A structured and systematic model-based development method for automotive systems, considering the OEM/supplier interface

Kristian Beckers\textsuperscript{a}, Isabelle Côte\textsuperscript{b}, Thomas Frese\textsuperscript{c}, Denis Hatebur\textsuperscript{b,d}, Maritta Heisel\textsuperscript{d}

\textsuperscript{a}Technische Universität München, Germany
\textsuperscript{b}Institut für technische Systeme GmbH, Germany
\textsuperscript{c}Ford Werke GmbH, Germany
\textsuperscript{d}paluno - The Ruhr Institute for Software Technology University Duisburg-Essen, Germany

Abstract

The released ISO 26262 standard for automotive systems requires to create a hazard analysis and risk assessment and to create safety goals, to break down these safety goals into functional safety requirements in the functional safety concept, to specify technical safety requirements in the safety requirements specification, and to perform several validation and verification activities. Experience shows that the definition of technical safety requirements and the planning and execution of validation and verification activities has to be done jointly by OEMs and suppliers. In this paper, we present a structured and model-based safety development approach for automotive systems. The different steps are based on Jackson’s requirement engineering. The elements are represented by UML notation extended with stereotypes. The UML model enables a rigorous validation of several constraints. We make use of the results of previously published work to be able to focus on the OEM/supplier interface. We illustrate our method using a three-wheeled-tilting control system as running example and case study.

Keywords: ISO 26262, automotive, hazard analysis, risk assessment, safety goal, safety, functional, technical, requirement, UML, validation and verification

1. Introduction

Developing and constructing road vehicles has become a complex task due to the increase of features, such as adaptive cruise control or lane keeping assist functions. The safety aspects of these features have to be taken into account during the product development. Another fact is that most of these complex systems are developed by different organizations. This means that the overall system is broken down into several components and/or subsystems. Different divisions within the OEM are responsible for the components/subsystems, which are provided by different suppliers.
This raises the complexity for the manufacturer (OEM), who has to organize the necessary activities. With the release of ISO 26262 - Road vehicles Functional safety in November 2011 [1], the automotive sector benefited from a consistent functional safety process for developing and constructing electric/electronic (E/E) systems. ISO 26262 addresses all levels of development, including definition of functions/features, systems engineering as well as details of software and hardware development. The standard should be applicable to different scenarios for establishing this process, including e.g., the OEM and any number of suppliers for the distributed systems.

Since ISO 26262 is a risk-based functional safety standard addressing malfunctions, its process starts with a hazard analysis to determine the necessary risk reduction to achieve an acceptable level of risk. The hazard analysis results in safety goals with an automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) that describes the necessary risk reduction. Performing such a hazard analysis is a challenging task because

- It should be comprehensible for different stakeholders, e.g., engineers, project leaders, managers.
- It should be possible to review the hazard analysis within a realistic time period.
- Hazard analyses of different projects should be comparable.
- In a hazard analysis, all relevant faults or situations need to be considered.

This hazard analysis is usually performed by the OEM division responsible for the development of the overall system.

According to ISO 26262, the next steps are to break down the safety goals derived in the hazard analysis into functional safety requirements. It has to be justified that the derived functional safety requirements are suitable to achieve the stated safety goals. These functional safety requirements are then detailed and the technical safety requirements are derived. In addition, the Verification and Validation (V&V) is performed. The results of the V&V activities is fed back and collected in an appropriate way to support the creation of the safety case.

Most of these complex systems are distributed. This distribution includes several challenges: For the requirement engineering, it has to be determined who has to provide which content at which level of detail. Usually, the OEM division responsible for the development of the system creates the logical architecture and then distributes requirements to different divisions within the OEM responsible for the components. These divisions receive all requirements from systems in which their component is involved in, integrate the requirements and cascade the requirements to the component suppliers. They do the implementation and supply pieces of hardware and software that then have to be integrated into the vehicle. Some of the requirements engineering (RE) has to be done by the OEM and the supplementary RE has to be added by the suppliers.

For the verification and validation (V&V), the OEM division responsible for the overall system has to ensure that the V&V tasks are defined and cascaded to the other divisions and the suppliers. Some aspects can only be validated on vehicle level by the OEM division responsible for the system (e.g. the overall behavior of the system), some aspects can be validated on component level by the divisions responsible for the components (e.g. the behavior of the component) and other aspects can only be
validated using internal interfaces of the component by the suppliers. When the V&V is performed, the results of the V&V activities at supplier side and within the different OEM divisions needs to be fed back and collected by the division responsible for the overall system.

In addition, heterogeneous and concurrent engineering processes, methods and tools exist within the affected parties which need to be harmonized. Communication between OEM and divisions/suppliers has to be organized via requirements as well as verification and validation documents.

In this paper, we propose a structured method based on UML models supported by a tool for the hazard analysis, the requirement engineering, and the V&V activities.

The advantage of a UML model-based approach is that the different artifacts are explicitly connected instead of having loosely coupled documents. On this overall model, consistency checks can be performed. These consistency checks can be specified with the Object Constraint Language (OCL) from the Object Management Group (OMG) [2].

Our paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we introduce some background knowledge as well as previous work to establish a common understanding. Section 2.1 briefly introduces the underlying standard used throughout our method followed by a short description of the requirements analysis method in Sect. 2.2. The Framework, in which the method is embedded, is outlined in Sect. 2.3 and the model is introduced in Sect. 2.4.

Section 3 introduces the case study we use to illustrate our method. Section 3.2 describes the hazard analysis and risk assessment artifacts [1]. In section 3.3, the artifacts created in the functional safety concept are given [2].

In Section 4, the technical safety requirement specification method illustrated with the example is presented.

Section 6 introduces the applied support tool and Sect. 7 discuss related work. Finally, in Sect. 8, we provide a conclusion and an outlook on future work.

Remark: The parts of the method that have already been published will only be briefly discussed. The interested reader can find more details in the provided citations.

2. Background

2.1. ISO 26262

In 2011, the functional safety standard, ISO 26262 [3], was published. It is derived from the generic functional safety standard IEC 61508 [4] and aligns with the automotive safety life-cycle including specification, design, implementation, integration, verification, validation, configuration, production, operation, service, decommissioning, and safety management. ISO 26262 provides an automotive-specific risk-based approach for determining risk classes that describe the necessary risk reduction for achieving an acceptable residual risk, called automotive safety integrity level (ASIL). The possible ASILs are QM, ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL C, and ASIL D. The ASIL requiring the highest risk reduction is called ASIL D. In case of a QM rating, the normal quality measures applied in the automotive industry are sufficient. The standard also addresses the OEM-supplier interface to some extent. ISO 26262 Part 8 requires an appropriate
definition (e.g., by using a development interface agreement) of the interface between
OEM and supplier, but as the application of the standard should be possible in different
project scenarios, the standard does not provide a predefined and dedicated method to
split technical responsibilities amongst the different participating parties.

2.2. Requirements Analysis

Our requirements engineering method is inspired by and based on the approach pro-
posed by Jackson [5]. In this approach, requirements can only be guaranteed for a
certain context. Therefore, it is important to describe the environment in which the
system to be built (called item in the automotive domain) will operate. This is achieved
by a context diagram. Figure 1 shows an example of such a diagram. The context
diagram consists of boxes representing different elements, also called domains (e.g.,
SteeringWheel in Fig. 1\(^1\)), in the application environment that already exist.

A special domain is the system to be built, i.e., the item. The different domains
are connected by interfaces consisting of shared phenomena. Shared phenomena may
be events, operation calls, messages, and the like. They are observable by at least
two domains, but controlled by only one domain. The phenomenon steering_angle is
an example for such a shared phenomenon. It is observable by the domains 3WTC
(3-Wheeler-Tilt-Control system) and SteeringWheel (SW). However, only Steering-
Wheel controls that phenomenon. This is indicated by the exclamation mark after the
abbreviated name of the domain (see ‘SW!{steering_angle}’ in Fig. 1).

2.3. Functional Safety Framework

The Ford Integrated process for Functional Safety (FIFS) consists of templates, ex-
amples and guidelines in Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel. These templates, ex-
amples and guidelines were developed and improved (using project feedback) since
2009. They were applied in more than 30 projects and cover all parts of ISO 26262
being relevant for an OEM who does not develop software and hardware. Currently,
the first pilot projects are aiming to use a model-based approach for functional safety.
If the templates are applied according to the guidelines, ISO 26262 compliant (work)
products are developed. The method is based on practical experience in the automotive
domain.

\(^1\)As a simplification, we assume that the domain SteeringWheel consists of the actual physical steering
wheel as well as a steering wheel provider module.
Within the V-model applied in ISO 26262, the first step of requirements engineering is to perform a hazard analysis and risk assessment for the system under consideration. Output of this step is given by the safety goals, describing the highest level of safety requirements. In the functional safety concept (FSC), the safety goals from the hazard analysis are broken down into functional safety requirements. These functional safety requirements are mapped to subsystems or components.

The task of the subsequent step is to split the functional safety requirements up into technical safety requirements. Within our approach, the technical safety requirement categories depicted in Fig. 2 (right-hand side) are used.

With these functional safety requirements and technical safety requirements, the requirement activities of the OEM are finalized within the setup chosen for our method. The technical safety requirements are cascaded to the other OEM divisions and finally to the suppliers and the V&V phase is started.

The method presented in this paper supports the planning and performing of V&V activities as well as the documentation of their results. It is embedded in the overall functional safety process according to ISO 26262. The created documentation is an essential part for the subsequent steps that result in the safety case. The safety case is the argument that the safety requirements for an item are complete and satisfied by evidence compiled from documents of all ISO 26262 safety activities during the whole life cycle. It represents the key argument for the Functional Safety Assessment and product release and concludes the ISO 26262 development process.

Aiming at tool support, we started to develop a UML profile and a set of OCL constraints to support the development activities.

The approach was presented on the automotive industry conferences VDA Automotive SYS Conference, Baden-Baden Spezial 2012 and Safetronic 2014. The Electronic Steering Column Lock case study is used in these papers and presentations.

The approach presented in aforementioned papers and presentations, introduces several stereotypes necessary to capture ISO26262-specific aspects. An excerpt of such a resulting UML-profile is given in Fig. 2 (left-hand side).

---

2.4. Modeling

The implementation of Ford’s approach to realize an ISO 26262 compliant safety process (see Sect. 2.3) started off as a document-driven/document-centric approach using Microsoft products, such as Word, Excel and Visio. The experiences with this approach were good. However, with the growing number of projects using the approach and with increasing complexity of certain features, it is a rather tedious task to keep the different documents consistent and correct amongst each other. Basically, independent documents are created and data is copied manually between the different documents. It is possible to some extent to embed data or to use Visual Basic for Application (VBA) to provide some means to link data from one document to another. Unfortunately, not everything can be implemented using embedded data and it might not always be possible to use VBA due to corporate regulations. Therefore, it is desirable to move away from a purely document-driven approach. We suggest to use a model-driven approach. With such an approach, it is possible to benefit from a global data model allowing different views on this model. Furthermore, it is possible to incorporate the experiences and feedback from the document-driven approach into the envisioned model-driven process. We propose UML [6]. UML is a well-established modeling standard providing a variety of structural and behavioral models with related diagram types. It also offers the concept of stereotypes. Stereotypes give a specific meaning to the element(s) they are attached to. UML already offers profiles with pre-existing stereotypes. However, it is possible to provide additional stereotypes to meet one’s needs. This is usually done by providing a new profile containing the additionally defined stereotypes. This profile can then be applied to the model and the additional stereotypes can be used. We use UML with our own profile that extends UML with the ability to express requirements in a similar way as the SysML profile [7] extends UML. If a SysML model with blocks describing the context and requirements was given, we could use the same approach by extending SysML by the missing stereotypes and constraints. The decision to use UML instead of SysML was based on the already existing UML4PF framework with its extensive OCL validation and document generation capabilities.

For our different method steps, we require stereotypes that are not pre-existing. Therefore, we created profiles that hold all necessary stereotypes relevant to our method. An example for such a stereotype definition is shown in Fig. 2. In the graphical representation, i.e., the diagram, a stereotype is denoted by $\langle \text{stereotype}_\text{name} \rangle$, where stereotype_name denotes the corresponding type. For example, 3WTC in Fig. 1 has the stereotype item (denoted by $\langle \text{item} \rangle$) assigned, identifying it as the system to be built.

Another benefit of a model-driven approach based on UML is that it is possible to provide constraints, e.g., by using the Object-Constraint-Language (OCL) [8], on a model. This way, it is possible to specify syntactic and semantic checks. We specified OCL constraints for all our steps. An example for such an OCL constraint is given in Listing 1.

```
Dependency.allInstances()->select(getAppliedStereotypes().name->includes('realizes'))->forAll(f|
(source.getAppliedStereotypes().name->includes('SubsysComp')) and
(target.getAppliedStereotypes().name->includes('LogicalElement'))
```

Listing 1: Validation Condition 1M02LC
This expression is used to check that subsystems/components realize logical elements.

To perform the check, it is necessary to first select all (Line 2) dependencies (in Line 1) with the stereotypes «realizes» applied (using the EMF keyword `getAppliedStereo
types` in Line 1). For each of the dependencies matching the stereotype, it must be checked if it points from (using the EMF keyword `source` in Line 3) «SubsysComp» to (using the EMF keyword `target` in Line 4) «LogicalElement». The other validation conditions mentioned in this contribution are implemented in a similar way. Functional Safety should not be considered in isolation from systems engineering. Therefore, modeling both should be supported. Ideally, functional safety is integrated into systems engineering. Examples for such an integration in our approach are:

- In state machines developed for systems engineering, the stereotype «SafeState» is added to the appropriate states.
- In the architecture of the system, the stereotype «SubsysComp» is added to all components referenced by the functional safety requirements.
- «SafetyRequirement» is a special kind of «Requirement».

3. Case Study

In previous works, we used an electronic steering column lock (ESCL) as running example (see [1, 2, 9]). However, in this contribution, we introduce a new example: the three-wheeled-tilting control system (3WTC). 3WTC allows leaning the vehicle into a turn based on steering wheel angle and vehicle speed keeping it in balance. This improves stability at low speed curve driving and maneuverability in general. The system is part of the so called “Tilting three-wheeler”, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tilting_three-wheeler. This is a fictitious example system used for ISO 26262 training within Ford and there is no plan to develop such a system or vehicle. However, this example is selected for didactic reasons because its function is easy to understand and the system allows to explain various aspects of ISO 26262.

3.1. FIFS

In Sect. 2.3, we introduced the general structure of our process. Now, we will show how the previously published process steps are applied to the case study described in Sect. 3. This introduces the necessary data required to derive the Technical Safety Requirements Specification constituting the main contribution of this paper.

3.2. Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA)

As ISO 26262 is a risk-based functional safety standard, identifying hazards is a vital aspect. Therefore, we start our approach with identifying and classifying potential hazards of the item as described in [1]. In the following paragraphs, we apply the method on the 3WTC example.
1. Provide an Item Definition. ISO 26262 demands a definition of the item, its basic functionality, and its environment. As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, we use a context diagram to represent the item and the domains surrounding it. Figure 1 depicts the context diagram for 3WTC. It contains 3WTC as the item, as well as all relevant domains, e.g., driver, tilt actuator, to achieve tilting of the vehicle upon request. The function, we will further consider in our contribution is Tilting.

2. Instantiate Guide-Words. For the 3WTC example, we only consider the malfunctioning behavior no tilting and unintended tilting. A class with the stereotype \(\text{MalfunctioningBehavior} \) is used to describe any behavior that can be considered as a malfunction of the item. This class has a property \(\text{type: MFType} \), to link malfunctioning behavior and guide word to each other.

3. Situation Classification. Fig. 3 provides relevant situations for our case study (e.g., \(\text{DrivingAtHighSpeedMoreThan50kph} \)).

4. Hazard Identification. For our example, the combination of unintended tilting and driving at high speed was chosen as an example for a hazardous event (see HE3 in Fig. 3). The effect on the vehicle level, i.e., the effect that can be observed by the driver, is a self-steering behavior (see property \'effectOnVehicleLevel' in HE3).

5. Hazard Classification by Severity, Exposure, and Controllability. The objective of the hazard classification is to assess the level of risk reduction required for the hazardous event. We executed this step for the hazardous event HE3 from our 3WTC example. Figure 4 captures our results of the risk assessment for HE3 (given in Fig. 3). With the rating of S3, E4, and C2, we obtain an ASIL C.

6. Define and Verify Safety Goals. To address the hazardous event "Unintended tilting when driving at high speed", we derived the safety goal “Unintended tilting shall be prevented.” We can see that the safety goal is composed as avoiding the occurrence of the hazardous event. In this particular case, it is written as a more general form by
omitting the situation "when driving at speed". This enables us to assign this safety goal to further hazardous events related to similar situations. The safety goal is given in Fig. 3, right-hand side. The figure also provides the relations between safety goal, hazardous events, situations, and malfunctioning behavior.

### 3.3. Functional Safety Concept (FSC)

After the hazard analysis and risk assessment, the next step is to break down the high-level safety goals into functional safety requirements and allocate them to logical elements of a preliminary architecture as described in [2].

1. **Break-down safety goals into functional safety requirements.** Figure 5 illustrates the goal structure for deriving functional safety requirements for the safety goal obtained in Sect. 3.2 for the 3WTC example. For this particular safety goal, we derived a set of functional safety requirements. The naming convention we used is Feature abbreviation-F-S-Req running number. In Fig. 6, we show the warning and recovery concept (W&R) related to SG03. The starting point is **Strategy01.2.1**, the gray box in in Fig. 5. For the warning and recover concept, an additional two functional safety requirements have been derived. The first one (3WTC-F-S-Req04) deals with the concept of driver information and the second one (3WTC-F-S-Req05) with necessary recovery conditions.

2. **Specify all applicable attributes of the requirements.** To illustrate our approach, we select 3WTC-F-S-Req06 (see upper left-hand side of Fig. 5) as a representative of a
Table 1: 3WTC Attributes for 3WTC-F-S-Req06

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety Req-ID</th>
<th>Strategy/Subgoal</th>
<th>Operating Modes</th>
<th>Safety Goal Ref.</th>
<th>ASIL Classification (if applicable)</th>
<th>Safe State (if applicable)</th>
<th>Functional Safety Requirement</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Fault Tolerant Time Interval (if applicable)</th>
<th>Reduced Functionality Interval (if applicable)</th>
<th>Functional Redundancies (e.g., fault tolerance) (if applicable)</th>
<th>Description of actions of the driver or other endangered persons (if applicable)</th>
<th>Validation Criteria for these actions (if applicable)</th>
<th>V&amp;V method</th>
<th>V&amp;V acceptance criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3WTC-F-S-Req06</td>
<td>01.2 (strategy)</td>
<td>3WTC Normal Operation</td>
<td>SG03</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>No tilting</td>
<td>The 3WTC shall calculate a correct tilt angle based on vehicle speed and steering wheel angle.</td>
<td>Tilting shall be only performed if necessary.</td>
<td>200ms</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Design and methods review</td>
<td>Design and methods are appropriate for required ASIL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

safety related function requirement. The attributes, we must provide for this category are fault tolerant time (ftt), emergency operation interval (emergencyOpInterval), description of driver or other involved persons action (descriptionOtherPersonsAction), and validation criteria for the aforementioned actions (validationCriteriaForActions).

As a safety related function is also a functional safety requirement, the following attributes have to be provided, as well:

- related safety goal, sub-goal, strategy, *(These three attributes can be looked up in the related goal structure.)*
- operating modes, *(The related requirement is only valid for a given set of operating modes. Usually, some indication on the operating modes is given in the item definition)*
- purpose, *(The purpose of a safety requirement may be similar to the strategy or sub-goal if any exist.)*
- verification and validation method, *(An example for such a method could be testing.)*
- acceptance criteria considering verification and validation, *(An example for such criteria could be that all test cases pass.)*

3. Check for completeness of defined requirements. In our contribution, we consider only one safe state, namely *No tilting*. This safe state is covered by safety-related function 3WTC-F-S-Req06. For the assumptions *A1.1 Balance point is between wheels and A3.1 Tilting is only active during forward driving* general requirements 3WTC-F-S-Req10 and 3WTC-F-S-Req11 (not shown in this contribution) exist. For safe state *No tilting*, user information is covered by 3WTC-F-S-Req04, and recovery is covered by 3WTC-F-S-Req05 The only operating mode considered in this contribution is *3WTC Normal Operation*. This operating mode is referred to by 3WTC-F-S-Req01 – 3WTC-F-S-Req07. Within the scope set in this contribution, the investigation of requirements
necessary to ensure controllability referring to technical means or controls necessary for driver (or other persons involved) actions, no additional requirements have been identified.

4. ASIL decomposition. For our selected functional safety requirement 3WTC-F-S-Req06, no ASIL decomposition is necessary.

5. Allocation of Requirements. For our selected example, the requirement 3WTC-F-S-Req06 has been allocated to the logical elements 3WTC and TiltActuator (see Fig. 7).

6. Safety Analysis, Simulation, and Test. For our 3WTC example, the goal structures provided in Figs. 5 and 6 are sufficient qualitative analysis to show that the functional safety requirements are consistent and compliant to the safety goals and are able to mitigate or avoid the hazardous events. Simulation and tests are performed to check the controllability assumptions. However, the results of these analyses are not given in this contribution.

4. Technical Safety Requirements Specification (SRS) Method

In the previous step, we set up the functional safety concept (the final step in ISO26262’s concept phase) and derived a set of functional safety requirements and also obtained a preliminary architecture. In this step, we set up the safety requirement specification – a part of ISO26262’s product development at the system level phase. Our document covers the content required by ISO26262’s work products safety requirement specification, technical safety concept, and system design. The safety requirements specification is created by using the results from the functional safety concept:
the functional safety requirements are split up/refined to technical safety requirements,

- the technical safety requirements are allocated to logical elements of the preliminary architecture
- a system design is specified

Figure 8 depicts an overview of our method. We highlight for each activity the contribution of the OEM and its supplier.

**Step 1. Describe or Provide References to Technical Details.** The OEM provides the majority of information for this step and requests specific documentations of interfaces of components a supplier constructed. The supplier is just reacting upon demand of the OEM and has no active role in this step. The reason is that the OEM is responsible for the overall system and has the necessary overview to describe or demand descriptions of all parts.

We create safety requirements specifications describing how the safety measures located in the functional safety concept should be implemented and update the hazard analysis and risk assessment in case we identified new hazards or situations.

To derive the safety requirements specifications, we proceed as follows:

- **Describe or provide reference to details of external interfaces of the item.** The description from the item definition can be used and refined by specifying all parameters of the signals in detail.
- **Describe or provide reference to technical constraints.** Technical constraints are functionalities that are implemented in the same way for all vehicles.
- **Describe a functional overview of components/subsystems contained in the item.** Furthermore, describe a clear boundary of the item and its surroundings. State the main task and purpose for all elements located outside of the item boundary. For each component/subsystem the highest ASIL of the allocated functional safety requirements (for more details see [2]) is documented. The logical elements of our preliminary architecture are mapped to components/subsystems.

As a representative of the stereotypes we introduced for this step, we select ≪Subsys-Comp≫ (see Figure 10).

In the first step, we set the attributes description, inside, and asil. Figure 9 (center) shows these attributes for the relevant subcomponent Speed Sensor Module (SSM).

The *description* gives an overview on the realized functionality. Note that the property inside illustrates whether the component is inside the system boundary of the item. This information can usually be found in the item definition. The ASIL is set to the highest ASIL of the requirements referring to the subsystem or component.

Table 2 contains an excerpt of checks for this step. Remark: Instead of the actual OCL expression, we provide a short textual description of the purpose of the constraint (see e.g. Tab 2) for the remainder of this work.
Step 2. Describe System Level Architecture. The OEM describes the system architecture. This is usually an OEM task because the architecture requires complete information about the technical details. Any information required from the supplier should be gathered in the previous step.

The input is used to set up a system level architecture. This architecture may be represented, for example, as a UML composite diagram. The architecture in this step is enriched by a technical safety concept (e.g. redundancy) for every safety goal with an ASIL rating higher than ASIL B. Whenever redundancy is used, we are required to provide the type of redundancy (e.g. HW or SW). In addition, it is necessary to clarify if it is a diverse or homogeneous redundancy. In both cases, measures for handling potential dependent failures must be described.

In this step, the attributes safetyConcept, type, diverse, and measureForHandlingDependantFailures of ≪SubsysComp≫ have to be provided. For the subsystem component relevant to our 3WTC example, these values are set in the same way as those previously described.

Table 3 contains an excerpt of checks for this step.

Step 3. Specify Technical Safety Requirements. The OEM describes the OEM specific parts of the technical safety requirements. This is usually a task performed by the OEM, because the OEM has the knowledge of the overall architecture, while the
Step | ID  | Condition |
-----|-----|-----------|
1    | IM01DE | The description of components/subsystems is not allowed to be empty. In particular, each class with the stereotype `≪SubsysComp≫` must have an attribute 'description: String'. |
1    | IM02LC | Subsystems or components realize logical elements. A `≪realizes≫` stereotype is attached to a dependency from a class with the stereotype `≪SubsysComp≫` to a class with the stereotype `≪LogicalElement≫`. |

Table 2: SRS: Validation Conditions for Step 1 (excerpt)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
2    | 2C01SG | Every safety goal has to be realized by at least one component/subsystem. |
2    | 2C02DR | If a component realizes a safety goal with ASIL greater than ASIL B, a concept for redundancy shall be defined. |

Table 3: SRS: Validation Conditions for Step 2 (excerpt)

supplier knows isolated parts and cannot elicit technical safety requirements for parts unknown to it and in particular consider consequences of the interactions of known components with unknown components. However, it may also be the case that the supplier is responsible for deriving the relevant technical safety requirements depending on the project and item setup.

We now want to derive the technical safety requirements. To do this, we start with the functional safety requirement and the components or subsystems that realize this requirement. To find out which component or subsystems realize the functional safety requirement, the mapping from logical elements to components or subsystems is used. For the relevant elements of 3WTC, this mapping is shown in Fig. 9. For each component, the part of the functional requirement that should be realized, as well as its requirement text is described. For each technical safety requirement, a unique ID, the reference to the functional safety requirement it realizes, as well as the component or subsystem it is assigned to, is specified. The ASIL is derived from the ASIL of the functional safety requirement. Summarized, the following aspects have to be captured according to [3, Part 4, 6.4.2]:

- Reference to the functional safety requirement (FSR),
- Reference to the component/subsystem,
- Unique ID,
- ASIL (derived from the ASIL of the functional safety requirement),
- Technical safety requirement text,
- Purpose of the requirement,
- Safe state, and
- Category

The right-hand side of Fig. 11 contains all currently identified categories. For each functional safety requirement, we go through every category entry and decide whether it is relevant for the respective functional safety requirement. For those considered relevant, we fill out the corresponding template. Note that requirements of some categories (e.g., 'Decomposition' or 'Metric') may be defined at a later point.

Figure 9 shows three examples of technical safety requirements for our 3WTC example. For technical safety requirement 3WTC-T-S-Req06100, a subset of the just
mentioned attributes is given. To provide a better understanding, the corresponding functional safety requirement linked to the currently treated technical safety requirement is also provided (see grayed-out box in Fig. 9).

Table 4 provides an excerpt of consistency checks relevant to this step.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3M01ID</td>
<td>Technical safety requirements have a reference to a component/subsystem and a unique ID is set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3M02RA</td>
<td>Requirement text, purpose, and safe state have to be defined for all technical safety requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 4. Refine Requirements. The OEM refines the OEM specific parts of the technical safety requirements. This is an OEM task, because the OEM has the knowledge of the overall architecture, while the supplier knows isolated parts and cannot elicit technical safety requirements for parts unknown to it and in particular consider consequences of the interactions of known components with unknown components. Afterwards, the supplier is contacted to agree on these requirements.

At this place, the technical safety requirements of the previous step are investigated in more detail. The following activities have to be conducted:

- **Decomposition with independence argumentation.** For details on this topic, please refer to Part 8 of ISO 26262.

- **Hardware metric derivation and rationale.** Hardware metrics - as required by ISO 26262 part 5 - are derived and the break-down to components/subsystems is justified. This break-down of metric requirements enables a distributed development and is necessary to have a clear OEM/Supplier interface. The Maximum Probability of Safety Goal violation due to random Hardware Failures (PMHF) has to be achieved on safety goal level, i.e. by all components contributing to the Safety Goal. The PMHF value for SG03 has to be split into separated target values for the Steering Wheel Angle Provider, the Vehicle Speed Provider and the TiltActuator. In order to obtain the different target values, we first need to assign an initial value to the PMHF in question. We use the initial values to perform a fault tree analysis. Based on the outcome of this analysis, we can assign or adjust the PMHF for the respective module. The target value for the Vehicle Speed Provider is inserted into the refined requirement 3WTC-T-S-Req07141. If
redundancy concepts are applied and the fault detection is not limited to a single component, target values for Single Point Fault Metric (SPFM) and the Latent Fault Metric (LFM) have to be derived for each component. This calculation is based on the target values of the Safety Goal as given by ISO 26262. Otherwise, the SPFM and the LFM of the Safety Goal can be directly cascaded to all components that realize requirements derived from that Safety Goal.

- **Elicitation of requirements concerning the ability to configure a system by calibration data.** For details on this topic, please refer to the corresponding part of ISO 26262.

- **Identify Parameters used in several requirements.** For these parameters, boundary values should be defined. In the example, we refine 3WTC-T-S-Req06100. It makes use of the parameter “VSPEED_TOL”, representing the allowed tolerance of the vehicle speed value. For this parameter, we define a preliminary value needed for the correct calculation of the tilt angle. The constraint considered is that the upper boundary of the range is not hazardous.

- **Specify requirements for operation, service and decommissioning.** For details on this topic, please refer to the corresponding section of ISO 26262.

Within the tool, it is necessary to complete the properties which have been postponed in the previous step.

Table 6 shows the content inserted into the stereotype attributes for one technical safety requirement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4C01AF</td>
<td>The ASIL of the technical safety requirement is consistent to the ASIL in the corresponding functional safety requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4G02FF</td>
<td>Fault tolerant time interval is consistent with the corresponding functional safety requirement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: SRS: Validation Conditions for Step 4 (excerpt)

Table 5 introduces an excerpt of consistency checks.

**Step 5. Generate Documentation.** The OEM generates the initial set of documents that are presented in form of a template, which the supplier has to instantiate.

The OEM provides the content defined in the previous steps and the supplier adds the details, because the supplier has the knowledge of its components and the ability to perform the safety analysis for the component. The template is precise about which details are needed and reduces discussions and the risk of missing information in the overall safety analysis performed in the next step.

Based on the technical safety requirements, a document is generated for each relevant component/subsystem. These documents detail the supplier’s responsibilities.

Table 6 shows the table generated from the model for one technical safety requirement.

The component/subsystem provider has to define the architecture/redundancy concept including:

- A description of the architecture/redundancy concept
The vehicle speed provider shall provide correct vehicle speed with a tolerance of VSPEED_TOL, otherwise it marks it as being invalid.

Purpose
The vehicle speed is used to calculate a correct tilting angle.

Category
Safety Related Function Requirement

V&V Method
Review design and methods review at supplier. Vehicle test at all speed ranges. Fault insertion in sensor.

V&V Acceptance Criteria
Design and method are appropriate for required ASIL. Correct vehicle speed is delivered. Faults lead to quality flag = invalid.

Table 6: Generated Technical Safety Requirement

- The type of redundancy, e.g. information redundancy, time redundancy, hardware redundancy or software redundancy, including a justification why it is suitable
- A statement if diverse or homogeneous redundancy is used
- A description of measures for handling potential dependent failures

Furthermore, they have to define the latent fault handling including:

- Measures related to the detection and indication of faults in the component itself
- Avoidance of latent faults
- Multiple point fault detection interval
- Details on fault reaction

This information has to be made available for review purposes. Further relevant documents have to be referenced, as well.

Step 6: Perform Safety Analysis. Based on the documentation generated so far, the OEM performs a safety analysis. Note that the OEM asks the supplier for a safety analysis of subsystems that the supplier builds alone. The OEM conducts the safety analysis of the overall system without the supplier, because only the OEM has the knowledge of the overall system and all details provided by suppliers.

To perform the safety analysis, a reference to the design of components/subsystem should be given. The safety analysis shows compliance and consistency between the technical safety concept with its technical requirement, the functional safety concept, and the preliminary architecture. An analysis shall also verify the system design regarding compliance and completeness with regard to the technical safety concept.
This is why the description of components/subsystems in the respective stereotype «SubsysComp» has an attribute 'referenceToDesign: String'.

The safety analysis is performed using a structured fault tree. This fault tree will be subject of a planned publication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6C01RD</td>
<td>For each components/subsystems, the attribute referenceToDesign is not empty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6S01DE</td>
<td>Description of components/subsystems («SubsysComp» has attribute 'referenceToDesign: String')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: SRS: Validation Conditions for Step 6 (excerpt)

**Step 7. Perform Verification Review.** ISO 26262 requires to perform a verification review of the functional safety concept by a different person than the author of the review and a person who knows the technology of the system under development. This is supported by OCL validation constraints and the generation of a structured document from the model. The OEM performs the verification review without the supplier, due to its overall responsibility of the system. At this point in time the OEM should have gathered all required technical details in the previous steps of our method to conduct the verification review alone.

**5. Verification and Validation (V&V) Method**

The final FIFS step, we present in this contribution treats Verification and Validation (V&V) activities as described in [10] and we apply it to our 3WTC example.

**Step 1. Link Requirements and Safety Analyses.**

For our exemplary technical safety requirement 3WTC-T-S-Req06100 the linkage to the safety analysis is given in Fig. 12.

![Figure 12: 3WTC Linkage](image)

**Step 2. Plan V&V Activities.** Figure 13 depicts the V&V activities carried out for checking 3WTC-T-Req06100.

**Step 3. Plan Responsibilities and Due Dates.** The specification of the test case for the technical safety requirement 3WTC-T-S-Req06100 is done by the engineers responsible for the SSM component development at the suppliers side. The review of the test case is done by the OEM, the responsible person is the safety consultant of the 3WTC development project. This is depicted on the left-hand side of Fig. 14.

---

5Test results as well as FMEA and FTA results may have an influence on safety requirements. In our method, this relation is implicit, for example, modifying a safety requirement due to a test result, FMEA...
**Step 4. Provide Engineering Activity Feedback for Technical Safety Requirements.** For the selected example, the supplier engineer creates a test case for the component SSM, covering 3WTC-T-S-Req06100. This test case is part of the test specification Testplan_SSM_v12.02.pdf (see right-hand side of Fig. 14), therefore, the engineer provides this information, including a reference to the document section containing the test case.

**Step 5. Safety V&V for Technical Safety Requirements.** For the selected example, the OEM Safety Consultant reviews the referenced test case and checks it against 3WTC-T-S-Req06100. The review result is, that the test case is correctly defined and addresses all safety relevant aspects of the technical safety requirement (see Fig. 14).

**Step 6. Provide Engineering Activity Feedback for Functional Safety Requirements and Safety Goals.** The attribute **engineeringFeedback** is set in this step as depicted in Fig. 13 for the technical safety requirement.

**Step 7. Safety V&V for Functional Safety Requirements.** The approach here is similar to the one described in Step 5. The difference is that the functional safety requirement (for our example this would be 3WTC-F-S-Req01) is addressed in this step.

**Step 8. Perform Confirmation Review.** For the selected example, an external safety consultant reviews the V&V report and sets all attributes in the class with the stereotype ≪VaVConfirmation≫ as shown in Fig. 15.

This step concludes our method.

---

or FTA result. After the modification, the test case, FMEA or FTA is updated/executed using the new requirement. This iteration is not documented in the model itself, but it is visible in the change management of the respective test case, FMEA or FTA.
6. Tool Support

In sect.2.4, we stated how the previously document-driven approach could be transferred to a model-driven one. We now describe how this model-driven approach can be fitted with tool-support. When deciding on tool-support, one has to decide whether to develop a new tool or to use an existing one and adapt it. In our case, we used the latter approach.

We use a tool called UML4PF, developed at the University of Duisburg-Essen, and integrated support for FIFS as described in Sects. 3.2 – 5 into it. UML4PF is based on the Eclipse platform [11] together with its plug-ins EMF [12] and OCL [8]. Our UML-profiles are conceived as an Eclipse plug-in, extending the EMF meta-model. The OCL constraints are integrated directly into the profile. Thus, it is possible to automatically check the constraints using the validation mechanisms provided by Eclipse.

After the developer has drawn some diagram(s) using an EMF-based editor, for example Papyrus UML [13] and applied our stereotypes, UML4PF provides him or her with the following functionality: it checks if the developed model is valid and consistent by using our OCL constraints (represented textually throughout this contribution). It returns the location of invalid parts of the model, and generates documentation that can be used for the manual validation and review activities.

7. Related Work

HARA. We are not aware of any publications about a structured and model-based hazard analysis and risk assessment for automotive systems equipped with integrity checks.

Two hazard analysis methods are compared by Törner et al. [14]. The paper shows that the adapted functional failure analysis (FFA) is less time-consuming than the method of the European Space Agency (ESA method). The method presented is this paper is based on the results of [14].

The entire safety life-cycle including hazard analysis and risk assessment is presented by Baumgart [15]. Our method can complement the hazard analysis of Baumgart’s safety life-cycle.

The Safety Management System and Safety Culture Working Group provides guidance on hazard identification by different means, e.g., brainstorming, HAZOP, checklists, FMEA [16]. Their results are considered in the method presented in this paper.

Jesty et al. [17] give a guideline for the safety analysis of vehicle-based systems, including system analysis, hazard identification, hazard analysis, identification of safety integrity levels, FMEA, and fault tree analysis. Their work also uses the HAZOP guidelines, but they focus on the safety integrity level as defined in the IEC 61508 and not on the ASIL from ISO 26262. Jesty et al. additionally address FMEA and fault tree analysis for analyzing existing systems, but do not consider a model or validation conditions.

In contrast to our work, which focuses on the determination of necessary risk reduction, following papers describe model-based approaches specific for later development phases, when the system is already designed and not the determination of necessary risk reduction:
Papadopoulos and Grante [18] propose a process that addresses both cost and safety concerns and maximizes the potential for automation to address the problem of increasing technological complexity. It combines automated safety analysis with optimization techniques.

Li and Zhang [19] present a comprehensive software hazard analysis method, which applies a number of hazard analysis techniques, and the proposed method is applied to a software development process of a control system. The described method for hazard analysis is similar but less detailed than ours.

Mehrpouyan [20] proposes a model-based hazard analysis procedure (based on SysML models) for the early identification of potential safety issues caused by unexpected environmental factors and subsystem interactions within a complex safety-critical system. The proposed methodology additionally maps hazard and vulnerability modes to specific components in the designed system and analyzes the hazards.

Zhang et al. [21] propose a comprehensive hazard analysis method based on functional models. It mainly addresses fault tree analysis and FMEA.

Giese et al. [22] present an approach that supports the compositional hazard analysis of UML models described by restricted component and deployment diagrams. It also starts with environment models, but then focuses on the safety analysis of the design.

Hauge and Stølen [23] introduce the SaCS method. The method provides guidance on how to select and use patterns for the development of safety control systems. The patterns are categorized into process and product patterns. This work differs from our own, because we focus specifically on early hazard analysis and provide detailed guidance.

FSC. Basir, Denny, and Fischer [24] present goal structures for safety cases in the automotive sector. They do not focus on the technical realization but consider the entire safety process with their documents as entities.

Dittel and Aryus [25] present an overview of V&V activities at Ford Motor Company applied for the lane keeping aid system. This paper also presents elements of the process for functional safety according to ISO 26262, i.e. the analysis activities.

Sinha [26] illustrates an example of a brake-by-wire system for road vehicles including a safety and reliability analysis compliant to ISO 26262. The conclusions derive suggestions for future projects, such as that the system architecture of road vehicles shall support the detection of failures and have the means to still provide desired services until the failures are repaired.

Palin et al. [27] provide guidelines for safety practitioners and researchers to create safety cases compliant to the ISO 26262 standard. The authors propose extensions of the Goal Structuring Notation, patterns, and a number of re-usable safety arguments for creating safety cases. For confidentiality reasons, the authors cannot show example instantiations of their patterns or generic arguments.

Conrad et al. [28] compares software tools that support ISO 26262 certification. The authors identified a list a qualification requirements for selecting ISO 26262 support tools. The publication also contains a report about Conrad et al.’s experience with these tools.
Hillebrand et al. [29] discuss how to develop electric and electronic architectures (EEA) compliant with the ISO 26262 standard. The authors focus on safety requirements during early development phases. Hillenbrand et al. present a method for eliciting safety requirements, and mapping their safety concerns to functions of design artifacts. Previously, Hillebrand et al. [30] proposed a model-based and tool-supported approach for the failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) of EAAs compliant to ISO 26262. The authors contribute a formalized method for eliciting and analyzing data for a FMEA.

Habli et al. [31] propose a process for model-based assurance for justifying automotive functional safety. They use SysML and GSN as graphical notations. Their goal and ours is similar. We both want to support a method based on ISO 26262 to derive functional safety requirements. In contrast to their work, we use UML, which gives us a broader spectrum of modeling possibilities. Furthermore, we provide tool support for our method and equipped our approach with formal consistency checks on the model. These checks can be automatically checked by our tool. In addition, our way of modeling allows us to trace elements within our models.

Born et al. [32] report on lessons learned from applying a model-based approach for ISO 26262 certification. The authors also discuss the advantages of models instead of text in the ISO 26262 certification process.

SRS. We are not aware of any publication about a structured and model-based safety requirements analysis with a focus on the OEM-supplier interface for automotive systems equipped with integrity checks. Chen et al. [33] provide modeling support for ISO 26262 software development. In contrast to our work, the authors focus on providing support for the analysis of malfunctions and the hazards they cause. In particular, the work illustrates how to model errors and error propagation in an automotive system.

Habili et al. [34] show a model-based method for creating a functional safety concept compliant to ISO 26262. The authors extend the SysML modeling notation with new diagram types. Different to our work, their approach is limited to functional safety requirements that are elicited based on diagrams. Moreover, they do not provide formal OCL checks nor a structured method.

Tang et al. [35] present an approach for explicitly integrating the supplier into the product life-cycle of automotive development. The authors present a high level process for the entire product life-cycle management, and in contrast to our work do not focus on detailed requirements analysis.

The entire safety life-cycle including safety requirements analysis is presented by Baumgart [15], who also considers the supplier interface. Our method can complement the analysis of Baumgart’s safety life-cycle, because we offer a greater level of detail.

The Safety Management System and Safety Culture Working Group provides guidance on functional safety development by different means, e.g., brainstorming, HAZOP, checklists, FMEA [16]. Their work considers also the interface between systems and stakeholders, but does not focus in particular on a supplier interface or the automotive industry.

Jesty et al. [17] give a guideline for the safety analysis of vehicle-based systems, including system analysis, hazard identification, hazard analysis, identification of safety integrity levels, FMEA, and fault tree analysis. They focus on the safety integrity level.
as defined in the IEC 61508 and not on ASIL from ISO 26262. Jesty et al. do not consider a model or validation conditions and do not focus on the supplier interface.

In contrast to our work, who focuses on the safety requirements analysis concerning the supplier interface, the following papers describe model-based approaches specific for later development phases, when the system is already designed and not the determination of necessary risk reduction:

Papadopoulos and Grante [18] propose a process that addresses both cost and safety concerns and maximizes the potential for automation to address the problem of increasing technological complexity. It combines automated safety analysis with optimization techniques.

Giese et al. [22] present an approach that supports the compositional hazard analysis of UML models described by restricted component and deployment diagrams. It also starts with environment models, but then focuses on the safety analysis of the design and does not focus on the supplier interface.

VfV. We are not aware of any publication about a model-based structured validation and verification of automotive systems with a focus on the OEM-supplier interface for automotive systems equipped with integrity checks. Maropoulos et al. [36] presented a survey of industrial verification and validation efforts. The report presents evidence that verification and validation of products and processes is vital for complex products and in particular modeling and planning of such methods are an ongoing research challenge. Sinz et al. [37] used formal methods to validate automotive product configuration data. In contrast to our work, their method specifically focuses on detecting inconsistencies in product configurations of vehicles to support business decisions. Instead we focus on technical verification and validation efforts. Bringman et al. [38] described the impact model-driven design has in the automotive industry and showed how models can be used to derive test cases during different steps of the automotive product life-cycle. In contrast to our work Bringman et al. focus exclusively on model-based testing of automotive systems. Dubois et al. [39] presented a method for model-based validation and verification efforts to check if the final product matches initial requirements. In contrast to our work Dubois et al. focus on using UML-based models to create test cases for more detailed implementation models in e.g. SIMULINK. Montevechi et al. [40] focuses on the simulation of processes in the automotive industry. Their methodology builds simulation models to analyze which combinations of variables can lead to problems. Within the automotive industry, different activities are started to extend the safety processes with model-based system engineering aspects, mainly focusing on architecture description and semiautomatic safety analyses [41].

Tool. Software-based support tools are described in [32, 42]. Born et. al. [32] describe requirements on such tools and Makartetskiy et. al. [42] compare different tools. Our approach fulfills the requirements stated by Born et. al. [32]. Makartetskiy et. al. [42] state that the commercial product Medini Analyze can be used to create the

---

first functional safety work products. Our experience also shows that even in the later
development phases on supplier side, the tool can be used to perform safety analyses.
Nevertheless, the SysML model extension of "Medini Analyze" is kept confidential as
an intellectual property of the tool producer and in contrast to "Medini Analyze", we
force the developers to give (as required by ISO 26262) rationals for the derivation of
safety requirements.

8. Conclusion

Our method has been applied to several Ford of Europe projects. However, the
formal validation conditions and tool support was not used in these projects and was
developed as contribution for this paper. We are confident that this contribution will
ensure the same consistency and correctness of future verification & validation with
less effort than the manual approach currently used.

The main contribution of our approach is a Structured Method helping to:

- select relevant situations from the hierarchically organized profile for the hazard
  analysis to reduce the risk of forgetting a relevant situation,
- ensure that only situations are considered that are relevant for the function in
  question,
- describe the effect of a malfunction on system and on vehicle level to make the
  hazard analysis comprehensible for different stakeholders and enable an efficient
  team verification of the hazard analysis,
- structure the analysis in different steps on different levels and foster an alignment
  between the analysis and the organizations (departments with experts regarding
  hardware/software, system level, vehicle/functional level) involved in the cre-
  ation and review of the analysis,
- support the definition of safety goal definitions suitable to derive the system de-
  sign,
- derive functional safety concepts for the automotive domain compliant to ISO
  26262,
- ensure consistency between the safety requirements, safety analyses and safety
  V&V,
- define a complete set of V&V activities, including reviews, analyses, simula-
  tions and tests by using pre-defined V&V activities based on the category of the
  requirement,
- allocate the V&V activities between OEM and the involved suppliers,
- define due dates,
- collect and assess the V&V results for all requirements, and
- provide input to the safety case.

In this paper, we describe the overall process and add a structured method for re-
quirements management, helping to

- define the interface to the suppliers and address functional safety,
- break down the functional safety requirements into technical safety requirements,
• perform a metric breakdown,
• ensure the completeness of technical safety requirements by using tables with predefined cells.

Our UML profile contains all relevant elements for a hazard analysis, functional safety concept, technical safety requirements specification and safety V&V. The UML profile provides the basis for creating a model for the safety development in compliance with ISO 26262. Thus, we provide a computer-aided technique to discover errors in the complete safety development process caused by inconsistencies or errors in one or more (UML) diagrams. In addition, the model-based approach enables us to re-use the models, or parts hereof, for similar projects assuming that the same tool base is used.

The safety development documents, including the supplier interface, in practice are currently document based using spreadsheet-processing tools from Microsoft Office. We propose to conduct the analysis on UML models and to create tables from the models for the different artifacts. Thus, we use a model-based approach, but the suppliers will receive the same type of documentation they are used to.

In the future, we will extend the approach to Safety Analysis and Safety Management. Currently, Ford is implementing tool support in NoMagics MagicDraw. Ford is also creating import and export functionality for their current templates and is developing an interface to requirements management tools.

References


