Doctoral Students
Konstantin Lowe
1. Bio
I am a PhD student in first generation at the University of Duisburg-Essen, under the supervision of Professor Dr. Neil Roughley. I studied Philosophy and History at the University of Duisburg-Essen and received both my bachelor’s and my master’s degree there. I speak German and English.
2. Philosophical Interest
I am interested in a variety of topics such as: epistemic blame, epistemic injustice, emotion-theory, moral responsibility and other forms of responsibility, sentimentalism and reactive attitudes.
3. Working title of the PhD project
Epistemic Blame and Epistemic Rehabilitation
4. Summary of issues under investigation
Within my PhD thesis I want to tackle different issues.
The first issue concerns the nature of epistemic blame. Here I will try to give answers to questions like: for what kind of epistemic failings can someone justifiably be epistemically blamed? What mechanism are involved in epistemic blame? Is epistemic blame comparable or even analogues to moral blame? Also, question concerning negative aspects imposed on epistemically blamed agents will be investigated. Is a sanctioning response for epistemic failings, such as false beliefs, bad belief formation practices or faulty reasoning ever justified. If blaming responses are justified for epistemic failings, what should those responses consist in?
The second issue concerns how an epistemically blamed agent can engage in epistemic rehabilitation. Blame seems to involve negative consequences for the blamed party, for example other agents might lose trust in the blamed agent. In the moral domain a blamed agent can engage in repair actions, like apologising and doing amends. So, the question can be raised if something similar can be identified within the epistemic domain. One obvious difference between the epistemic and moral domain consists in the fact that epistemic failings (never?) involve a victim which could demand reparation. This might suggest that epistemic rehabilitation is categorical different then moral rehabilitation.
Finally, I believe that investigating questions regarding epistemic blame can also be illuminating for other forms of blame, even well studied forms of blame, such as moral blame.
Tilla Resheff
1. Bio
I am a PhD student in metaethics at the University of Duisburg-Essen, under the supervision of Prof. Neil Routhley. My research interests include moral realism and especially the areas of evolutionary moral naturalist-realism which integrate multilevel selection theory. I am also interested in other aspects of natural normativity, as well as theories that could be used for applying naturalistic metaethical principles, such as game theory. I have a BA in Philosophy from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. After moving to Germany, I learned German and completed an MA in Philosophy at the Free University of Berlin, where I focused on topics such as moral realism and epistemology. I have also attended several academic conferences and workshops. I speak fluent Hebrew, English and German.
2. Philosophical areas of specialisation
- Naturalist realist metaethics
- Naturalist Normativity
3. Working title of dissertation
Towards A Holistic Evolutionary Realist Account of Moral Normativity
4. Brief summary of issues to be/being tackled
One of the main issues that I will tackle in the thesis is the challenge of multilevel-selection theory to the idea of natural normativity. Multilevel-selection theory implies that there are multiple levels of selection, such as genes, individuals, groups, and species, and that each level has its own ends or goals. This leads to a pluralist picture of natural normativity, where different levels of selection may have conflicting or incompatible ends. I examine whether this pluralist picture is problematic or realistic, and how it affects our understanding of natural normativity. Another issue that I address is the question of why we should follow the reasons given by evolutionary history rather than the reasons given by our own desires. How can we justify that genetic and social ends are more authoritative or objective than the ends that we set for ourselves? This question becomes especially relevant when we encounter cases where our personal goals contrast with the external natural goals, such as when we choose not to reproduce or not to participate in society. A related issue that I explore is the question of motivation. What can motivate us to act according to the external goals of evolutionary processes, rather than our own preferences or interests? How can we bridge the gap between natural facts and normative reasons? Finally, I investigate the prospects for finding out what is good for us using mathematical models, such as prisoner's dilemma type models. I will check how these models can help us understand the dynamics and outcomes of multilevel selection, and how they can inform our practical reasoning and decision making.
André Waldheuser
1. Bio
I studied philosophy and practical social sciences at the University of Duisburg-Essen from 2003 to 2014. In 2014, I completed my Magister's degree under the supervision of Professor Roughley with a thesis in the field of the philosophy of emotions. In my thesis, I engaged critically with biological theories of emotions. Since 2016, Professor Roughley has been supervising my doctoral research.
During my initial stage of orientation, I delved deeply into the emerging field of robot ethics. Questions of moral responsibility intrigued me even at this early stage, particularly in the context of driverless car. Issues related to attributing responsibility in cases of accidents, challenges like the "many hands problem," or the responsibility gap ultimately led to my interest in the concept of moral responsibility itself.
In my view, the practical debate in the realm of robot ethics suffered from conceptual ambiguities. I am interested, on one hand, in the metaphysics of the property of being responsible. The question arises as to whether the property of being responsible depends on our responses which are constitutive of our practice of holding responsible, or if this property exists somewhat independently of our responses and, instead, establishes the normative status of our practice of holding responsible. On the other hand, there is the question of which attitudes are essential to our practices of holding others accountable. Since most theorists concur that certain emotional attitudes and responses are constitutive of the practice of holding responsible, I have long pondered the more profound question of what it is about emotions that enables them to fulfill their role in our responsibility system, and why this practice cannot simply be conceived as "cool and emotionless".
2. Philosophical ares of specialization
- Moral Responsibility
- Blame
- Philosophy of Emotions and Reactive Attitudes
- Free Will (and Determinism)
3. Working title of dissertation
Moral Responsibility as Influenceability: The role of emotions in our responsibility system
4. Brief Summary of issues to be/being tackled
In my dissertation, I will argue that moral responsibility for something is a matter of susceptibility to specific responses from others. I will propose a conception of moral responsibility that tends to view it as a social and forward-looking phenomenon. My approach encourages an analysis of moral responsibility beyond the relationship between moral agents and their actions and attitudes, which takes into account the necessary type of control which depend on a stabilizing feedback system through our affective blame responses.
I will develop my thesis of moral responsibility as influenceability by distinguishing it from two prominent camps. First, I will critically demonstrate that the so-called Strawsonian views also include elements of influenceability theories and can be plausibly extended as such. I will also show that essential elements of so-called New Attributionalist Theories encompass elements of influenceability theories. Subsequently, I will present my approach to finally examine the nature of responsibility for different objects, such as attitudes, emotional reactions, and actions.
Consequensly, I will address in my dissertation metaphysical questions regarding responsibility and argue for a middle ground with respect to prevailing positions. The idea here is that the relevant capacity in the form of reason responsiveness, which grounds the property of being responsible, is constituted and sustained through an ongoing interaction with our practices of holding responsible.
A specific understanding of holding responsible is central to my theory of moral responsibility. I will argue that essential questions and issues in the field can be best addressed when we understand reactive attitudes, as constitutive attitudes of holding responsible, based on a particular theory of emotions. A key point here is that the underlying theory of emotions implies that our practice of holding responsible is not based on justifications relying on desert or the correctness of representational content. My proposal will be that we should justify our practice - in a compatibilism-friendly manner - differently.
I will delve into the so-called "force of blame," the function of blame, and the role blame plays in adjusting and maintaining our reason responsiveness. Furthermore, I will illuminate the role of reactive responses such as guilt, regret, or remorse in this context.
Another question I aim to address is that of the ultimate object of our moral responsibility. Some theorists uphold the common thesis that we can only be responsible for our actions, i.e., actions are paradigmatic objects of our responsibility. However, there are numerous different positions that argue that we are ultimately morally responsible for the action-generating attitudes.