14.02.2019 - 13:18

Guest Lecture by Lijia Tan

Evaluating the Car License Auction Formats of Shanghai, Guangzhou and Singapore: Theory and Experimental Evidence  |  Thu, Feb. 14, 2019, 14 h  |  Room SG 183, Geibelstr. 41, 47057 Duisburg

The IN-EAST School of Advanced Studies is pleased to announce that Dr. Lijia Tan, Research Fellow at the IN-EAST School, is going to give a guest lecture to which we cordially invite all interested scientists and students.

Abstract
Auctions are used to implement a quota system of car ownership in Singapore and in many fast growing cities of China. Three such cities where influential auction formats have been developed for allocating car licenses are the Asian metropolises of Singapore, Shanghai and Guangzhou, with other cities following suit. In this paper, we examine these auction formats theoretically and experimentally. We introduce reaction time as an important non-economic factor to model bidding behaviors in car license auctions. At the theoretical level, reaction time causes inefficient allocations in the Shanghai auction but not in the Singapore or Guangzhou auctions. The experimental results are consistent with our theoretical prediction that late bids prevail in all of these auction formats, but only lead to inefficient allocations in the Shanghai auction. Additionally, we scored the subjects' reaction time in the Shanghai treatment by conducting a number comparison task and we found a positive correlation between winning probability and the score for reaction time.

Bio
Lijia Tan is a postdoctoral researcher at Eindhoven University of Technology. She received a Ph.D. in Economics from Xiamen University in China, where she stayed seven years and earned M.A. degree in Finance.
Her research interests are Experimental Economics, Behavioral Operation Management, and Game Theory. Her main research focus is the relationship between buyer and seller in procurement, including prosocial behaviour and negotiation protocol which could contribute to the efficiency of a supply chain; Auctioneer’s systematic bias in optimal auction mechanism; Laboratorial investigation for the efficiency of the practical auction formats. Her works have been published in Management Science and Pacific Economic Review.