Mobility of Labour versus Capital: A Global Governance Perspective

Stuart Rosewarne & Nicola Piper
INTRODUCTION

The mobility of people can be defined as one of the pillars of globalisation because of the positive effects it can engender for global economic development. Yet, the governance of migration contrasts with other dimensions of globalisation. The liberalisation of international trade, money and finance has been backed by an internationally-endorsed governance architecture. There has not been a comparable counterpart regulating migration. Increased migration and movement of refugees have exposed this lacuna, resulting in what we characterise as the *securitisation-liberalisation paradox*: the challenge in advancing the development promise of international migration and reconciling it with maintaining the integrity of national sovereignty without compromising human and labour rights. The United Nations’ (UN) Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration articulate a raft of governance principles and instruments to encourage international cooperation. However, the preoccupation with ensuring national sovereignty has prevailed to the detriment of furthering a post-migration paradigm with respect to human and labour rights. What is needed is a broader focus on migration, a better understanding of its various forms and a rights-based approach in migration governance.
APPROACHES TO GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY

Global labour market liberalisation

By implementing the Global Compact, we ensure effective respect for and protection and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, across all stages of the migration cycle.”

“Migration contributes to positive development outcomes and to realizing the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially when it is properly managed. The Global Compact aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievement of all Sustainable Development Goals (…).”

National sovereignty to restrict labour mobility

“By implementing the Global Compact, we ensure effective respect for and protection and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, across all stages of the migration cycle.”

“The Global Compact reaffirms the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law.”

“Migration contributes to positive development outcomes and to realizing the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially when it is properly managed. The Global Compact aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievement of all Sustainable Development Goals (…).”

Source: Authors
1. LABOUR MOBILITY IN TIMES OF GLOBALISATION

The steady growth in international labour mobility has been one of the defining pillars of globalisation. From the World Bank’s tentative speculations in the *Workers in an Integrating World* 1995 report that liberalising global labour markets would enhance the pace of economic development (World Bank 1995), the Bank is now more strident than ever in asserting the importance of international labour migration.

There has been a marked and sustained increase in international migration in the decade following the global financial crisis [see Figure 2]. A substantial proportion of this growth is attributed to those migrating for work. In 2017, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that almost two-thirds of international migrants were migrant workers [see Figure 3]. The number of migrant workers increased by 9% compared to the 2013 estimate (ILO 2018, p. ix).

The overwhelming majority of international migrants have their origin in the Global South. The principal destinations for migrants are in the Global North, with the Gulf states also key destinations [see Figure 4, p. 8/9]. This is reflected in the regional concentration of migrant workers, although South-South migration has become increasingly significant [see Figure 5, p. 10].

Recruitment of migrant workers can help overcome labour force shortfalls, especially where the demand for skilled and professional workers cannot readily or fully be met domestically. In many countries of origin, export of labour serves as a socio-political valve to ease pressure in regard to the notorious problem of un- and underemployment locally. The opportunities for transnational migration can further assist in the acquisition, sharing and diffusion of new skills, enhancing productivity and contributing to more efficient and effective utilisation of the world’s stock of labour resources. A much-emphasised aspect of the catalytic force of international labour migration is the prospect of migrant workers from the Global South being gainfully employed and earning an income, resulting in their ability to remit parts of their earnings to their home countries or accumulate savings for use post-return.

In the narrative of a migration-development nexus as emanating from global governing institutions, migrant workers’ remittances help to generate foreign exchange earnings, thereby contributing to redress an economy’s external imbalance, support the health and wellbeing of families and provide funds that can be invested in new business initiatives to expand employment opportunities. This, at least, is the theory behind the largely celebratory tenor around the migration-development nexus today.

**FIGURE 2**
Slow rise of migrant population as share of world population
*The international migrant population in total numbers and as a proportion of the world’s population, 1990–2017*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>International migrant population (in million)</th>
<th>International migrant population as proportion of world’s population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockTotal_2017.xlsx, Table 1/Table 3

**FIGURE 3**
Migrant workers constitute 70% of migrants of working age
*Global estimates of the stock of international migrants and migrant workers, 2017 (in million)*
HALF OF ALL INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS LIVE IN ONLY 10 COUNTRIES

Top 20 of origins and destinations of international migrants, 2017 (in million)

Source: UN DESA 2017, pp. 6/13

Largest populations of international migrants from a single country/area of origin living in a single country/area of destination, 2017 (in million)

Source: UN DESA 2017, p. 14
Worker remittances flowing from the Global North to the Global South are more substantial than overseas development assistance and, in many cases, foreign direct investment (World Bank 2017, p. 3). Yet, for all its celebration of the migration-development nexus, the World Bank acknowledges that migration governance must be improved. The exploitative and abusive conditions faced by many migrant workers have to be rectified and the development impetus of labour migration bolstered [see also Figure 6, p. 16/17].

The asymmetry in the patterns of international migration has become a politically volatile subject. Increasing transnational migration into several countries of the Global North has generated highly vocal anti-immigration sentiments. These sentiments have escalated in the wake of the recent surges in refugees seeking asylum in Europe and elsewhere. They have been amplified by retreat to economic nationalism. The World Bank acknowledged this challenge when proselytising the economic advantages of Workers in an Integrating World. The Bank conceded the possibility that open borders could result in fears that the Global North could be inundated particularly with low-skilled migrant workers, and that a state’s right to restrict transnational labour movement to preserve the political and territorial integrity of the ‘nation’ should be respected, a position that it has reiterated (World Bank 2002, 2017).

Historically, national sovereignty was not regarded as being antithetical to broadly-based migration per se. Indeed, there are numerous instances where immigration has been integral to nation-building. Immigration, especially of skilled and professional migrant workers, is generally regarded as a positive force in national economic development. This continues to be the case. In contrast, the immigration of low-skilled workers, and particularly those from different cultural or religious origins, is more likely to face opposition. This is not uncommonly expressed in terms of fears of inundation and of such workers becoming an economic burden on the nation. Such sentiments have not stopped migrants being recruited to meet crucial labour market needs, but one of the ways in which the concerns have been allayed is by restricting admission on a temporary (or circular) basis.

The differentiation of skilled and professional workers being afforded resettlement and often citizenship rights and low-skilled workers with restricted residence conditions, has too frequently translated into limiting low-skilled workers’ access to rights enjoyed by residents and citizens. Migrants end up disproportionately in sectors or types of work which are notoriously under-regulated or neglected by authorities (e.g. labour inspection) – and at times even by labour unions (Berg 2017; Hennebry et al. 2016). From the perspective of migrants’ grassroots organisations and migrant rights advocates, too little attention has been given to promoting migrant workers’ labour and human rights, especially with regard to hiring and employment practices experienced by the two-thirds of all migrant workers who are employed in low-skilled occupations (ILO 2017).

Recognising that international migration has not been to the benefit of all those involved, we contend that migration governance, as the outcome of global processes, has been subordinated to economically instrumentalist objectives. Participants in migration processes, which can include states, corporations, employers, the raft of labour market intermediaries that lubricate labour mobility and bureaucrats, have been set on capturing the material benefits generated through labour migration while minimising the costs they can incur. This has frequently been married to efforts to externalise costs that arise in the course of managing migrants and/or migration, such as by impressing on transit countries the responsibility for restricting people’s movement.

To demonstrate this, we begin our discussion by summarising developments in the institutional and discursive manifestation(s) of the global governance of migration, followed by a section providing critical insights into the politics
surrounding the debate on the migration-development nexus. Taking us back to the securitisation-liberalisation paradox, the last section further underpins our argument about states’ reinforced preoccupation with national sovereignty to the detriment of furthering a post-migration paradigm when it comes to human and labour rights.

2. THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF REVIVED ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

The endeavour to raise the governance of cross-border mobility to the global level has been guided or informed by numerous international organisations which have approached this project from different perspectives. Broadly summarised, these perspectives are: (1) the economic approach based on the facilitation of mobility, (2) the securitisation approach focused on controlling borders and population flows (exit and entry) and (3) the rights-based approach derived from United Nations conventions and ILO’s international labour standards [see Figure 1, p. 4/5]. The first two approaches are the constituent components of what has been named management of migration and championed by many governments and employer organisations. The latter approach emanates mostly from civil society organisations and labour unions.

Given the various priorities and interests by the many stakeholders involved, the attempt to arrive at an agreeable global framework has become a delicate balancing act. At the core of this balancing act lies the tension between global labour market liberalisation and the exercise of national sovereignty to restrict labour mobility which has exposed a fundamental anomaly in the globalisation project. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are endowed with the authority to compel state compliance with the liberal economic order and liberalise international trade, money and capital flows. But there is no international institutional counterpart that has the authority to require state policies to conform to internationally-agreed standards or protocols with respect to transnational migration and employment. Some concerted efforts have been made to address the absence of an internationally-agreed regulatory framework for governing international migration. But beyond the pressure of moral suasion, the internationally-agreed conventions and protocols formulated within the United Nations and the ILO, which set some minimum standards for migrant workers, have proved to be quite ineffective and weak (e.g. the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the ILO’s Convention concerning Migration for Employment (C97) and, most recently, the Domestic Workers Convention (C189)). They remain under-ratified or are being watered down when implemented. This has resulted in the continuing and widespread occurrence of low-paid, low-skilled and short-term contracts of employment which subject the migrants to exploitative and abusive recruitment and employment experiences (see Human Rights Watch’s work on migrant workers, e.g. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/06/lebanon-migrant-workers-abuse-account; Verité 2014). Efforts to reconcile the economic and rights-based approaches to migration have led the United Nations to use international development as the key frame for multilateral discussions on migration establishing the so-called migration-development nexus (Piper 2017). This is also evident from the most recent negotiations around the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (see Forum section in Global Social Policy 18/3, 2018). The Compact is the culmination of two years of deliberations that brought together the ambitions embodied in the UN and ILO conventions that were designed to set minimum standards for migrant workers and in the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It is predicated on non-binding principles and voluntary guidelines on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations based on comprehensive international cooperation.

3. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE BIRTH OF A GLOBAL AGENDA

Debate within and outside the United Nations has sought to address the migration-development nexus for quite a while, commencing with the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006 and followed by the Joint Migration and Development Initiative over 2008–2012 or the regularly-convened Global Forum on Migration and Development which has involved state and non-state actors (but is state-driven).

Throughout these deliberations – and indicative of the tensions outlined above – the importance of international labour migration as a critical force in the
making of globalisation has not been questioned, and this is also the case with respect to the notion that migration is a crucial development catalyst.

Much energy has been invested in these debates with little concrete success. One strategy that has aimed to circumvent the impasse has been for labour-export countries to negotiate bilateral labour migration agreements with migrant worker destination countries. Two of the most significant sources of low-skilled workers, the Philippines and Indonesia, have struck bilateral agreements with destination countries that prescribe guidelines on recruitment, terms of employment and minimum rates of remuneration as well as reference to some labour rights. Not all such agreements are honoured to the letter of the law, and in some instances, mostly involving Asian labour-export states, the agreements take the form of non-binding Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). In these instances, where it is predominantly unskilled workers who are affected, MoUs provide virtually no bases for enforcing understandings. Further instruments that are being negotiated are the economic development partnership agreements or free trade agreements that include provisions specifying labour mobility. Some of these agreements are specifically concerned with opening up opportunities for particular categories of service workers who can be recruited from overseas, in effect, building on the very limited Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that governments of the Global South had tried to negotiate to broaden the scope for overseas employment.

Perhaps the first notable watershed moment in garnering near universal endorsement of the coupling of labour migration with development and migrants’ labour and human rights has been the UN’s 2030 Agenda (ILO n.d. (b)). The 2030 Agenda builds on the UN’s earlier sustainable development agenda by explicitly embracing the ILO’s decent work and fair migration ambitions. While aspirational, it set out the bases of the Compact for Migration.

The 2016 canvassing of a respective Compact, together with the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, signalled an intention to establish a global regulatory and governance order that pointed the way to how nation state sovereignty can be reconciled with the liberalisation of global labour mobility, and, as the ILO contended, could provide the institutional architecture “to forge policies to maximize the benefits of labour migration for all those involved” (ILO n.d. (a)). The fruitful consummation of the marriage of migration with (sustainable) development is, in the view of the ILO, contingent upon protecting labour rights and promoting “safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants” (Sustainable Development Goal 8.8, cited ILO n.d. (b)).

4. TOWARDS A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH

Nevertheless, as encouraging as this development is, the trend demonstrates how the economic approach to the facilitation of mobility clearly outweighs the human-rights approach to international migration. In turn, this also shows the notorious difficulty of advancing and promoting a rights-based approach to both migration and development. On a positive (and general) note, after decades of treating the domains of human rights and development as separate in the migration discourse, there has finally been a shift in thinking about human rights as a central feature of the development process. This shift was first and foremost triggered by the belief that state-led approaches to development have failed in the delivery of individual well-being and empowerment – and the resultant realisation that a need exists to place the individual at the centre of the development process (Sen 1999). Rights have thereby come to be seen as a useful conduit. Rights theory serves to define individual injustice and to frame advocacy efforts as urgent and justified claims in order to tackle the multiple forms of exclusion experienced by ‘the marginalised many’ (the poor, women, children, migrants) with regard to certain issues or policy fields (e.g. food, water, housing, social protection and decent work).

Aligning human rights and development agendas more closely on a global scale and thus addressing global inequality had become an issue already during the era when newly independent former colonies entered the UN in the 1960s and 1970s; at that time without a focus on migration yet. Their key demand was for a new international economic order, which would transform notions of aid as charity to becoming a matter of social justice, voice and entitlement. One outcome was the Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986 (Marks 2004). Despite its non-binding nature, this Declaration is seen as constituting a key milestone since “rather than confine itself to a conventional understanding of rights as being about state-citizen relations, it places an emphasis on the global dimension. Pointing to inequalities between North and South, it stresses the ‘collective obligation of all states’” (Nyamu-Musembi/Cornwall 2004, p. 8).
FIGURE 6

POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF LABOUR MIGRATION...

More efficient and effective utilisation of the world’s stock of labour resources

- Overcoming labour force shortfalls
- Development through remittances
- Easing pressure in regard to the un- and underemployment
- Acquisition, sharing and diffusion of new skills

...AND ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS

- Precarity of low-skilled migrants
- Brain drain
- Violation of migrant workers’ labour and human rights/modern form of slavery
- Privatisation and securitisation of migration governance
- Anti-immigration sentiments

For the benefit of overcoming labour force shortfalls in more developed economies

Source: Authors
Evidently, this led to the re-politicisation of underdevelopment and poverty in relation to global inequalities, which was, however, countered in the course of the late 1980s and 1990s by certain countries questioning the types of rights that were seen as developmental concerns. Unsurprisingly, much of the resistance to economic and social rights came from the West (especially the USA) who feared three consequences: that the focus on economic and social rights would detract attention from the ‘classical’ political rights and freedoms, that this would weaken the West ideologically in its struggle with Real Socialism and that the West would have to pay the bill for opening up economic and social rights to litigation.

The end of the Cold War made possible a more comprehensive view of rights. Thus the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights established the principle of both the indivisibility and the universality of human rights. Today, the main hurdle to the acceptance of a rights-based approach to migration concerns the freedom of movement and the idea of non-citizens/non-nationals having rights, especially when arriving ‘uninvited’ or in an irregular, unauthorised (‘illegal’) manner. As numerous studies have shown, undocumented migrants are among the most exploited. Public support for their rights at work is limited, if it exists at all. As observed by one of the authors during the negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration, there is much opposition to establishing firewalls between law enforcement concerned with immigration rules and workplace jurisdiction.

When on the global level attention is being paid to measures aimed at re-dressing the precarious position of those migrant workers recruited into the low-paid, low-skilled occupations, it is in the context of the most vulnerable. Precarity is seen to be associated with victims of human or labour trafficking and not a general phenomenon that is evident across the spectrum of occupations and employment relations. Yet, precisely how development is linked to migration and what exactly is meant by development remains somewhat opaque. This observation is not to dismiss the critical importance of exposing and combatting the exploitative and abusive conditions experienced by migrant workers. Rather, we argue for the need to broaden the focus on migration processes to reveal the multiple development trajectories that have contributed to the making of globalisation. In addition to such broadening, there has to be a deepening in the form of breaking down the category of migrant worker into the increasingly complex types of migrants to ascertain what the role of various forms of migration is in these trajectories.

5. THE SECURITISATION-LIBERALISATION PARADOX

The need to pay more attention to the meaning of migration for development is all the more pressing given the paradoxical shifts in state migration governance priorities. Over the course of the last decade, and particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis, successive annual International Migration Outlook reports by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have observed a trend for member states to tighten their humanitarian migration programmes and introduce measures that make family reunion more restrictive. At the same time, there has been greater emphasis on expanding the intakes of migrant workers to meet particular labour market needs and to introduce labour migration programmes that afford different resident and citizenship opportunities according to economic and labour market status. In the 2017 International Migration Outlook the OECD reported that many countries had expanded resettlement programmes in response to the surge in refugees, but that protection outside the 1951 UN Refugee Convention had become less favourable. Many countries were “implementing stricter border controls and stricter verification of entries and stays” at the same time reviewing and improving “policies for attracting high skilled foreign workers, entrepreneurs and investors, offering them more channels for entry and better conditions for residence” (OECD 2017, p. 9).

The setting up of schemes for fast track pathways to citizenship, too, has become a hallmark of migration policies for many countries, motivated by the objective to attract capital investment. In Europe, Austria, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are among the states that have taken advantage of the wide discretionary powers of the state regarding the issuance of passports and the granting of citizenship to establish Investor Visa Programmes, or “golden visa” schemes, that provide for the fast-tracking of residence and citizenship visa applications (Transparency International 2018). Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have introduced similar schemes.

Migration policies have become more economically instrumental in signalling how best to address labour shortfalls in particular occupations. The adoption of score systems, which prioritise visa applications from migrants with professional and skilled qualifications, has become an increasingly common practice in several OECD countries. Health sector workers and ICT specialists have been welcomed and issued with reasonably well-defined
residence-to-citizenship pathways. In contrast, recourse to migrant workers to meet labour market requirements in a range of sectors has relied on temporary labour migration programmes. Migrant workers recruited to undertake low-paid domestic and/or care work, seasonal agriculture, hospitality and construction work are being employed through working holiday maker programmes, which provide limited work possibilities, seasonal worker schemes or under the terms of international study programmes that include the right to engage in waged work for a set number of hours. These schemes explicitly restrict the duration of residence work permits, forbid family reunion and generally afford very little opportunity for permanent residence. This cohort is likely to be subjected to abusive and exploitative employment experiences. The obstacles that frustrate any redress simply highlight the disconnect between migration policy and industrial law.

As the liberalisation of migration policy has shifted the relative significance of labour migration vis-à-vis humanitarian and family reunion migration, there has also been a significant reorientation in migration governance. Governments are outsourcing an increasing number of stages of the recruitment, vetting and placement processes to private operators. International airlines and shipping companies are now charged with responsibility for ensuring that transborder travellers possess the appropriate visas. Transnational manpower (sic) corporations support the recruitment of professional and skilled workers, indicating the extent to which migration has turned into a commercial for-profit industry. It is an industry, involving labour brokers, recruitment agencies, training enterprises, financiers and a host of ancillary service providers which contribute to the organisation of global labour migration chains. The industry also plays a role in the securitisation of migration through enterprises that operate detention centres or that are contracted to deport undocumented workers.

The securitisation of migration has become big business. This aspect of migration governance reflects the broadening of the scope of controlling migration as compared to protecting the migrants. This is evident in the labour recruitment industry where industry associations have sought to improve the sector’s reputation through the adoption of ethical standards and codes of conduct which, however, cannot be guaranteed let alone enforced (Forde/MacKenzie 2010). This is also evident with regard to the role of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in migration governance. The IOM has become an instrument for funnelling many of the migration policy objectives of OECD member states into the international arena. Most of its programmes are funded by OECD member states. Yet, its charter does not include an explicit remit to protect and advance labour and human rights. This has led to criticism. In accepting commissions, it has sometimes meant conceding the compromise of minimum human rights obligations in the interests of endorsing measures that align with a state’s determination to exercise robust border controls that assert the sovereignty of the nation (Georgi/Schatral 2012). This is more generally reflected in the IOM being among the more preeminent advocates of ‘safe, orderly and regular migration’. It supports the continuing growth of labour migration but also advocates and endorses policies that exercise a strong hand in controlling transborder mobility to the detriment of human rights, such as by denying the right to apply for asylum or affording protection measures for refugees as provided for in the Geneva Refugee Convention. While the IOM has assumed an important role as intermediary in pressing this objective in several regional contexts, some Global North countries have independently sought to assert their political and economic power to pressure countries of origin of migration and transit countries to exercise more responsibility in regulating the movement of people. The European Union has also acted to advance these initiatives, announcing intentions to provide developmental assistance and other aid that is conditional to, for instance, Maghreb countries and Turkey agreeing to European efforts to stem transborder crossings, a securitisation policy that is replicated in the United States and Australia.

This fusion of liberalisation and securitisation as the key pillars of contemporary international migration governance is not without contradictions. The attempts to control the flow of people while at the same time welcoming some labour cohorts tend to impel irregular labour flows. The contradiction is compounded by the promise that migration impels development in the Global South. Once labour migration has been set in motion to become a regular and integral feature of cultural and economic practices in that country, facilitated by the development of personal, state organised and commercial as well as clandestine networks, efforts to block labour flows are commonly countered by unauthorised migration.
6. IN CONCLUSION

We live in a world where the multilateral level of governance needs to achieve a better balance between the migration and labour dimensions if the system is not to regress into ever deepening fragmentation and erosion of workers’ rights at the intersection of authoritarian national and global supply-chain capitalisms. We are far from this goal at this moment in time: The competing agendas of various stakeholders have placed severe obstacles to the formulating of binding global agreements. As far as the realm of international organisations at the centre of global migration governance is concerned, the IOM has been moved closer to the UN family to an extent that it now claims to be the UN Migration Agency, leaving the ILO politically marginalised and in budgetary terms increasingly dependent on the World Bank and the EU, amongst other funding sources.

Unauthorised, irregular and temporary migration is not just happening. It is consciously being shaped into an instrument to serve the needs of labour markets, enhancing the competitiveness of certain businesses through reducing their labour costs. To justify this system, the fear of migrants to be detected, detained and deported is engineered, in order to ensure that they will not complain, nor protest, nor mobilise. Being silenced, not for lack of individual agency, but by strategic choice in order not to compromise the whole migration project they carry, they can become the exploitable pliable workforce which creates part of our wealth as a society. Despite all the human rights frameworks and institutions that were created in the post-World War II period, a modern system of slavery and precarity is being recreated in the name of competitiveness and national sovereignty.

Yet, there are small successes such as the adoption of the ILO resolution C189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers, a highly marginalised sector primarily staffed by migrant women from the Global South; another (potential) success is the inclusion of decent work into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and greater cooperation between unions and migrant organisations (Piper et al. 2017; Rosewarne 2013). The Global Compact for Migration, adopted in December 2018, can be counted as another small success in an unfolding journey. The overwhelming endorsement of the Compact holds out the promise of member states’ commitment to cooperating to promote safe and orderly migration and to shore up the migration-development nexus to enhance the benefits of international migration. However, engagement with the Compact is voluntary, which, in other words, suggests that it could be little more than aspirational. In fact, the aspirational potential could well be frustrated by the decisions of several key states, including the important migration destination countries of the United States, Australia, Austria, Israel, Poland and the Eastern European states of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, refusing to endorse the Compact. The politics of immigration, with all its xenophobic undertones, appears to have got the better of political leaders who have excused themselves from joining the overwhelming majority of member states under the misapprehension that to sign would be to sacrifice national sovereignty. This merely highlights the limitations of the global architecture and the capacity to enhance migrant workers’ human rights and labour rights when these are viewed as compromising the authority of the state. Yet, the Compact does set a new discursive agenda, and it opens up the political and rhetorical space to serve as a platform for garnering concerted and enhanced global advocacy of migrants labour as well as human rights and mobilisation.
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THE AUTHORS

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GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS 03|2018

The Global Refugee Crisis: Towards a just response
B.S. Chimni
July 2018; 28 pages

With their effort to keep refugees and migrants out of their territories, Western nations abdicate their historical and political responsibility, according to the analysis of the renowned Indian migration researcher B.S. Chimni in GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS 03|2018. And what is more: by leaving it to the poor and poorest countries in the world to deal with the growing number of refugees, they allow new crises to emerge.

GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS 02|2018

The UN Security Council: From a 20th century relic to effective security governance
Jakkie Cilliers
February 2018, 28 pages

The urgently needed UN Security Council reform has been stuck for decades. Without a far-reaching structural change that includes the end of permanent seats and the veto, the Council is fading into irrelevance. But at a time of great power transitions, multipolarity without sufficient multilateralism is a dangerous trend. Therefore, in GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS 02|2018, Jakkie Cilliers calls for a political and intellectual leap to overcome the impasse in UN Security Council reform.

GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS 01|2018

Cooperation in a Post-Western World: Challenges and future prospects
Michèle Roth & Cornelia Ulbert
February 2018; 32 pages

The Western liberal order finds itself in deep crisis. Global power shifts are accelerating. What does this mean for the future of global cooperation? How can the wish for more national autonomy be reconciled with the need to cooperate in a globalised world? Can new forms of governance contribute to sustaining global cooperation? Michèle Roth and Cornelia Ulbert discuss these questions in the new issue GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS 01|2018.
GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS

examines current and future challenges in a globalised world against the background of long-term political trends. It deals with questions of particular political relevance to future developments at a regional or global level. GLOBAL TRENDS. ANALYSIS covers a great variety of issues in the fields of global governance, peace and security, sustainable development, world economy and finance, environment and natural resources. It stands out by offering perspectives from different world regions.