Aging populations and declining workforces have increased the demand for migrant care workers in many European countries, especially in home-based care work. Home-based care workers rarely have a formal employment contract and informal employment is characterized by low wages, insufficient break-time and little chance to address worker health and service quality problems resulting from situations like 24-hour care. The focus in this paper is on two European countries with a high dependence on Eastern European migrant labor for home care work – Austria and Germany. These two country cases are important for two other reasons. Austria and Germany both introduced long-term care insurance schemes in the early 1990s (1993 in Austria and 1995 in Germany), providing cash support to those in
need of care services. These schemes are often considered progressive, because they give those in need of care the freedom to decide how to use benefits. From a gender perspective however, “cash-for-care” insurance policies often follow a logic, which is characteristic of conservative welfare systems—the alignment of social policies with a traditional gender division of labor. Often referred to as male-breadwinner models of welfare, a range of tax and social policies in Austria and Germany function as incentives for women (as spouses of male breadwinners) to remain dependent on the social protections extended by their husbands’ employment contracts rather than taking up socially insured employment themselves. These incentives work to make women more available than men for domestic and care work activities. The same assumptions about the division of labor between paid and household labor, the employment of men and women are made for women hired to help households with extra domestic and care tasks—that hired women are also not in need of social protections, and are merely earning extra money for the family budget. Yet for many migrant women, such jobs may be a major source of family income, and working hours often add up to more than full-time jobs.

The informalization of care work in private households, defined as the spread of employment relations without a formal employment contract, has raised public concerns about the lack of social protections for care workers and the effects on the quality of care work. Recent tax and employment reforms in Austria and Germany have aimed at encouraging private households to register home care workers as employees. The aim of this paper is to understand the politics and effects of attempts to formalize home-care work. The central question is whether these reforms challenge or re-affirm the traditional gender of labor.

**Gender, Policy and Care Work**

To understand the implications of the introduction of long-term care insurance in Germany and Austria on preferences for home-based services and on the increasing use of in-home migrant care workers, I begin by outlining the state of research about how social welfare policies in Austria and Germany are strongly rooted in the male breadwinner model of gender relations. The male breadwinner model is a concept used to describe national types of social policy provision, which assume that men are in paid work and women are dependent on their husbands for their livelihood. Social policies extending coverage and benefits of full-time employment to unemployed or part-time employed spouses and tax policies which create disadvantages for dual-earner households are characteristic of male breadwinner welfare models.

The german health and pension insurance (including survivor insurance) for spouses, and the system of tax-splitting are considered ideal examples of how social and tax policies create disincentives for women to work full-time, and for families to engage in a dual-career/dual-care strategy of work and family life.

Yet, social policy alone cannot explain why married women and mothers in a country like Germany exhibit low commitments to full-time employment in cross-national comparisons. For example, educational institutions create different qualification paths for occupations traditionally coded as female, while employment regulations construct specific employment forms with typical (traditional) male and female biographies in mind. Institutional studies of welfare capitalism have shown how different policy domains develop over time to align in complementary ways. Thus, a specific type of part-time work in Austria and Germany—marginal part-time work limited to 400 € or less per month—assumes that those who take it up are covered by the health and pension benefits of their spouses, and tax policies are most beneficial for families where there is a well-earning male breadwinner and a low-earning spouse. The complementarities between social, tax and employment policy strongly shape decisions about family formation, who works and how much, and who is available for taking care of children, elderly or disabled family members. Unraveling such policy logics demands broad and interlinked reforms, which in political systems like Germany, where coalitions are common, cross over several ministries under different political party compositions. Piecemeal reforms often have unintended consequences, or their intended effects get blocked by countervailing logics in other policy domains.

Although there are many indications that traditional gender relations in Austria and Germany are eroding, the tight complementarities between social, tax and employment policies often result in contradictory outcomes for improving gender equality. One of these contradictory movements is the slow, but evident, shift of home-based care work, from housewives and daughters to low-paid and uninsured migrant female workers, which free-up national women to engage in the labor market by reducing their home care obligations, but which face migrant women with precarious employment, undermining their chances for securing independent livelihoods. Have recent attempts to formalize the employment of home-based care workers in Austria and Germany over the past decades resulted in better employment conditions for home-based care workers or have they re-affirmed the assumption that female workers are dependent on male breadwinners for social protections and livelihood security?

The policies shaping the formalization of household care work cross the domains of social, tax, family and employment policy, and the politics
behind many of the recent policies reflect some unexpected shifts in party preferences and the constituents they are aimed at. Family and social policies have received the most attention from scholars studying the development of care work cross-nationally. Though the deregulation of employment is also a well-covered area in contemporary policy studies, the effects of reforms on the informality of domestic service work are largely neglected. Recent changes in employment regulations covering household labor are linked to a set of tax and wage payment reforms aimed at formalizing employment.

In Germany expansions of allowable tax deductions for household labor and services intend to provide incentives for families to register employment relations. The introduction of a service voucher system in Austria is an attempt to formally document the provision and remuneration of household services. Both measures are aimed at encouraging households to register workers providing home-care services, nationals and migrants alike. In both cases however, the drive to formalize service provision is tied to special exemptions from social insurance payments for those employed for domestic and care work in the home. The next sections engage in an analysis of recent tax, social and employment reforms in Germany and Austria respectively. The focus is on the political contexts under which reforms have been enacted. A key part of the analysis concerns how reforms in various policy domains interact to shape whether and how female migrant care workers are employed for home care work.

### Policies and Politics of Domestic Care Work in Germany

Under the five CDU coalition governments led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–1998), tax deductions relevant to household and care work were mainly aimed at regularly employed household staff (employed on a weekly basis with a monthly salary, and registered in social insurance schemes), a situation typical to well-endowed families, and which was referred to popularly as the “maids privilege”. Up until 1997, these deductions were only allowed for families with at least 2 children under the age of 10. In 1997 a tax reform removed the family restriction, and allowed all families to make deductions (up to 18,000 DM a year) for wage costs of the household staff they employed. Moreover, a household-check system was introduced, which made it easier for families to arrange for the normal employer contributions to social insurance.

A turning point came after the change in government in 1998, when, in 2001 the first Schröder coalition government removed the “maids privilege” for formally employed staff. With the removal of the stipulation of formal employment, policymakers acknowledged that “normal” private households needed and used cleaning and childcare helpers too, and that tax laws needed to reflect these outlays. The first Schröder coalition government (1998–2002) had made the election promise of reducing unemployment within its first term, and it seems the removal of restrictions were aimed at encouraging registration of home-helpers. In 2002 the Hartz commission took up the issue of tax subsidies for domestic work as a measure for including home workers into employment statistics and social insurance contribution schemes. A separate recommendation involved a further de-regulation of marginal part-time employment (geringfügige Beschäftigung), with more relaxed regulations covering so-called mini-jobs in private households.

The creation of mini-jobs as an employment forms goes back to the Kohl government coalitions. Special regulations covering the exclusion of low-hours/low-earning part-time jobs in the 1990s were aimed at housewives, who were already cove-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German nationals</td>
<td>34,008</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-German nationals</td>
<td>3,375</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-Jobs in households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German nationals</td>
<td>27,817</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-German nationals</td>
<td>3,856</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


red by the social insurance contributions of their breadwinner husbands. The employment form promised to bring informal work into the employment statistics, without burdening women and their families with additional income deductions. Under the CDU/CSU/FDP coalitions, mini-jobbers were not required to make any contributions to social insurance. With the entry of the SPD/die Grünen into office in 1999, labor demands for better regulation of mini-jobs were partially met by introducing an employer-paid contribution to cover health and pension insurance (but not unemployment insurance). Moreover, spouses were not required to report income from mini-jobs as household income, which under the “tax-splitting” system in Germany might have slightly raised the tax payments. A clear change in the design of the mini-job employment as a job for housewives was not evident in this first re-regulation of marginal part-time employment under the SPD coalition government.

The second social-democratic reform of marginal part-time employment in private households came in the form of the Hartz laws, passed in April 2003. Of the 38 million households in Germany at the time, 3.3 million were thought to be using cleaning and care help, mostly on an hourly basis, with estimates of 1% or less registered as employment\(^1\). The Hartz II law included provisions explicitly aimed at encouraging more registration of domestic cleaning and care work. Working hour limits were removed and the earnings limit raised to 400 €. While workers themselves are still not required to make social insurance contributions, the contributions of employers were increased. But again, special reductions in these contributions were introduced explicitly for private households, adding up to employer contributions of about 14% (10% less than paid by employers for all other mini-jobs\(^2\)). By the year 2005, 18.1% of all employees were in mini-jobs\(^3\), in 2011 nearing 25%\(^4\). The quota of registered mini-jobs in private households has continued to rise, but is not a large part of the mini-job population. Available estimates of the total number of households using in-home help from the Socio-Economic Panel Survey in Germany were 3.6 million in 2004. If we assume an increase to 4 million households using services in 2011, the present rate of registration would be 5% (compared to 3% in 2005)\(^5\). Thus about 95% of all household service work (at an estimated 3.8 million households) remains unregistered.

Despite the clear rise in registered mini-jobs in private households, these attempts to formalize household service and care work employment can still be considered a failure. From the perspective of households, the extra costs of employer social insurance contributions are more or less balanced out by the tax deductions available to private households, but until recently, pretty much at break-even points. An actual incentive for registering domestic help is not evident. For domestic service workers, both German nationals and migrant workers, strong motivations not to register their work have remained. For the largely female German workforce in household services, the continuing tax incentives and social insurance coverage under the male breadwinner model of gendered social policy mean that there is no clear advantage to having a formal employment contract. Pension provision of mini-jobs is minimal, and the low health and safety risks of most cleaning and care tasks tend to cancel out the benefit of gaining accident insurance.

Estimates are that unregistered migrants in elderly care work are mainly addressing acute and continual care needs. Mini-jobs as an employment form are typically in low-hours part-time work. For migrants as well as nationals, 400 € a month is not attractive enough for full-time care work. Moreover, the recipients of care insurance support are not required to document how they use the money. Indeed, policy makers introducing long-term care insurance (the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition in 1995) had assumed that cash benefits would be used mainly as “symbolic wages” for family care givers rather than “routed wages”\(^6\) for external service providers.

When the CDU returned to office in 2005 with Chancellor Angela Merkel at the helm of a grand coalition with the SPD, tax and mini-job reforms came on to the agenda again, as part of the relief and economic stimulation measures in response to the global financial crisis in 2008. This time however, both reforms were framed more clearly as Family Supports (the law covering deductions for care work is called the Family Support Law, Familienleistungsgesetz) with the fervor for reform coming from the CDU Family Minister Ursula von der Leyen. The package of laws passed in 2008 contained something for everyone in the coalition government. The measures included three provisions relevant to private household budgets for service help: raising the ceiling on deductions allowed for Handwerker (minimally, a demand of the CSU to stimulate the small firm handicraft sector of the economy), raising the ceiling on deductions for all forms of household help and care work and further de-regulations of mini-jobs in private households, again to improve registration (as demanded by the SPD as a countermeasure to Schwarzarbeit)\(^7\). Together with a package of measures to improve social assistance for families with schoolchildren, and increasing the levels of child transfer payments and the deductions available to families with children, Minister von der Leyen intended to create a differentiated policy, aimed at low- as well as high-income families, stay-at-home mothers, as well as working mothers. Thus the Family
Support the more traditional child transfer payments, increasing school-supply supports for families on social assistance (Hartz IV), alongside tax deductions for home services, and raising the standard child deductions, both benefitting high-income families. In the statement issued by the ministry: “Employed parents profit from the improved tax deductions for household and family support services – so that they have more time for their children outside of their working time”.

The further de-regulations of mini-jobs in 2008 again improved registrations in private households. By June 2011, the number of mini-jobs registered in private households had risen to a high of 221,698, while overall numbers of mini-jobs have remained roughly the same. About 3% of all mini-jobs are registered to private households. Nonetheless, the level of registration of household service and care work remains well below political expectations. Of the registered mini-jobbers in private households, most were German women (92% women, 86.2% German nationals), with 23% of the total above the age of 60 years, whose hours of work are low enough to make the 400 € limit attractive enough. Actual incentives and benefits for household employers and migrant care workers to enter into formal employment contracts are missing from all the policy domains covered here – long-term care insurance (no documentation requirement for money spent), tax deductions (not large enough to make a gain against social benefit contributions) and employment regulations (mini-jobs for private households are not relevant for long-hours work roles). In 2008, Peer Steinbrück, SPD Finanzminister (2005–2009) declared that unregistered work in private households had become normal.

### Policies and Politics of Domestic Care Work in Austria under the ÖVP/FPÖ/BZÖ and SPO/ÖVP Governments

Austria has followed an alternative policy path to encourage the formalization of home-based care work by introducing a voucher system (Dienstleistungsscheck). Introduced in 2006 by the ÖVP/FPÖ/BZÖ governments with the explicit aim of curtailing unregistered work in private households, the vouchers, like the German tax deductions, were tied to a reform of marginal part-time employment contracts for private households.

Vouchers, which could be purchased easily at Trafiken, corner shops selling public transport tickets among other sundries, contain 20 cents for every 10 € value, apportioned accident insurance contributions for marginal part-timers employed by private households. As in Germany, marginal part-time employment is limited to a monthly earnings ceiling (374.02 € in Austria), but in the case of private households, marginal part-time employment contracts are fixed to one month, and open for continual renewal. At the time the Dienstleistungsschecks were introduced, there were 10,000 registered household helpers/staff in Austria, 2/3 of whom were in marginal part-time contracts. Estimates are, however, that most work in private households is not registered, with estimates ranging from 60,000 to 300,000 unregistered employment relations.

Work in private households has been covered since after WWI under the Austrian Household Help and Staff Law (Hausgehilfen- und Hausangestelltengesetz), first introduced in 1920, and re-introduced in 1962. This law is aimed at full-time regular household staff – commonly working in the Austrian family-based tourism industry. The law specifically regulates working hours and employment rights of in-house residential staff in Austria, who are also covered by other laws regulating employment and social rights. It might have been a model for 24-hour care work, but it has not been taken as such. In fact, by fixing the terms of marginal part-time work under the voucher system, private households can easily circumvent the regulations of the Household Help and Staff Law. Continuous non-fixed-term marginal part-time work carried out in private households is still subject to the Household Staff Law. Thus using vouchers, and limiting the terms of contracts, allows private households to get around a number of working time and other regulations on household labor. Employees in the voucher system have the option of voluntarily joining pension and health insurance schemes (in contrast to Germany, marginal employment of any kind does not have mandatory employer contributions beyond accident insurance).

By all accounts however, the uptake of the voucher system is very low, and the measure is considered a failure. The head of the section for Women and Family at the Chamber of Labor in Vienna estimates that only 300 marginally employed workers in private households in 2007 were actually paid by voucher. That comprises 3% of registered household staff or less than 1% of the estimated total unregistered workers in Austrian private households.

A series of laws introduced since 2006 regulating the use of foreign workers from the newly ascending EU member countries in Eastern Europe in private households is also of relevance for understanding how policies fail to encourage the formalization of employment contracts. Austria and Germany were the only EU member states to take full advantage of a possible seven year moratorium on the free movement of labor from the new EU members states into their labor markets. As in Germany, placement agencies for care workers in local communities...
were heavily engaged in a grey-zone of immigration activities, dedicated to recruiting Eastern European women for care work, often by taking advantage of holiday travel visas\(^\text{13}\). The systematic undermining of the seven year moratorium on labor mobility in the Austrian care sector became public during the 2006 national election campaign it was revealed that several top politicians were engaged in the illegal employment of foreign workers for the care of elderly relatives, including the (then) Chancellor Schüssel. Subsequently, the second chamber of parliament enacted an amnesty for all foreign care workers from new EU member states working illegally in Austria, followed by a law relaxing entry of workers from Eastern Europe into Austria for elderly care work, (prior to the mandatory lifting of restrictions in May 2011)\(^\text{14}\).

In January 2007, shortly after the relaxation of restrictions on Eastern European migrant workers in carework, the (for Austria) usual social-democratic/folks party (SPÖ-ÖVP) Grand Coalition under the social democratic Chancellor Gusenbauer took office. The most recent policy change, a new law on Household Care (Hausbetreuungsgegnet), which replaced certain provisions in the long-existent Household Staff Law and the trade regulations defining personal care, took effect in July 2007. The law is aimed at live-in 24-hour care workers, and restricted to higher levels of care requirements and all cases of care for dementia patients. The law regulates working time in the context of 24 hour care, picking up on the 14-day cycle, which had already characterized the work mobility of Eastern European care workers. The law also regulates daily breaks, instituting a mandatory 10 hour rest following a 24 hour shift, and defines what forms of presence in the household can be counted as working time. The termination of the employment relation is also clearly tied to the death of the patient. Household care workers are also required to abide by quality reporting standards, to work together with family and medical staff and to keep patient and household information confidential. An exact definition of tasks covered by care work, amended from the industrial code regulating personal care jobs, is also specified in the law. It can be assumed that this law is especially aimed at further regulating and protecting migrant care workers in Austria (Beschluss des Nationalrates 2007). Yet all these protections hinge on the registration of the employment relation.

"Cash for Care" Insurance and how it shapes the employment of migrant elderly care workers

Recently, differences in the development of the care insurance systems in Austria and Germany have become evident, which affect the potential for formalization of migrant care-giver employment in the future. Though the Austrian and German care work insurance systems are both based on the “cash for care” model, the Austrian system goes the furthest in relying entirely on cash benefits. This has encouraged the development of grey markets for care services and a lag in the development of external service markets for care work. All of these factors have also increased the reliance on migrant care workers\(^\text{15}\). The German system meanwhile has become more mixed. Beneficiaries can use their cash for institutional care, and since 2001, additional “in-kind” benefits for some types of care work, and experiments with case-managed systems (more similar to the French system) are stimulating the growth of an external care service infrastructure. As Da Roit et al. argue, care policies shape the creation of a formal care market and how migrant labor is likely to be used. Benefits for external services create a pathway away from relying solely

---

**According to the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data from 2006, where households were asked “Do you regularly or occasionally employ a Cleaning Person or Domestic Helper?”:**

- 4.36 million, or 11% of all German households employed some form of domestic or cleaning helper
  - 2.67 million did so regularly
  - 1.69 million did so occasionally

In the year of this survey 176,000 German households had registered their cleaning and domestic helpers, yet 2.67 million households reported using such helpers in the SOEP survey.

Comparing SOEP reports with official reports yields estimates of 2.5 million German households, which are not registering their employment of domestic helpers.

---

\(^\text{13}\) See https://www.bundesregierung.de/DE/Content/Rede/Schaefer/2010/20100923-20100929/index.html

\(^\text{14}\) See https://www.bundesregierung.de/DE/Content/Rede/Schaefer/2010/20100923-20100929/index.html

\(^\text{15}\) See https://www.bundesregierung.de/DE/Content/Rede/Schaefer/2010/20100923-20100929/index.html

on informal care work by family members and migrants brought into the home in Germany. But the net effect for migrant workers may be marginal, as they move from home-based care work into precarious forms of work in low-paid social services, unless working conditions in the sector are better regulated as well.

The proximity of the Eastern European borders to Austria and Germany has encouraged a special form of migrant care work, “commuting migrants” (Pendelmigration), whereby women rotate shifts of 24 hour care work on a bi-weekly basis. In Germany, commuting care workers, who are usually dispatched by foreign-based operators, were covered under special regulations governing dispatching practices. The practice was legal, even under the moratorium on free labor movement before 2011, since it involved businesses, mainly in Poland, dispatching their workers to Germany. Dispatching regulations in some sectors in Germany require a minimum wage, but this was opposed by the FDP for care work in both the Merkel coalitions, until 2010, when Ursula von der Leyen, this time as Minister of Labor in the second Merkel coalition, succeeded in having a bill passed for minimum wages in care work. The minimum wage for care work now covers all regular employment relations in care services, but not for mini-jobs in household care, which are covered by their own regulation. The Austrian Home Care Law also represents an attempt to introduce protections aimed especially at migrant care workers, but these improvements only apply to a very limited group of care workers (in the 24 hour care business). All these regulatory attempts depend on the registration of home-care workers. In Austria and Germany, tax deductions and vouchers have been used to try to encourage the registration of employment relations in home-based care. Under the moratorium on labor mobility, this failed since many migrants were either not eligible (having been dispatched from home country operators) or uninterested (as quasi-legal or illegal entrants). Now that the full freedom of labor movement is in force in Europe, migrant home-care workers have moved from violating immigration, to violating employment regulations. Here Austria and Germany have taken different paths in addressing the formalization of migrant care work, with Austrian authorities displaying much more tolerance for unregistered workers, and Germany, especially under SPD coalitions, striving for more controls and crackdowns on private households. A fault in formalization attempts is the assumption that home care workers can be integrated into the employment system through marginal part-time work contracts. While marginal part-time contracts may suit traditional German housewives working only a few hours a week who are dependent on husbands for social policy coverage, these contracts are unsuitable for employment of in-home continual care by mobile migrant women. Qualified Eastern European women (many have nursing qualifications in the home-care sector) are more likely, with the end of restrictions on their labor mobility in Austria and Germany, to move into full-time and insured employment relations in institutional care facilities. If these jobs are not available in Austria or Germany, they will move on to Britain (as they already have). In fact, the recent shifts in German care insurance system from cash, to a mix of cash, institutional and in-kind benefits is increasing demand for external care workers, though cultural preferences continue to be for home-based care solutions.

Preliminary Conclusions

The tax deductions and voucher policies in Germany and Austria, which were aimed at formalizing the employment of in-home care workers, have failed. The initial response in Austria to simply tolerate informality has switched recently, to a better and direct regulation of in-home care employment. With the supply of in-home care workers tight, these regulations give migrant workers resources for demanding better and more formalized working conditions. German policies, by contrast, have tended to push for formalization, in part by criminalizing the use of unregistered workers, or to search for other alternatives like the development of telemicine and technological alternatives of ambient assisted living innovations. A better regulation of in-home care work, like the recent Austrian reforms, are absent in Germany. The failures in both countries to create effective incentives for private households to register their home care lies in part with the overall nature of care insurance, which assumes that women will be available, either as housewives or as part-time workers to perform care work. Asking the question “Who Cares” reveals how misplaced these assumptions are. Migrant women are more likely to be members of dual-earner households, and rely on their employment relations for material and social security, not provided by either generous welfare states or male breadwinners in their home countries. With the freedom of labor mobility now operating throughout the EU, there may be little reason for qualified care workers from Eastern Europe to seek work in Austrian and German private households. Formal employment contracts with elderly care institutions and service providers, especially those which also accommodate forms of rotation migration favored by Eastern European migrant care workers, may guarantee better working hours, social protections and a better use of the skills of migrant workers. Long-term care insurance in Austria and Germany was aimed initially at maximizing the freedom of choice on the demand-side, for those in need
of care for home-based or external care services. The end of restrictions on transnational labor mobility opened up more freedom of choice on the supply-side, and migrant women may no longer be as available for or willing to enter into private household care work. Preferences of those in need of continual care for home-based care will either remain unfulfilled, or pressure for improving the employment conditions of home-care workers will encourage more suitable regulations of employment in private households. Germany seems to be taking the first path, which may result in more institutionalized care. The Austrian mix of relaxed immigration and better regulation of working conditions has also failed to encourage households to enter into formal employment contracts with home care workers. While cultural preferences for in-home care remain strong, the best future from the perspective of the quality of work and care services may lie in the development of a better institutional care service infrastructure where migrants’ skills are utilized more fully, and care services are professionalized. Creating more gainful employment for national and migrant women in an expanding institutional care sector would help to shift policies away from the traditional male breadwinner logic to a more sustainable dual-career model of social welfare and gender relations.

Zusammenfassung


Anmerkungen

Der vorliegende Beitrag ist im Rahmen eines internationalen Forschungsnetzwerkes entstanden, das die politische Regulierung von haushaltsnahen Dienstleistungen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien, den Niederlanden, Österreich, Spanien und Schweden vergleichend untersucht.


The main focus was on cutting the costs to households of using registered workers. The interests of domestic service workers received little attention in the report, though some thought was given to the role of service agencies, which could bundle this work together to create regular socially insured jobs for workers. These alternatives have since received some attention from scholars concerned with improving employment conditions, but the stronger solution from the perspective of combating unregistered work today is considered to be in the development of residential-quarter and other quasi-institutional forms of care (Weinkopf 2006).

2) Minijob Zentrale 2003–2011
3) Keller and Seifert 2006
4) own calculations, Minijob Zentrale 2011
5) Weinkopf 2006, own unconfirmed estimate for 2011
6) Yeandle and Ungerson 2007
7) BMFSFJ 2008
8) BMFSFJ 2008, translation by author
9) Minijob Zentrale 2011
10) Fokus Money Online 2008
11) Moritz 2008
12) Moritz 2008
13) Österle & Hammer 2007
14) Theobald 2009, pp. 21–22
15) Da Roit et al. 2007
16) Schneider & Reyes 2007
17) Simonazzi 2009
18) Gottschall & Schwarzkopf 2010; Da Roit et al. 2009
19) von Konratowitz 2005

Literatur

– Hartz Commission: Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt: Vorschläge der
Kommission zum Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit und zur Umstrukturierung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. 2002, Blieskastel: Bliesdruckerei Peter Jung GmbH.


Die Autorin

Karen Shire hat eine Professur für Gesellschaftsvergleich am Institut für Soziologie und Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften an der Universität Duisburg-Essen inne. Sie ist Sprecherin des DFG-Graduiertenkollegs „Risk and East Asia“ und unterstützt die Geschäftsführung des Essener Kollegs für Geschlechterforschung als Vorstandsmitglied seit dem frühen und unerwarteten Tod der Gründungsdirektorin, Prof. Dr. Doris Janshen, die sie schmerzlich vermisst. Der Forschungsfokus von Karen Shire ist auf den Wandel von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen und deren Auswirkungen auf soziale Ungleichheiten, insbesondere der geschlechterbezogenen Ungleichheiten im internationalen und interregionalen Vergleich, ausgerichtet.