Social media is not only a platform for connecting with friends and getting updates on favorite influencers, but also a primary source for political news. Young people especially report that social media is their main source of news (Galan et al., n.d.). Users appreciate that they are algorithmically suggested news article without any additional effort (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). However, one must ask how updates on terrorism, war, and new policy proposals interspersed with vacation photos influence young people's well-being (Eden et al., 2020; Ferguson et al., 2024; Kross et al., 2021).

Survey research is suggested for investigating this question.

Bei Interesse bitte direkt wenden an: jana.dreston@uni-due.de

Suggested reading:

Eden, A. L., Johnson, B. K., Reinecke, L., & Grady, S. M. (2020). Media for Coping During COVID-19 Social Distancing: Stress, Anxiety, and Psychological Well-Being. Frontiers in Psychology, 11. https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.577639

Ferguson, G., Hawes, M. T., Mogle, J., Scott, S. B., & Klein, D. N. (2024). Social Media Activities and Affective Well-being in the Daily Life of Emerging Adults. Affective Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42761-024-00251-3

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Weeks, B. E., & Ardèvol-Abreu, A. (2017). Effects of the News-Finds-Me Perception in Communication: Social Media Use Implications for News Seeking and Learning About Politics. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 22(3), 105–123. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12185

Kross, E., Verduyn, P., Sheppes, G., Costello, C. K., Jonides, J., & Ybarra, O. (2021). Social Media and Well-Being: Pitfalls, Progress, and Next Steps. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 25(1), 55–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.10.005

Galan, L., Osserman, J., Parker, T., & Taylor, M. (n.d.). How Young People Consume News and The Implications For Mainstream Medi. Flamingo commissioned by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Oxford University.

Moral outrage describes the emotional response to perceived violations of shared moral standards and has traditionally served important social functions, such as enforcing norms and signaling moral commitment (Batson et al., 2007). These processes evolved in contexts characterized by direct interaction and limited audiences. In online environments, however, moral outrage unfolds under markedly different conditions. Research shows that people encounter moral outrage far more frequently online than in offline, face-to-face settings (Crockett, 2017), and that moral content is especially salient and emotionally engaging (Gantman & Van Bavel, 2014). While moral outrage can mobilize collective action and support social change (Spring et al., 2018), it is also associated with negative outcomes such as harassment, affective polarization, and intergroup hostility (Brady et al., 2023).

These developments raise the question of how individuals themselves experience and express moral outrage online compared to offline contexts, how and why their responses differ across settings, what norms they perceive, and which motives guide their actions or non-actions, as well as what costs and benefits they associate with participating in episodes of moral outrage.

These research question will be addressed with semi-structured qualitative interviews with passive observers and active expressors of moral outrage.

Bei Interesse bitte direkt wenden an: hannah.logemann@uni-due.de

Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., Nord, L.-A., Stocks, E. L., Fleming, D. A., Marzette, C. M., Lishner, D. A., Hayes, R. E., Kolchinsky, L. M., & Zerger, T. (2007). Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage? European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(6), 1272–1285. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.434

Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K. L., Torres, M. P., Luo, K. F., Gendron, M., & Crockett, M. J. (2023). Overperception of moral outrage in online social networks inflates beliefs about intergroup hostility. Nature Human Behaviour, 7(6), 917–927. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01582-0

Crockett, M. J. (2017). Moral outrage in the digital age. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(11), 769–771. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0213-3

Gantman, A. P., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2014). The moral pop-out e]ect: Enhanced perceptual awareness of morally relevant stimuli. Cognition, 132(1), 22–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.02.007

Spring, V. L., Cameron, C. D., & Cikara, M. (2018). The Upside of Outrage. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22(12), 1067–1069. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.09.006

Research on moral threat shows that public reactions to controversial issues are often driven by perceived threats to core moral values rather than by factual disagreement alone (Bender et al., 2016). Rothmund et al. (2015) demonstrate that individuals who strongly endorse nonviolence perceive both real-life violence and violent video games as morally threatening, and that this perceived moral threat increases their support for regulatory action. Within this framework, moral threat is conceptualized as a motivational force that promotes value protection and value-consistent political positions.

At the same time, the theoretical background of this work draws on models of threat and defense that emphasize affective responses to threat, suggesting that moral threat should elicit negative moral emotions (Lodewijkx et al., 2008). However, emotional responses such as moral outrage are not explicitly included as components of the tested model. As a result, it remains unclear whether moral threat translates directly into support for political action, or whether this relationship is shaped by the experience of moral outrage as an emotional response to perceived moral violations.

Building on this gap, the present project addresses the question of whether perceived moral threat predicts moral outrage feelings and whether these feelings, in turn, account for the expression of moral outrage and support for political action. An adapted model linking moral threat, moral outrage feelings, and moral outrage expression will be tested experimentally.

Bei Interesse bitte direkt wenden an: hannah.logemann@uni-due.de

Bender, J., Rothmund, T., Nauroth, P., & Gollwitzer, M. (2016). How moral threat shapes laypersons’ engagement with science. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(12), 1723-1735. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216671518

Lodewijkx, H. F., Kersten, G. L., & Van Zomeren, M. (2008). Dual pathways to engage in ‘silent marches’ against violence: Moral outrage, moral cleansing and modes of identification. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 18(3), 153-167. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.916

Rothmund, T., Bender, J., Nauroth, P., & Gollwitzer, M. (2015). Public concerns about violent video games are moral concerns—How moral threat can make pacifists susceptible to scientific and political claims against violent video games. European Journal of Social Psychology, 45(6), 769-783. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2125

Previous research has demonstrated that moral outrage is not only a response to perceived injustices but can also serve a defensive function for the self. Rothschild and Keefer (2017) show that threats to one’s moral identity elicit feelings of guilt, which in turn predict moral outrage toward third-party transgressors. Across several studies, guilt mediated the relationship between moral identity threat and moral outrage, and expressing outrage subsequently reduced guilt and restored perceived moral character.

While this work provides strong evidence for the role of guilt, it focuses on a single self-conscious moral emotion. However, theoretical and empirical accounts of moral emotions distinguish guilt from shame in important ways. Guilt is typically linked to negative evaluations of specific behaviors, whereas shame is rather self-evaluative and involves stronger concerns about social exposure (Tangney et al., 2007). Because shame is more directly tied to threats to the moral self, it may differentially shape when and how individuals respond to moral identity threats with moral outrage (Gausel et al., 2012). In particular, shame may intensify or attenuate the tendency to express outrage defensively, depending on whether outrage serves to distance the self from moral failure or risks further social condemnation.

The role of shame as a moderator of the relationship between moral identity threat, moral outrage, and moral outrage expression will be tested experimentally.

Bei Interesse bitte direkt wenden an: hannah.logemann@uni-due.de

Gausel, N., Leach, C. W., Vignoles, V. L., & Brown, R. (2012). Defend or repair? Explaining responses to in-group moral failure by disentangling feelings of shame, rejection, and inferiority. Journal of personality and social psychology, 102(5), 941. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027233

Rothschild, Z. K., & Keefer, L. A. (2017). A cleansing fire: Moral outrage alleviates guilt and buffers threats to one’s moral identity. Motivation and Emotion, 41(2), 209-229. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-017-9601-2

Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 58(1), 345-372. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145