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Placing Women’s Lives in Context and in Theory
Editorial: Placing Women’s Lives in Context and in Theory 357

Anthropological Currents 361

Jennifer Johnson-Hanks
When the Future Decides: Uncertainty and Intentional Action in Contemporary Cameroon with CA comment 363

Sally Engle Merry and Rachel E. Stern
The Female Inheritance Movement in Hong Kong: Theorizing the Local/Global Interface with CA comment 387

Lisa René Taylor
Dangerous Trade-offs: The Behavioral Ecology of Child Labor and Prostitution in Rural Northern Thailand with CA comment 411

Michael Carrithers
Anthropology as a Moral Science of Possibilities with CA comment 433

Discussion

André Costopoulou/Frank W. Marlowe
On Comparative Studies Using Standard Cross-Cultural Sample Data: Monte Carlo Simulation of Artificial Trends 457

Craig T. Palmer, Kathryn Coe, and Reed L. Wadley/John McNabb
On Tools and Traditions 459

Reports

Alexandra Brewis and Mary Meyer
Demographic Evidence That Human Ovulation Is Undetectable (At Least in Pair Bonds) 465

Robert J. Quinlan, Marsha B. Quinlan, and Mark V. Flinn
Local Resource Enhancement and Sex-biased Breastfeeding in a Caribbean Community 471

Peter Bellwood and Alicia Sanchez-Mazas
Human Migrations in Continental East Asia and Taiwan: Genetic, Linguistic, and Archaeological Evidence 480
ject. Mutual trust makes way for mutual suspicion that develops into a tug-of-war between attempts to discover and attempts to conceal darker worlds and realities that cannot be openly acknowledged. As a result, ethnographers of violence do not attempt to reconcile what they say to people with what they write about them but rather try to write about people what they do not dare say to them. I regard this lack of sincerity not as unethical but as an acceptable practice in the study of political violence.

Carrithers regards fieldwork as a cooperative research practice in which authority is distributed more or less evenly between ethnographer and subject in a shared effort to translate and interpret cultural knowledge. Again, this reflects my experience in Brazil but not in Argentina. Authority was claimed or even demanded in a self-conscious way by my interlocutors. These military officers, guerrilla commanders, bishops, lawyers, and human rights leaders tried to control the ethnographic encounter in time, place, content, form, and metaphor.

The deception, seduction, and power play existed not only within the dynamic of the ethnographic relation but also—and here Carrithers is right on target—in rhetorical persuasion. Discussing traumatic historical events, my Argentine interlocutors created conflicting but equally persuasive versions with such high degrees of detail and internal coherence that they were all convincing within their particular political discourses and moral aesthetics. Such persuasive stories provided, in Carrithers's words, "instant comprehension while discouraging a search in leisure among other possibilities, other interpretations," precisely the ethnographic seduction I have just described. Together with the suspicion that pervades such fieldwork relations, this rhetorical and seductive persuasion cannot but have implications for Carrithers's argument. His call for public accountability on the part of our political leaders is laudable but must be infused with the awareness that these same leaders order wiretaps at the United Nations and the mistreatment of prisoners at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. Suspicion is not a surrender to Realpolitik but rather a recognition that ethnographers and citizens may be led astray through deception, seduction, rhetoric, and misinformation. Such ploys and strategies must first be detected and unmasked before we can enter into genuine relations of mutual trust and forbearance.

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Carrithers asserts that anthropology is a "moral science"—in several different senses of the term "moral." I shall try to specify four of these senses and to reconstruct the most plausible arguments for them. I have no quarrel with claims 1 and 2, am unqualified to assess 3, and reject 4.

1. A first use that can be made of the expression "moral
science" is an archaic designation of one of the humanities as distinguished from the natural sciences, a usage introduced by Mill in his *Logic* (1843:833–954). In contrast to Mill but in agreement with Schütz and Winch (1964), Carrithers insists that the social sciences are "verstehende Wissenschaften," which can provide genuine explanations only if the investigator learns to apply the concepts in terms of which members of the society under investigation live their lives ("engaged learning"). Explanation is thus dependent on understanding and will be bogus if it primarily seeks nomological connections between macrostructural entities. Moreover, such structural conceptions tend to treat members of the societies studied as passive bearers of the structures, neglecting the causal role of their active choices. Here the term "moral" isolates a particular subject matter and recommends a specific methodology for its study.

2. The bearers of a culture are, Carrithers insists further, not just "agents" and "choosers" but loci of "moral agency" and "moral choice." His point here seems to be to emphasize that the concepts in terms of which people live their lives do not just pick out items of the world's furniture but also involve prescriptions concerning what is to be done. A second sense of "moral science," then, designates the study of the normative and evaluative systems, the "mores" of the societies under investigation. This has consequences for the anthropologist's work. Because evaluation involves adopting emotional stances towards whatever is evaluated, what the anthropologist has to learn here is ways of being emotional. Engaged learning is, at least in part, a matter of *feeling with* one's informants.

3. The next step appears to involve combining this idea with a psychological fact about most normal human beings: feeling *with* people tends to lead to feeling for them. Within the anthropological enterprise, this mechanism is given a special cognitive framing. Here the shared emotional perspective results from the anthropologist's repeatedly putting himself in the emotional shoes of his informants. Carrithers describes how taking this step brings home to the investigator with particular force the contingency of his own deeply felt attachments, a kind of corporeal—or "aesthetic"—underscored of what is otherwise a highly abstract belief. From this experience of oneself as another it is small cognitive step to the sense of others as potentially oneself. This "aesthetically" underscored cognitive movement can in turn be seen as conferring an "objective" status on the sympathy that arises where shared emotional stances are adopted. Such "objectified sympathy" is a good candidate for the mechanism by means of which we attribute intrinsic worth to others. If this is right, then engaged learners will tend to see their interlocutors as the bearers of intrinsic value. As a result, anthropological knowledge is acquired as a result of a process frequently characterized by an affirmative evaluative perspective on the objects of knowledge. It is this fact that allows Carrithers to describe anthropology as a "moral science" in a third sense—as a discipline whose methods can be separated
only with difficulty from the adoption of a positive moral or evaluative stance towards its objects.

4. However, this notion of the "morally infused character of anthropological knowledge" does not take us to the final sense in which, according to Carrithers, anthropology is a "moral science." The discipline is "moral" in this last, normative sense to the extent that it provides the basis for the moral criticism of human actions such as the Iraq war. Bush's rhetoric, Carrithers tells us, is to be condemned because it "contravened the . . . moral aesthetic of anthropology." This, I suspect, means more or less that it is appalling to a sensibility trained in forms of interaction governed by sympathy and the knowledge of the contingency of one's own identity. However, anthropological fieldwork provides no guarantee that what is felt by a sensibility thus schooled is normatively binding. There may well be cases in which what ought morally to be done meets with unjustified resistance from such sensibilities. I happen to agree with Carrithers's judgement about Iraq, but for reasons that have little to do with anthropology: rigorous requirements on the justification of any war, respect for international law, and the prudential norm that one avoid aggravating problems one is supposed to be solving. Perhaps there are morally normative conditions for cognitively successful anthropology, but that would not make the discipline itself normative.