sides, but it also reflected a rational strategy: “Cooperation was partly anchored in self-interest – the first, post-Taliban regime headed by Karzai had been installed as a result of the US military intervention and approved by the UN, and the government continued to be dependent upon the international community for its survival.” (Suhrke 2006a: 8)

Conclusion

Post-conflict governments are frequently unresponsive to the (admittedly complicated) Level II constituencies they are supposed to represent. This is a deeply troubling conclusion, since it calls the sustainability of the state-building enterprise into question. Research has generally supported the notion that peace is more likely to last if all conflict parties are involved in the process. For example, Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie have analyzed 38 cases of negotiated settlements to civil wars between 1945 and 1998 and found “that the creation of an array of power-sharing institutions is positively associated with a durable peace.” (2003: 319) The more extensive these arrangements are, the more they contribute to a lasting peace.

Power-sharing agreements, while generally effective, are no panacea, though. Bumba Mukherjee (2005) reports that such agreements work better in cases where the government

had previously scored a military victory than after military stalemates. He further underscores the importance of institution-building by arguing that third-party enforcement of a peace agreement – generally thought to be the most effective way of guaranteeing peace (e.g., Fortna 2003) – might be less important than the quality of democratic institutions: “third-party enforcement plays an important role in promoting the *likelihood* of peace in the short run, but domestic institutions are more critical for *sustaining* peace in the long run.” (2006: 428, emphasis in the original).

Suhrke concludes that international state-building efforts in Afghanistan have been hampered by an overemphasis on the military aspects and a neglect by the international community to reach out to the Taliban: “To be attractive, reconciliation must be qualitatively different from an invitation to surrender and entail compromises on both sides, including a measure of power-sharing. Until now, ‘reconciliation’ has meant amnesty on the terms of the government.” (2006b: 20)

All these contributions point toward the conclusion that state-building has to be accompanied by an inclusive peace process to be effective (MacGinty 2005). Mukherjee’s findings suggest that these two factors can be mutually reinforcing, with peace contributing to state-building and state institutions shoring up the peace. It also reminds us that a mere cessation of violence is not a sufficient foundation for sustainable state-building.

Hartzell and Hoddie sum it up thusly: “Finally, this research suggests that, in cases like Afghanistan, the international community can play an important role in structuring stability. Mediators at the negotiating table should support rival parties in their attempts to structure power-sharing institutions and encourage them to create a diverse array of mechanisms of this nature. These efforts to produce extensive power-sharing institutions through the process of brokered negotiation have the greatest potential for establishing a self-enforcing peace in the long term.” (2003: 330)

Unfortunately, such a strategy, while theoretically and empirically grounded, will run into difficulties. These can be material, e.g., when the international community cannot muster enough resources to fund such a lengthy process, or immaterial, e.g., when psychological inhibitions prevent international actors from involving ‘undesirable’ actors in negotiations. The biggest hurdle, however, is that a highly extraverted government is a) easier to set up than a responsive one, and b) easier to manipulate for international actors holding the purse strings. There is simply no incentive for international actors help governments develop capacity and accountability, because then these governments would have to be more responsive to veto players (with some of them being former combatants, this is a problem for donor countries by itself), thus shrinking their win-sets and improving their bargaining positions.

So, although international negotiators would be well-advised to pressure post-conflict governments to respect Level II win-sets from a developmental point of view, these concerns are easily sidelined by motives other than state-building (e.g., fighting the War on Terror,

liberalization of the economy, access to natural resources, gaining influence). Thus, it is advantageous for international actors to keep post-conflict government dependent on their largesse. As Stedman puts it: “Policymakers often have concerns other than a specific conflict at hand; a strategy that may be best from a perspective of solely managing the conflict may not be best for a policymaker considering a range of interest. [...] The optimal strategy to end a conflict and manage a spoiler may be too costly or risky for external actors. As a U.S. defense official told me, ‘One should not confuse what is needed to end these conflicts with what the United States is prepared to do.’” (1997: 16)

This is a problem that is not easily overcome. Rather, these practices will, in all likelihood, continue for the foreseeable future. What are the implications for research? The most obvious one is that research on state-building needs to pay more attention to the government in post-conflict countries and to the dynamics of Level II politics there. That means that research on post-conflict countries needs to have a theory of domestic politics and not reduce it to being an arena where international actors clash. Public policy analysis offers several tools (advocacy coalitions, policy arenas, policy networks etc.) that could be employed for such an approach. The cursory manner in which Level II actors are portrayed as either passive victims or spoilers belies the complexity of politics in the domestic arena

Current scholarship of post-conflict state-building strives to create a recipe for state-building that doesn't include people in it (hence the focus on institutions). From a methodological point of view, that is completely understandable – if you move beyond single-case studies, you necessarily have to abstract from concrete actors. However, it would seem that such a recipe that does not include local actors *as actors* (and not just as objects) is defective and does not give us good advice about how to approach state-building.

Another area that could be explored is whether the extraversion of post-conflict governments is comparable to that of governments in quasi-states (Jackson 1990). There is a high degree of extraversion in many such states, which are characterized by *juridical* statehood in the absence of *empirical* statehood. However, the unequal relationship between international actors and the government that characterizes the post-conflict setting is structured somewhat differently in quasi-states. Here, domination by outside powers is usually less overt, intervention less intrusive (often lacking a military dimension, for example) while economic aspects are played up (Reno 1997, Clapham 2001). Further research would be necessary to see whether this is just a difference in appearance or in substance.

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