In June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors found Iran to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations for the first time in nearly two decades. This finding seemed to mark the beginning of a serious escalation in a long-simmering conflict regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and culminated in military airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities by Israel and the United States soon after.Setting aside the legal, safety, and other issues surrounding attacks on nuclear facilities, a lesser discussed question is this: What does a finding of non-compliance signify, and what actions should, and equally importantly, should not the relevant state take?

Nuclear verification is a critical component of global security, ensuring compliance with international treaties and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, verification efforts are facing growing challenges due to technological advances and geopolitical tensions. Open-source intelligence (OSINT), based on publicly available data, offers a powerful complement to traditional verification methods by increasing transparency and improving detection capabilities.

On 22 January 2026, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will mark the fifth anniversary of its entry into force. Although more than half of the world’s countries now support the treaty, with 75 ratifications and 25 signatories as of January 2026, some critics doubt that the occasion is a moment for fireworks. Despite persistent criticism, the TPNW remains a significant effort, whose impact extends far beyond its legal status. Its deeper transformative potential lies in a deliberate, systemic effort to reconfigure the global nuclear order by centering the health and humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons while addressing three intersecting axes of exclusion: gender, generation, and geography.